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1 Abstract	  The	  transition	   from	  the	  current	  air	   traffic	  system	  to	   the	  next	  generation	  air	   traffic	  system	   will	   require	   the	   introduction	   of	   new	   automated	   systems,	   including	  transferring	   some	   functions	   from	   air	   traffic	   controllers	   to	   on-­‐board	   automation.	  	  This	  report	  describes	  a	  new	  design	  verification	  and	  validation	  (V&V)	  methodology	  for	  assessing	  aviation	  safety.	  The	  approach	  involves	  a	  detailed	  computer	  simulation	  of	  work	  practices	   that	   includes	  people	   interacting	  with	   flight-­‐critical	   systems.	  The	  research	   is	   part	   of	   an	   effort	   to	   develop	   new	   modeling	   and	   verification	  methodologies	   that	   can	   assess	   the	   safety	   of	   flight-­‐critical	   systems,	   system	  configurations,	  and	  operational	  concepts.	  	  The	   2002	   Überlingen	   mid-­‐air	   collision	   was	   chosen	   for	   analysis	   and	   modeling	  because	  one	  of	  the	  main	  causes	  of	  the	  accident	  was	  one	  crew’s	  response	  to	  a	  conflict	  between	  the	  instructions	  of	  the	  air	  traffic	  controller	  and	  the	  instructions	  of	  TCAS,	  an	  automated	  Traffic	  Alert	  and	  Collision	  Avoidance	  System	  on-­‐board	  warning	  system.	  	  It	   thus	   furnishes	   an	   example	   of	   the	   problem	   of	   authority	   versus	   autonomy.	   It	  provides	   a	   starting	   point	   for	   exploring	   authority/autonomy	   conflict	   in	   the	   larger	  system	  of	  organization,	   tools,	  and	  practices	   in	  which	   the	  participants’	  moment-­‐by-­‐moment	  actions	  take	  place.	  	  	  We	  have	  developed	  a	  general	  air	   traffic	  system	  model	  (not	  a	  specific	  simulation	  of	  Überlingen	   events),	   called	   the	   Brahms	   Generalized	   Überlingen	   Model	   (Brahms-­‐GÜM).	   Brahms	   is	   a	   multi-­‐agent	   simulation	   system	   that	   models	   people,	   tools,	  facilities/vehicles,	  and	  geography	  to	  simulate	  the	  current	  air	  transportation	  system	  as	  a	  collection	  of	  distributed,	  interactive	  subsystems	  (e.g.,	  airports,	  air-­‐traffic	  control	  towers	   and	   personnel,	   aircraft,	   automated	   flight	   systems	   and	   air-­‐traffic	   tools,	  instruments,	  crew).	  	  	  	  	  Brahms-­‐GÜM	   can	   be	   configured	   in	   different	   ways,	   called	   scenarios,	   such	   that	  
anomalous	   events	   that	   contributed	   to	   the	   Überlingen	   accident	   can	   be	  modeled	   as	  functioning	   according	   to	   requirements	   or	   in	   an	   anomalous	   condition,	   as	   occurred	  during	  the	  accident.	  Brahms-­‐GÜM	  thus	  implicitly	  defines	  a	  class	  of	  scenarios,	  which	  include	   as	   an	   instance	   what	   occurred	   at	   Überlingen.	   Brahms-­‐GÜM	   is	   a	   modeling	  framework	   enabling	   “what	   if”	   analysis	   of	   alternative	   work	   system	   configurations	  and	  thus	  facilitating	  design	  of	  alternative	  operations	  concepts.	  It	  enables	  subsequent	  adaption	   (reusing	   simulation	   components)	   for	   modeling	   and	   simulating	   NextGen	  scenarios.	  	  	  This	   project	   demonstrates	   that	   BRAHMS	   provides	   the	   capacity	   to	   model	   the	  complexity	  of	  air	  transportation	  systems,	  going	  beyond	  idealized	  and	  simple	  flights	  to	   include	   for	   example	   the	   interaction	   of	   pilots	   and	   ATCOs.	   The	   research	   shows	  clearly	  that	  verification	  and	  validation	  must	  include	  the	  entire	  work	  system,	  on	  the	  one	  hand	  to	  check	  that	  mechanisms	  exist	   to	  handle	   failures	  of	  communication	  and	  alerting	   subsystems	   and/or	   failures	   of	   people	   to	   notice,	   comprehend,	   or	  communicate	   problematic	   (unsafe)	   situations;	   but	   also	   to	   understand	   how	  people	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must	  use	  their	  own	  judgment	  in	  relating	  fallible	  systems	  like	  TCAS	  to	  other	  sources	  of	   information	   and	   thus	   to	   evaluate	   how	   the	   unreliability	   of	   automation	   affects	  system	   safety.	   The	   simulation	   shows	   in	   particular	   that	   distributed	   agents	   (people	  and	   automated	   systems)	   acting	   without	   knowledge	   of	   each	   others’	   actions	   can	  create	  a	  complex,	  dynamic	  system	  whose	  interactive	  behavior	  is	  unexpected	  and	  is	  changing	  too	  quickly	  to	  comprehend	  and	  control.	  	  
2 Introduction	  and	  Project	  Summary	  This	   research	   report	   describes	   a	   new	   design	   verification	   and	   validation	   (V&V)	  methodology	   for	   assessing	   aviation	   safety.	   The	   approach	   involves	   a	   detailed	  computer	  simulation	  of	  work	  practices	  that	  includes	  people	  interacting	  with	  flight-­‐critical	   systems.	   The	   simulation	   model	   is	   general,	   enabling	   what-­‐if	   analysis	   of	  alternative	   work	   system	   configurations	   and	   thus	   facilitating	   design	   of	   alternative	  operations	  concepts.	  	  This	   research	   is	   part	   of	   the	   “Authority	   and	   Autonomy”	   task	   within	   the	   Aviation	  Safety	   Program	   (AvSP)	   of	   the	   System-­‐Wide	   Safety	   and	   Assurance	   Technologies	  (SSAT)	  Project	   	   of	  NASA’s	  Aeronautics	  Research	  Mission	  Directorate	   (ARMD).	  The	  research	   is	   intended	   to	   provide	  methods	   for	   evaluating	   early-­‐in-­‐design	  models	   of	  complex	   interactions	   in	   which	   there	   are	   	   “multiple,	   different,	   simultaneous,	  situation-­‐dependent	   assignments	   of	   authority	   and	   autonomy	   among	   both	   humans	  and	   automation.”	   	   This	   effort	   explicitly	   includes	   organizational	   aspects	   of	   a	   work	  system:	  “what	  roles,	  functions,	  tasks,	  and	  activities	  are	  assigned	  to	  what	  actor	  in	  the	  organization?”	   (SSAT	   2011).	   This	   project	   can	   be	   viewed	   as	   an	   experiment	   to	  evaluate	   the	   use	   of	   a	   particular,	   well-­‐established	   work	   practice	   modeling	   tool,	  Brahms,	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  objectives	  of	  A&A	  research.	  This	  report	  argues	  that	  the	  experiment	   has	   been	   successful,	   leading	   to	   both	   valuable	   conclusions	   and	  suggestions	  for	  further	  research	  	  (Chapter	  12.8).	  	  Brahms	  is	  a	  multi-­‐agent	  simulation	  system	  in	  which	  people,	  tools,	  facilities/vehicles,	  and	  geography	  are	  modeled	  explicitly	  (Clancey	  et	  al.	  1998).	  	  In	  the	  Brahms	  modeling	  framework,	  the	  air	  transportation	  system	  is	  modeled	  as	  a	  collection	  of	  distributed,	  interactive	   subsystems	   (e.g.,	   airports,	   air-­‐traffic	   control	   towers	   and	   personnel,	  aircraft,	   automated	   flight	   systems	   and	   air-­‐traffic	   tools,	   instruments,	   crew).	   	   Each	  subsystem,	  whether	  a	  person,	  such	  as	  an	  air	  traffic	  controller,	  or	  a	  tool,	  such	  as	  the	  ATCC1	  radar,	   is	  modeled	   independently	  with	   properties	   and	   contextual	   behaviors.	  	  The	   simulation	   then	   plays	   out	   the	   interactions	   among	   these	   separately	   existing	  models	  of	   subsystems	  (colloquially,	   the	  model	   is	   “run”	   to	  produce	  a	  chronology	  of	  behaviors	  in	  time,	  with	  the	  result	  called	  “a	  simulation	  run”).	  In	  this	  framework	  as	  in	  everyday	   work,	   authority	   is	   most	   often	   manifest	   as	   a	   combination	   of	   task	  responsibilities	   (i.e.,	   enacting	   authority)	   and	   decision-­‐making	   behavior	   in	   the	  context	  of	  guidance	  from	  multiple	  sources	  (i.e.	  following	  authority).	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  See	  Glossary	  for	  acronyms.	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The	  2002	  Überlingen	  mid-­‐air	  collision	  (BFU	  Report	  2004)	  has	  been	  chosen	  for	  this	  experiment	   using	   Brahms	   because	   systems	   like	   the	   Traffic	   Alert	   and	   Collision	  Avoidance	   System	   (TCAS	   2012)	   deliberately	   shift	   authority	   from	   the	   air-­‐traffic	  controller	  to	  an	  automated	  system.	  	  Thus,	  the	  Überlingen	  accident	  is	  often	  taken	  as	  a	  clear	  example	  of	  the	  problem	  of	  authority	  versus	  autonomy.	   	  It	  provides	  a	  starting	  point	   for	   exploring	   authority/autonomy	   conflict	   in	   the	   larger	   system	   of	  organization,	   tools,	   and	   practices	   in	   which	   the	   participants’	   moment-­‐by-­‐moment	  actions	  take	  place.	  	  	  	  Here	   is	   a	   summary	  of	   the	   accident	  based	  on	   (Maiden	  et	   al.	   2006).	  The	   accident	   is	  analyzed	  in	  Chapter	  4	  of	  this	  report	  with	  related	  information	  in	  Appendices	  16-­‐21.	  	  The	   Überlingen	   accident	   was	   a	   midair	   collision	   between	   two	   aircraft—a	  Tupolev	  Tu-­‐154M	  passenger	  jet	  	  travelling	  from	  Moscow	  to	  Barcelona	  and	  a	  Boeing	   757-­‐23APF	   cargo	   jet	   travelling	   from	   Bergamo	   to	   Brussels.	   TCAS	  onboard	   both	   planes	   issued	   first	   a	   warning	   and	   then	   instructions	   for	   a	  change	   of	   course	   for	   both	   planes:	   a	   “Resolution	   Advisory.”	   Seven	   seconds	  before	  TCAS’	   command	   to	   the	  Tupelov	   to	   climb,	   the	  air	   traffic	   controller	   in	  charge	  of	   the	  sector	   issued	  a	  command	  to	  descend,	  which	  the	  crew	  obeyed.	  	  Since	  TCAS	  had	  issued	  a	  Resolution	  Advisory	  to	  the	  Boeing	  crew	  to	  descend,	  both	  planes	  were	  descending	  when	  they	  collided.	  	  The	   immediate	   cause	   of	   the	   accident	   was	   the	   Tupelov	   crew’s	   decision	   to	  follow	  the	  ATC’s	  instructions	  rather	  than	  TCAS,	  although	  the	  regulations	  for	  the	   use	   of	   TCAS	   state	   that	   in	   the	   case	   of	   such	   a	   conflict,	   TCAS	   must	   be	  followed.	  	  	  	  This	   conflict	   of	   authority	   happened	   because	   a	   potential	   separation	  infringement	   between	   the	   two	   planes	   was	   not	   noticed	   by	   the	   air	   traffic	  controller	   early	   enough	   to	   issue	   instructions	   to	   one	   of	   the	   two	   planes	   to	  change	   course.	   Such	   potential	   separation	   infringements	   are	   frequent	  occurrences;	  it	  is	  part	  of	  the	  normal	  work	  of	  air	  traffic	  control	  to	  notice	  and	  correct	  them.	  	  	  	  A	   set	  of	   complex	   systemic	  problems	  at	   the	  Zurich	  air	   traffic	   control	   station	  contributed	  to	  the	  accident.	   	  Although	  two	  controllers	  were	  supposed	  to	  be	  on	  duty,	  one	  of	  the	  two	  was	  absent	  on	  a	  rest	  break—a	  common	  and	  accepted	  practice	  during	  the	  lower	  workload	  portion	  of	  night	  shift.	  	  On	  this	  evening,	  a	  scheduled	  maintenance	  procedure	  was	  being	  carried	  out	  on	  the	  main	  radar	  system,	   which	  meant	   that	   the	   controller	   had	   to	   use	   a	   less	   capable	   backup	  system.	   	  The	  maintenance	  work	  also	  disconnected	  the	  phone	  system,	  which	  made	  it	  impossible	  for	  other	  air	  traffic	  control	  centers	  in	  the	  area	  to	  alert	  the	  Zurich	  controller	  to	  the	  problem.	  	  Finally,	   the	  controller’s	  workload	  was	   increased	  by	  a	   late-­‐arriving	  plane,	  an	  Airbus	  320,	   landing	   in	  Friedrichshafen.	   	  This	   required	  his	  attention	  and	  his	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physical	   presence	   at	   a	   different	  work	   station.	   	   It	   also	   caused	   him	   to	   spend	  considerable	   time	   attempting	   to	   contact	   the	   Friedrichshafen	   controller	   by	  using	   the	   disabled	   phone	   system,	   thus	   distracting	   him	   from	   the	   potential	  separation	  infringement	  of	  the	  two	  planes.	  	  Brahms	   is	   suitable	   for	   modeling	   such	   a	   scenario	   because	   control	   responsibility	  among	  people	  and	  automated	  systems	  can	  be	  represented	   in	  a	   flexible	  manner.	   In	  particular,	   a	   given	   agent/system	   can	   have	  more	   than	   one	   role/responsibility	   at	   a	  given	  time,	  and	  these	  roles/responsibilities	  can	  be	  reassigned	  during	  operations	  in	  a	  situation-­‐dependent	  manner.	  For	  example,	  we	  can	  simulate	  that	  when	  an	  air	  traffic	  controller	  (ATCO)	  goes	  on	  break,	  as	  occurred	  at	  Überlingen,	  another	  ATCO	  shifts	  to	  handling	   multiple	   workstations.	   Simulated	   pilots	   and	   ATCOs	   also	   have	   context-­‐dependent	  behaviors	  for	  communicating,	  following	  directions,	  and	  interacting	  with	  automated	  systems.	  	  In	   summary,	   this	   report	   describes	   an	   air	   transportation	   system	   simulation	  model	  represented	   in	   the	   Brahms	   multi-­‐agent	   framework	   and	   designed	   to	   satisfy	   these	  requirements:	  	  	  	  
• Extend	  formal	  human-­‐system	  performance	  modeling	  from	  the	  individual	  level	   (one	  user,	  one	   task,	  one	  display)	   to	   the	   level	  of	  complex	  multi-­‐agent	  
teams	  (a	  choreography	  of	  people	  and	  automated	  systems);	  
• Incorporate	  human	  experts	  and	  software	  agents	  (e.g.,	  TCAS);	  
• Enable	   realistic	   mixed-­‐initiative	   scenarios	   that	   entail	   reconfiguration	   of	  airspace	   and	   reassignment	   of	   roles	   and	   responsibilities	   among	   human	   and	  software	  agents;	  
• Be	   consistent	   with	   providing	   Brahms	   with	   formal	   semantics	   to	   enable	  
using	   sophisticated	   software	   modeling	   tools	   (e.g.,	   Java	   Pathfinder)	   to	  provide	  useful	  analyses	  early	  in	  the	  design	  process.	  
 Together	  these	  will	  demonstrate	  that	  the	  BRAHMS	  framework	  provides	  the	  capacity	  to	  model	   the	  complexity	  of	  air	   transportation	  systems,	   going	  beyond	   idealized	  and	  simple	  flights	  to	  include	  for	  example	  the	  interaction	  of	  pilots	  and	  ATCOs.	  	  A	  work	   practice	   simulation	   represents	   chronological,	   located	   behaviors	   of	   people	  and	   automated	   systems.	   In	   contrast	   with	   functional	   models,	   which	   represent	  abstractly	  what	  behaviors	  accomplish	  (i.e.,	  functions),	  a	  behavioral	  model	  represents	  what	   people	   and	   systems	   do,	   called	   activities.	   Activities	   include	   monitoring	  (looking),	  moving,	   communicating,	   reading	   and	  writing,	   all	   of	   which	   require	   time	  and	  occur	   in	  particular	   places	  with	  particular	   people,	   tools,	  materials,	   documents,	  and	  so	  on.	  In	  terms	  of	  work,	  a	  function	  model	  characterizes	  what	  a	  person	  or	  system	  does	   (e.g.,	   “determine	   the	   altitude”),	   and	   a	   behavioral	   model	   represents	   how	   the	  work	  is	  done	  (e.g.,	  move	  to	  see	  the	  altitude	  display	  and	  perhaps	  push	  a	  button,	  then	  perceive	   the	   altitude	   number).	   	   Figure	   2-­‐1	   shows	   most	   of	   objects,	   systems,	   and	  human	   roles	   represented	   in	   the	   Brahms	   simulation	   presented	   in	   this	   report	   (not	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shown	  are	  details	  such	  as	  Flight	  Plan	  Host	  Computer	  that	  communicates	  with	  ATC	  printers	  that	  print	  out	  Flight	  Control	  Strips).	  	  The	   simulation	   is	   based	   on	   a	   fine-­‐grained	   analysis	   of	   the	   published	   events	   of	   the	  Überlingen	   collision,	   relating	   spatial	   and	   temporal	   interactions	   of:	   1)	   information	  represented	  on	  displays	  and	  documents	  at	   the	  air	   traffic	  control	  center	  and	   in	   the	  cockpit,	   2)	   what	   controller(s)	   and	   cockpit	   crew	   were	   individually	   doing	   and	  observing,	  3)	  alerts	  provided	  by	  automated	  systems,	  4)	  communications	  within	  the	  cockpit	   and	   with	   air	   traffic	   control,	   4)	   control	   actions	   to	   change	   automation	   and	  aircraft	   flight	   systems,	   5)	   human	   beliefs	   and	   reasoning	   throughout	   regarding	  responsibilities	   of	   individuals	   and	   automated	   systems,	   progress	   appraisal	   of	  assigned	  responsibilities,	  and	  resolution	  of	  conflicting	  information/directives.	  	  	  	  
	  
Figure	  2-­‐1:	  People	  and	  Systems	  Modeled	  and	  Simulated	  in	  Brahms-­‐GÜM.	  As	  mentioned	  above,	   the	  Überlingen	  case	   is	  of	   special	   interest	  because	  TCAS	  gave	  advice	   to	   one	   flight	   crew	   just	   seconds	   after	   they	   had	   already	   begun	   to	   follow	   a	  different	   directive	   from	   the	   Zurich	   air	   traffic	   controller.	   The	   “lessons	   learned”	  offered	  by	  the	  BFU	  Investigation	  Report	  stress	  the	  necessity	  of	  doing	  whatever	  TCAS	  instructs,	   but	   do	   not	   discuss	   the	   complexities	   involved	   in	   this	   advice.	   There	   are	  subtle	   psychological,	   social,	   and	   even	   physical	   coordination	   issues	   required	   by	  	  disengaging	   from	   an	   action	   in	   process	   that	  may	  make	   it	   difficult	   or	   impossible	   to	  	  follow	   this	   protocol.	   In	   particular,	   decision-­‐making	   based	   on	   trust	   (Burnett	   et	   al.	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2006)	  may	  be	  contextually	  bound	  to	  how	  people	  are	  mentally	  engaged	  in	  an	  already	  complex	  interaction	  with	  each	  other.	  	  	  The	  analysis	  and	  model	  of	  the	  Überlingen	  collision	  makes	  the	  point	  that	  the	  issue	  of	  "authority"	   is	   as	   important	   as	   “autonomy”	   in	   designing	   automation	   for	   work	  systems.	   “Authority”	   may	   be	   defined	   by	   rules	   and	   protocols	   that	   the	   people	   and	  systems	  must	  follow,	  but	  in	  practice	  authority	  is	  a	  relation	  among	  actors,	  involving	  a	  mix	   of	   psychological,	   social,	   legal,	   and	   formal	   (mathematical	   and/or	   logical)	  interactions	  in	  a	  dynamic	  physical	  and	  temporal	  context.	  When	  aspects	  of	  the	  work	  system	  are	  missing	  or	  malfunctioning,	  interactions	  may	  be	  unpredictable,	  making	  an	  everyday	   complicated	   system	   into	   a	   complex	   system	   (Perrow	   1999).	   During	   a	  complex	  human-­‐automation	  interaction,	  as	  occurred	  at	  Überlingen,	  both	  people	  and	  automated	   systems	   are	   operating	   in	   an	   unknown	   and	   often	   unanticipated	  environment	  that	  they	  are	  creating	  for	  each	  other.	  A	  key	  objective	  of	  this	  project	  is	  to	  provide	  a	  means	  of	  formalizing	  and	  studying	  scenarios	  of	  interaction	  that	  might	  otherwise	   be	   unexpected,	   involving	  different	   configurations	   of	   human	   and	   system	  behavior,	   and	   thus	   potentially	   broaden	   the	   certification	   process	   beyond	  mathematical	   and	   logical	   relations	   of	   aircraft	   and	   automated	   systems	   to	   include	  human	  actions.	  	  	  	  It	   is	   important	   to	   realize	   that	   the	   Brahms	   simulation	   model	   constructed	   in	   this	  research	   is	   not	   merely	   a	   replication	   of	   the	   Überlingen	   collision,	   that	   is,	   a	   single	  scenario	   of	   events.	   Rather	   the	   Brahms	  model	   created	   in	   this	   project	   consists	   of	   a	  generalization	   of	   all	   the	   subsystems	   (e.g.,	   phones,	   radar,	   alert	   systems,	   aircraft,	  pilots,	   air-­‐traffic	   controllers,	  ATCCs)	   that	  played	  a	   role	   in	   the	  Überlingen	  collision.	  We	   call	   it	   the	  Brahms	   “Generalized	  Überlingen	  model”	   (Brahms-­‐GÜM).	   Rather	   than	  only	   representing	   the	   states	   and	  behaviors	  of	   these	   subsystems	  at	   the	   time	  of	   the	  collision,	  Brahms-­‐GÜM	  represents	   the	  normal	   states	  and	  behaviors,	  but	  allows	   for	  them	   to	   be	   configured	   for	   each	   simulation	   “run”	   to	   characterize	   alternative	  behaviors,	   including	   absent,	   alternative,	   and	   dysfunctional	   or	   off-­‐nominal	   forms	  (e.g.,	  a	  pilot	  can	  follow	  TCAS	  or	  ignore	  it;	  the	  phones	  in	  an	  ATCC	  are	  not	  operating;	  a	  scheduled	  flight	  departs	  15	  minutes	  late).	  	  	  	  In	  general,	  a	  Brahms	  model	  is	  configured	  by	  defining	  “initial	  facts”	  about	  the	  world,	  people,	   and	   subsystems,	   and	   “initial	   beliefs”	   and	   “group	  memberships”	   of	   people	  (conventionally,	   called	   the	   “initial	   parameters”	   of	   the	   model).	   Each	   of	   the	   many	  possible	   configurations	  of	  Brahms-­‐GÜM	  parameters	  defines	   a	   scenario.	   Because	  of	  the	  variations	  in	  initial	  facts,	  beliefs,	  etc.	  and	  the	  probabilistic	  definitions	  of	  activity	  durations,	   each	   simulation	   run	   produces	   time-­‐space-­‐state	   interactions	   with	  potentially	  different	  outcomes.	  For	  example,	   in	  some	  configurations	  of	   the	  Brahms	  model,	   the	   Zurich	   ATCO	   notices	   the	   imminent	   collision	   and	   advises	   pilots	   before	  TCAS	  issues	  a	  traffic	  advisory.	  The	  combinations	  of	  all	  possible	  parameter	  settings	  define	   a	   space	   of	   scenarios	   that	   Brahms-­‐GÜM	   should	   be	   able	   to	   validly	  simulate.	  	  What	  occurred	  at	  Überlingen	  is	  one	  scenario	  in	  that	  space.	  	  	  	  
	  	  
WORK	  PRACTICE	  SIMULATION	  OF	  COMPLEX	  HUMAN-­‐AUTOMATION	  SYSTEMS	  IN	  SAFETY-­‐CRITICAL	  SITUATIONS	   1
7 	  
In	   essence,	   the	   Brahms	   “Generalized	   Überlingen	   model”	   includes	   the	   proper	  practices	  and	  system	  functions	  that	  might	  have	  been	  present,	  as	  well	  as	  variations	  on	   practice	   and	   anomalous	   events	   that	   transpired	   during	   the	   Überlingen	  accident.	   	  The	  model	  development	  approach	  involved	  creating	  a	  series	  of	  complete	  (runnable)	  models	  that	  incrementally	  added	  off-­‐nominal	  events	  and	  behaviors.	  	  This	  has	   enabled	   experimenting	   with	   arbitrary	   combinations	   of	   factors	   in	   a	   variety	   of	  scenarios	   (e.g.,	   only	   one	   air	   traffic	   controller	   on	   duty,	   phone	   system	  not	  working,	  delayed	  flight	  requiring	  attention,	  degraded	  radar	  system).	  	  	  	  As	  a	  starting	  point	  in	  creating	  the	  Brahms	  air	  transportation	  system,	  we	  adapted	  an	  existing	   functional	  model	  of	  how	  a	  pilot	   interacts	  with	  a	   flight	  automation	  system.	  We	   chose	   Pritchett’s	   functional	   simulation,	   called	   “Work	   Model	   that	   Computes”	  (WMC,	   Pritchett	   &	   Feigh	   2011)	   which	   was	   based	   on	   “cognitive	   work	   analysis,”	  because	   it	   provided	   a	   ready-­‐made	   framework	   detailing	   how	   different	   ways	   of	  configuring	   a	   flight	   management	   computer	   affected	   the	   aircraft	   and	   the	   pilot’s	  complementary	   responsibilities.	   Adapting	   this	   simulation	   also	   enabled	   a	   direct	  comparison	   of	   cognitive	   work	   analysis	   to	   work	   practice	   analysis	   that	   is	   the	  theoretical	   basis	   of	   the	   Brahms	   activity	   framework.	   Specifically,	   this	   model	  development	  approach	  enables	  explicating	  from	  experience	  how	  a	  function	  model	  is	  converted	   into	  a	  work	  practice	  model.	   In	  particular,	   the	  Brahms-­‐GÜM	  includes	  the	  perception,	   physical	  movements,	   and	   communications	   of	   the	   pilots	   as	  well	   as	   the	  ATCs,	   radar,	   telephones,	   radio,	   handoff	   protocols,	   TCAS,	   etc.	   The	   description	   of	  WMC,	  the	  Brahms-­‐WMC	  model,	  and	  comparison	  appears	  in	  Appendix	  17.	  	  In	   summary,	   Brahms	   is	   useful	   for	   simulating	   complex	   human-­‐automation	  interactions	  in	  safety-­‐critical	  situations	  in	  the	  following	  ways:	  	  
• Shows	  how	   creating	   and	   experimenting	  with	  work	  practice	  models	   reveals	  interactions	   that	   are	   omitted,	   glossed	   over,	   or	   difficult	   to	   comprehensively	  describe	  in	  accident	  reports;	  
• Provides	   a	   principled	   way	   of	   determining	   where	   analysis	   requires	  psychological	  models,	  insofar	  as	  providing	  detailed	  behavioral	  models	  for	  all	  roles	  and	  activities	  becomes	  impractical;	  
• Provides	  a	  principled	  definition	  of	  “authority”	  and	  demonstrates	  how	  this	  is	  modeled	  and	  manifest	  in	  a	  multi-­‐agent	  behavioral	  model;	  
• Reveals	   where	   formal	   methods	   are	   valuable,	   relative	   to	   systematic	  simulation	  of	   the	  parameter	  space	   (including	   the	  Monte	  Carlo	  method)	  and	  sensitivity	  analysis	  experiments.	  	  Experimentation	  with	  Brahms-­‐GÜM	  revealed	  that	  timing	  of	  events	  at	  the	   level	  of	  a	  few	  seconds	  made	  a	  substantial	  difference	  in	  the	  simulated	  outcomes.	  In	  particular,	  TCAS	   in	   2002	   was	   most	   vulnerable	   to	   an	   ATCO	   intervention	   with	   pilots	   a	   few	  seconds	   before	   it	   generates	   a	   resolution	   advisory,	   which	   is	   what	   happened	   at	  Überlingen.	   We	   had	   not	   encountered	   such	   sensitivity	   to	   timing	   and	   emergent	  interaction	  sequences	  in	  any	  of	  the	  prior	  Brahms	  models	  created	  over	  two	  decades.	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This	  result	   is	  consistent	  with	  the	  claim	  that	  the	  degraded	  Überlingen	  work	  system	  was	   complex	   (Chapter	   5)	   and	   provides	   evidence	   that	   the	   Brahms	   model	  appropriately	   represents	   and	   allows	   simulating	   a	   work	   system	   with	   complex	  human-­‐automation	   interactions.	   The	   Brahms	   framework	   enables	   modeling	   the	  variability	  and	  dynamic	  implications	  of	  a	  work	  system	  that	  combines	  simultaneous	  agent	  activities	  and	  subsystem	  processes,	  and	  allows	  this	  model	  to	  be	  simulated	  in	  different	   configurations	   (scenarios)	   having	   contextual	   behaviors	   that	   interact	   in	  otherwise	  unpredictable	  ways.	  	  	  	  We	   conclude	   that	   subtle	   issues	   of	   timing	   in	   human-­‐automation	   interactions	   may	  arise	   when	   degraded	   or	   missing	   subsystems	   result	   in	   lack	   of	   information	   and	  inability	   to	   communicate,	   transforming	   a	   given	   configuration	   of	   flights	   that	   are	  routine	  in	  a	  normal	  work	  system	  to	  a	  situation	  too	  complex	  to	  handle.	  	  In	  particular,	  the	   events	   in	   the	   air	   traffic	   control	   center	   reveal	   how	   after	   people	   develop	  work	  practices	   in	   which	   they	   rely	   on	   automation	   (e.g.,	   a	   collision	   warning	   alert),	   the	  absence	   of	   automation	   may	   cause	   the	   workload	   to	   increase	   and	   the	   evolving	  situations	   to	   become	   too	   cognitively	   complex	   to	   appropriately	   prioritize	   tasks	   or	  delegate	  responsibility.	  	  A	  complementary	  research	  project,	  which	  is	  not	  presented	  in	  this	  report,	  aims	  to	  use	  model	  checking	  as	  a	  tool	  for	  developing,	  refining,	  and	  applying	  simulation	  models,	  in	  particular	  the	  Brahms	  simulation	  model	  developed	  here.	  The	  overall	  approach	  is	  to	  first	   focus	   on	   characteristics	   of	   work	   systems	   that	   we	   wish	   to	   model	   and	  understand,	   determine	   the	   	   strengths	   and	   weaknesses	   of	   the	   Brahms	   simulation	  framework	   in	  this	  regard,	  and	  subsequently	  determine	  how	  model-­‐checking	  might	  enhance	  strengths	  and	  resolve	  some	  of	  the	  weaknesses.	  	  	  	  We	   explicate	   how	   one	   might	   cast	   a	   work	   practice	   design	   simulation	   in	   terms	   of	  software	  engineering	  verification,	  emphasizing	  the	  challenges	  inherent	  in	  verifying	  a	  process	  model	  of	  a	  work	  system	  design	  that	  incorporates	  social	  and	  psychological	  scientific	  theories	  and	  assumptions	  about	  how	  people	  behave.	  	  	  	  That	  is,	  the	  objective	  is	  not	  primarily	  a	  matter	  of	  “checking”	  the	  Brahms	  simulation,	  but	  using	  model	   checking	   to:	  1)	  develop	  better/appropriate	   simulation	  models	  by	  indicating	   gaps,	   assumptions,	   lack	   of	   generality,	   or	   lack	   of	   flexibility	   for	   exploring	  some	   subspace	   of	   scenarios,	   2)	   generate	   scenarios	   or,	   through	   formal	   analysis,	  provide	  scenario	  outcomes	  without	   running	   the	  model,	   and	  3)	  construct	  a	   tool	  kit	  for	   scientifically	   understanding	   the	   behavior	   in	   human-­‐automation	   systems	   and	  formulating	   principles	   for	   work	   system	   design.	   To	   this	   end,	   the	   objective	   of	   the	  present	   report	   is	   to	   provide	   an	   archival	   reference	   that	   documents	   the	   design	   and	  development	  of	  the	  Brahms-­‐GÜM.	  Details	  about	  the	  analytic	  framework,	  challenges,	  and	  the	  refinement	  process	  are	  provided	  that	  may	  be	  useful	   for	  developing	  model	  checking	  tools	  that	  could	  facilitate	  the	  modeling	  process	  itself,	  as	  well	  as	  to	  be	  useful	  for	  using	  the	  model	  to	  discover	  properties	  about	  the	  work	  system,	  such	  as	  potential	  failures	  involving	  human-­‐automation	  interaction.	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Subsequent	  chapters	  in	  this	  report	  describe:	  
• The	   broader	   NextGen	   research	   program	   to	   which	   this	   project	   is	   designed	   to	  contribute	  (Chapter	  3)	  
• The	  Überlingen	  collision	  facts,	  Normal	  Accident	  Theory	  analytic	  framework,	  and	  systemic	   failure	  analysis	  of	   the	  accident,	   emphasizing	   the	  nature	  of	   complexity	  (Chapters	  4,	  5,6)	  
• Further	   background	   about	   Brahms	   and	   work	   practice	   modeling	   with	  comparisons	  to	  other	  frameworks	  (Chapter	  7)	  	  
• The	   development	   and	   structure	   of	   the	   Brahms	   Generalized	   Überlingen	   Model	  (Chapter	  8),	   including	  details	  about	  modeling	  challenges	  and	  abstractions	  used	  (Chapter	   9),	   and	   the	   methodology	   and	   rationale	   for	   refining	   and	   scoping	   the	  model	  to	  produce	  quantifiable	  analyses	  (Chapter	  10).	  
• Discussion	  of	   authority	  and	  automation	  with	   respect	   to	  Brahms-­‐GÜM	  (Chapter	  11).	  
• Discussion	   of	   issues	   relevant	   to	   verification	   and	   validation	   of	   a	   work	   practice	  model	   and	   simulation—and	  why	   on	   the	   basis	   of	   the	   function	   and	   fallibility	   of	  TCAS,	   certifying	   this	   automated	   system	   requires	   a	   work	   practice	   simulation	  	  (Chapter	  12)	  
• Conclusions	   and	   recommendations	   about	   using	   Brahms-­‐GÜM	   for	   simulating	  human-­‐automation	   systems	   with	   reference	   to	   the	   objectives	   of	   the	   Aviation	  Safety	   research	   program,	   lessons	   learned	   using	   Brahms,	   and	   prior	  recommendations	  from	  the	  National	  Academy	  of	  Sciences	  (Chapter	  12.8).	  	  Appendices	  provide	  details	  about	   the	  Überlingen	  accident	  and	  unexplained	  events	  (Appendices	   16	   -­‐	   18)	   ;	   the	   TCAS	   logic	   and	   protocol	   (Appendices	   19	   and	   21);	   and	  Brahms-­‐GÜM	   components,	   scenario	   configurations,	   simulation	   graphics,	   an	  annotated	  simulation	  run,	  and	  limitations	  (Appendices	  	  22	  -­‐	  28).	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3 Background:	  NextGen	  Research	  Objectives	  &	  Requirements	  	  This	  chapter	  briefly	  presents	  the	  air	  transportation	  system	  context	  and	  the	  research	  topic	  it	  motivates,	  followed	  by	  the	  requirements	  that	  have	  guided	  the	  definition	  and	  methods	  of	  the	  Brahms	  simulation	  effort.	  
3.1 NextGen	  ATS	  Problem	  and	  Approach	  By	  2025	  US	  Air	   traffic	   is	   expected	   to	  double	  or	   triple,	   increasing	  density	  of	   flights	  with	   new	   aircraft	   classes	   and	   operational	   concepts,	   characterized	   as	   the	   Next	  Generation	  Air	  Transportation	  System	  (“NextGen	  ATS”;	  see	  FAA	  2013,	  JPDO	  2013).	  	  From	  one	  perspective,	  NextGen	  challenge	  might	  be	  described	  as	   “to	  keep	  collision	  risks	  low	  while	  increasing	  the	  occasions	  for	  collisions”	  (Perrow	  1984,	  p.	  158):	  
 [NextGen]	  proposes	  to	  transform	  America’s	  air	  traffic	  control	  system	  from	  an	  aging	  ground-­‐based	   system	   to	   a	   satellite-­‐based	   system.	   GPS	   technology	   will	   be	   used	   to	  shorten	   routes,	   save	   time	   and	   fuel,	   reduce	   traffic	   delays,	   increase	   capacity,	   and	  permit	   controllers	   to	   monitor	   and	   manage	   aircraft	   with	   greater	   safety	   margins.	  Planes	  will	  be	  able	  to	   fly	  closer	  together,	   take	  more	  direct	  routes	  and	  avoid	  delays	  caused	  by	  airport	  “stacking”	  as	  planes	  wait	  for	  an	  open	  runway….	  	  	  Once	   implemented,	   NextGen	  will	   allow	   pilots	   and	   dispatchers	   to	   select	   their	   own	  direct	  flight	  path,	  rather	  than	  using	  a	  grid-­‐like	  highway	  system.	  By	  2020,	  aircraft	  are	  expected	   to	   be	   equipped	   to	   tell	   pilots	   exactly	  what	   their	   location	   is	   in	   relation	   to	  other	   aircraft,	   enabling	   planes	   to	   fly	   closer	   together	   safely.	  By	   providing	   more	  information	   to	   ground	   control	   and	   planes,	   planes	   are	   expected	   to	   land	   faster,	  navigate	   through	   weather	   better	   and	   reduce	   taxi	   times	   so	   flights	   and	   airports	  themselves	  can	  run	  more	  efficiently.	  The	   increased	  scope,	  volume	  and	  distribution	  of	   information	   is	   intended	   to	   help	   planes	   land	   faster,	   improve	   weather	   forecasts,	  automation	  and	  information	  sharing,	  as	  well	  as	  reduce	  taxi	  times.	  (“Next	  Generation	  Air	  Transportation	  System,”	  Wikipedia,	  accessed	  19	  September	  2012)	  	  To	   manage	   risk	   within	   this	   growth	   regime,	   the	   Aviation	   Safety	   Program	   (AvSP)	  within	   NASA/ARMD	   seeks	   to	   “develop	   transformational	   methods,	   tools	   and	  techniques	  that	  advance	  safety	  assurance	  of	  complex,	  networked,	  distributed	  flight	  critical	  systems.”2	  Referring	  in	  particular	  to	  the	  Assurance	  for	  Flight	  Critical	  Systems	  technical	  theme,	  this	  research	  has	  been	  described	  as:	  	  …the	  exploration	  and	  extension	  of	  mathematical	  approaches	  to	  systems	  engineering	  and	   safety	   analysis,	   based	   on	   formal	   methods	   usually	   associated	   with	   software	  engineering.	   The	   substantive	   issues	   being	   addressed	   span	   Aviation	   Safety	   and	  Airspace	   Systems,	   aiming	   to	   provide	   sophisticated	  model-­‐based	   safety	   analyses	   of	  NextGen	  airspace	   control	   technologies	  being	   considered	  by	   the	   Joint	  Planning	  and	  Development	  Office	  (JPDO).	  3	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  Sharon	  Graves,	  LaRC	  acting	  project	  lead,	  July	  2010	  overview	  slides.	  3	  Michael	  Shafto,	  17	  Dec	  2010	  memo,	  Intelligent	  Systems	  Division,	  NASA	  Ames.	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The	   particular	   technical	   theme	   of	   the	   task,	   Authority	   and	   Autonomy,	   explores	  methods	  	  …for	   extending	   formal	   human-­‐system	   performance	   modeling	   from	   the	   individual	  level	   (one	   user,	   one	   task,	   one	   display)	   to	   the	   level	   of	   complex	   multi-­‐agent	   teams	  incorporating	   human	   experts	   and	   software	   agents	   in	   realistic	   mixed-­‐initiative	  scenarios.	  	  These	  scenarios	  may	  entail	  reconfiguration	  of	  airspace	  and	  reassignment	  of	  roles	  and	  responsibilities	  among	  human	  and	  software	  agents.	  The	  best	  examples	  of	  such	  scenarios	  in	  current-­‐generation	  airspace	  concern	  Traffic-­‐alert	  and	  Collision	  Avoidance	  System	  (TCAS)	  scenarios.	  	  	   The	   technical	   approach…is	   to	   adapt	   existing	   agent-­‐based	   modeling	   systems	   (e.g.,	  Brahms)	  and	   to	  provide	   them	  with	   formal	   semantics.	  Then	   sophisticated	   software	  modeling	   tools	   (e.g.,	   Java	  Pathfinder	   [developed	   for	   software	  verification])	  may	  be	  able	  to	  provide	  useful	  analyses	  early	  in	  the	  design	  process.	  	  	  The	  SSAT	  Project	  Plan	  explains	  how	  the	  concepts	  of	  authority	  and	  autonomy	  arise	  in	  designing	   complex	   systems	   providing	   multiple	   functions	   that	   support	   many	  operating	  models,	  environments,	  and	  technologies:	  
 The	  ATS,	  especially	  with	  future	  NextGen	  concepts	  of	  operation,	  is	  a	  complex	  system	  involving	   dynamic	   interactions	   among	   multiple	   actors	   that	   are	   largely	   governed	  through	   formal	   assignment	   of	   roles	   and	   responsibilities.	   These	   assignments	   of	  authority	   and	   autonomy	   are	   made	   at	   the	   design	   level,	   but	   are	   executed	   at	   the	  operational	   level	   according	   to	  each	  actor’s	  view	  of	   their	   roles	  and	   responsibilities.	  Operationally,	   the	  system	  continuously	  adjusts	   for	  shortcomings	   in	  the	  assignment	  of	   authority	   and	   autonomy,	   for	   shortcomings	   in	   the	   capacity	   of	   actors	   to	   perform	  their	   assigned	   roles	   and	   responsibilities,	   and	   to	   optimize	   various	   performance	  factors	   such	   as	   capacity,	   environmental	   impact,	   and	   safety.	   This	   suggests	   that	  system	  safety	  should	  be	  derived	  not	  only	   from	  a	  predictable	  execution	  of	  assigned	  roles	   and	   responsibilities	   but	   also	   from	   checks	   and	   balances	   to	   ensure	   that	   the	  system	  operates	  as	  designed	  in	  the	  face	  of	  failures,	  disturbances	  and	  degradations.	  The	   ability	   of	   the	   system	   to	   operate	   in	   off-­‐nominal	   conditions	   as	   a	   result	   of	   the	  checks	   and	   balances	   extent	   in	   it	   provides	   resilience,	   a	   critical	   characteristic	   for	  system	  safety.	  	  The	  objective	  of	  the	  A&A	  research	  area	  is	  to	  develop	  methods	  to	  ensure	  that	  flight-­‐critical	   systems	   are	   free	   from	   safety	   concerns	   in	   the	   assignment	   of	   authority	   and	  autonomy,	   in	   terms	   of	   their	   comprehensiveness	   and	   lack	   of	   conflicts	   and	  ambiguities	   and	   in	   terms	   of	   their	   correspondence	   to	   system	   safety	   objectives	  including	  resilience.	  This	  research	  must	  account	  for	  context	  where	  capabilities	  may	  be	   degraded,	   for	   temporal	   effects	   during	   transition	   of	   authority	   and	   autonomy	  (including	   both	   transient	   and	   enduring	   problems),	   and	   for	   the	   dynamics	   of	  delegation	  involving	  both	  humans	  and	  automation.4	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	  This	  paragraph	  and	  following	  text	  are	  excerpted	  and	  adapted	  from	  the	  SSAT	  (2011).	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In	  summary,	  this	  research	  focuses	  on	  developing	  new	  modeling	  and	  verification	  
methodologies	   that	   can	   assess	   the	   safety	   of	   flight-­‐critical	   systems,	   system	  
configurations	  and	  operational	  concepts.	  	  	  	  The	   research	   considers	   the	   air	   transportation	   system	   as	   a	   distributed,	   interactive	  system	   of	   systems	   with	   authority	   and	   autonomy	   assigned	   to	   both	   humans	   and	  automation	   at	   multiple	   levels.	   The	   approach	   is	   to	   develop	   modeling	   and	   V&V	  methods	   that	  can	  be	  applied	   to	  proposed	  concepts	  and	  configurations	  early	   in	   the	  development	   process	   to	   identify	   promising	   candidates	   as	   well	   as	   find	   design	  problems	  when	   they	   are	   easier	   to	   fix.	   	   This	   combination	   of	  modeling	   and	   V&V	   is	  intended	   to	   increase	   assurance	   of	   safety	   and	   motivate	   adoption	   of	   advanced	  automation	  and	  associated	  operations	  protocols.	  	  	  
3.2 Authority	  and	  Autonomy	  Research	  Theme	  In	   one	   common	   formulation,	   the	   nature	   of	   A&A	   is	   characterized	   as	   an	   “allocation	  problem”—in	   which	   a	   work	   system	   consists	   of	   well-­‐defined,	   bounded	   functional	  roles	  that	  satisfy	  the	  need	  for	  actors	  to	  have	  an	  unambiguous	  understanding	  of	  each	  other’s	   actions	   and	   their	   consequences.	   The	   assumption	   is	   that	   authority	   bounds	  (limits)	  behavior	   in	  terms	  of	  ownership—who	  has	  authority	   in	  any	  situation—and	  how	  it	  may	  affect	  safety.	  	  	  	  We	  provisionally	  adopt	  the	  definitions	  from	  an	  NASA	  Research	  Announcement:5	  	  
• Authority	  refers	  to	  having	  the	  right,	  or	  power,	  to	  exercise	  controls	  or	  issue	  air	  traffic	   commands	   that	   impact	   the	   position,	   velocity,	   and/or	   attitude	   of	  aircraft	  during	  operations.	  	  
• Autonomy	   (or	   automation)	   refers	   to	   a	   function	   or	   system	   that	   can	   operate	  independently	  of	  pilot	  or	  air	  traffic	  controller	  intervention.	  	  	  Pilots	  and	  controllers	  in	  commercial	  airline	  operations	  may	  delegate	  their	  authority	  to	  automation	  for	  selected	  activities	  or	  functions	  (e.g.	  auto-­‐land	  systems).	  The	  pilot	  remains	  responsible	  for	  monitoring	  the	  performance	  of	  the	  automation	  to	  assure	  it	  performs	  its	  intended	  function	  and	  to	  reclaim	  authority	  should	  it	  fail.	  This	  paradigm	  has	  worked	  well	   and	  has	  been	  demonstrated	   to	  be	   safe	   for	  many	   situations—due	  largely	   to	   rigorous	   V&V	   processes	   and	   well-­‐defined	   and	   trained	   procedures.	  Nevertheless,	   in	   some	   situations	   the	   V&V	   process	   and/or	   operational	   procedure	  designs	  have	  failed	  and	  accidents	  have	  resulted.	  An	  example	  is	  the	  Überlingen	  mid-­‐air	   collision	   in	   2002	   (BFU	   2004),	   which	   grounds	   and	   focuses	   the	   analysis	   and	  modeling	  of	  this	  report.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5	  In	   this	   section	   we	   adopt	   and	   largely	   paraphrase	   NASA	   NRA	   Subtopic	   AFCS-­‐1.4	   (Authority	   and	  Autonomy):	   AMENDMENT	   No.	   8	   TO	   THE	   NASA	   RESEARCH	   ANNOUNCEMENT	   (NRA)	   ENTITLED	  “RESEARCH	  OPPORTUNITIES	  IN	  AERONAUTICS	  –	  2011	  (ROA-­‐	  2011),”	  NNH11ZEA001N,	  RELEASED	  August	  26,	  2011,	  pp.	  19-­‐25.	  	  In	  general	  the	  text	  of	  this	  announcement	  is	  incorporated	  and	  adapted	  in	  this	  section	  without	  further	  citation.	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The	   future	   air	   transportation	   system,	   commonly	   referred	   to	   as	   “NextGen,”	  anticipates	   a	  more	   fluid	   sharing	   of	   responsibility	   and	   authority,	   particularly	   with	  regard	   to	   flight	   path	   management.	   Four-­‐dimensional	   trajectories	   or	   trajectory	  changes	   may	   be	   defined	   and	   executed	   by	   automated	   systems,	   ground-­‐based	  “controllers,”	   and/or	   pilots,	   collectively	   referred	   to	   as	   “agents.”	   Further,	  
collaborative	  decision-­‐making	  (CDM)	  is	  promoted	  by	  NextGen,	  by	  which	  for	  example	  agents	  may	  negotiate	  flight	  trajectories.	  Furthermore,	  a	  variety	  of	  authority	  models	  are	   being	   proposed,	   ranging	   from	   the	   current	   model:	   “the	   pilot	   always	   has	   final	  authority”	  to	  the	  proposed,	  	  more	  controversial	  “automation	  can	  take	  over”	  mode	  of	  operation.	  	  Furthermore,	   given	   the	   flexibility	   of	   allocation	   of	   authority	   and	   autonomy	   in	  NextGen,	   it	   makes	   sense	   to	   expand	   the	   concept	   of	   safety	   from	   clear-­‐cut	   safety	  
conditions	   to	   the	   notion	   of	   resilience	   of	   a	   system	   composed	   of	   communicating	  
organizations	  and	  agents.	   	   	  Safety	  resilience	   is	  defined	  as	   the	  ability	  of	   a	   system	   to	  keep	  functioning	  safely	  in	  the	  presence	  of	  (possibly	  compounding)	  disturbances	  This	  is	  especially	  of	  concern	  when	  human	  flexibility	  is	  confronted	  with	  the	  rigidity	  and	   failure	  of	   autonomous	   systems.	  Therefore,	  NextGen	   research	   focuses	  not	   only	  on	  nominal	  system	  behaviors	  but	  also	  on	  the	  structure	  and	  response	  of	  the	  ATS	  in	  off-­‐nominal	  conditions.	  
 This	  A&A	  research	  does	  not	  focus	  specifically	  on	  the	  design	  problem	  of	  determining	  the	  appropriate	  capabilities	  for	  each	  element	  of	  the	  system	  given	  its	  position	  within	  a	  broader	  distributed	  system	  context.	  Rather,	  it	  focuses	  on	  methods	  for	  creating	  and	  
evaluating	  early-­‐in-­‐design	  representations	  of	  systems	  that	  include	  multiple,	  different,	  simultaneous,	   situation-­‐dependent	  assignments	  of	  authority	  and	  autonomy	  among	  both	  humans	  and	  automation.	  This	  concept	  is	  broadly	  associated	  with	  analyzing	  the	  organizational	   aspects	   of	   a	   system:	  what	   roles,	   functions,	   tasks,	   and	   activities	   are	  assigned	   to	  what	  actor	   in	   the	  organization?	  Also,	   the	   interactional	   aspect	   requires	  systemic,	  “total	  system”	  analyses	  and	  models,	  relating	  in	  particular	  to	  the	  notion	  of	  distributed,	   simultaneous	   behaviors	   and	   events	   by	   different	   agents	   that	   may	  interact	   in	  complex,	  unanticipated	  ways	  (a	  pivotal	  characteristic	  of	   the	  Überlingen	  accident).	  	  Previous	   V&V	  methods	   addressing	   human-­‐automation	   problems	   have	   focused	   on	  scenarios	   restricted	   to	   a	   confined	   “operator-­‐interface,”	   such	   as	   a	   pilot	   and	   the	  plane’s	   cockpit	   displays	   or	   a	   controller	   and	   traffic	   advisory	   displays.	   In	   contrast,	  V&V	  techniques	  applied	  to	  new	  concept	  of	  operations	  currently	  take	  a	  broad	  view,	  but	  often	  rely	  on	  crude	  models	  of	  people	  and	  automation.	  High-­‐fidelity	  simulations	  (possibly	  with	   people	   in	   the	   loop)	   are	   expensive,	   time-­‐consuming,	   and	   cover	   only	  some,	   usually	   highly	   simplified	   scenarios.	   This	   report	   provides	   an	   approach	   for	  bridging	  this	  gap	  through	  a	  “work	  practice”	  analysis	  and	  simulation.	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3.3 Scenario	  Requirements	  The	   project	   reported	   here	   using	   the	   Brahms	   simulation	   framework	   addresses	  requirements	  recommended	  for	  NASA	  AFCS	  research	  projects6:	  	   1. Following	   the	   principle	   that	   good	   scientific	   research	   is	   grounded	   in	   real-­‐world	  phenomena,	  we	  seek	  to	  develop	  and	  evaluate	  the	  applicability	  of	  V&V	  techniques	   for	   detecting	   A&A	   problems	   in	   realistic	   scenarios.	   	   Realistic	  scenarios	  have	  the	  following	  properties:	  	  
▪ Sufficiently	  complex	  to	  model	  new	  aeronautics	  concepts	  and	  designs	  	  
▪ Defined	  to	  expose	  problems	  associated	  with	  assignments	  of	  authority	  and	   function	   across	   the	   multi-­‐agent	   (i.e.,	   human	   and	   automation)	  design	  space.	  	  
▪ Enable	  observing	  and	  measuring	  resiliency,	  the	  capability	  of	  a	  system	  to	   compensate	   for	  errors	  when	   they	  occur.	  That	   is,	   scenarios	   should	  be	   developed	   that	   enable	   the	   resiliency	   of	   a	   system	   to	   be	   observed	  and	  measured.	  	  2. The	  project	  should	  help	  NASA	  understand	  how	  previous	  research	  on	  complex	  work	   environments,	   such	   as	   the	   design	   and	   evaluation	   of	   new	  indications/displays	   and	   alerting	   strategies,	   can	   be	   leveraged	   to	   perform	  V&V	  at	  the	  level	  of	  concept	  of	  operations.	  	  3. Scenarios	   should	   have	   sufficient	   fidelity	   to	   study	   designs	   (i.e.,	   operations	  concepts)	   at	   various	   levels	   of	   detail	   and	   to	   demonstrate	   or	   evaluate	   the	  applicability	  of	  other	  V&V	  methods	  and	  tools.	  	  	  
▪ Scenarios	  should	  specify	  a	  set	  of	  bounding	  conditions,	  parameters,	  or	  assumptions	   that	  do	  not	   change	  during	   an	  operation.	  These	   include,	  for	  example:	  aircraft	  class,	  crew	  size,	  operating	  rules,	  and	  equipage.	  	  
▪ Scenarios	  need	  not	  capture	  all	  operational	  details	   (e.g.	   the	  color	  and	  position	   of	   an	   indicator	   or	   button),	   details	   can	   be	   used	   to	   provide	  useful	  abstractions	  as	  to	  possible	  interactions.	  	  These	   requirements	   are	   addressed	   by	   1)	   the	   choice	   of	   the	   Überlingen	   collision	  (detailed	  in	  the	  next	  chapter),	  2)	  the	  adaptation	  of	  an	  existing	  functional	  allocation	  simulation	   of	   human-­‐automation	   interaction	   (“Work	   Model	   that	   Computes,”	  Pritchett	  &	  Feigh	  2011;	  Pritchett	  et	  al.	  2011;	  see	  also	  Section	  8.4),	  and	  3)	  the	  use	  of	  Brahms	   to	   create	   a	   generalized	  model	   defining	   a	   well-­‐defined	   space	   of	   scenarios	  whose	  parameters	   include	   the	  off-­‐nominal	   factors	   that	  contributed	  to	   the	  collision	  (Chapter	  8).	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6	  Adapted	   from	  AMENDMENT	  No.	  8	  TO	  THE	  NASA	  RESEARCH	  ANNOUNCEMENT	  (NRA)	  ENTITLED	  “RESEARCH	  OPPORTUNITIES	  IN	  AERONAUTICS	  –	  2011	  (ROA-­‐	  2011),”	  NNH11ZEA001N,	  RELEASED	  August	  26,	  2011,	  pp.	  19-­‐25.	  
	  	  
WORK	  PRACTICE	  SIMULATION	  OF	  COMPLEX	  HUMAN-­‐AUTOMATION	  SYSTEMS	  IN	  SAFETY-­‐CRITICAL	  SITUATIONS	   2
5 	  
4 Überlingen	  Collision	  Overview	  To	  provide	  sufficient	  background	  for	  the	  subsequent	  presentation	  and	  discussion	  of	  Normal	  Accident	  Theory	  (NAT),	  this	  chapter	  describes	  the	  Überlingen	  collision	  and	  why	   it	   was	   chosen	   for	   this	   project.	   NAT	   is	   an	   analytic	   framework	   applicable	   to	  complex	  human-­‐automation	  systems;	  it	  is	  particularly	  useful	  for	  understanding	  how	  the	  local	  ATS	  became	  complex	  during	  the	  sequence	  of	  Überlingen	  events.	  
4.1 Choice	  of	  Überlingen	  Accident	  as	  Research	  Focus	  	  The	   Überlingen	   accident,	   involving	   the	   TCAS	   air	   traffic	   advisory	   system,	   is	   often	  taken	   as	   a	   clear	   example	   of	   the	   problem	   of	   authority	   versus	   autonomy	   (A&A).	   It	  combines	  several	  well-­‐known	  causes	  of	  errors:	  people	  and	  automated	  systems	  have	  different	   information	   about	   a	   situation	   and	   adopt	   different	   strategies;	   workload	  impairs	  performance	  or	  causes	  distraction,	  automation	  is	  not	  trusted,	  etc.	  (Riley	  et	  al.	  1996).	  We	  have	  therefore	  chosen	  the	  Überlingen	  accident	  as	  a	  starting	  point	  for	  exploring	  the	  larger	  space	  of	  organization,	  roles,	  tools,	  procedures,	  and	  facilities	  in	  which	  air	  transportation	  work	  takes	  place:	  	  	  
• The	   Überlingen	   collision	   is	   a	   paradigmatic	   example	   of	   A&A	   conflicts.	   In	  particular,	  TCAS	  has	  ability	  to	  reconfigure	  the	  pilot-­‐ATCO	  relationship,	  taking	  authority	  from	  the	  ATCO	  and	  telling	  the	  pilot	  what	  to	  do.	  
• The	   Überlingen	   collision	   was	   not	   an	   isolated	   event	   involving	   conflicts	  between	  TCAS	  and	  an	  ATCO:	  	  About	   a	   year	   before	   the	   Bashkirian	  Airlines-­‐DHL	   collision	   there	   had	   already	   been	  another	  incident	  involving	  confusion	  conflicting	  TCAS	  and	  ATCO	  commands.	  During	  the	  2001	  Japan	  Airlines	  mid-­‐air	  incident,	  two	  Japanese	  airliners	  nearly	  collided	  with	  each	  other	  in	  Japanese	  skies.	  Both	  aircraft	  had	  received	  conflicting	  orders	  from	  the	  TCAS	  and	  ATC;	  one	  pilot	   followed	  the	   instructions	  of	   the	  TCAS	  while	  the	  other	  did	  not.	  Disaster	  was	  only	   averted	  because	  one	  of	   the	  pilots	  made	  evasive	  maneuvers	  based	   on	   a	   visual	   judgment….	   As	   a	   consequence	   Japan	   called	   for	   measures	   to	  prevent	   similar	   incidents.	   However,	   the	   International	   Civil	   Aviation	   Organization	  (ICAO)	  did	  not	  take	  action	  until	  after	  the	  crash	  over	  Germany.	  In	  addition	  four	  near	  misses	   in	   Europe	   occurred	   before	   the	   German	   disaster,	   because	   one	   set	   of	   pilots	  obeyed	   the	   air	   traffic	   controllers	   while	   the	   other	   obeyed	   TCAS.	   (Wikipedia,	  
“Überlingen	  mid-­‐air	  collision”,	  accessed	  19	  September	  2012).	  	  
• The	  Überlingen	  collision	  was	  the	  basis	  for	  a	  significant	  revision	  to	  the	  TCAS	  algorithm	  (from	  version	  II	  7.0	  to	  II	  7.1),	  requiring	  over	  a	  decade	  to	  formalize	  and	  deploy	  (see	  Appendix	  19).	  
• The	  Überlingen	  collision	  proves	  that	  methods	  used	  for	  certifying	  TCAS	  II	  7.0	  did	  not	  properly	  consider	  human-­‐automation	  interactions.	  In	  particular,	  the	  certification	  method	  treated	  TCAS	  as	  if	  it	  were	  flight	  system	  automation,	  that	  is,	   a	   system	   that	   automatically	   controls	   the	   flight	   of	   the	   aircraft.	   	   Instead,	  TCAS	  is	  a	  system	  that	  tells	  pilot	  how	  to	  maneuver	  the	  aircraft,	  an	  instruction	  that	  implicitly	  removes	  and/or	  overrides	  the	  air	  traffic	  controller’s	  authority.	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• Furthermore,	   the	   fallibility	   of	   TCAS	   means	   that	   understanding	   how	   this	  automated	  system	  affects	  aviation	  safety	  requires	  understanding	  how	  pilots	  integrate	  its	  advice	  with	  other	  sources	  of	  information	  (Section	  12.8)	  	  TCAS	  is	  an	  onboard	  aircraft	  system	  that	  uses	  radar	  transponder	  signals	  to	  operate	  independently	   of	   ground-­‐based	   equipment	   to	   provide	   advice	   to	   the	   pilot	   about	  conflicting	  aircraft	  that	  are	  equipped	  with	  the	  same	  transponder/TCAS	  equipment.7	  	  The	  history	  of	  TCAS	  dates	  at	  least	  to	  the	  late	  1950s.	  Motivated	  by	  a	  number	  of	  mid-­‐air	  collisions	  over	  three	  decades,	  the	  FAA	  initiated	  the	  TCAS	  program	  in	  1981.8	  The	  system	  in	  use	  over	  Überlingen	  in	  2002	  was	  TCAS	  II	  7.0,	  which	  had	  been	  installed	  by	  US	  carriers	  since	  1994:	  	   TCAS	  II	  issues	  the	  following	  types	  of	  aural	  annunciations:	  	  
o Traffic	  advisory	  (TA)	  
o Resolution	  advisory	  (RA)	  
o Clear	  of	  conflict	  	  When	  a	  TA	   is	   issued,	  pilots	   are	   instructed	   to	   initiate	  a	  visual	   search	   for	   the	   traffic	  causing	   the	  TA.	   If	   the	   traffic	   is	   visually	   acquired,	   pilots	   are	   instructed	   to	  maintain	  visual	   separation	   from	   the	   traffic…	  When	   an	   RA	   is	   issued,	   pilots	   are	   expected	   to	  respond	  immediately	  to	  the	  RA	  unless	  doing	  so	  would	  jeopardize	  the	  safe	  operation	  of	  the	  flight.	  	  	  The	  separation	  timing,	  called	  TAU,	  provides	  the	  TA	  alert	  at	  about	  48s	  and	  the	  RA	  at	  35s	   prior	   to	   predicted	   collision;	   which	   corresponds	   precisely	   to	   the	   events	   over	  Überlingen.	   For	   reasons	   that	   are	   not	   documented,	   a	   secondary	   “increase	  descent/climb”	  RA	  was	  provided	  to	  both	  aircraft	  but	  at	  different	  times	  (p.	  62).	  
4.2 Überlingen	  Scenario	  Narrative	  The	   following	   is	   a	   summary	   of	   the	  Überlingen	   accident	   (Maiden	   et	   al.	   2006);	   it	   is	  discussed	   in	   detail	   in	   subsequent	   sections;	   an	   annotated	   timeline	   appears	   in	  Appendix	  17.	  	   On	   July	   1	   2002,	   a	   midair	   collision	   between	   a	   Tupolev	   Tu-­‐154M	   passenger	   jet	  	  travelling	  from	  Moscow	  to	  Barcelona,	  and	  a	  Boeing	  757-­‐23APF	  cargo	  jet	  manned	  by	  two	   pilots,	   travelling	   from	   Bergamo	   to	   Brussels,	   occurred	   at	   23:35	   UTC	   over	   the	  town	  of	  Überlingen	  in	  southern	  Germany.	  	  The	  two	  flights	  were	  on	  a	  collision	  course.	  	  TCAS	   issued	   first	   a	  Traffic	  Advisory	   (TA)	  and	   then	  a	  Resolution	  Advisory	   (RA)	   for	  both	  planes.	   	  Just	  before	  TCAS’	  RA	  to	  the	  Tupelov	  to	  climb,	  the	  air	  traffic	  controller	  in	  charge	  of	  the	  sector	  issued	  a	  command	  to	  descend,	  which	  the	  crew	  obeyed.	  	  Since	  TCAS	  had	  issued	  a	  Resolution	  Advisory	  to	  the	  Boeing	  crew	  to	  descend	  and	  that	  they	  immediately	  followed,	  both	  planes	  were	  descending	  when	  they	  collided.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  7	  For	  more	  detailed	  history	  and	  analysis	  see,	  Kuchar	  and	  Drumm	  (2007).	  8 	  “Traffic	   Alert/Collision	   Avoidance	   System,”	   Aeronautics	   Learning	   Laboratory	   for	   Science,	  Technology,	  and	  Research,	  accessed	  19	  September	  2012.	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  The	   immediate	   cause	   of	   the	   accident,	   which	   represents	   the	   conflict	   between	   the	  authority	  of	  automated	  systems	  (TCAS)	  and	  people	  (crews	  and	  ATC),	  as	  well	  as	  their	  autonomy	   (freedom	   to	   act	   independently),	   was	   the	   Tupelov	   crews’	   decision	   to	  follow	  the	  ATC’s	  instructions	  rather	  than	  TCAS,	  although	  the	  regulations	  for	  the	  use	  of	  TCAS	  state	  that	  in	  the	  case	  of	  such	  a	  conflict,	  it	  takes	  precedence.	  	  	  	  The	   potential	   for	   this	   conflict	   came	   about	   because	   a	   potential	   separation	  infringement	   between	   the	   two	   planes	   was	   not	   noticed	   by	   ATCO	   early	   enough	   to	  issue	   instructions	   to	   one	   of	   the	   two	   planes	   to	   change	   course.	   	   Such	   potential	  separation	  infringements	  are	  frequent	  occurrences;	  it	  is	  part	  of	  the	  normal	  work	  of	  air	  traffic	  control	  to	  notice	  and	  correct	  them.	  	  	  	  Leading	   to	   this	   was	   a	   set	   of	   complex	   systemic	   problems	   at	   the	   Zurich	   air	   traffic	  control	  station.	  	  Although	  two	  controls	  were	  supposed	  to	  be	  on	  duty,	  one	  of	  the	  two	  was	   resting	   in	   the	   lounge:	   a	   common	   and	   accepted	   practice	   during	   the	   lower	  workload	   portion	   of	   night	   shift.	   	   On	   this	   evening,	   a	   scheduled	   maintenance	  procedure	  was	  being	   carried	  out	  on	   the	  main	   radar	   system,	  which	  meant	   that	   the	  controller	   had	   to	   use	   a	   less	   capable	   air	   traffic	   tracking	   system.	   	   The	  maintenance	  work	   also	  disconnected	   the	  phone	   system,	  which	  made	   it	   impossible	   for	   other	   air	  traffic	  control	  centers	  in	  the	  area	  to	  alert	  the	  Zurich	  controller	  to	  the	  problem.	  	  Finally,	   the	  controller’s	  workload	  was	  increased	  by	  a	   late	  arriving	  plane,	  an	  Airbus	  320,	   landing	   in	   Friedrichshafen.	   	   This	   required	   his	   attention,	   compounded	   by	   the	  unavailability	   of	   the	   phones,	   distracting	   him	   from	   the	   potential	   separation	  infringement	  of	  the	  two	  planes.	  	  	  
4.3 Protocol	  for	  Pilot	  Interaction	  with	  TCAS	  and	  ATCO	  The	  role	  of	  the	  ATCO	  relative	  to	  TCAS’s	  advisories	  is	  at	  the	  heart	  of	  the	  work	  system	  design	  problem	  that	   this	  project	  and	  report	   investigates:	  Which	  verbal	   instruction	  should	  the	  pilot	  obey,	  the	  one	  uttered	  by	  the	  ATCO	  or	  by	  TCAS?	  	  By	  one	  account,	  the	  authority	  is	  clear,	  TCAS	  is	  always	  in	  control:	  	  This	   means	   that	   aircraft	   will	   at	   times	   have	   to	   manoeuver	   contrary	   to	   ATCO	  instructions	   or	   disregard	   ATCO	   instructions.	   In	   these	   cases,	   the	   controller	   is	   no	  longer	  responsible	  for	  separation	  of	  the	  aircraft	  involved	  in	  the	  RA	  until	  the	  conflict	  is	  terminated.	  (TCAS	  2012)	  	  However,	  the	  claim	  that	  “the	  controller	  is	  no	  longer	  responsible”	  is	  qualified:	  	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  ATCO	  can	  potentially	  interfere	  with	  the	  pilot’s	  response	  to	  RAs.	  If	  a	  conflicting	  ATCO	  instruction	  coincides	  with	  an	  RA,	  the	  pilot	  may	  assume	  that	  ATCO	  is	   fully	  aware	  of	   the	  situation	  and	   is	  providing	   the	  better	   resolution.	  But	   in	   reality	  ATCO	   is	  not	   aware	  of	   the	  RA	  until	   the	  RA	   is	   reported	  by	   the	  pilot.	  Once	   the	  RA	   is	  reported	  by	   the	  pilot,	  ATCO	   is	  required	  not	   to	  attempt	   to	  modify	   the	   flight	  path	  of	  the	  aircraft	  involved	  in	  the	  encounter.	  Hence,	  the	  pilot	  is	  expected	  to	  “follow	  the	  RA”	  but	  in	  practice	  this	  does	  not	  yet	  always	  happen.	  (TCAS	  2012)	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Pilot	  training	  emphasizes:	  	  
o Do	  not	  manoeuver	   in	  a	  direction	  opposite	   to	   that	   indicated	  by	   the	  RA	  because	  this	  may	  result	  in	  a	  collision.	  
o Inform	   the	   controller	   of	   the	  RA	   as	   soon	   as	   permitted	   by	   flight	   crew	  workload	  after	   responding	   to	   the	   RA.	   There	   is	   no	   requirement	   to	  make	   this	   notification	  prior	  to	  initiating	  the	  RA	  response.	  	  Pritchett	   (2012)	  discusses	   situations	   in	  which	   it	  may	  be	  permissible	   for	   a	  pilot	   to	  disobey	  an	  RA,	  based	  on	  other	  information	  or	  experience	  that	  pilots	  may	  have	  about	  a	  particular	   situation	   in	  which	  a	  TCAS	  alert	  may	  occur.	  Other	   information	  may	  be	  provided	   by	   party-­‐line	   communications,	   charts	   highlighting	   “normal”	   traffic	   flow,	  and	  “call	  outs”	  by	  the	  ATCO.	  Experience	  with	  the	  airspace,	  the	  aircraft,	  and	  of	  course	  TCAS	   advisories	   are	   also	   important.	   Overall,	   her	   analysis	   shows	   that	   pilot	   non-­‐compliance	  with	  TCAS	  is	  not	  always	  an	  error.9	  	  Indeed,	  casting	  the	  problem	  of	  pilot	  compliance	  as	  an	  “authority”	  issue	  comes	  from	  viewing	  non-­‐compliance	  as	  failure	  to	  obey,	  when	  in	  fact	  pilots	  know	  that	  TCAS	  is	  fallible	  (see	  also	  Section	  12.8).	  	  Commentary	   about	   the	   Überlingen	   collision	   has	   ranged	   over	   a	   variety	   of	  interpretations	   regarding	   the	   nature	   of	   a	   TCAS	   RA.	   Most	   notably,	   Frank	   Fischer,	  speaking	  for	  ANSA	  submitted	  a	  letter	  to	  Eurocontrol	  (ANSA+AirRadio,	  2004,	  p.	  67)	  prior	  to	  the	  publication	  of	  the	  BFU	  Report:	  	   As	  the	  term	  "RA	  -­‐	  Resolution	  Advisory"	  implies,	  pilots	  are	  given	  an	  advice	  on	  how	  to	  resolve	  the	  indicated	  conflict.	  They	  are	  not	  being	  instructed.	  The	  term	  RA	  had	  been	  introduced	   in	   the	   respective	  ICAO	   procedures	   to	   match	   with	   the	   internationally	  agreed	  ACAS	  procedures	  …	   leaving	   it	  up	   to	   the	  pilot	   to	   take	   the	   last	  decision,	   if	   to	  follow	  the	  RA	  or	  to	  take	  another	  deconflicting	  course	  of	  action….	  
 Furthermore,	  air	  traffic	  regulations	  in	  the	  Russian	  Federation,	  in	  force	  at	  the	  time	  of	  the	  accident,	  forced	  pilots	  to	  give	  preference	  to	  instructions	  for	  evasive	  manoeuvres	  by	  ATCO	  before	  following	  a	  TCAS	  -­‐	  RA.	  
 It	   is	   therefore	   unfortunate	   that	   the	   public	   is	   being	  mislead	   by	   such	   disseminated	  information,	   which	   often	   leads	   to	   prejudice	   and	   premature	   decision	   on	   who	   was	  guilty.	   The	   ICAO	   procedure	   explicitly	   excluded	   the	   obligation	   of	   pilots	   to	   obey	   a	  TCAS	   -­‐	   RA:	   Also	   Eurocontrol	  ́s	   ACAS	   training	   brochure	   as	   well	   as	   the	  Swiss	   and	  German	  AIPs	  only	  state	  that	  pilots	  "should"	  follow	  an	  RA,	  but	  not	  "shall",	   i.e.	  under	  all	  circumstances…. 	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  9	  In	   contrast	   with	   the	   analytic	   perspective	   presented	   in	   this	   project,	   the	   model	   of	   the	   “human	   as	  machine”	  applied	  by	  Pritchett	  follows	  the	  cognitivist	  approach	  of	  emphasizing	  the	  role	  of	  knowledge	  of	   an	   individual	   (the	   pilot),	   omitting	   the	   interactive	   aspects	   of	   perception	   and	   attention,	   including	  effects	  of	  the	  physical	  layout	  in	  getting	  information	  and	  using	  controls	  (Hutchins	  2000).	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As	  recently	  as	   late	  2011,	  an	  FAA	  safety	  alert	   indicated	  that	  “FAA	  guidance	  permits	  non-­‐compliance	  with	   an	   RA	   under	   certain	   circumstances.”10	  	   The	   “Introduction	   to	  TCAS	  II	  v.	  7.1”	  booklet	  provides	  this	  advice	  (FAA	  2011,	  p.	  39):	  	   TCAS	   does	   not	   alter	   or	   diminish	   the	   pilot's	   basic	   authority	   and	   responsibility	   to	  ensure	   safe	   flight.	   Since	   TCAS	   does	   not	   detect	   aircraft	   that	   are	   not	   transponder	  equipped	   or	   aircraft	  with	   a	   transponder	   failure,	   TCAS	   alone	   does	   not	   ensure	   safe	  separation	  in	  every	  case.	  Further,	  TCAS	  RAs	  may,	  in	  some	  cases,	  conflict	  with	  flight	  path	  requirements	  due	  to	  terrain,	  such	  as	  an	  obstacle-­‐limited	  climb	  segment	  or	  an	  approach	  towards	  rising	  terrain.	  Since	  many	  approved	   instrument	  procedures	  and	  IFR	  clearances	  are	  predicated	  on	  avoiding	  high	  terrain	  or	  obstacles,	  it	  is	  particularly	  important	   that	   pilots	   maintain	   situational	   awareness	   and	   continue	   to	   use	   good	  judgment	   in	   following	   TCAS	   RAs.	   Maintain	   frequent	   outside	   visual	   scan,	   "see	   and	  avoid"	  vigilance,	   and	  continue	   to	   communicate	  as	  needed	  and	  as	  appropriate	  with	  ATC.	  
 Therefore	  the	  distribution	  of	  potentially	  conflicting	  authority	  includes	  the	  pilot,	  not	  just	  TCAS	  versus	  ATCO.	  The	  pilot	  remains	  responsible	  for	  ensuring	  safe	  flight.	  	  	  One	  role	  of	  a	  simulation	  model	  is	  to	  enable	  formalizing	  and	  studying	  different	  kinds	  of	  interactions,	  such	  as	  those	  described	  here,	  so	  better	  procedures	  and	  training	  can	  be	  provided	  to	  both	  pilots	  and	  controllers.	  	  The	  TCAS	  introduction	  booklet	  reviews	  operational	   experience	   that	   provides	   evidence	   that	   simulation-­‐based	   training	   has	  been	  effective	  (p.	  44).	  	  Training	  to	  handle	  failures	  in	  the	  logic	  producing	  incorrect	  or	  “nuisance	  RAs”	  is	  of	  particular	  importance	  (p.	  45).	  	  The	  Überlingen	  accident	  was	  one	  of	  the	  prime	  motivations	  for	  implementing	  TCAS	  II	  7.1,	   which	   includes	   a	   “reversal”	   logic	   that	   had	   long	   been	   considered	   (from	  Wikipedia,	  “Überlingen	  mid-­‐air	  collision”,	  accessed	  19	  September	  2012):	  	  Before	  this	  accident	  [Überlingen]	  a	  change	  proposal	  (CP	  112)	  for	  the	  TCAS	  II	  system	  had	   been	   issued.	   This	   proposal	   would	   have	   created	   a	   "reversal"	   of	   the	   original	  warning	   -­‐	   asking	   the	   DHL	   plane	   to	   climb	   and	   the	   Tupolev	   crew	   to	   descend.	  According	  to	  an	  analysis	  by	  Eurocontrol	  this	  would	  have	  avoided	  the	  collision	  if	  the	  DHL	   crew	   had	   followed	   the	   new	   instructions	   and	   the	   Tupolev	   had	   continued	   to	  descend.[citing	  BFU	  Report,	  2004,	  p.	  35]	  	  	  Additionally,	   an	  automatic	  downlink	   for	   the	  TCAS	   -­‐	  which	  would	  have	  alerted	   the	  air	  traffic	  controller	  -­‐	  had	  not	  been	  deployed	  worldwide	  at	  the	  time	  of	  the	  accident.	  [citing	  BFU	  Report,	  2004,	  p.	  50]	  	  Worldwide	  deployment	  of	  TCAS	  II	  7.1	  was	  still	  in	  process	  in	  2012,	  a	  decade	  after	  the	  Überlingen	  collision.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  10	  Safety	  Alert	  for	  Operators	  11010,	  11/7/11	  http://www.faa.gov/other_visit/aviation_industry/airline_operators/airline_safety/safo/all_safos/media/2011/SAFO11010.pdf	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5 Analytic	  Framework:	  Normal	  Accident	  Theory	  Normal	   Accident	   Theory	   (NAT,	   Perrow	   1999)	   provides	   an	   especially	   appropriate	  framework	   for	   analyzing	   the	   causes	   of	   the	   Überlingen	   collision	   because	   of	   the	  systemic	   nature	   of	   the	   accident,	   including	   organizational	   factors,	   complex	  interactions	   among	   people	   with	   different	   roles	   and	   automation,	   and	   the	   tight	  coupling	   with	   short	   time	   dependencies	   within	   the	   local	   Air	   Traffic	   System	   (ATS)	  caused	  by	  non-­‐operating	  equipment.	  	  To	   begin,	   the	   collision	   is	   properly	   characterized	   as	   a	   “system	  accident.”	   In	  NAT,	   a	  system	   consists	   of	   subsystems,	   composed	   of	   parts	   that	   are	   composed	   of	   units.	  Failures	  of	  units	  are	  “incidents,”	  such	  as	  the	  loss	  of	  the	  telephone	  system	  at	  Zurich	  ATCC.	  	  A	  “component	  failure	  accident”	  is	  one	  that	  occurs	  below	  the	  system	  level,	  in	  which	   the	   sequential	   causative	   linkages	   were	   known	   and	   anticipated.	   A	   system	  accident	   such	   as	   Überlingen	   involves	   an	   “unanticipated	   interaction	   of	   multiple	  failures”	  (p.	  70).	  	  The	  interaction	  of	  events	  is	  unanticipated	  because	  the	  units	  of	  the	  system	   are	   “tightly	   coupled”	   (defined	   subsequently);	   we	   say	   that	   the	   system’s	  behavior	  (in	  a	  particular	  time	  period)	  is	  “highly	  interactive”	  (p.	  11).	  	  The	  purpose	  of	  NAT	   is	  primarily	   to	   identify	   interactive	  complexity	  in	  a	  system’s	  potential	  behavior	  and	  thus	  to	  understand	  the	  operational	  risks.	  	  These	  risks	  and	  the	  resulting	  system	  accidents	  are	  normal	  because	  it	  is	  an	  “inherent	  property	  of	  the	  system	  to	  occasionally	  experience	  this	  interaction”	  (p.	  6).	  As	  Perrow	  puts	  it	  simply,	  “nothing	  is	  perfect”	  (p.	  356):	  	   [T]wo	  or	  more	   failures,	  none	  of	   them	  devastating	   in	   themselves	   in	   isolation,	   come	  together	   in	   unexpected	   ways	   and	   defeat	   the	   safety	   devices—the	   definition	   of	   a	  ‘normal	   accident’	   or	   system	   accident.	   If	   the	   system	   is	   also	   tightly	   coupled,	   these	  failures	  can	  caused	  faster	  than	  any	  safety	  device	  or	  operator	  can	  cope	  with	  them,	  or	  they	   can	   be	   incomprehensible	   to	   those	   responsible	   for	   doing	   the	   coping.	   If	   the	  accident	   brings	   down	   a	   significant	   part	   of	   the	   system,	   and	   the	   system	   has	  catastrophic	  potential,	  we	  will	  have	  a	  catastrophe.	  That,	  in	  brief,	  is	  Normal	  Accident	  Theory.	  (p.	  356-­‐7)	  	  Perrow	   defines	   a	   “catastrophe”	   as	   a	   system	   accident	   that	   “kills	   more	   than	   100	  people	   with	   one	   blow”	   (p.	   357).	   	   Although	   the	   loss	   of	   lives	   at	   Überlingen	   fell	  somewhat	  short	  of	  this	  definition,	  the	  destruction	  of	  the	  two	  planes	  and	  subsequent	  murder	  of	  the	  Zurich	  ATCO	  would	  certainly	  count	  as	  a	  catastrophic	  accident.	  	  	  Perrow	   emphasizes	   that	   the	   danger	   of	   such	   accidents	   is	   always	   inherent	   in	   an	  interactively	   complex	   system:	   “We	   need	   to	   have	   just	   the	   right	   combination	   of	  conditions	   in	   the	   response	   system	   and	   the	   surrounding	   environment	   for	   the	  catastrophic	   potential	   to	   be	   realized”	   (p.	   357).	   	   In	   this	   respect,	   Perrow	   argues	  against	   	   “high	   reliability	   theory,”	  which	   claims	   that	   system	  designs	   can	   guarantee	  safety.	  	  In	  particular,	  human-­‐automation	  systems	  are	  intrinsically	  open	  systems—all	  possible	  states	  and	  behaviors	  cannot	  be	  known	   in	  advance—and	  thus	   interactions	  among	  Aircraft,	  environment,	  and	  human	  behavior	  cannot	  be	  completely	  predicted:	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“We	   will	   always	   have	   accidents	   because	   of	   intrinsic	   characteristics	   of	  complex/coupled	  systems”	  (p.	  369).	  	  	  	  Perrow’s	   conclusion	   that	  accidents	  are	   inevitable	   in	  a	   complex	  human-­‐automation	  work	  system	  follows	  as	  well	  from	  the	  assumption	  that	  work	  practice	  (what	  people	  actually	   do)	   is	   not	   ultimately	   controllable.	   Trends	   and	   averages	   might	   be	  predictable,	   patterns	  will	   exist,	   as	   indeed	   the	   very	   notion	   of	   a	   “practice”	   suggests	  regularities	   and	   norms	   (expected	   ways	   of	   behaving).	   	   	   However,	   what	   any	   one	  individual	   does	   in	   a	   particular	   situation—that	   is	   over-­‐constrained	   and	   time	  limited—could	   introduce	   an	   unexpected	   effect	   that	   interferes	   with	   what	   other	  people	  and/or	  an	  automated	  system	  are	  attempting	  to	  accomplish.	  	  	  Perrow’s	  conclusion	  is	  stark:	  “It	  follows	  that	  if	  systems	  have	  catastrophic	  potential,	  they	   should	   be	   abandoned,	   drastically	   scaled	   back,	   or	   drastically	   redesigned”	   (p.	  369).	  The	  present	  project	  might	  be	  viewed	  in	  part	  as	  using	  a	  computer	  simulation	  to	  evaluate	  whether	  a	  system	  has	  catastrophic	  potential.	  
5.1 Relation	  of	  “Culture”	  to	  Accidents	  Perrow	   cautions	   against	   blaming	   an	   accident	   on	   “culture”	   especially	   as	   a	   generic	  property	  of	  a	  system.	  	  He	  emphasizes	  instead	  that	  catastrophic	  potential	  arises	  more	  specifically	   from	  power	  differences	   among	  various	   actors	   in	   the	   system,	  which	  he	  exemplifies	   in	  his	  analysis	  of	  how	   the	  Union	  Carbide	  Corporation	  was	   responsible	  for	  the	  deaths	  of	  more	  than	  4000	  people	  in	  Bhopal,	  India,	  due	  to	  a	  toxic	  gas	  leak	  (p.	  356-­‐8).	  	  Perrow	   accordingly	   criticizes	   Vaughan’s	   (1996)	   analysis	   of	   Challenger	   accident	  because	  it	  minimizes	  the	  role	  of	  power	  and	  interests,	  characterizing	  NASA	  in	  1986	  as	   “a	  damaged	  organization	   that	  allowed	  unique	  production	  pressures	   to	  override	  safety	   concerns”	   (p.	   379).	   	   By	   this	   perspective,	   the	   “culture”	   of	  NASA	   actually	   has	  multiple	  components,	  a	  managerial	  culture	  and	  an	  engineering	  culture;	  operations	  decisions	   are	   made	   by	   managers	   who	   view	   the	   engineers	   as	   instrumental	   to	   a	  mission,	  not	  as	  decision-­‐making	  peers.	  	  	  	  One	   might	   say	   from	   the	   perspective	   of	   a	   failure	   analysis	   that	   when	   power	  undermines	   technical	   judgment	   it	   is	   the	   organization	   that	   is	   “damaged.”	   	   Shuttle	  operations	  during	  Challenger	  were	  already	  operating	   in	  a	   failure	  mode	   (managers	  exerting	  power	  over	  the	  engineers),	  even	  before	  the	  hardware	  component	   failures	  on	  launch	  occurred.	  	  Perrow	   further	   cautions	   against	   Vaughn’s	   “social	   construction	   of	   reality	   case”	   of	  blaming	   the	  bureaucracy	   for	  having	  created	  and	  sustained	   “a	  habit	  of	  normalizing	  deviations	  from	  safe	  procedures”	  (p.	  380)	  One	  can	  say	  that	  acceptance	  of	  deviations	  as	   being	   normal	   happened	   leading	   to	   the	   Challenger	   accident,	   but	   “that	  interpretation	  minimizes	  the	  corruption	  of	  the	  safety	  culture”	  and	  effectively	  leads	  to	  ignoring	  “the	  extraordinary	  display	  of	  power	  that	  overcame	  the	  objections	  of	  the	  engineers	  who	  opposed	  the	  launch”	  (p.	  381).	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  Crucially,	  the	  risk	  on	  launch	  day	  was	  “unprecedented”	  (as	  shown	  by	  Tufte’s	  [2006]	  chart	  of	  the	  temperature	  compared	  to	  other	  launch	  days);	  the	  engineers	  “fumbled”	  in	  making	   their	   case	   and	  were	   coerced	   to	   “put	   on	   their	  managerial	   hats.”	   	   “Upper	  management	  enforced”	  a	  particular	  “cultural	  script”	  (p.	  380).	  That	  is,	  the	  “rules	  were	  deployed	   strategically”—the	   managers	   were	   not	   unthinking	   robots	   playing	   out	  cultural	  scripts	  (p.	  380).	  What	  occurred	  was	  “the	  exercise	  of	  organizational	  power”	  (p.	  380).	   	  The	  engineers	  were	  asked	   to	  abandon	   their	   engineering	  knowledge	  and	  judgment,	  and	  view	  the	  problem	  in	  terms	  of	  schedule	  and	  political	  risk.	   	  The	  same	  power	  manipulation	  between	  managers	  and	  engineers	  played	  out	  again	  during	  the	  Columbia	  accident	  (German	  et	  al.	  2003).	  	  	  	  Perrow	  concludes,	  “We	  miss	  a	  great	  deal	  when	  we	  substitute	  culture	  for	  power”	  (p.	  380).	   For	   this	   reason,	   the	   stance	   adopted	   in	   this	   report	   is	   not	   to	   speak	   about	   a	  diffuse	  “culture”	  but	  to	  consider	  specifically	  roles,	  responsibility,	  and	  opportunity	  to	  act.	  We	  find	  that	  this	  perspective	  is	  perhaps	  applicable	  to	  understanding	  the	  Zurich	  ATCO’s	   reaction	   to	  maintenance	   disruption	   of	   his	  work	   environment	   (see	   Section	  5.3).	  	  However,	  we	  do	  find	  Vaughan’s	  concept	  of	  the	  “normalization	  of	  deviance”	  valuable	  and	   relevant	   to	   the	   overall	   analysis	   of	   the	   Überlingen	   accident.	   	   Normalization	   of	  deviance	  is	  a	  process	  by	  which	  a	  deviation	  from	  technical	  or	  procedural	  standards	  is	  seen	   in	   a	   series	   of	   cases	   not	   to	   cause	   a	   problem,	   and	   therefore	   becomes	   part	   of	  informally	   or	   even	   formally	   accepted	   action	   within	   a	   group.	   Warnings	   are	  misinterpreted	   as	   the	   historical	   context	   becomes	   a	   justification	   for	   its	   own	  continuation.	  In	  Vaughan’s	  (1996)	  description:	  	   Behavior	  the	  work	  group	  first	   identified	  as	  a	  technical	  deviation	  was	  subsequently	  reinterpreted	   as	   within	   the	   norm	   for	   acceptable	   joint	   performance,	   then	   finally	  officially	  labeled	  an	  acceptable	  risk.	  	  They	  redefined	  evidence	  that	  deviated	  from	  an	  acceptable	  standard	  so	  that	  it	  became	  the	  standard.	  	  Once	  this	  first	  challenge	  to	  field	  joint	   integrity	   was	   resolved,	   management’s	   definition	   of	   the	   seriousness	   of	   the	  problem	  and	  the	  method	  of	  responding	  to	  problems	  with	  the	  SRB	  joints	  to	  the	  next	  incident	   when	   signals	   of	   potential	   danger	   again	   challenged	   the	   prevailing	  construction	   of	   risk.	   	   Risk	   had	   to	   be	   renegotiated.	   	   The	   past	   –	   past	   problem	  definition,	   past	  method	   of	   responding	   to	   the	   problem	   –	   became	   part	   of	   the	   social	  context	  of	  decision	  making.	  	  (p	  65.)	  	  This	  process	  is	  explicitly	  described	  in	  the	  BFU	  report,	  in	  its	  discussion	  of	  “single	  man	  operations”	  in	  the	  air	  traffic	  control	  center,	  during	  periods	  of	  low	  traffic	  volume,	  and	  is	  later	  identified	  as	  one	  of	  the	  systemic	  causes	  of	  the	  accident:	  	  	   After	   the	   sectorisation	  work	  had	   started	   and	   the	   air	   traffic	   volume	  had	  decreased	  one	  of	  the	  controllers	  retired	  to	  rest	  in	  the	  lounge.	  Normally	  he	  would	  have	  returned	  to	  the	  control	  room	  early	  in	  the	  morning	  when	  air	  traffic	  increases,	  unless	  unusual	  circumstances	  would	  require	  his	  presence	  earlier.	  The	  spatial	  distance	  between	  the	  lounges	   and	   the	   control	   room	   prevents	   a	   quick	   alert	   of	   the	   second	   controller	   in	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conjunction	   with	   an	   immediate	   appearance.	   Thus	   the	   remaining	   radar	   controller	  had	   to	   assume	   the	   tasks	   of	   the	   radar	   planning	   controller	   (RP)	   and	   the	   radar	  executive	   controller	   (RE)	   and	   if	   necessary	   the	   tasks	   of	   the	   supervisor	   (DL)	   at	   the	  same	  time.	  	  Officially	   this	   procedure	   did	   not	   exist,	   but	   had	   been	   in	   practise	   at	   ACC	   Zurich	   for	  many	   years.	   This	   arrangement	   made	   the	   night	   shifts	   for	   the	   controllers	   more	  comfortable.	  This	  is	  a	  way	  of	  proceeding	  which	  does	  not	  provide	  any	  redundancy	  of	  human	  resources	  so	  that	  procedural	  errors,	  wrong	  distributions	  of	  attention	  or	  the	  omission	  of	  important	  actions	  may	  lead	  to	  hazardous	  situations	  as	  nobody	  is	  there	  to	   notice	   these	  mistakes	   and	   to	   take	   corrective	   actions.	   It	   follows	   that	   the	   breaks	  prescribed	  could	  not	  be	  taken.	  Even	  though	  it	  was	  an	  unofficial	  procedure	  it	  was	  
known	  to	  and	  tolerated	  by	  the	  management.	  	  (BFU	  Report,	  p	  75)	  	  The	  concept	  of	  the	  normalization	  of	  deviance	  furnishes	  a	  precise	  identification	  of	  the	  process	   by	   which	   a	   risky	   unofficial	   procedure	   is	   known	   and	   tolerated	   by	  management.	   Rather	   than	   saying	   individuals	   engaged	   in	   “misconduct,”	   Vaughn	  (2003)	   emphasizes	   that	   the	   accident	   was	   due	   to	   systemic,	   	   institutional,	  organizational,	   and	   political	   problems.	   Such	   problems	   are	   cultural	   because	  behaviors	   are	   reproduced	   by	   organizational	   structures	   and	   practices	   that	   are	  independent	   of	   the	   people	   involved.	   Hence,	   Vaughn	   correctly	   predicted	   in	   her	  analysis	  of	  Challenger	  that	  the	  same	  “organizational	  culture”	  would	  create	  a	  future	  accident—she	  went	  on	  to	  make	  significant	  contributions	   to	   the	  Columbia	  Accident	  Investigation	  Board.	  	  The	  normalization	  of	  deviance	  in	  Zurich	  was	  manifest	  in	  how	  single	  man	  operations	  (SMOP)	   was	   allowed	   by	   skyguide, 11 	  the	   private	   company	   that	   provides	   air	  navigation	   services	   in	   Switzerland,	   during	   day	   operations,	   despite	   disapproval	   by	  regulatory	   authorities	   (p.	   93).	   	   The	   rules	   of	   the	   procedure	   were	   incrementally	  ignored	   and	   reinterpreted	   to	   allow	   the	   practices	   in	   effect	   during	   the	   Überlingen	  accident.	  	  	  In	   particular,	   the	   night	   shift	   was	   never	   approved	   for	   SMOP,	   but	   it	   was	   followed	  informally.	   	   SMOP	  required	   the	  supervisor	   (DL)	   to	  be	  present	  with	  one	  controller.	  Effectively	   during	   the	   night	   shift,	   the	   supervisor	   was	   replaced	   by	   a	   third	   ATCO	  (allowing	   one	   to	   sleep	   and	   the	   other	   to	   serve	   as	   DL)—an	   example	   of	   “deviance”	  accepted	  in	  practice.	  The	  deviation	  from	  original	  standards	  was	  taken	  to	  an	  extreme	  when	  the	  third	  ATCO	  was	  eliminated:	  	   The	  practice	  of	  rostering	  only	   two	  ATCOs	  had	  developed	  because	  of	   the	  personnel	  situation.	  The	   former	  system	  had	  scheduled	   three	  controllers	   for	   the	  night	   shift.	   It	  ensured	  that	  two	  controllers	  were	  always	  at	  their	  workstations	  and	  the	  third	  took	  a	  break.	  That	   this	   controller	   took	  a	   longer	  break	  during	   times	  of	   low	   traffic	  became	  unofficial	  practice.	  This	  practice	  was	  maintained	  as	   the	  night	   shift	  was	   reduced	   to	  two	  controllers.	  	  (BFU	  Report,	  p.	  92)	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  11	  The	  company	  name,	  skyguide,	  is	  officially	  written	  in	  lower	  case.	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  On	  the	  night	  of	  the	  incident,	  the	  toleration	  of	  deviation	  went	  one	  step	  further:	  SMOP	  was	   only	   allowed	   if	   radar	   and	   alert	   systems	  were	   fully	   operational.	   At	   this	   point,	  practices	   had	   so	   degraded	   that	   none	   of	   the	   requirements	   for	   SMOP	  were	  met—it	  was	  not	  only	  not	  officially	  allowed,	  the	  normalization	  of	  deviance	  had	  permitted	  its	  rules	   to	  be	  entirely	  disregarded.	   In	  effect,	   the	  meaning	  of	  SMOP	  was	  now	   lost	  and	  the	  phrase	  was	  taken	  literally—only	  one	  person	  was	  monitoring	  the	  airspace.	  
5.2 Unseen	  and/or	  Unbelievable	  Interactions	  NAT	   concerns	   systems	   in	   which	   “interactions	   are	   not	   only	   unexpected,	   but	   are	  incomprehensible	   for	   some	   critical	   period	   of	   time…saying	   he	   should	   have	   zigged	  instead	   of	   zagged	   is	   possible	   only	   after	   the	   fact”	   (p.	   7).	   	   That	   is,	   an	   experienced	  person	  on	  the	   job	  is	  confronted	  with	  a	  particular	  work	  configuration	  (e.g.,	  aircraft,	  resources)	   in	   a	  dynamic,	   time-­‐sensitive	   sequence	   that	   the	  work	   system	  designers,	  trainers,	   and	  hence	  worker	   did	   not	   expect	   to	   occur,	   and	   the	   nature	   of	   the	   system	  interactions	  occur	  are	  too	  complex	  to	  comprehend	  on	  the	  spot	  in	  time	  to	  prevent	  an	  accident.	  	  	  	  The	   Überlingen	   accident	   proved	   that	   the	   design	   of	   TCAS,	   introduced	   as	   a	   major	  safety	  device,	  makes	  possible	  unexpected	  and	   incomprehensible	   interactions.	   	  The	  accident	  illustrates	  that	  automation	  that	  was	  intended	  to	  increase	  redundancy	  does	  not	  necessarily	  or	  as	  a	  matter	  of	  course	  make	  a	  situation	  safer.	  According	  to	  Perrow,	  a	  safety	  device,	  “since	  it	  is	  often	  added	  after	  problems	  are	  recognized,	  too	  frequently	  creates	   unanticipated	   interactions	  with	   distant	   parts	   of	   the	   system	   that	   designers	  find	  it	  hard	  to	  anticipate”	  (p.	  368).	  	  	  In	   particular,	   it	   was	   not	   anticipated	   (or	   was	   ignored	   by	   designers,	   certifiers,	  managers,	   and	   trainers)	   that	   interventions	   of	   TCAS	   and	   the	   ATCO	   might	   overlap	  such	  that	  the	  ATCO	  would	  speak	  between	  the	  TCAS	  TA	  and	  RA,	  and	  his	  instruction	  to	   climb	  or	  descend	  would	  be	   followed;	   in	  which	   case	   following	  TCAS	  would	   then	  require	  reversing	  the	  aircraft’s	  direction	  within	  seconds.	  In	  this	  respect,	  pilots	  might	  be	  confronted	  not	  only	  with	  an	  authority	  issue	  (“who	  is	  in	  charge?”)	  but	  a	  physical	  (and	  perhaps	  psychophysiological)	  control	  issue—an	  alternative	  action	  has	  already	  begun,	   the	   timing	   might	   be	   too	   tight	   to	   reverse	   mentally	   and	   physically	   	   in	  maneuvering	  the	  aircraft.	  	  This	  report	  analyzes	  such	  timing	  and	  interaction	  issues	  in	  detail.	  
5.3 How	  Situations	  are	  Allowed	  to	  Become	  Complex	  Situations	  can	  become	  more	  complex	  if	  people	  make	  decisions	  without	  appreciating	  interactions	   or	   constraints	   already	   in	   play	   (e.g.,	   focusing	   on	   the	   late-­‐arriving	   AEF	  flight	   without	   realizing	   the	   loss	   of	   STCA	   optical	   would	   require	   more	   careful	  monitoring	   of	   the	   wider	   sector)	   or	   existing	   processes	   that	   will	   be	   affected	   by	   an	  action	  (e.g.,	   	  clearing	  DHL	  to	  fly	  at	  the	  same	  altitude	  as	  the	  BTC).	  People	  may	  make	  comfortable,	  familiar	  choices	  that	  reduce	  their	  range	  for	  future	  action	  and	  therefore	  increase	  the	  probability	  of	  an	  accident.	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In	   general	   terms,	   Perrow	   gives	   an	   example	   of	   receiving	   an	   order	   from	   your	  supervisor	  (it	  could	  be	  a	  written	  directive	  or	  standing	  protocol),	  which	   later	   turns	  out	   to	   be	   ambiguous—should	   you	   do	  A	   or	   B?	   (p.	   27)	   	   	   In	   particular,	   consider	   the	  supervisor	  in	  the	  Zurich	  ATCC	  who	  left	  early	  for	  the	  night	  and	  thus	  implicitly	  made	  the	  ATCOs	  responsible	  for	  supervisory	  overview	  of	  the	  center.	  Later,	  with	  one	  ATCO	  on	   break,	   the	   lone	   Zurich	   ATCO	   has	   to	   carry	   out	   multiple	   roles.	   He	   is	   soon	  confronted	  with	  unexpected	  maintenance	  work	  (he	  had	  not	   read	   the	  memo	   in	   the	  break	  room	  and	  it	  did	  not	  mention	  the	  loss	  of	  the	  STCA	  optical	  alert;	  BFU	  Report,	  p.	  74,	  89).	  What	  should	  he	  do?	  Suppose	  that	  action	  “A”	  would	  be	  to	  refuse	  permission	  for	  the	  maintenance	  work	  (as	  a	  supervisor	  might	  do)	  or	  call	  back	  the	  other	  ATCO	  to	  assist.	  	  Action	  “B”	  would	  be	  to	  carry	  on,	  to	  simply	  accept	  what	  the	  maintenance	  work	  entailed—after	  all,	  the	  work	  will	  be	  complete	  in	  a	  half	  hour	  or	  less.	  	  Perrow	  suggests	  that	  these	  two	  choices	  are	  general	  ways	  of	  handling	  an	  unexpected	  situation:	  
• 	  “A	  would	  be	  correct	  if	  something	  were	  terribly	  wrong	  or	  if	  the	  situation	  were	  quite	  unusual”	  (e.g.,	  the	  ATCO	  might	  have	  concluded	  this	  if	  the	  maintenance	  team	  had	  told	  him	  what	  systems	  would	  be	  affected)	  
• “B	   would	   be	   correct	   if	   it	   were	   a	   situation	   that	   had	   occurred	   a	   few	   times	  before	   and	   was	   not	   all	   that	   serious”	   (e.g.,	   perhaps	   the	   Zurich	   ATCO	   was	  familiar	  with	  maintenance	  work	  on	  Sunday	  evenings).	  	  If	  B	  “has	  been	  used	  before,	  and	  it	  is	  easy	  to	  carry	  out…”	  (p.	  27),	  ATCO	  proceeds	  and	  things	  happen	  as	   they	  should.	  This	  does	  not	  prove	   that	  B	   is	  a	  more	  correct	  action	  than	   A,	   yet	   it	   reinforces	   his	   decision	   and	   how	   he	   has	   conceptually	   framed	   the	  situation:	  “you	  are	  creating	  a	  world	  that	  is	  congruent	  with	  your	  interpretation,	  even	  though	   it	   is	   the	  wrong	  world.	   It	  may	  be	   too	   late	  before	  you	   find	   that	  out”	   (p.	   28).	  	  That	  is,	  ATCO’s	  interpretation	  now	  becomes	  part	  of	  his	  understanding	  of	  the	  current	  work	  context.	  	  In	   this	   case,	   the	  Zurich	  ATCO	  has	   convinced	  himself	   that	  he	   can	  handle	   the	   traffic	  with	   the	  existing	  resources.	   	  He	  didn’t	   realize	   that	  he	  had	  allowed	  the	  phones	  and	  optical	   STCA	   to	   be	   disabled,	   both	   of	  which	  would	   be	   essential	   for	   handling	   a	   late	  arriving	  flight	  when	  two	  other	  planes	  were	  on	  collision	  course.	  He	  did	  not	  reflect	  as	  a	  supervisor	  might;	  he	  did	  not	  ask	  questions	  to	  be	  sure	  he	  understood	  the	  potential	  effects	  on	  his	  equipment.	  	  He	  accepted	  that	  it	  was	  normal	  to	  have	  the	  supervisor	  and	  second	  ATCO	  absent	  and	  for	  maintenance	  to	  be	  done	  on	  a	  Sunday	  evening.	  Yet	  each	  change	   to	   the	   system	   he	   allowed	   was	   transforming	   the	   air	   traffic	   system	   that	  evening	   into	  a	   complex	   system,	  a	   configuration	  of	   controllers,	   flights,	   radar,	  TCAS,	  pilots,	   etc.	   that	   would	   have	   complex	   interactions	   as	   events	   unfolded	   just	   a	   few	  minutes	  later.	  	  	  	  	  Woods	  (2005,	  p.	  297)	  suggests	  that	  accidents	  exhibit	  a	  “classic	  drift	  toward	  failure…	  as	  production	  pressures	  and	  change	  erode	  the	  defenses	  that	  normally	  keep	  failure	  at	  a	  distance.”	  At	  Überlingen,	  the	  gradual	  unknown	  loss	  of	  tools	  and	  disabling	  of	  taken-­‐
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for-­‐granted	  methods	  and	  alerts,	  unexpectedly	  and	  apparently	  abruptly	  brought	  the	  ATCO	   to	   a	   complex	   situation:	   maintenance	   was	   viewed	   as	   normal	   rather	   than	   a	  process	  of	   introducing	  anomalies	   in	   the	  operational	   system;	   there	  was	  apparently	  no	  cross-­‐check	  of	  the	  effects	  of	  maintenance	  (who	  was	  responsible	  for	  verifying	  that	  the	   “accepted”	   risks	   of	   the	   backup	   systems	   were	   in	   fact	   acceptable?);	   the	  background	   of	   prior	   success	   with	   SMOP	   led	   to	   organizational	   complacency	   that	  “hazards	  were	  not	  present”	  (cf.	  Woods	  on	  Columbia,	  p.	  293);	  this	  ATCO’s	  close-­‐call	  the	  prior	  year	  was	  a	  clear	  warning	  of	   the	  accident	  yet	  to	  come,	  but	  the	  changes	  to	  the	  radar	  display	  led	  to	  the	  false	  belief	  that	  vulnerabilities	  of	  his	  operating	  alone	  had	  been	  resolved,	  with	  the	  systemic	  issues	  obviously	  poorly	  modeled	  in	  management’s	  understanding	  of	  the	  risks.	  	  The	   Zurich	  ATCO	  might	   have	   categorized	   the	   system	  and	   operations	   that	   night	   in	  July	  2002	  as	  normal,	  but	  the	  constraints	  that	  would	  eventually	  make	  human	  actions	  ineffective	  and	  force	  an	  accident	  were	  accumulating.	  Step	  by	  step,	  the	  ATCC	  allowed	  resilience	  to	  be	  removed	  from	  the	  system—the	  manager	  departs,	  the	  second	  ATCO	  goes	  on	  break,	  the	  maintenance	  begins.	  And	  the	  consequences	  of	  these	  events	  reveal	  more	  broadly	   the	  systemic	   failure	  of	   the	  organization—failures	   to	   learn	   from	  past	  mistakes,	   to	   follow	   staffing	   standards,	   to	   assign	   cross-­‐checking	   roles,	   to	   manage	  safety	  critical	  situations.	  
5.4 Definition	  of	  “Complex	  Interaction”	  Perrow’s	  NAT	  is	  particularly	  valuable	  for	  defining	  the	  kinds	  of	  system	  interactions	  that	  will	  inevitably	  lead	  to	  accidents.	  	  As	  indicated	  above,	  a	  complex	  interaction	   is	  one	  that	  is	  unintended	  or	  intended	  but	  unfamiliar	   (p.	   77).	   For	   example,	   a	   TCAS	   RA	   reversing	   an	   ATCO	   instruction	   was	  perhaps	   unintended	   by	   the	   certifiers	   of	   the	   system’s	   safety;	   this	   sequence	   was	  definitely	  unfamiliar	  to	  the	  Zurich	  ATCO.	  	  More	  generally,	  a	  “component	  can	  interact	  with	   one	   or	  more	   other	   components	   outside	   of	   the	   normal	   production	   sequence,	  either	  by	  design	  or	  not”	  (p.	  78).	  	  More	   simply,	   the	   interactions	   are	   said	   to	   be	   complex	   because	   they	   occur	   in	   an	  unexpected	  sequence	  (p.	  78).	   	  That	   is,	   the	  unfolding	  sequence	  of	  events	   is	   complex;	  complexity	  is	  not	  a	  property	  per	  se	  of	  a	  system	  (p.	  8),	  but	  of	  the	  relations	  among	  the	  events	  over	  time.	   If	   the	   interactions	  are	   linear,	  such	  that	  all	  causal	  relations	   in	  the	  system’s	   behavior	   can	   be	   anticipated	   (pre-­‐enumerated),	   by	   definition	   unexpected	  sequences	  of	  behavior	  will	  not	  occur.	  	  This	  means	  that	  complexity	  is	  not	  an	  abstract	  property	  of	  components,	  procedures,	  etc.	  in	  isolation,	  but	  rather	  characterizes	  how	  roles,	  tools,	  practices,	  environment,	  etc.	  interact	  to	  create	  unanticipated	  sequences	  of	  events—it	   is	   a	   property	   of	   the	   system’s	   behavior,	   of	   what	   we	   often	   call	  “situations”—a	  dynamic	  configuration	  of	  objects,	  people,	  processes	  in	  action.	  	  	  A	   situation	   is	   not	   a	   state,	   but	   a	   flow	   of	   events—“situation	   awareness”	   refers	   to	   a	  person’s	   perceptions	   and	   conceptions	   in	   time	   (Clancey,	   1999).	   Accordingly,	   a	  person’s	   interpretation	   is	   temporal.	  The	  ATCO’s	   conception	  of	   “what	   is	  happening	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now”	   includes	   his	   experienced	   past,	   reinterpretations	   of	   the	   present,	   and	  anticipations	  of	  the	  future.	  	  This	  is	  what	  Perrow	  means	  by	  “creating	  a	  world	  that	  is	  congruent	  with	  your	  interpretation.”	  	  	  In	   particular,	   the	   Überlingen	   TCAS–Pilot–ATCO	   interactions	   became	   complex	  because	  of	   the	   timing	  of	  events—the	   flight	  paths	  of	   the	  planes	  on	  collision	  course,	  the	   delayed	   flight	   coming	   into	   Friedrichshafen,	   the	   irregular	   monitoring	   of	   the	  sector	  by	  the	  Zurich	  ATCO,	  the	  dysfunctional	  phones,	  the	  missing	  STCA	  Optical	  alert,	  the	  instruction	  to	  the	  BTC	  by	  TCAS,	  the	  instruction	  by	  TCAS	  to	  the	  DHL,	  and	  so	  on.	  	  	  	  With	   one	  ATCO	  on	  break	  during	   the	  maintenance	  work,	   the	   system	  of	   controllers	  and	   their	   tools	  had	   lost	   redundancy—there	  were	   fewer	  eyes	  on	   the	   radar	   screens	  and	   less	   data	   and	   alerts	   displayed.	   	   The	   lone	   ATCO	   had	   to	   do	   more	   tasks	   and	  therefore	  work	  more	  quickly,	  with	   less	  support.	   	  The	   interactions	  among	  this	   lone	  ATC,	  the	  pilots	  onboard	  three	  aircraft,	  and	  TCAS—how	  their	  behaviors	  became	  part	  of	  the	  operating	  environment	  for	  each	  other—were	  now	  complex.	  	  More	  specifically,	  the	   system’s	   interacting	   processes	   (people,	   aircraft,	   automated	   systems)	   were	  complex	  because	  they	  had	  become	  tightly	  coupled.	   	  As	  detailed	  subsequently,	  even	  the	  12	  second	  sweep	  delay	  of	  the	  radar	  was	  affecting	  what	  the	  sequence	  of	  events.	  
5.5 	  Tight	  Coupling	  Perrow	   defines	   a	   tightly	   coupled	   system	   as	   having	   time-­‐dependent	   processes	   that	  “cannot	  wait	  or	  stand	  by	  until	  attended	  to”	  (p.	  92).	   	  There	  is	  “no	  slack	  or	  buffer	  or	  give”	  between	  processes,	  “what	  happens	  in	  one	  directly	  affects	  what	  happens	  in	  the	  other”	   (p.	   90).	   	   In	   a	   tightly	   coupled	   system,	   parts	   of	   the	   system	   (people	   and	  automated	  subsystems)	  must	  behave	   in	   response	   to	  what	  other	  parts	  are	  doing—there	   is	   little	  or	  no	   flexibility.	   If	  A	  occurs	   then	  B	  must	  occur	   (and	  usually	  soon)	   to	  satisfy	   the	   operating	   requirements.	   	   For	   example,	   once	   the	  DHL	   aircraft	  was	   on	   a	  TCAS	   RA	   descent,	   it	   was	   necessary	   for	   the	   BTC	   pilots	   to	   immediately	   reverse	   the	  Zurich	  ATC’s	  instruction	  and	  follow	  the	  command	  of	  the	  TCAS	  RA	  to	  climb.	  	  	  	  A	   dynamic	   system	   (such	   as	   a	   configuration	   of	   flights,	   controllers,	   and	   automated	  subsystems)	  becomes	  tightly	  coupled	  when	  the	  course	  of	  acceptable	  actions	  and	  the	  time	  to	  act	  become	  more	  limited.	  	  As	  a	  system	  becomes	  tightly	  coupled,	  dependent	  interactions	   increase	   and	   time	   to	   respond	   appropriately	   (e.g.,	   to	   avoid	   a	   safety	  violation)	   decreases.	   In	   air	   traffic	   control	   systems,	   tight	   coupling	   develops	   when	  redundancy	   is	   lost—in	   particular	   removing	   actors	   (people	   and/or	   subsystems)	  decreases	   flexibility	   as	   fewer	   actions	   become	   possible	   in	   a	   given	   time	   (e.g.,	   less	  frequent	  monitoring	  and	  redirection	  of	  aircraft),	  thus	  increasing	  time-­‐dependencies.	  The	  	  interactions	  in	  the	  system	  are	  then	  complex.	  	  By	   contrast,	   loose	   coupling	   “allows	   certain	   parts	   of	   the	   system	   to	   express	  themselves	  according	  to	  their	  own	  logic	  or	  interests”	  (p.	  92);	  loose	  coupling	  	  “allows	  recovery”	  (p.	  160).	  	  	  “The	  sequences	  in	  tightly	  coupled	  systems	  are	  more	  invariant”	  (p.	  93);	  if	  A	  occurs	  then	  B	  must	  follow.	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It	   is	   important	   to	   understand	   that	   “tight	   coupling”	   in	   the	   context	   of	   the	   air	  transportation	   system	   pertains	   to	   a	   system	   comprised	   of	   controllers,	   flights,	   and	  automated	   subsystems	   during	   operations:	   it	   characterizes	   a	   developing	   situation,	  the	  actual	  or	  potential	  effects	  a	  configuration	  of	  subsystems	  and	  processes	  have	  on	  each	  other	  as	  events	  unfold.	  	  	  	  If	  certain	  behaviors	  do	  not	  occur	  or	  occur	  at	  a	  different	  time,	  a	  system	  might	  remain	  loosely	  coupled.	  	  For	  example,	  if	  the	  Zurich	  ATCO	  had	  received	  an	  optical	  STCA	  alert,	  he	  might	  have	  intervened	  before	  the	  time	  of	  the	  TCAS	  TA,	  and	  the	  sequence	  of	  his	  speaking	   between	   a	   TCAS	   TA	   and	   RA	   would	   not	   have	   occurred.	   Instead,	   his	  intervention	   and	   the	   TCAS	   RA	   both	   occurred,	   and	   both	   instructions	   had	   to	   be	  processed	  by	  the	  BTC	  pilots.	  	  Or	  with	  another	  Zurich	  ATCO	  on	  duty,	  the	  paths	  of	  the	  DHL	   and	   BTC	   would	   very	   likely	   have	   been	   noticed	   and	   modified	   much	   earlier,	  eliminating	   interactions	  among	  ATC,	  TCAS,	  and	  pilots	   from	  the	  sequence	  of	  events	  that	  night.	  	  	  The	   Überlingen	   accident	   involved	   at	   least	   three	   interacting	   processes	   that	   were	  impinging	   or	   encroaching	   on	   each	   other,	   such	   that	   what	   was	   happening	   in	   one	  process	  was	  now	  affecting	  another	  (a	  tight	  coupling):	  	  	   1. Handoff	   of	   AEF	   delayed	   flight	   by	   Zurich	   ATCO	   (involving	   attempted	  communication	  with	  Friedrichshafen	  tower	  via	  the	  disabled	  phone	  system)	  2. Zurich	  ATCO	  observing	  flight	  paths	  on	  radar	  and	  instructing	  BTC	  to	  descend	  3. DHL	  pilots	  interacting	  with	  TCAS.	  	  The	  analysis	  of	  a	  complex	  situation	  in	  terms	  of	  tight	  coupling	  reveals	  that	  temporal	  relations	   will	   be	   pivotal	   in	   modeling	   and	   simulating	   the	   Überlingen	   events	   and	  verifying	   system	   models.	   The	   analysis	   also	   suggests	   that	   the	   collision	   would	   not	  have	  occurred	   if	  TCAS	  didn’t	  exist,	  which	   is	  one	  of	  several	   “what	   if”	  scenarios	   that	  Brahms-­‐GÜM	  simulation	  experiments	  examine.	  	  
5.6 	  Cognitive	  Complexity	  To	   summarize,	   what	   appear	   to	   be	   ordinary	   circumstances	   can	   change	   the	  configuration	  of	  the	  work	  system	  and	  environment	  causing	  a	  loss	  of	  redundancy	  in	  operation	  processes	  (how	  the	  work	  is	  done	  becomes	  less	  flexible).	  	  Interactions	  that	  emerge	   among	   people	   and	   systems	   become	   tightly	   coupled	   as	   choices	   and	   timing	  are	   constrained.	   	   The	   workload	   increases	   as	   additional	   tasks	   become	   necessary	  and/or	  are	  performed	  more	  frequently	  and	  quickly.	  	  Effort	  might	  need	  to	  be	  devoted	  to	   finding	   workarounds	   (e.g.,	   alternative	   ways	   of	   communicating	   or	   getting	  information).	   	   More	   work	   might	   need	   to	   be	   done	   manually,	   which	   is	   slower	   and	  reduces	  attention	  to	  simultaneous	  responsibilities;	  situation	  awareness	  diminishes,	  critical	  tasks	  are	  not	  undertaken	  and	  events	  are	  not	  noticed	  (Dismukes	  et	  al.	  2001).	  The	   work	   has	   become	   cognitively	   complex,	   such	   that	   the	   people	   are	   no	   longer	  managing	   events	   and	   become	   enmeshed	   in	   how	   the	   systems	   themselves	   are	  interacting.	  The	  probability	  increases	  of	  taking	  hasty	  actions	  infused	  with	  fear	  that	  make	  situations	  worse,	  causing	  or	  contributing	  to	  accidents.	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  Cognitive	  complexity	  is	  a	  relation	  between	  knowledge/skills	  (familiarity)	  and	  a	  situation	  comprised	  of	  time-­‐dependent	  tasks	  and	  resources.	  In	  general,	  more	  work	  must	   be	   done	  more	   quickly	  with	   less	   information	   and	   assistance	   and	   fewer	  tools.	   As	   the	   system	   becomes	   tightly	   coupled,	   tasks	   shift	   from	   being	   a	   loosely	  unordered	  sequence	  of	  routine	  actions	  (redirecting	  aircraft)	  to	  a	  rapid	  sequence	  of	  finely	   reasoned	   actions	   that	   are	   necessary	   to	   avoid	   a	   catastrophe.	  When	   only	   one	  solution	  is	  possible	  (e.g.,	  ATCO	  must	  advise	  BTC	  to	  climb	  rather	  than	  descend	  or	  not	  intervene	   at	   all),	   the	   lack	   of	   information	   and	   time	   will	   greatly	   increase	   the	  probability	  of	  doing	  the	  wrong	  thing.	  	  	  During	   the	  Überlingen	   sequence	   of	   events	   the	  workload	   became	  more	   cognitively	  complex	   at	   each	   step:	   the	   second	   Zurich	   ATCO	   left	   requiring	   the	   lone	   ATCO	   to	  manage	  two	  workstations;	  the	  radar	  data	  was	  reduced,	  the	  phones	  disabled,	  and	  the	  optical	  STCA	  disabled—each	  reducing	  or	  preventing	  the	  flow	  of	   information	  in	  the	  work	   system;	   	   then	   the	   AEF	   arrived	   on	   scene,	   imposing	   a	   task	   that	   required	   full	  attention.	  	  The	  presence	  of	  automation	  such	  as	  the	  optical	  STCA	  or	  another	  person’s	  assistance	  would	  have	  reduced	  the	  cognitive	  complexity	  experienced	  by	  the	  Zurich	  ATCO.	  The	  workload	  was	   excessive	   because	   of	   lost	   resources;	   during	   a	   period	   of	   diminished	  situation	   awareness,	   there	   was	   too	   much	   to	   do	   simultaneously.	   Even	   the	   highest	  priority	  task,	  avoiding	  a	  collision,	  was	  not	  perceived	  until	  TCAS	  was	  engaged	  and—also	   unknown	   the	   Zurich	   ATC—was	   redirecting	   the	   aircraft	   for	   which	   ATCO	  was	  responsible.	  	  Interactions	   are	   most	   commonly	   understood	   as	   physically	   causal,	   as	   for	   example	  two	   aircraft	   in	   a	   certain	   proximity	   will	   trigger	   a	   TCAS	   TA.	   	   Events	   may	   also	   be	  conceived	  by	  a	  person	  as	  requiring	  certain	  actions	  in	  a	  certain	  time	  frame,	  such	  that	  the	   relation	   of	   the	   events	   and	   attempted	   actions	   is	   conceptual,	   that	   is,	   a	   person’s	  understanding.	   Thus	   as	   the	   AEF	   arrived	   late	   for	   landing	   at	   Friedrichshafen,	   the	  Zurich	  ATCO	  understood	  that	  he	  needed	  to	  carry	  out	  the	  normal	  handoff	  procedure	  by	  calling	  the	  Friedrichshafen	  airport	  control	  tower.	  The	  phones	  were	  down	  and	  he	  became	   fixated	   on	   calling,	   seeking	   an	   alternative	   number	   and	   spending	   too	  much	  time	  dealing	  with	  this	  situation.	  In	  fact,	  calling	  Friedrichshafen	  immediately	  was	  not	  his	   only	   option;	   in	   actuality,	   there	   was	   not	   a	   tight	   coupling	   between	   the	   plane’s	  arrival	  at	  a	  certain	  time	  and	  ATCO’s	  executing	  the	  handoff.	  	  The	  urgency	  and	  priority	  of	  the	  handoff,	  and	  even	  handling	  the	  landing	  by	  serving	  as	  handoff	  mediator,	  were	  a	  conceptual	  point	  of	  view	  that	  the	  Zurich	  ATCO	  adopted	  unnecessarily.	   In	  effect,	  he	  placed	  himself	  in	  a	  box	  of	  his	  own	  making.	  	  The	  Zurich	  ATCO	  failed	  to	  exploit	  a	  safety	  feature	  within	  his	  repertoire	  (cf.	  p.	  96,	  p.	  161),	   namely	   to	   place	   the	   AEF	   in	   a	   holding	   pattern,	   	   releasing	   the	   handoff	  temporarily	  from	  his	  attention	  and	  thus	  buying	  time	  to	  find	  another	  solution.	   	  The	  	  tight	   coupling	   between	   the	   AEF’s	   flight	   path	   and	   the	   ATC’s	   phone-­‐related	   actions	  was	  mental,	   a	  matter	   of	   personal	   judgment,	   than	   either	   a	   physical	   necessity	   or	   a	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standard	  procedure	  imposed	  by	  his	  role.	  The	  problem	  was	  mostly	  in	  his	  mind.	  	  The	  system	  offered	  flexibility	  that	  was	  not	  exploited,	  illustrating	  how	  a	  failure	  might	  be	  cognitive,	   and	   the	   system	   would	   become	   in	   fact	   more	   tightly	   coupled	   from	   the	  resulting	   actions	   (e.g.,	   the	   DHL	   and	   BTC	   aircraft	   were	   allowed	   to	   approach	  dangerously	  close,	  reducing	  his	  subsequent	  time	  to	  avoid	  a	  collision).	  	  Backing	   up	   at	   bit	  we	  might	   try	   to	   explain	   the	  ATCO’s	   fixation.	   The	   Zurich	  ATCO’s	  focus	  on	  calling	  Friedrichshafen	  (which	  he	  attempted	  3	  times	  within	  7	  1/2	  minutes,	  on	  the	  line	  56	  seconds	  total12),	  originated	  in	  the	  combination	  of	  the	  loss	  of	  regular	  and	  backup	  phones	  (for	  11	  ½	  minutes,	  BFU	  Report,	  p.	  17),	  a	  late-­‐arriving	  plane,	  and	  working	  alone.	   	  Thus	   the	   loss	  of	   redundancy	   in	   the	   system	   to	   that	  point,	  when	  he	  discovered	  the	  bypass	  phones	  were	  down,	  presented	  overall	  an	  unfamiliar	  situation.	  	  The	  loss	  of	  redundant	  means	  of	  accomplishing	  the	  handoff	  could	  explain	  the	  Zurich	  ATC’s	   fixation.	   The	   event	   of	   a	   late-­‐arriving	   plane	   followed	   by	   discovering	   he	  was	  unable	  to	  communicate	  with	  the	  tower	  might	  have	  presented	  itself	  as	  one	  coupled	  event.	   The	   urgency	   to	   resolve	   the	   one	   problem	   (phone	   call)	  was	   compounded	   by	  urgency	   to	   resolve	   the	   other	   (handoff),	   raising	   the	   controller’s	   anxiety,	   narrowing	  his	  attention	  further.	  	  	  In	   effect,	   “handle	   arriving	   AEF”	   became	   identical	   in	   ATCO’s	   mind	   with	   “make	   a	  phone	  call”—and	  it	  must	  be	  remembered	  that	  during	  these	  7	  ½	  minutes	  when	  ATCO	  was	  on	   the	  phones	   for	  56	   seconds,	  BTC	   reported	  arrival	   in	   the	  Zurich	   sector,	  AEF	  called	  in	  twice	  pressuring	  ATCO	  to	  manage	  their	  arrival	  in	  Friedrichshafen,	  and	  two	  other	  flights	  (THA933	  and	  MON5621)	  required	  handoff	  to	  other	  sectors.	  	  The	  Zurich	  ATCO	  was	  perhaps	  also	  implicitly	  still	  relying	  on	  redundancy	  offered	  by	  the	   STCA	   optical	   alert,	  which	   unknown	   to	   him	  was	   not	   enabled	  —“safety	   devices	  contribute	   to	   complacency	  and	   inattention”	   (p.	  153).	   	  The	   records	  do	  not	   indicate	  whether	  the	  Zurich	  ATCO	  ever	  relied	  on	  the	  STCA	  to	  call	  his	  attention	  to	  traffic	  that	  he	  was	  not	  otherwise	  monitoring.	   	  This	  is	  the	  kind	  of	   information	  an	  ethnographic	  study	  of	  ATCC	  work	  practices	  or	  a	  study	  of	  prior	  failure	  reports	  might	  reveal.	  
5.7 Resilience	  
Resilience	   of	   a	   work	   system	   concerns	   detection	   and	   recovery	   from	   problematic	  situations.	   By	   analogy	   to	   Hutchins’	   (1995)	   question,	   “How	   does	   the	   cockpit	  remember	   its	   speed?”	   we	   can	   ask,	   “How	   does	   the	   air	   traffic	   system	   detect	   and	  recover	   from	   problematic	   situations?”	   	   As	   throughout,	   in	   this	   analysis	   we	   are	  focusing	  on	  interactive	  behaviors	  of	  the	  system,	  which	  may	  involve	  any	  combination	  of	  human	  and	  automated	  actions.	  	  	  	  Considering	  the	  resilience	  of	  the	  air	  traffic	  system	  leads	  us	  to	  consider	  how	  the	  work	  system	  is	  designed	  with	  checks	  and	  balances	  to	  distribute/share/activate	  attention	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  12	  The	  BFU	  Report	   states	   that	   seven	   calls	  were	  attempted	   (p.	  7),	   but	   the	  ANSA	   transcript	   indicates	  only	   three.	  Based	  on	   timing,	   it	   is	  possible	  ATCO	  dialed	  multiple	   times	  during	   the	   second	  and	   third	  	  attempts.	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and	  responsibility	  for	  action.	  The	  Überlingen	  work	  system	  became	  complex	  because	  of	   subsystems	   failing	   and/or	   being	   absent.	   The	   system	  was	   not	   resilient	   because	  
emerging	   problems	  were	   not	   detecting	   early	   enough	   to	   resolve	   easily	   (leading	   to	   a	  cognitively	   complex	   situation	   for	   the	   ATCO)	   and	   recovery	   from	   these	   problematic	  
(unsafe)	  situations	  was	  mismanaged	  (leading	  to	  the	  collision).	  	  Errors	   are	   caused	   not	   only	   by	   individuals	   (lack	   of	   knowledge,	   “lapses”	   caused	   by	  workload/stress/fatigue),	  but	  also	  by	  the	  work	  system	  lacking	  checks	  and	  balances.	  Section	   6.7	   considers	   checks	   and	   balances	   that	   were	   missing	   or	   not	   executed	  properly	   during	   the	   Überlingen	   events	   by	   asking	   what	   could	   have	   happened	  differently.	  
5.8 Complexity	  and	  Coupling	  of	  Airways	  Perrow	   (1984)	   analyzes	   six	   systems	   involving	   high-­‐risk	   technologies:	   nuclear	  power,	   petrochemical	   plants,	   aircraft	   and	   airways,	   marine	   shipping,	   earthbound	  systems	   (e.g.,	   dams),	   and	   “exotics”	   (space,	   weapons,	   DNA).	   	   His	   appraisal	   of	  aircraft/airways	   	   is	   ambiguous,	   suggesting	   that	   the	   ATS	   is	   relatively	   high	   in	  complexity	  but	  this	  complexity	  “will	  respond	  to	  [a]	  considerable	  extent,	  though	  not	  completely,	  by	  management	  and	  technological	  innovations”	  (p.	  168).	  	  	  On	   the	   one	   hand,	   he	   says	   the	   airways	   are	   “neither	   very	   tightly	   coupled	   nor	  complexly	   interactive”	   (p.	   159).	   	   Yet	   he	   says	   the	   “airways	   system	   is	   high	   on	  interactive	  complexity	  and	  on	  tight	  coupling”	  (p.	  168).	  	  In	  other	  words,	  he	  concludes	  that	   complexity	   is	  high,	  but	  not	   extreme—the	  ATS	   is	  not	  very	   tightly	   coupled.	   	  He	  says	   that	   with	   the	   introduction	   of	   transponder	   automation	   to	   reveal	   aircraft	  information	   on	   radars,	   “time	   constraints	   are	   still	   tight;	   the	   system	   is	   not	   loosely	  coupled,	   only	   moderately	   tightly	   coupled”	   (p.	   160).	   	   This	   is	   because	   “delays	   are	  possible;	   aircraft	   are	   highly	   maneuverable	   and	   in	   three-­‐dimensional	   space,	   so	   an	  airplane	  can	  be	  told	   to	  hold	  a	  pattern,	   to	  change	  course,	  slow	  down…”	  (p.	  160).	   In	  other	  words,	   the	  system	   is	   resilient;	  pilots	  and	  controllers	  have	   time	  and	  space	   to	  adapt	  to	  manage	  separation.	  	  In	  effect,	  Perrow	  is	  attempting	  to	  explain	  why	  the	  ATS	  is	  so	  safe	  as	  measured	  by	  loss	  of	   life.	   	   Reasoning	   backwards	   to	   fit	   the	   NAT	  model,	   it	   must	   be	   the	   case	   that	   the	  airways	   system	   is	   not	   complexly	   interactive	   and	   tightly	   coupled	   in	   general—reduction	   in	   complexity	   and	   coupling	   has	   resulted	   “in	   about	   as	   error-­‐free	   a	   large	  system	  as	  we	  are	  likely	  to	  see	  in	  our	  society”	  (p.	  168).	  He	  says,	  “if	  there	  ever	  was	  a	  safe	  system	  that	  was	  complex	  and	  coupled,	  it	  is	  this	  one”	  (p.	  382).	  	  Perrow	   emphasizes	   that	   reported	   near	   misses	   indicate	   the	   system’s	   flexibility	   in	  recovery	   (compared	   to	   nuclear	   power	   plants)	   and	   “near	   misses	   reported	   to	   be	  under	  100	  feet	  are	  exceedingly	  rare	  and	  the	  proximity	  may	  be	  exaggerated”	  (p.	  161).	  	  He	   later	  says	   in	   the	  book’s	  Afterword	  (published	   in	  1999)	   that	  ATS	  safety	  may	  be	  resulting	  from	  the	  frequency	  of	  trials	  (flights)	  that	  has	  created	  a	  large	  database	  with	  rare	  events,	  which	  has	  promoted	  improved	  technology	  and	  training	  (p.	  382).	  Perrow	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also	  acknowledges	  minimizing	  the	  role	  of	  ATCs	  in	  his	  initial	  analysis,	  that	  15	  years	  later	  he	  believes	  that	  their	  role	  is	  “primarily…to	  pack	  as	  much	  traffic	  into	  airports	  as	  they	  could”	  (p.	  383).	  	  One	  way	  of	   understanding	  Perrow’s	   appraisal	   of	   the	  ATS	   is	   that	  he	   is	   speaking	   in	  general,	   abstract	   terms	   about	   the	   complexity	   of	   the	   system	   at	   large,	   not	   specific	  situations	  that	  may	  occur	  within	  this	  system	  in	  a	  particular	  time	  and	  place.	  	  Thus	  the	  Überlingen	  ATS	  configuration	  on	  that	  Sunday	  evening	  in	  2002	  was	  atypical	   for	  the	  location	   and	   time—the	   system	   became	   complexly	   interactive	   and	   tightly	   coupled	  because	  of	  loss	  of	  operations	  redundancy	  and	  unusual	  flight	  circumstances.	  	  Exemplifying	   this	   point,	   Perrow	   states	   that	   the	   SNA	   (John	  Wayne	  Airport,	   Orange	  County,	  CA)	  system	  configuration	  is	  “quite	  tightly	  coupled”	  (p.	  152)	  because	  a	  small	  airport	   handles	   many	   private	   and	   commercial	   planes,	   making	   it	   complexly	  interactive.	  So	  in	  general	  (by	  this	  analysis)	  this	  airport	  has	  less	  operations	  flexibility	  and	   the	   traffic	   is	  more	   demanding	   for	   people	   and	   systems	   to	  manage	   safely	   than	  other	  airports.	  In	  simple	  terms,	  the	  everyday,	  routine	  work	  is	  more	  difficult.	  	  In	   a	   cautionary	   conclusion	   relevant	   to	   NextGen,	   Perrow	   states	   (in	   the	   Afterword	  published	  in	  the	  1999	  reissue	  of	  the	  1984	  original	  edition):	  “The	  FAA	  is	  pressing	  for	  more	   automation	   in	   its	   system,	   thereby	   reducing	   the	   number	   of	   controllers	  extensively.	   Both	   of	   these…will	   lead	   to	   much	   tighter	   coupling—that	   is	   to	   less	  resources	   to	   recover	   from	   incidents”	   (p.	   161).	   While	   TCAS	   exemplifies	   how	  automation	   can	   increase	   safety,	   the	   Überlingen	   collision	   also	   illustrates	   how	   the	  
absence	   of	   routinely	   relied	   on	   automation	   (STCA	   Optical	   alert)	   and	   technology	   in	  general	  (the	  phones)	  can	  also	  increase	  the	  complexity	  of	  the	  system.	  
5.9 Theoretical	  Justification	  for	  Developing	  a	  Series	  of	  Models	  In	  attempting	  to	  explain	  why	  the	  ATS	  is	  relatively	  safe,	  Perrow	  points	  out	  that	  one	  must	  consider	  the	  task	  at	  hand:	  	  “If	  one	  tried,	  it	  would	  be	  hard	  to	  make	  two	  aircraft	  collide”	   (p.	   161).	   	   The	   Brahms-­‐GÜM	   simulation	   of	   the	   Überlingen	   scenario	  demonstrates	  that	  point	  (see	  Chapter	  10).	  	  In	   general,	   evaluating	   a	   work	   system	   design	   requires	   knowing	   the	   context	   of	  particular	   work	   environments.	   As	   explained	   above,	   complexity	   of	   the	   work	   is	   a	  dynamic	   relation,	   it	   will	   vary	   as	   configurations	   of	   aircraft,	   weather,	   automated	  systems,	   workers	   playing	   different	   roles,	   and	   tools	   change.	   Complexity	   is	   not	   a	  property	  located	  in	  some	  part	  of	  the	  system,	  but	  about	  evolving	  operations	  from	  the	  perspective	   of	   agents	   (people	   and	   automated	   subsystems)	   with	   specific	   goals	   to	  affect	  the	  system’s	  behavior.	  	  Perrow's	  discussion	  of	  SNA	  (John	  Wayne	  Airport,	  Orange	  County,	  CA)	  illustrates	  that	  complexity	   varies	   with	   airport,	   time	   of	   day,	   season,	   weather,	   etc.	   	  It	   is	   in	   the	  combination	  of	  these	  specific	  factors	  that	  interactive	  complexity	  and	  tight	  coupling	  arise.	   Consequently	   "what	   if"	   simulation	   of	   different	   specific	   configurations	   is	  important	  for	  evaluating	  what	  kinds	  of	  interactions	  might	  arise	  that	  affect	  safety.	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  The	  effect	  of	  losing	  redundancy	  is	  of	  central	  concern	  in	  creating	  and	  experimenting	  with	   work	   practice	   simulations.	   	   Perrow’s	   analysis	   reveals	   that	   redundancy	   for	  communicating	   information	   and	   taking	   action	   increases	   flexibility—choice	   and	  timing	  of	  actions,	  thus	  reducing	  interactions	  and	  	  coupling	  among	  them.	  The	  ability	  to	  cope	  with	  loss	  of	  redundancy	  is	  an	  aspect	  of	  the	  system’s	  resilience.	  	  	  Consequently,	  we	  concluded	  that	  the	  Brahms	  simulation	  should	  be	  designed	  not	  to	  replicate	  a	  single	  scenario,	  but	  rather	  the	  model	  should	  comprise	  a	  family	  or	  space	  of	  scenarios	  that	  enables	  systematically	  evaluating	  the	  effects	  of	  loss	  of	  redundancy.	  Evaluating	  safety	  properties	  such	  as	  “separation	  assurance”	  requires	  evaluating	  how	  air	  traffic	  control	  interactions	  and	  coupling	  are	  affected	  by	  loss	  of	  redundancy	  in	  the	  context	  of	  different,	  specific	  air	  traffic	  configurations	  (e.g.,	  late	  arriving	  plane).	  	  The	  Brahms–GÜM	  has	  been	  designed	  and	  developed	  accordingly	  (described	   in	  Chapter	  8).	  	  But	  first	  in	  the	  next	  chapters	  we	  explain	  in	  Chapter	  6	  more	  about	  the	  content	  of	  what	   needs	   to	   be	   modeled	   based	   on	   failure	   analyses	   of	   the	   collision,	   that	   is	   the	  objects,	   properties,	   and	   events	   relevant	   to	   the	   incident,	   and	   then	   in	  Chapter	  7	  we	  explain	  more	   about	   the	  modeling	   framework	   that	   is	   applied	   for	   representing	   this	  work	  system	  and	  its	  alternative	  configurations	  (scenarios).	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6 Überlingen	  Collision:	  Systemic	  Failure	  Analysis	  As	   explained	   in	   the	   previous	   chapter,	   following	   NAT	   there	   is	   no	   “root	   cause”	   or	  simple	  tree	  of	  events	  leading	  to	  the	  collision.	  Rather	  a	  sequence	  of	  events,	  some	  of	  which	  were	  causally	  related,	  reduced	  flexibility	  in	  the	  local	  ATS,	  causing	  interactions	  among	   people,	   aircraft,	   tools,	   and	   automated	   systems	   to	   become	   more	   tightly	  coupled,	   to	   the	   point	   that	   the	   system	   was	   out	   of	   control.	   The	   goals,	   states,	   and	  behaviors	   of	   the	   agents—pilots,	   controllers,	   and	  TCAS—became	  unknown	   to	   each	  other.	   	  As	  one	  commentator	  put	   it,	   “If	  Überlingen	  demonstrated	  anything,	   it's	   that	  nobody	   has	   to	   time	   to	   sort	   it	   out	   much	   less	   come	   up	   with	   a	   new	   plan	   and	  communicate	   it.”13	  	   Synchronization	   required	   for	   safety	   was	   lost;	   their	   combined	  actions	  of	  maneuvering	  and	  guiding	  implicitly	  led	  the	  planes	  to	  collide.	  	  	  	  This	   chapter	   reviews	   different	   analyses	   of	   the	   collision,	   providing	   a	   background	  reference	  for	  the	  subsequent	  presentation	  of	  the	  Brahms	  modeling	  framework	  and	  Brahms-­‐GÜM	  simulation.	   	  The	  analyses	   include	   the	  official	   conclusions	  of	   the	  BFU	  Report,	   commentary	   on	   it	   by	   the	   ANSA	   AirRadio	   organization,	   and	   deviating	  positions	   published	   by	   the	   Kingdom	   of	   Bahrain 14 ,	   Switzerland,	   and	   Russian	  Federation.	  Three	  independent	  analyses	  are	  also	  presented	  by	  Aviation	  Knowledge,	  Aviation	  Safety	  Network,	  and	  an	   independent	  academic	  research	  report	   funded	  by	  Eurocontrol.	   	   The	   excerpts	   provided	   here	   illustrate	   the	   different	   levels	   of	   details	  (immediate	  and	  systemic	  causes),	  many	  decisions	  (e.g.,	  directions	  given	  to	  the	  DHL	  flight)	   and	   intricate	   timings	   involved	   (e.g.,	   a	   claim	   that	   the	   instruction	   to	   the	  BTC	  was	   already	   too	   late	   to	   ensure	   separation;	   the	   BFU	   Report	   [p.	   109]	   states	   that	  separation	  was	  7	  nm	  during	  the	  last	  second	  of	  ATCO’s	  first	  intervention	  at	  21:34:56	  hrs,	  which	  constitutes	  an	  infringement).	  	  Subsequently,	   the	   factors	   presented	   in	   these	   reports	   are	   organized	   	   using	   the	  Human	   Factors	  Analysis	   and	   Classification	   of	   Causal	   Factors	   scheme	   (Section	   6.5)	  and	   then	   re-­‐presented	  using	   a	   form	  of	   causal	   tree	   analysis	   (Section	   6.6),	  which	   is	  used	   to	   bring	   out	   alternative	   scenarios	   that	   might	   have	   occurred	   (Section	   6.7).	  Finally,	   the	   interactions	   articulated	   in	   the	   analyses	   are	   considered	   from	   the	  perspective	   of	   the	   affect	   of	   timing	   of	   events	   causing,	   inhibiting,	   or	   requiring	  interactions	  among	  people	  and	  systems	  (Section	  6.8).	  	  	  Following	   the	   Normal	   Accident	   Theory	   framework	   and	   the	   specific	   analyses	   and	  commentary	  presented	  here,	  we	  conclude	  that	  the	  attempt	  to	  assign	  a	  single	  cause	  to	  the	  accident	   is	   fruitless,	   that	  the	  observed	  sequence	  of	  events	  occurred	  through	  complex,	   systemic	   interactions	   in	   the	   work	   system	   on	   that	   night,	   manifesting	  failures	  in	  organizational	  policies,	  staffing,	  supervision,	  air	  traffic	  control	  monitoring	  and	   collaboration	   in	   the	   center,	   pilot	   knowledge	   and	   training,	   and	   the	   design	   and	  certification	  of	  TCAS.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  13	  PPRuNE	   Forums,	   http://www.pprune.org/archive/index.php/t-­‐343376.html,	   accessed	   26	   Sept	  2012,	  “ATCO	  Issues:	  TCAS	  or	  ATCO	  priority?	  Re.	  DHL	  757	  midair	  and	  TU-­‐154”	  14	  DHL	  International	  Aviation	  is	  based	  in	  the	  Kingdom	  of	  Bahrain.	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6.1 Official	  Report	  by	  the	  German	  Federal	  Bureau	  of	  Aircraft	  Accidents	  The	   primary	   source	   for	   developing	   Brahms-­‐GÜM	   is	   the	   2004	   German	   Federal	  Bureau	   of	   Aircraft	   Accidents	   Investigation	   Report	   (“Bundesstelle	   für	  Flugunfalluntersuchung	  Report”).	  The	  BFU	  Report’s	  conclusions	  (p.	  110)	  are:	  	   The	  following	  immediate	  causes	  have	  been	  identified:	  
o The	   imminent	   separation	   infringement	   was	   not	   noticed	   by	   ATCO	   in	   time.	  The	   instruction	   for	   the	   TU154M	   to	   descend	  was	   given	   at	   a	   time	  when	   the	  prescribed	  separation	  to	  the	  B757-­‐	  200	  could	  not	  be	  ensured	  anymore.	  
o The	  TU154M	  crew	  followed	  the	  ATCO	  instruction	  to	  descend	  and	  continued	  to	   do	   so	   even	   after	   TCAS	   advised	   them	   to	   climb.	   This	   maneuver	   was	  performed	  contrary	  to	  the	  generated	  TCAS	  RA.	  	  The	  following	  systemic	  causes	  have	  been	  identified:	  
o The	   integration	   of	   ACAS/TCAS	   II	   into	   the	   system	   aviation	  was	   insufficient	  and	   did	   not	   correspond	   in	   all	   points	   with	   the	   system	   philosophy.	   The	  regulations	   concerning	   ACAS/TCAS	   published	   by	   ICAO	   and	   as	   a	   result	   the	  regulations	   of	   national	   aviation	   authorities,	   operational	   and	   procedural	  instructions	   of	   the	   TCAS	   manufacturer	   and	   the	   operators	   were	   not	  standardised,	  incomplete	  and	  partially	  contradictory.	  
o Management	   and	   quality	   assurance	   of	   the	   air	   navigation	   service	   company	  did	   not	   ensure	   that	   during	   the	   night	   all	   open	   workstations	   were	  continuously	  staffed	  by	  controllers.	  
o Management	   and	   quality	   assurance	   of	   the	   air	   navigation	   service	   company	  tolerated	   for	   years	   that	   during	   times	   of	   low	   traffic	   flow	   at	   night	   only	   one	  controller	  worked	  and	  the	  other	  one	  retired	  to	  rest.	  	  
6.1.1 Kingdom	  of	  Bahrain	  deviating	  position	  The	  BFU	  report	  summarizes	  that	  “The	  Kingdom	  of	  Bahrain	  is	  of	  the	  opinion	  that	  the	  results	   of	   the	   Human	   Factors	   group	   shall	   have	   been	   made	   the	   sole	   basis	   for	   the	  analysis,”	   and	   then	   proceeds	   to	   incorporate	   the	   deviating	   interpretations	   (BFU	  Report,	  Appendix	  10,	  pp.	  1-­‐2):	  	  The	  second	  systemic	  cause	  should	  be	  expanded	  incorporating	  the	  findings	  from	  the	  HF	  Group	  report	  on	  the	   failure	   to	  assess	   the	  risks	  on	  the	  particular	  night,	  mitigate	  against	   them	   by	   manning	   both	   positions	   the	   whole	   night,	   briefing	   all	   staff	  appropriately,	   delegating	   responsibilities	   and	   effective	   training.	   Training	   does	   not	  necessarily	   mean	   TRM/CCC	   Training,	   but	   rather	   ensuring	   that	   the	   ATCOs	  understand	   and	   practice	   (simulate)	   operations	   in	   “radar	   fall-­‐back	   mode”.	   This	  should	  have	  been	  an	  essential	  element	  of	  their	  emergency/refresher	  training.	  	  The	  third	  systemic	  cause	  should	  also	  be	  expanded.	  How	  could	  management	  possibly	  tolerate	   a	   single	   controller	   working	   at	   night	   at	   ‘low’	   traffic	   level,	   when	   such	  operation	  did	  not	  conform	  to	  SMOP’s	  criteria?	  It	  also	  raises	  a	  question	  on	  how	  does	  one	  define	   ‘low’	   traffic	  –	   three	  aircrafts	  on	  01	   July	  2002	  demanded	  a	  great	  deal	  of	  attention	  even	  notwithstanding	  the	  temporary	  radar	  and	  telephone	  shortcomings?	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6.1.2 ANSA	  AirRadio	  commentary	  The	  International	  Advisory	  Group	  Air	  Navigation	  Services	  (ANSA)	  and	  Aeronautical	  Radio	   &	   Air	   Traffic	   Control	   Advisors	   (AirRadio)	   (ANSA+AIRADIO	   2004,	   p.	   36)	  analysis	   is	   included	   here	   because	   it	   is	   quite	   different	   from	   the	   BFU	   Report’s	  conclusions.	  Rather	  than	  focusing	  on	  the	  BTC	  crew	  response	  to	  TCAS	  in	  responding	  the	   imminent	   collision,	   this	   analysis	   focuses	   on	   the	   ATCO’s	   route	   approvals	   that	  caused	  the	  planes	  to	  be	  put	  on	  a	  collision	  path	  (italic	  emphasis	  added):	  	  The	  development	  of	  the	  conflict	  situation	  between	  DHX	  611	  and	  BTC	  2937	  and	  the	  resulting	   collision	   could	   have	   easily	   been	   avoided,	   if	   the	   air	   traffic	   controller	   had	  properly	   identified	   flight	   BTC	   2937	   and	   in	   application	   of	   vertical	   separation	   let	   it	  
climb	  to	  flight	  level	  370,	  or	  alternatively	  hereto	  had	  DHX	  611	  climb	  to	  flight	  level	  350	  
only	  instead	  of	  360.	  	  This	  easy	  solution	  was	  however	  not	  chosen,	  since	  he	  apparently	  did	   not	   recognize	   the	   given	   situation	   or	   his	   other	   distracting	   duties	   (arrival	   to	  
Friedrichshafen)	  demanded	  too	  much	  of	  him.	  	  	  On	   the	  other	  hand	   it	  would	  have	  been	  more	  than	  advisable	  to	  issue	  a	  corresponding	  
traffic	   information	  to	  flight	  DHX	  611	  at	  the	  time	  of	   issuance	  of	  the	  descent	  clearance	  
for	  BTC	  2937	  to	  flight	  level	  350,	  or	  even	  better,	  to	  turn	  flight	  DHX	  611	  away	  from	  its	  
course	  and	  have	  it	  climb	  further,	  since	  it	  was	  previously	  being	  identified	  by	  himself.	  	  	  
For	   this	   commentator	   the	   air	   traffic	   controller	   acted	   in	   gross	   negligence	   and	  
demonstrated	  lacking	  professional	  competence.	  [emphasis	  in	  original].	  	  
6.1.3 Russian	  Federation	  deviating	  position	  In	   an	   appendix	   of	   the	   BFU	   Report	   (Appendix	   10,	   p.	   2),	   the	   Russian	   Federation	  provided	  a	  deviation	  opinion	  that	  like	  the	  ANSA	  AirRadio	  Commentary	  criticizes	  the	  Zurich	  ATCO’s	  instruction	  to	  the	  BTC	  pilots,	  claiming	  that	  the	  traffic	  information	  he	  provided	  was	   incorrect	   and	   also	   that	   the	   DHL	   crew	   had	   sufficient	   information	   to	  avoid	  the	  conflict	  (presuming	  that	  they	  had	  ignored	  the	  TCAS	  RA):	  	  
• The	  TU154M	  crew	  followed	  the	  ATCO	  instruction	  to	  descend	  and	  continued	  to	  do	  so	  even	  after	  TCAS	  advised	  them	  to	  climb.	  This	  maneuver	  was	  performed	  contradictory	  to	  the	  generated	  TCAS	  RA.	  	  
• The	  crew	  was	  unable	  to	  follow	  TCAS	  RA	  as	  by	  that	  time	  they	  were	  at	  35	  500	  feet	  and	  the	  controller	  informed	  them	  about	  conflicting	  traffic	  above,	  at	  FL	  360.	  	  
• The	   false	   ATCO’s	   information	   on	   the	   direction	   towards	   the	   conflicting	   traffic	   (2	  o’clock	  instead	  of	  actual	  10	  o’clock)	  and	  contradictory	  ATCO	  and	  TCAS	  instructions	  did	  not	  contribute	  to	  the	  correct	  decision	  of	  the	  crew	  as	  well.	  	  	  
• The	   B757-­‐200	   crew	   who	   were	   at	   the	   same	   frequency	   and	   heard	   three	   ATCO	  instructions	  to	  descend,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  readback	  of	  the	  TU154M	  crew	  about	  leaving	  FL	  360,	  had	  a	  real	  possibility	  to	  avoid	  collision.	  	  
6.1.4 Switzerland	  deviating	  position	  The	  deviating	  position	  filed	  by	  Switzerland	  focuses	  on	  the	  descent	  through	  FL	  350	  by	  the	  TU154M	  following	  the	  ACC	  Zurich	  instruction	  as	  the	  cause	  of	  the	  accident	  (BFU	  Report,	  Appendix	  10,	  p.	  2):	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3.1	  Findings	  	  Accident:	  
• When	  the	  TU154M,	  contrary	   to	   the	   instruction	  of	   the	  ATC,	  was	  descending	  through	   flight	   level	   350,	   the	   airplane’s	   rate	   of	   descent	   was	   approximately	  1900	  ft/min.	  	  ACAS/TCAS:	  
• The	  simulation	  and	  the	  analysis	  of	  the	  alert	  sequence	  showed	  that	  the	  initial	  RA’s	  would	  have	  ensured	  a	  safe	  vertical	  separation	  of	  both	  airplanes	  if	  both	  crews	  had	  followed	  the	  instructions	  accurately.	  	  3.2	  Causes	  (3.	  immediate	  cause)	  
• When	  reaching	  flight	  level	  350,	  the	  rate	  of	  descent	  of	  the	  TU154M	  was	  still	  approximately	   1900	   ft/min.	   Subsequently	   the	   crew	   of	   the	   TU154M	  descended	  below	  the	  flight	  level	  assigned	  by	  the	  air	  traffic	  control	  unit.	  
6.2 	  “Aviation	  Knowledge”	  Analysis	  The	  web	   site	  Aviation	  Knowledge15	  suggests	   that	   fault	  mainly	   lies	  with	   the	  Zurich	  ATCC	  skyguide	  management,	  following	  the	  systemic	  causes	  cited	  in	  the	  BFU	  Report,	  adding	  the	  fact	  that	   four	  skyguide	  middle	  managers	  were	  prosecuted	  for	  negligent	  homicide.	  	  The	  details	  of	   this	  analysis	  are	  provided	  as	  reference	   for	   the	  discussion	  about	   the	  Brahms	  model,	  which	   includes	  most	  of	   the	   facts	  stated	  here.	  Readers	   interested	   in	  understanding	   the	   circumstances	   of	   the	   collision	  will	   find	   this	   summary	   of	   value;	  others	  can	  skip	  ahead.	  
Background	  information	  The	  Tu-­‐154M	  was	  a	  charter,	  being	  operated	  by	  Bashkirian	  Airlines	  as	  Flight	  2937	  and	  en	  route	  to	  Barcelona	  from	  Moscow,	  while	  the	  757-­‐200PF	  was	  a	  DHL	  freighter,	  Flight	  611,	  flying	  from	  Bergamo,	  Italy,	  to	  Brussels.	  At	  the	  time	  of	  the	  accident,	  the	  aircraft	  were	  in	  controlled	  airspace	  being	  guided	  by	  the	  private	  Swiss	  air	  traffic	  control	  company,	  skyguide.	  
• Single	  controller	  There	  were	  two	  skyguide	  controllers	  on	  duty,	  but	  only	  one	  was	  working,	  while	  the	  other	  was	  on	  break	  for	  a	  significant	  period	  of	  time.	  
• Disabled	  conflict	  detection	  system	  Procedures	  required	  a	  conflict	  detection	  system	  to	  be	  operational	  while	  only	  one	  controller	  is	  working,	  however	  due	  to	  maintenance	  taking	  place	  at	  the	  time,	  it	  was	  disabled.	  
• Downgraded	  radar	  Furthermore,	  the	  maintenance	  work	  also	  meant	  that	  the	  radar	  systems	  were	  operating	  in	  a	  downgraded	  mode,	  which	  was	  less	  responsive	  and	  accurate	  [it	  did	  not	  automatically	  identify	  the	  aircraft	  and	  range	  scale	  bar	  introduced	  in	  response	  to	  May	  2001	  separation	  violation	  by	  this	  same	  ATCO	  was	  unavailable,	  BFU	  Report,	  p.	  82].	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  15http://aviationknowledge.wikidot.com/asi:bashkirian-­‐airlines-­‐flight-­‐2937-­‐dhl-­‐flight-­‐611:mid-­‐air-­‐c	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• Disabled	  phone	  line	  The	  phone	  line	  was	  also	  disabled,	  meaning	  the	  controller	  wasted	  a	  significant	  amount	  of	  time	  trying	  to	  contact	  a	  local	  German	  ATCO	  unit	  about	  another	  aircraft.	  
• Unoperational	  backup	  phone	  system	  Unfortunately,	  the	  backup	  phone	  system	  was	  not	  operational	  either,	  due	  to	  a	  software	  failure	  that	  was	  not	  detected	  even	  when	  tests	  were	  run	  on	  the	  ATCO	  system	  three	  months	  previously.	  
• Two	  discrete	  frequencies	  A	  final	  consideration	  was	  that	  the	  controller	  was	  working	  two	  different	  radar	  screens	  with	  discrete	  frequencies.	  This	  meant	  that	  he	  had	  divided	  attention,	  and	  could	  only	  deal	  with	  one	  screen	  and	  frequency	  at	  a	  time.	  
• Collision	  course	  established	  At	  21:21:50	  UTC,	  the	  Boeing's	  crew	  requested	  a	  climb	  from	  FL320	  to	  FL	  360.	  Eight	  minutes	  later,	  after	  this	  had	  been	  confirmed	  by	  ATCO	  and	  performed	  by	  the	  crew,	  the	  two	  aircraft	  were	  on	  a	  collision	  course	  at	  the	  same	  altitude.	  
• Initial	  TCAS	  advisory	  About	  five	  minutes	  after	  this,	  at	  21:34:42,	  and	  50	  seconds	  before	  the	  collision,	  both	  crews	  received	  an	  initial	  TCAS	  traffic	  advisory:	  “traffic,	  traffic”,	  warning	  of	  the	  possible	  collision	  with	  the	  other	  aircraft.	  A	  few	  seconds	  later,	  the	  controller	  instructed	  the	  Tupolev's	  crew	  to	  descend	  expeditiously	  to	  avoid	  the	  Boeing,	  which	  the	  crew	  complied	  with	  but	  did	  not	  acknowledge.	  
• Attempted	  sector	  controller	  warning	  A	  German	  upper	  sector	  controller	  noticed	  the	  potential	  collision	  but	  could	  not	  warn	  the	  skyguide	  controller	  due	  to	  the	  disabled	  phone	  lines.	  
• TCAS	  RA	  Fourteen	  seconds	  after	  the	  initial	  TCAS	  traffic	  advisory,	  the	  Boeing's	  TCAS	  issued	  a	  resolution	  advisory	  to	  descend:	  “descend,	  descend”,	  and	  the	  Tupolev's	  TCAS	  issued	  a	  resolution	  advisory	  to	  climb:	  “climb,	  climb”.	  The	  Boeing's	  crew	  began	  to	  descend,	  while	  the	  Tupolev's	  crew	  also	  continued	  to	  descend,	  following	  ATC's	  instructions	  and	  ignoring	  TCAS.	  Shortly	  before	  the	  collision,	  the	  Boeing	  and	  Tupolev's	  crews	  received	  an	  “increase	  descent”	  and	  “increase	  climb”	  command	  respectively	  [but	  instruction	  to	  Tupolev	  crew	  was	  delayed	  by	  11	  seconds].	  
• Collision	  One	  second	  before	  the	  collision,	  both	  crews	  conducted	  drastic	  evasive	  maneuvers	  but	  it	  was	  too	  late	  to	  avoid	  the	  collision.	  
Considerations	  
• Single	  controller	  duties	  This	  procedure	  was	  met	  with	  great	  controversy	  when	  it	  was	  implemented	  a	  year	  before	  the	  collision,	  and	  resulted	  in	  many	  protests	  from	  the	  controllers'	  union.	  It	  was	  seen	  as	  an	  unsafe	  practice	  due	  to	  the	  lack	  of	  supervision	  or	  assistance	  in	  safety-­‐critical	  situations.	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• Disabled	  systems	  Skyguide's	  management	  should	  not	  have	  permitted	  maintenance	  to	  disable	  these	  key	  systems	  while	  there	  was	  only	  one	  controller	  working,	  and	  as	  a	  result	  of	  these	  errors,	  four	  skyguide	  middle	  managers	  were	  prosecuted	  for	  negligent	  homicide.	  
• Controller's	  workload	  Even	  though	  traffic	  was	  light,	  the	  working	  conditions	  would	  have	  put	  extra	  strain	  on	  the	  controller	  and	  greatly	  lowered	  the	  possibility	  of	  him	  preventing	  the	  collision.	  
Conclusion	  This	  accident	  is	  an	  excellent	  example	  of	  an	  organisational	  accident,	  as	  while	  it	  does	  appear	  that	  the	  controller	  should	  be	  held	  responsible	  for	  the	  event,	  the	  decisions	  made	  by	  skyguide	  management	  made	  such	  an	  event	  almost	  inevitable.	  
6.3 Aviation	  Safety	  Network	  Analysis	  An	  analysis	  by	  the	  Aviation	  Safety	  Network16	  assigns	  systemic	  fault	  to	  inadequate	  regulations	  in	  the	  form	  of	  operations	  procedures	  for	  pilots’	  interactions	  with	  TCAS,	  as	  well	  as	  repeating	  the	  BFU	  Reports	  criticism	  of	  skyguide	  management:	  	  
• The	   integration	  of	  ACAS/TCAS	   II	   into	   the	   system	  aviation	  was	   insufficient	  and	  did	  not	  correspond	  in	  all	  points	  with	  the	  system	  philosophy.	  
• The	   regulations	   concerning	   ACAS/TCAS	   published	   by	   ICAO	   and	   as	   a	   result	   the	  regulations	  of	  national	  aviation	  authorities,	  operational	  and	  procedural	  instructions	  of	  the	  TCAS	  manufacturer	  and	  the	  operators	  were	  not	  standardised,	  incomplete	  and	  partially	  contradictory.	  
6.4 Review	  of	  the	  BFU’s	  Überlingen	  Accident	  Report	  Johnson	   (2004b)	   provides	   a	   comprehensive	   independent	   analysis	   of	   the	   contents	  and	   presentation	   of	   the	   BFU	   investigation	   report,	   emphasizing	   how	  ATCO	   actions	  related	  to	  perceptual	  cues.	  Johnson	  depicts	  events	  using	  a	  “simplified	  form	  of	  Events	  and	  Causal	  Factors	  [ECF]	  analysis,	  initially	  pioneered	  by	  the	  US	  Department	  of	  Energy”	  (p.	  11);	  see	  Figure	  6-­‐1.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  16	  http://aviation-­‐safety.net/database/record.php?id=20020701-­‐0	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Figure	  6-­‐1:	  Events	  and	  Causal	  Factors	  (ECF)	  analysis	  (Johnson,	  2004b,	  p.	  18).	  The	   remark	   in	   this	   diagram	   “Radar	   controller	   now	   focuses	   all	   attention	   on	  A320”	  illustrates	  the	  difficulty	  of	  reconstructing	  events.	  	  From	  the	  perspective	  of	  the	  other	  analyses,	  saying	  that	  he	  “focuses	  all	  attention”	   is	  arguable.	   	   In	  particular,	   the	  claim	  that	  “radar	  controller	  believes	  he	  has	  resolved	  the	  conflict”	  (which	  Johnson	  depicts	  as	   causing	   his	   shift	   back	   to	   AEF)	   is	   based	   on	   the	   claim	   “radar	   controller	   sees	  TU154M	  initiate	  descent	  on	   left	  (RP)	  monitor”	  (a	  statement	  made	  by	  ATCO	  during	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the	   debrief,	   BFU	   Report,	   p.	   85).	   An	   alternative	   assumption	   about	   the	   ATCO’s	  perception	   and	   belief	   is	   that	   he	   shifted	   to	   respond	   to	   AEF	   because	   the	   “radar	  controller	   believes	   he	   must	   respond	   immediately	   to	   an	   aircraft	   approaching	   an	  airport.”	  In	  short,	  claims	  about	  what	  the	  ATCO	  perceives	  or	  believes	  are	  difficult	  to	  justify	   aside	   from	   saying	   he	   is	   reactive,	   shifting	   back	   and	   forth	   between	   the	  workstations	   according	   to	   what	   comes	   to	   his	   attention.	   Also,	   a	   person	  may	   have	  multiple,	  simultaneous	  conceptual	  justifications	  for	  an	  action.	  Rather	  than	  shifting	  “all	  attention”	  one	  might	  interpret	  the	  actions	  as	  managing	  two	  simultaneous	  activities	  according	  to	  what	  information	  allowed	  and	  timing	  required.	  	  Immediately	  after	  instructing	  the	  BTC	  to	  expedite	  descent,	  AEF	  1135	  called	  in	  again	  on	   the	  other	  workstation,	   so	  ATCO	  moved	   to	   respond,	   “ah	  okay,	   turn	   left	   heading	  240,	  intercept	  ILS	  24,	  descend	  four	  thousand	  feet.”	  	  Indeed,	  the	  AEF	  1135	  is	  landing	  at	   precisely	   the	   time	   of	   the	   collision	   and	   called	   ATCO	   four	   times	   during	   the	   last	  minute	  before	  the	  collision.	  ATCO’s	  lack	  of	  follow	  up	  to	  confirm	  that	  he	  had	  resolved	  the	  BTC/DHL	  separation	  might	  suggest	  a	  lack	  of	  proper	  prioritization	  of	  tasks.	  	  But	  his	  actions	  reflect	  as	  well	  the	  layout	  of	  the	  work	  stations	  —that	  a	  single	  controller	  on	   duty	   must	   move	   back	   and	   forth—and	   that	   to	   watch	   for	   the	   radar	   display	   to	  update	  to	  confirm	  the	  relative	  locations	  of	  the	  aircraft	  (details	  are	  reconstructed	  in	  Section	   6.8.6).	   	   Hence	   he	   responded	   to	   the	   AEF	   flight	   immediately—the	   “shift	   in	  focus”	  reflects	  doing	  something	  urgent	  rather	   than	   just	  staring	  at	   the	  display	   for	  a	  few	   seconds.	   	   Unfortunately,	   it	   is	   just	   at	   this	  moment	   that	   the	  DHL	   calls	   in,	   “…six	  hundred..äh	  TCAS-­‐descent,”	  a	  remark	  that	  apparently	  ATCO	  did	  not	  hear.	  Consistent	  with	  this	  example	  about	  of	  the	  difficulty	  of	  explaining	  what	  the	  ATCO	  is	  doing	  and	  why,	  Johnson	  notes	  the	  inadequacy	  of	  the	  BFU	  Report’s	  Appendix	  2	  and	  3	  chronology	   and	  diagram	  of	   events	   for	   reconstructing	   events	  what	   occurred	   in	   the	  Zurich	   ATCC.	   His	   observations	   explain	   why	   developing	   the	   Brahms	   simulation	  required	  a	  great	  deal	  of	   investigation	  and	  inference	  about	  the	  events	  leading	  up	  to	  the	  accident:	  Appendix	   2	   does	   not	   go	   back	   far	   enough	   to	   consider	   the	   dissemination	   of	  information	   about	   the	   planning	   and	   maintenance	   work	   on	   ATCO	   systems	  (recommendation	   01/2003)	   nor	   does	   it	   address	   the	   events	   that	   led	   to	  recommendation	   11/2004	   on	   the	   need	   to	   provide	   backup	   telecommunications	  systems	   in	   the	   event	   of	   a	   main	   telecommunications	   system	   failure.	   Secondly,	   the	  timelines	  in	  Appendix	  2	  is	  entitled	  ‘Events	  in	  both	  Cockpits’	  hence	  the	  focus	  is	  not	  on	  the	  circumstances	  surrounding	  the	  controller’s	  actions.	  (p.	  7)	  	  The	   key	   point	   is	   that	   these	   timelines	   provide	   an	   entry	   point	   for	   any	   analysis	   and	  must	  be	   supplemented	  by	   additional	   techniques	   if	   they	   are	   to	   yield	  more	  detailed	  insights…	  (p.	  8)	  	  As	  we	  discovered	  in	  constructing	  the	  Brahms	  simulation,	  Johnson	  mentions	  that	  the	  timing	   of	   the	   STCA	   acoustic	   alert	   and	   why	   it	   wasn’t	   heard	   are	   not	   described	   or	  depicted	  together	  anywhere	  in	  the	  document;	  one	  must	  piece	  together	  remarks	  on	  different	  pages:	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On	  page	  44	  of	  the	  BFU	  report	  it	  is	  stated	  that:	  “At	  21:35:00	  hrs	  the	  MV	  computer	  of	  ACC	   Zurich	   generated	   an	   acoustic	   STCA	   message	   which	   was	   addressed	   to	   the	  workstation	  RE	  SUED.	  It	  was	  not	  heard	  by	  any	  of	  the	  staff	  members	  present	  in	  the	  control	  room”	  (BFU,	  page	  44	  [sic;	  page	  42]).	  	  	  	  	  Page	  77	  extends	  this	  analysis	  by	  revealing	  that	  the	  several	  seconds	  before	  the	  STCA	  the	   controller	   was	   already	   aware	   of	   the	   potential	   conflict	   and	   was	   taking	   action,	  which	  he	  believed	  would	  resolve	  the	  situation.	  At	  21:34:49	  and	  again	  at	  21:35:03	  he	  issued	   instructions	   for	   the	   TU154M	   to	   expedite	   a	   descent.	   It	   is	   important	   to	   note	  that	   this	   excerpt	   does	   not	   mention	   the	   STCA	   audible	   alarm	   even	   though	   the	  controller’s	   preoccupation	   with	   issuing	   descent	   instructions	   provide	   a	   cogent	  explanation	  for	  the	  failure	  to	  hear	  this	  alarm….  	  Again	   on	   page	   91	   [sic;	   page	   89],	   a	   similar	   set	   of	   observations	   is	  made.	   The	   aural	  STCA	  alert	  was	  issued	  at	  21:35:00,	  it	  was	  not	  heard	  by	  anyone.	  This	  paragraph	  does	  mention	  that	  the	  Controller	  had	  reacted	  to	  ‘resolve	  the	  conflict’	  when	  the	  alarm	  was	  issued.	  (p.	  9)	  	  Of	  particular	  importance	  is	  how	  the	  Zurich	  ATCO	  finally	  realized	  the	  collision	  danger	  causing	  him	  to	  instruct	  the	  BTC	  pilots	  to	  descend.	  This	  topic	  is	  never	  mentioned	  in	  the	  investigation	  report,	  but	  is	  essential	  for	  understanding	  how	  people	  and	  systems	  interacted,	   particularly	   to	   evaluate	   resilience	   of	   backup	   processes	   and	   redundant	  sources	  of	  information:	  The	  construction	  of	  the	  more	  detailed	  timeline	  helped	  to	  identify	  the	  importance	  of	  the	  STCA	  and	  the	  timing	  of	  the	  controller’s	  initial	  response	  to	  the	  conflict.	  It	  raises	  a	  number	  of	  questions	  that	  are	  not	  fully	  analyzed	  in	  the	  BFU	  report.	  For	  instance,	  it	  is	  
unclear	   when	   precisely	   the	   controller	   became	   aware	   of	   the	   potential	   conflict.	  Similarly,	   it	   is	   difficult	   to	   determine	   what	   might	   have	   made	   him	   aware	   of	   the	  
potential	  conflict.	  For	  instance,	  Appendix	  2	  of	  the	  BFU	  report	  indicates	  that	  the	  TCAS	  alerts	   were	   generated	   in	   the	   two	   planes	   at	   21:34:42.	   It	   does	   not	   record	   any	  communications	  that	  alerted	  the	  controller	  to	  the	  conflict	  and	  that	  might	  then	  have	  triggered	   his	   instruction	   to	   the	   TU154M	   to	   ‘expedite’	   the	   descent	   at	   21:34:49.	   It	  seems	   too	   much	   of	   a	   coincidence	   that	   the	   controller	   responded	   within	   seven	  seconds	  of	  the	  TCAS	  warning	  and	  so	  he	  may	  have	  been	  alerted	  by	  overhearing	  radio	  
communications	  [of	  the	  Russians	  communicating	  among	  themselves?].	  However,	   this	  is	  not	  explicitly	  stated	  in	  the	  BFU	  report.	  If	  he	  had	  been	  alerted	  by	  other	  systems	  or	  observations	  then	  this	  might	  add	  further	  insight	  to	  the	  report.	  (p.	  9)	  	  Johnson’s	  analysis	  of	  	  the	  importance	  of	  STCA	  alerts	  highlights	  that	  the	  BFU	  Report	  focuses	  mostly	  on	  TCAS	  interaction	  with	  pilots	  and	  omits	  how	  to	  improve	  ways	  that	  automation	  interacts	  with	  ATCOs:	  Irrespective	  of	  the	  mechanisms	  by	  which	  the	  Controller	  was	  alerted	  to	  the	  conflict,	  our	  analysis	  has	  clearly	  shown	  the	  importance	  of	  the	  STCA	  system	  in	  this	  accident.	  
The	   importance	   of	   this	   ‘safety	   net’	   is	   not	   reflected	   in	   the	   existing	   BFU	  
recommendations.	   The	   previous	   quote	   from	   paragraph	   91	   [page	   89]	   of	   the	   report	  clearly	  shows	  that	  even	  if	  the	  STCA	  warning	  had	  been	  heard	  and	  acted	  upon	  then	  it	  is	  
unlikely	   that	   the	   collision	   would	   have	   been	   avoided	   [but	   if	   the	   Optical	   STCA	   were	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operational	  it	  would	  have	  generated	  a	  visual	  warning	  sooner,	  which	  would	  have	  been	  
sufficient	  if	  heeded	  immediately].	  	  	  It	  should	  be	  recalled	  that	  Recommendations	  07/2004,	  16/2004,	  14/2004	  all	  deal	   with	   informing	   pilots	   about	   the	   operational	   strengths	   and	   weaknesses	   of	  TCAS/ACAS.	  Our	  analysis	  has	  shown	  that	  similar	  recommendations	  ought	  to	  be	  made	  
so	  that	  controllers	  are	  aware	  of	  the	  role	  that	  STCA	  played	  in	  this	  accident.	  	  It	   is	   also	   important	   to	   emphasize	   the	  diverse	  ways	   in	  which	   the	  STCA	  was	  undermined	  by	  circumstance.	  An	  STCA	  alert	  was	  generated	  at	  the	  Karlsuhe	  center	  at	  
21:33:24	   but	   could	   not	   be	   communicated	   because	   of	   problems	   with	   the	   SWI-­‐02	  telecommunications	   system.	   The	   visual	   STCA	   alert	   at	   ACC	   Zurich	   that	  would	   have	  been	  presented	  some	  two	  minutes	  before	  the	  aural	  alert	  was	  disabled	  as	  a	  result	  of	  the	  upgrade	  activities.	  	  One	   insight	   into	   the	   Überlingen	   collision	   is	   that	   current	   STCA	   systems	  provide	   a	   final	   safety	   net.	   They	   do	   not	   guarantee	   that	   controllers	   will	   be	   able	   to	  respond	  in	  time	  to	  avert	  an	  accident	  and	  hence,	  any	  use	  other	  than	  as	  a	  ‘safety	  net’	  of	  
last	  resort	  should	  be	  avoided.	  (p.	  10)	  
 These	   remarks	   underscore	   the	   importance	   of	   a	   “total	   systems”	   model	   and	  simulation	   of	   the	   systems	   and	   events,	   including	   both	   the	   ATCC	   and	   the	   cockpits,	  particularly	   so	   one	   can	   understand	   what	   people	   perceived	   and	   hence	   better	  understand	  their	  behavior.	  	  	  The	  BFU	  report	  makes	  an	  acceptable	  effort	  to	  discuss	  organizational	  factors,	  but	  is	  deficient	  in	  mentioning	  cognitive	  and	  perceptual	  cues,	  merely	  reciting	  Zurich	  ATCO	  actions	  without	  explaining	  them.	  	  Johnson	  concludes:	  
Additional	   Recommendation	   7:	  A	  subsequent	  analysis	  of	   the	  accident	   should	  be	  conducted	  to	  identify	  the	  cognitive	  and	  perceptual	  cues	  that	  helped	  the	  controller	  to	  identify	  the	  potential	  conflict.	  (p.	  21)	  	  With	  respect	  to	  organizational	  factors,	  Johnson	  argues	  that	  the	  way	  the	  Zurich	  ATCC	  management	  handled	   the	   temporary	   repair	  work	   is	   a	   systemic	   cause	   and	   is	  more	  fundamental	  than	  the	  “single	  controller”	  issue	  because	  it	  placed	  that	  controller	  in	  an	  untenable	  situation:	  The	   Chief	   controller	   briefed	   his	   two	   colleagues	   about	   the	  work	   at	   the	   start	   of	   the	  shift	  but	  did	  not	   tell	   them	  of	   the	  written	   instructions,	  mentioned	  above,	  nor	  about	  the	  additional	  staff.	  In	  consequence,	  a	  single	  controller	  was	  placed	  in	  a	  situation	  
where	  they	  believed	  they	  were	  responsible	  for	  the	  tasks	  associated	  with	  radar	  
planning,	   radar	   execution,	   shift	   supervisor	   and	   systems	   manager	   at	   a	   time	  
when	  profound	  changes	  were	  being	  made	  to	  the	  technical	  infrastructure.	  	  	  The	  BFU	  argue	  that	  the	  safety	  culture	  and	  safety	  management	  practices	  of	  the	  ATM	  service	  provide	  should	  have	  ensured	  minimum	  manning	   levels.	  However,	   it	  can	  be	  argued	   that	   overstaffing	   of	   control	   room	   environments	   can	   lead	   to	   complacency,	  boredom	   and	   fatigue	   that	   are	   themselves	   error	   inducing	   factors	   during	   quiet	  intervals	  in	  safety-­‐critical	  tasks.	  	  	  Hence,	  the	  ECF	  analysis	  …	  again	  reinforces	  the	  observation	  that	  it	  is	  not	  the	  under-­‐
manning	  itself	  that	  is	  the	  root	  cause	  of	  the	  problem.	  The	  accident	  was	  caused	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by	   a	   combination	   of	   the	   under-­‐manning	   and	   a	   failure	   to	   recognise	   the	   risks	  
associated	   with	   the	   profound	   system	   changes	   and	   lack	   of	   normal	   system	  
support	  as	  a	  consequence	  of	  the	  SYCO	  flight	  plan	  processing	  system	  upgrade.	  	  That	  is,	  the	  ATCC	  chief	  controller	  failed	  to	  carry	  out	  his	  responsibility	  because	  he	  did	  not	  perform	  actions	  that	  were	  well	  within	  his	  authority.	  Specifically,	  the	  supervisor	  could	  have	  instructed	  the	  two	  ATCOs	  to	  remain	  in	  the	  center	  until	  the	  maintenance	  work	  was	  completed.	  	  In	  particular,	  the	  following	  sequence	  of	  events	  is	  striking:	  21:00:00Z	  maintenance	  work	  begins	  to	  reconfigure	  the	  system	  21:15:00Z	  (approx.)	  the	  second	  controller	  left	  (BFU	  Report,	  p.	  42)	  21:23:00Z	  the	  remaining	  ATCO	  agreed	  for	  the	  phone	  system	  to	  be	  reconfigured,	  requiring	  use	  of	  the	  bypass	  system.	  (p.	  17)	  	  
21:35:43Z	  first	  attempt	  to	  call	  Friedrichshafen	  
21:29:25Z	  second	  attempt	  to	  call	  
21:32:50Z	  third	  attempt	  to	  call	  21:34:37Z	  the	  main	  telephone	  system	  was	  operational	  again,	  though	  ATCO	  did	  not	  know	  (p.	  17)	  The	   collision	   occurred	   at	   21:35:32.	   	   Therefore,	   the	   second	   controller	   would	   have	  
needed	  to	  delay	  his	  rest	  break	  for	  less	  than	  20	  minutes	  to	  allow	  the	  maintenance	  to	  be	  
complete,	  and	  it	  is	  likely	  the	  collision	  would	  have	  been	  averted.	  Stemming	  from	  the	  above	  and	  related	  analyses,	  Johnson	  adds	  this	  recommendation:	  Any	   risk	   based	   assessment	   of	   the	   impact	   of	   large	   scale	  maintenance	   and	   upgrade	  activities	  should	  consider	  a	  range	  of	  plausible	  worst	  case	  scenarios	  especially	  where	  there	  may	  be	  common	  causes	  of	  ‘failure’.	  In	  this	  case	  it	  was	  important	  to	  consider	  the	  
combined	   effects	   of	   the	   loss	   of	   telecommunications	   as	   well	   as	   radar	   and	   flight	   plan	  
correlation	   facilities	  rather	   than	  considering	  the	  consequences	  of	  each	  system	   loss	   in	  
isolation.	  (p.	  17)	  	  The	  sequence	  of	  scenarios	  approach	  we	  have	  adopted	  in	  designing	  and	  developing	  the	  Brahms–GÜM,	  in	  which	  scenarios	  configure	  the	  subsystems	  in	  different	  ways,	  is	  consistent	  with	  this	  recommendation.	  	  Regarding	  the	  affect	  of	  the	  distraction	  on	  monitoring	  the	  sector,	  Johnson	  notes	  that	  “The	  outcome	  of	  this	  ‘distraction’	  or	  division	  of	  attention	  [responding	  to	  the	  A320]	  was	   that	   the	   controller	   failed	   to	   observe	   the	   radar	   trace	   of	   the	   B757’s	   descent	   in	  response	   to	   the	   previous	   TCAS	   advisory”	   (p.	   18).	   	   See	   Section	   6.8.6	   for	   a	   detailed	  analysis	  of	  the	  radar	  state	  during	  the	  crucial	  sweep	  prior	  to	  the	  collision.	  In	   view	  of	   the	  Zurich	  ATC’s	   failure	   also	   to	  hear	   the	   (arguably	   late)	  DHL	   radio	   call	  about	  their	  “TCAS	  descent,”	  Johnson	  provides	  a	  communication	  recommendation	  for	  TCAS	  incidents—improved	  automation	  is	  insufficient:	  
Additional	   Recommendation	   8:	   Further	   thought	   should	   be	   given	   to	   the	   verbal	  
protocols	  governing	  the	  exchange	  of	  information	  between	  controllers	  and	  the	  crews	  of	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all	   aircraft	   involved	   in	   a	   TCAS	   incident.	   Whenever	   possible	   channels	   of	  communication	   should	   be	   kept	   clear	   until	   all	   the	   parties	   involved	   have	   confirmed	  their	  immediate	  response	  to	  the	  warnings.	  The	  BFU	  recommendation	  08/2004	  that	  RA’s	  be	  downlinked	   to	  ATCO	  does	  not	  remove	   the	  need	   for	  such	  a	  verbal	  protocol	  given	  that	  even	  the	  revised	  ICAO	  guidelines	  offer	  crews	  discretion	  in	  the	  response	  to	  an	  advisory	  if	  they	  feel	  that	  to	  follow	  the	  TCAS	  alert	  would	  endanger	  safety.	  (p.	  21-­‐22)	  
6.5 Human	  Factors	  Analysis	  and	  Classification	  of	  Causal	  Factors	  Analyses	   of	   the	   Überlingen	   accident	   suggest	   a	   variety	   of	   systemic	   and	   immediate	  causes.	  	  An	  obvious	  systemic	  cause	  of	  the	  accident	  is	  the	  missing	  air	  traffic	  controller	  in	  Zurich.	  Yet	  without	  the	  late	  arriving	  AEF	  flight	  the	  Zurich	  ATCO	  would	  have	  been	  monitoring	  the	  sector	  more	  normally	  and	  even	  with	  the	  lost	  equipment	  during	  the	  maintenance,	   would	   have	   been	   able	   to	   avert	   the	   collision.	   Similarly,	   a	   single	  controller	  could	  have	  handled	  the	  AEF	  flight	  and	  been	  done	  with	  that	  responsibility	  10	   minutes	   before	   the	   collision	   (about	   21:25:43)	   if	   the	   backup	   phones	   had	  functioned.	   Or	   if	   the	   STCA	   visible	   alert	   had	   functioned,	   other	   combinations	   of	  problems	  might	  have	  been	   tolerated.	   	  With	  so	  many	   factors	   interacting	  over	  short	  time	   intervals,	   a	   simulation	   that	  breaks	   the	   scenario	   into	   independent	   factors	  and	  examines	   how	   they	   interact	   would	   therefore	   be	   useful.	   	   To	   do	   this,	   it	   would	   be	  helpful	   to	   have	   a	   systematic	   method	   for	   organizing	   the	   known	   factors	   and	  determining	  the	  completeness	  of	  the	  failure	  analysis.	  	  The	  “Human	  Factors	  Analysis	  and	  Classification	  System”	  (HFACS)	  provides	  a	  way	  of	  organizing	  the	  causal	  factors	  in	  an	  accident	  (Shappell	  and	  Wiegmann	  2000).	  HFACS	  was	  developed	   to	  provide	   structure	   and	  detail	   to	   the	   four	   levels	   of	   human	   failure	  presented	  by	  Reason	  (1990;	  Shappell	  and	  Wiegmann	  2000,	  p.	  2):	  	  	   1) Organizational	  influences	  2) Unsafe	  supervision	  3) Preconditions	  for	  unsafe	  acts	  4) Unsafe	  acts	  of	  operators	  	  A	  hierarchical	  outline	  of	  events	  and	  causes	  provides	  a	  way	  to	  identify	  and	  organize	  the	  factors	  that	  a	  simulation	  might	  include.	  	  (See	  Section	  7.2.3	  for	  a	  critical	  analysis	  of	  the	  conventional	  sequential	  ordering	  of	  these	  levels.)	  	  The	   following	   four	   subsections	   correspond	   to	   the	   four	   levels	   of	   HFACS	   with	  Überlingen	  events	  and	  anomalies	  listed.17	  
6.5.1 HFACS	  Level	  1:	  Unsafe	  Acts	  1) Errors	  –	  unintentional	  behaviors	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  17 	  This	   particular	   HFACS	   outline	   and	   the	   descriptions	   are	   adapted	   from	   Wikipedia—	  http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Human_Factors_Analysis_and_Classification_System	  (Accessed	  2	  October	  2012).	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a) Skill-­‐Based	  Errors:	  operator’s	  execution	  of	  a	  routine,	  highly	  practiced	  task	  relating	  to	  procedure,	  training	  or	  proficiency	  results	  in	  an	  unsafe	  a	  situation	  (e.g.,	  fail	  to	  prioritize	  attention,	  checklist	  error,	  negative	  habit).	  i) Failure	  of	  Zurich	  ATCO	  to	  monitor	  larger	  airspace	  ii) Failure	  of	  Zurich	  ATCO	  to	  put	  AEF	  flight	  into	  holding	  pattern	  	   b) Decision	  Errors:	  behaviors	  or	  actions	  of	  the	  operators	  proceed	  as	  intended	  yet	  the	  chosen	  plan	  proves	  inadequate	  to	  achieve	  the	  desired	  end-­‐state	  and	  results	  in	  an	  unsafe	  situation	  (e.g.	  exceeded	  ability,	  rule-­‐based	  error,	  inappropriate	  procedure).	  i) Approval	  by	  Zurich	  ATCO	  of	  DHL	  altitude	  change	  to	  FL360	  ii) Failure	  by	  Zurich	  ATCO	  to	  use	  the	  opportunity	  of	  the	  BTC	  handoff	  (when	  he	  acknowledged	  its	  arrival	  in	  his	  sector)	  to	  resolve	  the	  eventual	  DHL	  intersection,	  especially	  given	  the	  previous	  clearance	  of	  DHL	  FL360	  and	  control	  strip	  indicating	  BTC	  FL350	  after	  TRA	  VOR	  (BFU	  Report,	  p.	  75)	  	  iii) Instructing	  BTC	  pilots	  to	  descend	  without	  knowing	  or	  confirming	  path	  of	  DHL	  (given	  TCAS	  algorithm,	  ATCO	  should	  have	  known	  that	  both	  planes	  were	  within	  seconds	  of	  TCAS	  RA	  that	  might	  overrule	  him)	  	   c) Perceptual	  Errors:	  an	  operator's	  sensory	  input	  is	  degraded	  and	  a	  decision	  is	  made	  based	  upon	  faulty	  information.	  i) Failure	  by	  Zurich	  ATCO	  to	  hear	  STCA	  audible	  alarm	  ii) Failure	  by	  Zurich	  ATCO	  to	  notice	  DHL	  and	  BTC	  flights	  on	  A	  RE	  (ARFA	  sector)	  radar	  display	  at	  least	  two	  minutes	  earlier	  than	  they	  were	  detected	  at	  S	  RE	  (left)	  workstation	  	  2) Violations	  –	  willful	  disregard	  of	  the	  rules	  and	  regulations	  a) Routine	  Violations:	  a	  habitual	  action	  on	  the	  part	  of	  the	  operator	  and	  tolerated	  by	  the	  governing	  authority.	  i) Allowing	  second	  Zurich	  ATCO	  to	  sleep	  during	  Sunday	  night	  shift	  	   b) Exceptional	  Violations:	  an	  isolated	  departure	  from	  authority,	  neither	  typical	  of	  the	  individual	  nor	  condoned	  by	  management.	  i) NONE	  
6.5.2 HFACS	  Level	  2:	  Preconditions	  for	  Unsafe	  Acts	  1) Environmental	  Factors	  –	  factors	  that	  affect	  practices,	  conditions	  and	  actions	  of	  
individual	  and	  result	  in	  human	  error	  or	  an	  unsafe	  situation	  a) Physical	  Environment:	  the	  operational	  setting	  (e.g.,	  weather,	  altitude,	  terrain)	  and	  the	  ambient	  environment	  (e.g.,	  heat,	  vibration,	  lighting,	  toxins).	  i) NONE	  	  b) Technological	  Environment:	  design	  and	  automation	  issues	  including	  the	  design	  of	  equipment	  and	  controls,	  display/interface	  characteristics,	  checklist	  layouts,	  task	  factors	  and	  automation.	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i) Handling	  AEF	  flight	  and	  larger	  Zurich	  region	  required	  using	  and	  therefore	  moving	  between	  two	  workstations	  with	  radios	  on	  different	  frequencies	  ii) Degraded	  radar	  data	  on	  display	  iii) Missing	  STCA	  Optical	  alert	  iv) Phone	  system	  including	  backup	  disabled	  (technical	  defect	  in	  bypass	  system,	  BFU	  Report,	  p.	  17)	  v) TCAS	  design	  provided	  no	  information	  to	  ATCO	  about	  pilot	  interventions	  vi) TCAS	  design/certification	  did	  not	  account	  for	  ATCO	  intervention	  between	  TA	  and	  RA	  vii) Busy	  radio	  prevented	  DHL	  pilot	  from	  reporting	  TCAS	  intervention	  viii) DHL	  flight	  level	  data	  at	  time	  of	  Zurich	  ATCO’s	  intervention	  was	  incorrect	  because	  of	  standard	  delay	  in	  radar	  sweep	  	  	  2) Condition	  of	  Operators	  –	  factors	  that	  affect	  practices,	  conditions	  or	  actions	  of	  
individuals	  and	  result	  in	  human	  error	  or	  an	  unsafe	  situation	  a) Adverse	  Mental	  State:	  mental	  conditions	  that	  affect	  performance	  (e.g.,	  stress,	  mental	  fatigue,	  motivation).	  i) Stress	  from	  attempt	  to	  follow	  handoff	  procedure	  for	  late-­‐arriving	  AEF	  flight	  without	  phones	  ii) Stress	  from	  repeated	  (four)	  calls	  by	  AEF	  flight	  when	  ATCO	  was	  attempting	  to	  monitor	  and	  deal	  with	  sector	  responsibilities	  b) Adverse	  Physiological	  State:	  medical	  or	  physiological	  conditions	  that	  affect	  performance	  (e.g.	  medical	  illness,	  physical	  fatigue,	  hypoxia).	  i) NONE	  reported	  c) Physical/Mental	  Limitation:	  operator	  lacks	  the	  physical	  or	  mental	  capabilities	  to	  cope	  with	  a	  situation,	  and	  this	  affects	  performance	  (e.g.	  visual	  limitations,	  insufficient	  reaction	  time).	  i) Inability	  to	  be	  at	  two	  workstations	  at	  the	  same	  time	  ii) Apparent	  inability	  to	  monitor	  A	  RE	  (ARFA	  Sector)	  radar	  display	  more	  broadly	  to	  detect	  DHL	  and	  BTC	  routes	  while	  tracking	  AEF	  flight	  and	  making	  repeated	  phone	  calls	  at	  the	  same	  workstation.	  	  3) Personnel	  Factors	  –	  crew	  resource	  management	  and	  personal	  readiness	  factors	  
that	  affect	  practices,	  conditions	  or	  actions	  of	  individuals,	  and	  result	  in	  human	  error	  
or	  an	  unsafe	  situation	  a) Crew	  Resource	  Management:	  communication,	  coordination,	  planning,	  and	  teamwork	  issues.	  i) Allowing	  second	  ATCO	  to	  go	  off	  duty	  even	  though	  maintenance	  had	  begun	  and	  were	  scheduled	  to	  be	  completed	  within	  a	  half	  hour	  (a	  fact	  they	  might	  have	  known	  if	  they	  asked	  or	  had	  read	  the	  briefing	  in	  the	  break	  room).	  ii) Failure	  to	  include	  in	  maintenance	  briefing	  instructions	  for	  ATCOs	  the	  effects	  on	  the	  individual	  workstations	  and	  telephones	  at	  ATCC	  Zurich	  	  (BFU	  Report,	  p.	  38)	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iii) Failure	  by	  staff	  member	  from	  the	  ATCC	  management	  (who	  “had	  been	  instructed	  to	  act	  as	  a	  coordinator	  between	  controllers	  and	  technicians,”	  BFU	  Report,	  p.	  39)	  to	  engage	  with	  Zurich	  ATCO	  	  b) Personal	  Readiness:	  off-­‐duty	  activities	  required	  to	  perform	  optimally	  on	  the	  job	  such	  as	  adhering	  to	  crew	  rest	  requirements,	  alcohol	  restrictions,	  and	  other	  off-­‐duty	  mandates.	  i) NONE	  reported	  
6.5.3 HFACS	  Level	  3:	  Unsafe	  Supervision	  
Supervision	  Factors	  a) Inadequate	  Supervision:	  The	  role	  of	  any	  supervisor	  is	  to	  provide	  their	  staff	  with	  the	  opportunity	  to	  succeed,	  and	  they	  must	  provide	  guidance,	  training,	  leadership,	  oversight,	  or	  incentives	  to	  ensure	  the	  task	  is	  performed	  safely	  and	  efficiently.	  i) Failure	  of	  Zurich	  supervisor	  to	  properly	  oversee	  and	  prepare	  ATCOs	  for	  maintenance	  process,	  including	  requiring	  both	  to	  be	  present	  (1) Failure	  to	  ensure	  that	  ATCC	  management	  coordinated	  between	  controllers	  and	  technicians	  (BFU	  Report,	  p.	  39)	  (2) Failure	  to	  inform	  ATCOs	  about	  system	  manager’s	  (SYMA)	  availability.	  who	  could	  have	  informed	  ATCO	  about	  phone	  alternative	  (BFU	  Report,	  p.	  75)	  	   b) Plan	  Inappropriate	  Operation:	  operations	  that	  can	  be	  acceptable	  and	  different	  during	  emergencies,	  but	  unacceptable	  during	  normal	  operation	  (e.g.,	  risk	  management,	  crew	  pairing,	  operational	  tempo).	  i) Zurich	  supervisor	  could	  have	  told	  both	  ATCOs	  to	  remain	  on	  duty	  during	  the	  maintenance	  process	  or	  asked	  other	  ATCC	  personnel	  (e.g.,	  SYMA)	  to	  assist	  ATCO	  in	  atypical	  manner	  (BFU	  Report,	  p.	  39;	  86)	  	   c) Fail	  to	  Correct	  Known	  Problem:	  Refers	  to	  those	  instances	  when	  deficiencies	  are	  known	  to	  the	  supervisor,	  yet	  are	  allowed	  to	  continue	  unabated	  (e.g.	  report	  unsafe	  tendencies,	  initiate	  corrective	  action,	  correct	  a	  safety	  hazard).	  i) Failure	  to	  recognize	  and	  resolve	  systemic	  issue	  during	  similar	  circumstances	  the	  prior	  year	  (the	  same	  Zurich	  ATCO	  working	  alone	  allowed	  separation	  infringement	  in	  a	  crossing	  maneuver;	  the	  error	  was	  brought	  to	  his	  attention	  by	  an	  STCA	  Optical	  alert;	  BFU	  Report,	  p.	  82)	  	   d) Supervisory	  Violation:	  Refers	  to	  those	  instances	  when	  existing	  rules	  and	  regulations	  are	  willfully	  disregarded	  by	  supervisors	  (e.g.	  enforcement	  of	  rules	  and	  regulations,	  authorized	  unnecessary	  hazard,	  inadequate	  documentation).	  i) Reduction	  of	  ATCC	  workforce	  to	  one	  ATCO	  during	  Sunday	  evenings	  allowed	  by	  skyguide	  (BFU	  Report,	  p.	  92)	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6.5.4 HFACS	  Level	  4:	  Organizational	  Influences	  
Organizational	  Factors	  a) Resource	  Management:	  organizational-­‐level	  decision-­‐making	  regarding	  the	  allocation	  and	  maintenance	  of	  organizational	  assets	  (e.g.	  human	  resources,	  monetary/budget	  resources,	  equipment/facility	  recourse).	  ii) Skyguide	  reduction	  of	  workforce	  in	  ATCC	  (BFU	  Report,	  p.	  92)	  	   b) Organizational	  Climate:	  working	  atmosphere	  within	  the	  organization	  (e.g.	  structure,	  policies,	  culture).	  i) Overly	  rigid	  roles	  in	  ATCC,	  apparently	  without	  enabling	  informal	  assistance	  in	  time	  of	  emergencies	  	   c) Operational	  Process:	  organizational	  decisions	  and	  rules	  that	  govern	  the	  everyday	  activities	  within	  an	  organization	  (e.g.	  operations,	  procedures,	  oversight).	  i) Failure	  by	  skyguide	  to	  require	  Zurich	  supervisor	  to	  manage	  maintenance	  process	  	  	  ii) Implementation	  by	  skyguide	  of	  Single	  Man	  Operation	  Procedure	  (SMOP)	  during	  day	  operations,	  despite	  regulatory	  objections,	  which	  was	  unofficially	  adopted	  for	  the	  night	  shift	  when	  a	  supervisor	  would	  assist	  by	  monitoring	  the	  traffic,	  and	  then	  continued	  when	  the	  supervisor	  position	  was	  eliminated	  and	  the	  staff	  was	  reduced	  to	  two	  ATCOs	  (BFU	  Report,	  p.	  92).	  
6.6 Causal	  Tree	  Analysis	  The	  HFCAS	  analysis	  is	  useful	  for	  eliciting	  factors	  that	  affect	  an	  accident,	  particularly	  for	   relating	   on	   the	   spot	   errors	   to	   broader	   contextual	   causes	   in	   design	   and	  operations.	   However,	   creating	   a	   simulation	   model	   requires	   understanding	   the	  multiple,	  ongoing	  processes	  and	  how	  they	  causally	  affect	  each	  other.	  The	  following	  outline	   was	   constructed	   for	   identifying	   what	   roles,	   equipment/automation,	   and	  events	   might	   be	   included	   in	   the	   simulation.	   	   This	   analysis	   begins	   to	   define	   the	  different	  states	  of	  systems	  and	  what	  people	  knew	  and	  did.	  	  Explanations	  of	  what	  did	  not	  occur	  are	  not	  necessary	  to	  replicate	  the	  accident,	  but	  insofar	  as	  they	  represent	  nominal	   behaviors	   or	   “best	   practices,”	   they	   are	   included	   for	   generality	   in	   the	  simulation,	  broadening	  the	  space	  of	  scenarios	  the	  model	  can	  simulate.	  	  	  	  In	  this	  informal	  outline,	   items	  (indented)	  indicate	  “immediate”	  causes	  contributing	  to	   the	   parent	   item,	   that	   is,	   they	   play	   a	   direct	   physical	   and/or	   temporal	   role	   in	  subsequent	   events.	   	   For	   example,	   the	   DHL	   aircraft	   descended	   because	   the	   pilots	  followed	  the	  TCAS	  instruction;	  they	  did	  not	  immediately	  communicate	  this	  action	  to	  the	   Zurich	   ATC;	   and	   they	   apparently	   did	   not	   hear	   or	   interpret	   the	   ATCO’s	   urgent	  instruction	   to	   the	   BTC	   to	   also	   descend	   as	   relating	   to	   the	   TCAS	   alert	   or	   their	  trajectory.	   	  Contributing	  factors	  were	  that	  the	  DHL	  pilot	  not	  flying	  (PNF)	  had	  been	  out	   of	   the	   cockpit	  when	   the	  TA	   sounded	   (BFU	  Report,	   pp.	   92-­‐93),	   and	  when	   they	  attempted	  to	  communicate	  with	  ATCO	  the	  radio	  frequency	  was	  busy.	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• Collision	  
o DHLX	  611	  descended	  
§ TCAS	  instruction	  to	  descend	  was	  followed	  by	  the	  crew	  
§ Crew	  had	  no	  interaction	  with	  ATCO	  during	  this	  time	  
• Crew	  did	  not	  notice	  how	  ATCO’s	  instruction	  to	  BTC	  2397	  to	  descend	  related	  to	  their	  situation	  
o PNF	  (co-­‐pilot)	  had	  been	  away	  from	  his	  seat	  and	  on	  return	  was	  busy	  handling	  TCAS	  TA	  
§ Crew	  unable	  to	  communicate	  with	  ATCO	  when	  they	  attempted	  
• Zurich	  ATCO	  radio	  was	  busy	  	  
o BTC	  2397	  descended	  
§ BTC	  2397	  TCAS	  RA	  (“climb”)	  was	  generated	  after	  ATCO	  instruction	  to	  descend	  	  
§ Crew	  did	  not	  view	  subsequent	  TCAS	  instruction	  as	  overriding	  ATCO.	  
§ ATCO	  repeatedly	  instructed	  BTC	  2397	  to	  descend	  
• ATCO	  neglected	  control	  of	  BTC	  and	  DHL;	  he	  neither	  noticed	  the	  descent	  of	  the	  B757	  nor	  did	  he	  hear	  their	  radio	  message	  reporting	  a	  TCAS	  descent.	  
o ATCO	  	  distracted	  by	  AEF	  1135	  requiring	  using	  a	  different	  workstation	  
§ Phone	  system	  not	  operative	  so	  unable	  to	  transfer	  the	  flight	  to	  Friedrichshafen	  
• ATCO	  not	  informed	  about	  the	  presence	  of	  a	  SYMA	  who	  would	  have	  been	  able	  to	  suggest	  an	  alternative	  
§ Failed	  to	  put	  AEF	  into	  holding	  pattern	  
§ Failed	  to	  monitor	  ongoing	  flights	  in	  sector	  
o ATCO	  unable	  to	  safely	  execute	  all	  of	  the	  tasks	  required	  by	  two	  ATCO	  positions	  during	  this	  period	  
§ Second	  ATCO	  was	  absent	  from	  his	  position	  
§ Unaware	  of	  maintenance	  and	  its	  implications	  
• Supervisor	  did	  not	  brief	  ATCOs	  
• ATCOs	  didn’t	  read	  the	  memo	  
• Memo	  did	  not	  mention	  loss	  of	  STCA	  Optical	  alert	  
§ Maintenance	  caused	  unintended	  loss	  of	  backup	  (“bypass”)	  phones	  
§ ATCO	  didn’t	  review	  equipment	  status	  after	  maintenance	  began	  
• ATCO	  could	  have	  asked	  SYMA	  to	  review	  system	  status	   	  
• ATCO	  didn’t	  know	  DHLX	  611	  was	  following	  TCAS	  instruction	  to	  descend	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o DHL	  unable	  to	  radio	  because	  ATCO	  was	  talking	  to	  BTC	  
§ Design	  of	  radio	  system	  prevented	  three-­‐way	  conversations	  	  
• ATCO	  was	  not	  alerted	  of	  the	  impending	  collision	  risk	  because	  the	  optical	  STCA	  was	  not	  available	  
o DHL	  FL	  information	  (“now	  at	  360”)	  was	  incorrect	  because	  radar	  image	  was	  delayed	  	  
o ATCO	  inadvertently	  put	  BTC	  and	  DHL	  on	  collision	  path	  
§ After	  previously	  allowing	  DHL	  to	  change	  altitude	  to	  FL	  360,	  did	  not	  notice	  when	  BTC	  first	  reported	  a	  course	  change	  to	  Zurich	  that	  put	  both	  planes	  at	  the	  same	  altitude	  and	  approaching	  at	  64	  NM	  
§ Did	  not	  use	  the	  handoff	  opportunity	  to	  instruct	  BTC	  to	  descend	  to	  FL	  350,	  which	  the	  control	  strip	  showed	  after	  Trasadingen	  VOR	  	  	  
o The	  Karlsruhe	  ATCO	  did	  not	  avert	  the	  collision	  	  
§ The	  faulty	  phone	  lines	  prevented	  the	  Karlsruhe	  ATCO	  from	  contacting	  the	  Zurich	  ATCO	  about	  the	  impending	  collision.	  
§ The	  Karlsruhe	  ATCO	  followed	  a	  protocol	  that	  forbid	  contacting	  the	  DHL	  or	  BTC	  pilots	  directly	  on	  an	  emergency	  frequency	  (apparently	  even	  to	  prevent	  a	  collision),	  without	  coordinating	  first	  with	  the	  responsible	  controller.18	  	  In	  summary,	  referring	  to	  this	  outline,	  a	  simulation	  of	  the	  Überlingen	  events	  should	  include	   the	   roles	   (e.g.,	   Zurich	   ATC,	   pilots)	   and	   all	   of	   the	   systems	   named	   in	   this	  outline	   (TCAS,	   phones,	   radar,	   etc.).	   Off-­‐nominal	   states	  must	   be	  modeled.	   Nominal	  behaviors	   that	   are	   prevented	   from	   occurring	   should	   also	   be	   simulated	   (e.g.,	   DHL	  pilots	   attempt	   to	   notify	   the	   ATCO	   about	   TCAS	   RA),	   such	   that	   if	   conditions	   are	  different	   in	   a	   particular	   simulation	   run	   (scenario),	   a	   different	   sequence	   of	   events	  might	  occur.	  	  Sections	  8.6	  explains	  this	  “sequence	  of	  scenarios”	  approach	  and	  how	  it	  is	  implemented	  in	  a	  Brahms	  model.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  18	  "The	  UAC	  Karlsruhe	  has	   a	   possibility	   of	   selecting	   the	   international	   emergency	   frequency	  121.50	  MHz….	  Prior	  to	   initiating	  activities	  outside	  their	  own	  area	  of	  responsibility,	   the	  controllers	  must,	   in	  accordance	   with	   the	   effective	   regulations,	   coordinate	   them	   with	   the	   responsible	   controller,	   who,	  however,	  was	  not	  reachable"	  (BFU	  Report,	  p.	  44).	  	  “The	  BFU	  is	  of	   the	  opinion	  that	  UAC	  Karlsruhe	  exhausted	  all	  possibilities	  to	  prevent	  the	   impending	  collision.	  The	  possibility	  of	  transmitting	  a	  warning	  to	  the	  aircraft	  in	  form	  of	  a	  blind	  transmission	  on	  the	  emergency	  frequency	  121.50	  MHz	  was	  not	  taken	  into	  consideration	  by	  good	  reason.	  This	  would	  have	   been	   contradictory	   to	   the	   regulations	   in	   force,	  would	   certainly	   have	   led	   to	   a	   confusion	   of	   all	  parties	  involved.	  It	  would	  not	  have	  prevented	  the	  collision	  with	  a	  very	  high	  probability	  particularly	  since	  it	  could	  not	  be	  clarified	  whether	  in	  one	  of	  the	  two	  airplanes	  this	  frequency	  had	  been	  selected	  at	  all”	  (BFU	  Report,	  p.	  77)	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6.7 What	  Could	  Have	  Happened—Alternative	  “What	  If”	  Scenarios	  As	   indicated	   by	   the	   previous	   sections,	   most	   analyses	   of	   the	   Überlingen	   accident	  focus	  on	  contributing	  causes.	  This	  section	  illustrates	  how	  one	  can	  create	  a	  nominal	  
model	   by	   turning	  around	  a	   failure	  analysis	   to	   consider	  what	   could	  have	  happened	  instead	   of	   the	   actual	   sequence	   of	   events.	   By	   seeking	   to	   understand	   what	   factors	  caused	  the	  actual	  events	  to	  unfold,	  insight	  can	  be	  gained	  about	  psychological	  factors	  in	   play	   at	   the	   time	   (e.g.,	   focus	   of	   attention,	   people’s	   beliefs)	   and	   logical-­‐practical	  constraints	   (e.g.,	   the	   effect	   of	   the	   radar	   sweep	   delay).	   	   The	   nature	   of	   timing	   and	  interactions	  among	  processes	  becomes	  clearer.	  As	  a	  way	  of	  beginning	  a	  “what	  if”	  analysis,	  one	  might	  begin	  with	  the	  two	  “immediate	  causes	  cited	  by	  the	  BFU	  Report	  (p.	  110):	  	  	   1. The	  Zurich	  ATCO	  failed	  to	  monitor	  and	  maintain	  focus	  on	  the	  BTC	  and	  DHL	  flights	  in	  his	  sector.	  2. The	  BTC	  crew	  failed	  to	  follow	  the	  TCAS	  resolution	  advisory.	  	  Creating	   a	   model	   of	   what	   might	   have	   happened	   differently	   requires	   identifying	  alternative	   strategies	   (approaches)	   for	   handling	   the	   situation,	   assuming	   that	   the	  same	  people	  are	   involved	  (e.g.,	  one	  Zurich	  ATCO),	   they	  have	  the	  same	  information	  available	  in	  the	  actual	  events	  (e.g.,	  what	  is	  presented	  on	  the	  radar	  display),	  and	  the	  equipment	   available	   in	   Zurich	  ATCC	   is	   also	   off-­‐nominal.	   Focusing	   on	  what	   people	  could	  have	  done	  differently,	  a	  “what	  if”	  analysis	  is	  presented	  here	  in	  outline	  form	  as	  a	  series	  of	  questions	  and	  examples	  of	  alternative	  behaviors.	  	  Each	  list	  of	  alternatives	  begins	  with	  a	  null	  hypothesis	  that	  the	  actual	  event/behavior	  was	  inevitable.	  
6.7.1 What	  could	  have	  happened	  differently	  in	  Zurich	  ATCC?	  	  	  The	  BFU	  Report	  comments	  why	  the	  Zurich	  ATCO	  didn’t	  act	  differently:	  	  	   Generally	  it	  would	  have	  been	  possible	  for	  the	  controller	  to	  safely	  handle	  the	  traffic	  consisting	  of	  three	  airplanes	  at	  the	  time	  of	  the	  accident.	  The	  controller	  came	  to	  the	  same	  conclusion	  and	  did	  not	  ask	  for	  support	  from	  his	  colleague	  in	  the	  lounge.	  This	  decision	   was	   probably	   based	   on	   his	   experience	   regarding	   a	   smooth	   course	   of	  operation	  and	  did	  not	  take	  into	  consideration	  possible	  problems,	  such	  as	  the	  failure	  of	  the	  telephone	  system.	  
 Once	  he	  realized	  the	  problem	  with	  the	  inoperative	  telephone	  system	  it	  was	  already	  too	  late	  to	  alert	  the	  colleague.	  The	  repeated	  attempt	  to	  phone	  Friedrichshafen	  about	  the	   arrival	   of	   the	   A320	   diverted	   his	   attention	   longer	   than	   intended	   from	   the	  proactive	  traffic	  control	  of	  the	  two	  other	  airplanes.	  	  (p.	  105) 	  These	   explanations	   aside,	   what	   are	   the	   logical	   variations	   possible	   in	   the	   ATCO’s	  behavior—what	  could	  he	  have	  done	  differently	  that	  might	  have	  made	  a	  difference?	  	  1. Nothing	  would	  make	  a	  difference	  (i.e.,	  the	  situation	  is	  untenable):	  	  a. Workload	  was	  too	  much	  for	  one	  person;	  an	  alternative	  would	  have	  endangered	  other	  flights	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b. Circumstances	  are	  too	  complex:	  Any	  alternative	  would	  cause	  a	  conflict/situation	  that	  is	  not	  permitted.	  	  2. Strategize	  attention	  differently	  by	  reframing	  conceptually	  what	  he	  was	  doing:	  a. Realizing	  the	  extreme	  danger,	  stay	  focused	  on	  the	  DHL	  and	  BTC	  flights	  after	  detecting	  danger,	  putting	  everything	  else	  on	  hold,	  until	  he	  had	  confirmed	  definitively	  that	  separation	  was	  assured:	  i. would	  have	  required	  10-­‐20	  seconds	  to	  confirm	  on	  radar	  and/or	  ii. would	  have	  entailed	  contacting	  DHL	  to	  determine	  their	  situation	  	  	  b. Realizing	  that	  he	  had	  multiple	  flights	  and	  levels	  to	  monitor,	  more	  quickly	  disengage	  from	  the	  attempt	  to	  call	  Friedrichshafen	  Tower:	  i. Noticing	  the	  collision	  danger	  sooner	  would	  have	  made	  a	  difference:	  	  	  	  21:33:49Z—This	   is	   the	   latest	   time	   at	   which	   Zurich	   ATCO	   should	   have	  given	   BTC	   2937	   the	   instruction	   to	   descend	   to	   FL	   350	   -­‐	   i.e.	   at	   least	   one	  minute	  before	  this	  instruction	  was	  actually	  given	  (BFU	  Report,	  p.	  75).	  	  	   ii. However,	  the	  BFU	  Report	  claims	  that	  he	  was	  appropriately	  assigning	  higher	  priority	  to	  handling	  the	  AEF	  flight	  (A320):	  	  	  At	  first	  the	  ATCO	  assigned	  a	  high	  priority	  to	  the	  task	  of	  handling	  the	  A320	  arriving	   late	   at	   Friedrichshafen,	   as	   evidenced	   in	   his	   preparation	   for	   the	  ARFA	  sector	  and	  attempt	  to	  coordinate	  with	  Friedrichshafen.	  This	  was	   in	  accordance	   with	   the	   requirements	   of	   the	   ATM	   Manual	   but	   it	   distracted	  from	  the	  task	  of	  evaluating	  and	  planning	  the	  upper	  air	  situation	  (p.	  84).	  	  3. Categorize	  the	  conflict	  situation	  differently	  and	  act	  accordingly:	  a. Very	  likely,	  by	  the	  time	  Zurich	  ATCO	  detected	  the	  conflict,	  the	  only	  course	  of	  action	  that	  would	  prevent	  collision	  was	  advising	  BTC	  to	  climb	  i. Was	  the	  suggestion	  to	  BTC	  to	  descend	  based	  on	  a	  recency	  effect	  because	  he	  more	  recently	  communicated	  with	  BTC	  than	  DHL	  about	  FL360	  (at	  21:30:28Z)?	  b. Recognizing	  his	  broader	  responsibilities,	  the	  Zurich	  ATCO	  could	  have	  put	  the	  AEF	  flight	  into	  a	  holding	  pattern	  so	  that	  he	  could	  properly	  monitor	  the	  other	  flights	  and	  get	  assistance.	  	  4. Get	  assistance	  of	  other	  Zurich	  ATC:	  a. Realizing	  the	  multiple	  obstacles	  to	  getting	  and	  giving	  information,	  he	  could	  have	  asked	  the	  Zurich	  ATCC	  CA	  to	  get	  the	  resting	  controller	  as	  soon	  as	  he	  was	  told	  that	  maintenance	  would	  be	  occurring	  and	  requiring	  use	  of	  backup	  	  b. Ask	  ATCC	  to	  spend	  more	  time	  resolving	  the	  communication	  problem,	  which	  might	  have	  included	  the	  CA	  consulting	  the	  manual:	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When	   the	   ATCO	   could	   not	   contact	   Friedrichshafen	   on	   the	   Bypass	   system	   he	  asked	  one	  of	  the	  CAs	  to	  find	  out	  another	  phone	  number.	  When	  he	  had	  no	  success	  with	   this	   number	   he	   discussed	   the	   options	   of	   relaying	   the	   information	   via	  Munich	  or	  contacting	  the	  technicians,	  before	  settling	  for	  the	  option	  of	  asking	  the	  crew	   of	   the	   A320	   to	   contact	   Friedrichshafen	   directly.	   The	   Emergency	  Manual	  listed	   the	   three	   phone	   systems	   available	   to	   ATM	   staff,	   but	   the	   ATCO	  was	   not	  aware	  of	  this,	  so	  did	  not	  consider	  the	  use	  of	  the	  mobile	  phone	  at	  DL’s	  suite.(BFU	  Report,	  p.	  83)	  
6.7.2 What	  could	  have	  happened	  differently	  in	  the	  BTC	  cockpit?	  	  	  That	  is,	  what	  could	  the	  Russian	  crew	  have	  done	  differently?	  
	  1. Nothing	  would	  make	  a	  difference	  (the	  situation	  is	  untenable):	  	  a. They	  were	  already	  following	  the	  controller’s	  instruction	  prior	  to	  TCAS	  RA;	  it	  was	  already	  too	  late	  to	  change	  the	  aircraft’s	  direction.	  	  (This	  was	  not	  the	  case.)	  b. The	  Zurich	  ATCO	  did	  not	  know	  about	  TCAS	  RA	  and	  might	  have	  continued	  to	  repeat	  “Expedite”	  instructions	  that	  could	  not	  be	  ignored.	  	  2. First	  officer	  sitting	  behind	  the	  commander	  on	  the	  left	  could	  have	  been	  more	  forceful	  about	  following	  TCAS:	  	  21:34:59Z-­‐-­‐BTC	   2937	   the	   copilot	   stated:	   “It	   (TCAS)	   says	   (говорит):	   “climb“.	   The	   PIC	  replied:	   “He	   (ATC)	   is	   guiding	   us	   down“.	   The	   copilot's	   enquiring	   response:	   “descend?“	  (BFU	  Report,	  p.	  8).	  	  3. Russian	  crew	  could	  have	  followed	  TCAS,	  believing	  it	  was	  the	  final	  word	  and	  over-­‐ruled	  anything	  instructed	  by	  a	  controller.	  	  As	   noted	   in	   the	   previous	   section,	   the	   Karlsruhe	   controller	   might	   have	   acted	  differently	   by	   contacting	   the	   pilots	   of	   the	   DHL	   and/or	   BTC	   directly.	   But	   this	  intervention	  is	  so	  problematic	  it	  is	  not	  included	  in	  the	  Brahms	  simulation	  reported	  here.	  While	  physically	  possible,	  it	  is	  contrary	  to	  ATC	  rules	  and	  practice.	  
6.7.3 Implications	  of	  “What	  if”	  analysis	  for	  model	  design	  The	  above	  exercise	  provides	  a	  set	  of	  requirements	  for	  how	  parts	  of	  the	  work	  system	  should	  be	  modeled	  so	  it	  has	  flexibility	  (can	  be	  reconfigured)	  for	  modeling	  different	  scenarios.	  	  For	  example,	  the	  alternative	  realities	  we	  would	  like	  to	  simulate	  include:	  	  	  
• DHL	  pilots	  attempt	  to	  radio	  Zurich	  ATCO	  about	  TCAS	  RA	  and	  aircraft	  altitude	  change	  	  immediately	  after	  following	  TCAS	  instruction.	  
• When	  BTC	  first	  reported	  to	  Zurich,	  ATCO	  notices	  that	  planes	  are	  at	  same	  altitude	  and	  approaching	  at	  64	  NM;	  ATCO	  uses	  the	  handoff	  opportunity	  to	  instruct	  BTC	  to	  descend	  to	  FL	  350,	  which	  the	  control	  strip	  showed	  after	  Trasadingen	  VOR.	  
• Backup	  phones	  actually	  work	  during	  the	  maintenance	  period;	  the	  Zurich	  ATCO	  uses	  the	  backup	  phone	  to	  call	  Friedrichshafen.	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• Zurich	  ATCO	  checks	  phones	  immediately	  after	  maintenance	  begins	  and	  detects	  a	  problem;	  maintenance	  procedure	  is	  immediately	  halted.	  
• Zurich	  ATCO	  puts	  AEF	  into	  holding	  pattern	  on	  first	  noticing	  all	  phones	  are	  out;	  thus	  he	  prioritizes	  monitoring	  the	  broader	  sector.	  	  Each	  of	  these	  variations	  involves	  one	  or	  more	  behaviors	  of	  people	  and/or	  systems	  that	  did	  not	  occur	  at	  Überlingen	  that	  should	  be	   included	  in	  the	  generalized	  model.	  	  These	  might	  all	  be	  construed	  as	  “nominal”	  or	  “best	  practices.”	  	  	  	  Because	  of	  project	  staffing	  limitations,	  the	  model	  cannot	  contain	  at	  first	  everything	  that	  might	  have	  happened	  differently	  to	  avoid	  the	  accident.	  	  Emphasis	  is	  placed	  first	  on	  simulating	  the	  complex	  interactions	  that	  did	  occur	  and	  exploring	  the	  sensitivity	  of	  the	  Überlingen	  work	  system	  configuration	  to	  circumstantial	  variations	  of	  timing	  and	   probability	   represented	   in	   the	   model.	   	   Small	   changes,	   such	   as	   the	   ATCO’s	  frequency	  of	  monitoring	  the	  broader	  sector,	  might	  be	  more	  interesting	  to	  explore	  at	  first	   than	   “adding	  back”	   tools	  and	  automation	   (e.g.,	   STCA	  optical	   alert)	   that	  would	  have	  very	  likely	  prevented	  the	  collision.	  However,	  the	  process	  of	  creating	  a	  general	  model	   involves	   including	  all	  of	   the	  behavior	  variations	   listed	  above	  and	  more,	  and	  systematically	   verifying	   that	   different	   combinations	   interact	   properly	   (e.g.,	   if	   the	  backup	   phone	   works,	   the	   Zurich	   ATCO	   uses	   it	   at	   the	   appropriate	   time)	   and	  validating	  that	  simulation	  outcomes	  are	  plausible.	  
6.8 Crucial	  Nature	  of	  Timing/Sequencing	  of	  Events	  The	   Überlingen	   narrative	   clearly	   shows	   that	   timing	   played	   a	   critical	   role	   in	   the	  outcome.	   	  Therefore,	  analysis	  and	  simulation	  modeling	  must	  pay	  close	  attention	  to	  what	  events	  occurred	  “late”	  or	  interacted	  because	  they	  were	  simultaneous,	  as	  well	  as	  what	  preceding	  factors	  affected	  these	  timings.	  	  	  	  Some	   activities,	   such	   as	   the	   scheduled	   maintenance,	   persisted	   throughout	   the	  critical	   period	  of	   the	   approaching	  DHL,	  BTC,	   and	  AEF	   aircraft.	   	   The	  phone	   system	  was	  not	  operating	  for	  17	  minutes,	  and	  this	  occurred	  when	  AEF	  1135	  needed	  to	  be	  handed	  over	   to	   the	   tower	  controller.	   	  We	  do	  not	  model	  or	  allow	  to	  vary	  when	  the	  maintenance	   occurs,	   but	   rather	   the	   model	   can	   be	   configured	   (initialized)	   to	  represent	   the	   implications	   of	   the	  maintenance.	   That	   is,	   anomalous	   configurations	  (e.g.,	   STCA	   optical	   and	   non-­‐functioning	   telephones)	   can	   be	   varied	   to	   define	   a	  scenario.	  This	  approach	  follows	  from	  not	  simulating	  the	  maintenance	  activity	  itself,	  for	   example	   to	   simulate	   how	   the	   engineers’	   actions	   caused	   the	   phones	   to	   be	  disabled.	   This	   is	   a	   general	   approach	   for	   constructing	   “dispositions”	   of	   objects	   and	  people	   in	   a	   Brahms	   model—discrete	   known	   states	   and/or	   behaviors	   can	   be	  modeled	  and	   configured	   rather	   simulating	   the	  history	  of	   events	   that	   caused	   those	  states/behaviors.	  	  Many	  of	  the	  key	  events,	  such	  as	  what	  the	  Zurich	  ATCO	  perceived	  on	  a	  radar	  display	  at	  a	  given	  time,	  are	  not	  documented	  and	  must	  be	  reconstructed—these	  assumptions	  can	  have	  a	   large	  effect	  on	  the	  outcome	  (particularly	  whether	  and	  when	  the	  Zurich	  ATCO	   intervenes	   to	   avoid	   a	   collision).	   Also	   the	   duration	   of	   many	   activities	   is	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circumstantial	   (e.g.,	   time	   it	   takes	   Zurich	   ATCO	   to	   speak	   to	   assistant	   about	   phone	  number),	   	   and	   hence	   these	  will	   be	   probabilistic	   (random	  distribution	   over	   a	  min-­‐max	  range);	  even	  a	  few	  seconds	  variance	  from	  one	  simulation	  run	  to	  the	  next	  (using	  the	  same	  scenario)	  could	  cause	  different	  outcomes.	  	  	  We	  knew	  of	  course	  such	  variability	  could	  be	  a	  property	  of	  a	  Brahms	  simulation,	  but	  Brahms-­‐GÜM	   is	   the	   first	   time	   we	   have	   encountered	   such	   critical	   temporal	  interactions.	   	   The	   variability	   itself	  makes	   Brahms-­‐GÜM	   an	   excellent	   candidate	   for	  model	  checking	  to	  explore	  and	  formalize	  how	  events	  interact.	  	  	  	  This	   section	   outlines	   kinds	   of	   temporal	   interactions	   and	   describes	   the	   most	  important	   aspects	   of	   the	   simulation	   in	   which	   timing	   of	   events	   needed	   to	   be	  analyzed,	  reconstructed	  in	  detail,	  and	  assumptions	  made	  in	  the	  model.	  	  
6.8.1 Temporal	  aspects	  of	  the	  scenario	  The	   interactions	   and	   events	   leading	   up	   to	   the	   collision	   have	   a	   wide	   variety	   of	  temporal	  relations	  that	  are	  modeled	  in	  Brahms-­‐GÜM:	  	  
• Parallel	  –	  processes	  occurring	  independently	  at	  the	  same	  time	  in	  their	  own	  space,	  e.g.,	  the	  planes	  are	  flying	  with	  their	  own	  flight	  systems	  independently	  of	  each	  other	  
• Simultaneous	  –	  processes	  that	  occur	  at	  the	  same	  time	  but	  overstep	  each	  other	  in	  the	  same	  space,	  e.g.,	  	  TCAS	  RA	  to	  “Climb!”	  overlaps	  last	  second	  of	  Zurich	  ATCO	  “descend	  –	  expedite”	  to	  Russians,	  and	  also	  overlaps	  their	  action	  to	  disengage	  autopilot.	  
• Sequence	  –	  a	  process	  with	  established	  ordered	  steps,	  e.g.,	  Zurich	  ATCO	  observes	  flight	  exiting	  his	  sector,	  he	  calls	  them	  instructing	  	  to	  contact	  next	  ATCC	  with	  a	  given	  frequency;	  they	  acknowledge.	  
• Periodicity	  –	  the	  regular	  rhythm	  of	  a	  process,	  a	  pattern	  of	  state	  changes	  or	  variations	  in	  intensity,	  e.g.,	  the	  generally	  quiet	  period	  on	  Sunday	  evening	  with	  few	  flights	  in	  the	  Zurich	  airspace	  and	  no	  planes	  landing	  locally,	  contrasted	  with	  Monday	  morning,	  which	  affected	  the	  staffing	  choice	  of	  single	  person	  operation	  at	  the	  time	  of	  the	  Überlingen	  accident.	  
• Phases	  –	  relatively	  prolonged	  system	  states/processes;	  the	  system	  exists	  in	  different	  phases	  of	  operation/behavior,	  well-­‐defined	  for	  designed	  systems,	  e.g.,	  TCAS	  phases:	  indicating	  on	  monitor	  another	  flight	  nearby	  prior	  to	  TA;	  phase	  after	  TA;	  phase	  after	  RA.	  	  Phases	  in	  human	  behavior	  correspond	  to	  Brahms	  “activities.”	  
• Temporary	  –	  a	  process/role	  that	  is	  in	  effect	  for	  a	  particular	  period,	  e.g.,	  “pilot	  flying”	  or	  Zurich	  ATCO	  being	  responsible	  for	  the	  entire	  airspace	  while	  his	  partner	  is	  on	  break.	  
• Permanent	  –	  a	  fixed	  process/role	  associated	  with	  a	  job,	  object,	  or	  setting,	  e.g.,	  how	  TCAS	  operates;	  how	  Zurich	  ATCO	  must	  handle	  flights	  landing	  locally	  at	  night.	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6.8.2 Effect	  of	  departure	  time	  on	  collision	  Regarding	  ultimate	  causes	  of	  the	  accident,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  observe	  that	  if	  either	  or	  both	   flights	  had	  departed	  on	  time	  (BTC	  was	  18	  minutes	   late;	  DHL	  6	  minutes	   late),	  the	  planes	  would	  not	  have	  collided.	  	  For	  example,	  if	  the	  Russian	  flight	  had	  departed	  on	   time,	   it	   would	   have	   been	   about	   164	  miles	   closer	   to	   Barcelona	   when	   the	   DHL	  plane	   reached	   the	   point	   of	   intersection	   of	   their	   flight	   paths.	   	   Similarly,	   if	   the	  DHL	  flight	  had	  departed	  on	   time,	   it	  would	  have	  been	  about	  53	  miles	   closer	   to	  Brussels	  when	  the	  Russian	  plane	  reached	  the	  point	  of	  intersection.	  Based	  on	  their	  field	  cruise	  speeds	  of	  463	  kt	  and	  470	  kt	  (or	  roughly	  7	  nm/min),	  a	  one	  
minute	   difference	   on	   route	   for	   either	   of	   the	   planes	   would	   have	   prevented	   the	  collision.	  	  	  
6.8.3 Effect	  of	  timing	  on	  following	  ATCO	  vs.	  TCAS	  Presumably	   the	   Zurich	   ATCO	   contacted	   the	   BTC	   because	   he	   noticed	   the	   DHL	   and	  BTC	   aircraft	   on	   the	   radar	   display	   (if	   STCA	   Optical	   alert	   had	   been	   functioning,	   it	  would	   have	   alerted	   him	   much	   sooner).	   	   However,	   we	   do	   not	   know	   which	   radar	  display	   he	   was	   observing	   (left	   or	   right	   workstation)	   and	   why	   he	   perceived	   the	  imminent	  collision	  at	  this	  moment.	  Both	  aircraft	  were	  visible	  on	  the	  radar	  displays	  of	  both	  workstations	  for	  some	  time	  prior	  to	  his	  recognition	  of	  the	  problem.	  	  	  	  The	  timing	  of	   the	  ATCO	  perceiving	  the	  aircraft	   locations,	   judging	  that	  a	  separation	  violation	  will	  occur,	  and	  intervening	  by	  advising	  the	  pilot(s)	   is	  of	  course	  pivotal	   in	  preventing	   a	   collision.	   	   Given	   the	   simultaneous,	   independent	   operation	   of	   TCAS	  onboard	   the	   aircraft,	   the	   intervention	   	   could	   occur	   before	   or	   after	   a	   TA	   or	   RA.	   In	  general	  of	  course,	  no	  collision	  will	  occur	  if	  the	  ATCO	  notices	  a	  conflict,	  instructs	  an	  aircraft,	   and	   the	   pilots	   react	   promptly	   before	   a	   TCAS	   TA.	   Furthermore,	   if	   ATCO	  intervenes	  soon	  after	  a	  TA	  and	  before	  a	  TCAS	  RA,	  then	  whether	  pilots	  allow	  ATCO	  to	  overrule	   TCAS	   instruction	   could	   be	   irrelevant—the	   pilots	   could	   take	   action	  sufficiently	  before	  the	  RA	  such	  that	  the	  RA	  takes	  into	  account	  their	  current	  change	  in	  altitude	  (that	  is,	  if	  still	  required,	  the	  advice	  would	  be	  consistent	  with	  their	  respective	  current	   trajectories,	   e.g.,	   BTC	   would	   be	   descending).	   Thus	   the	   timing	   of	   the	  intervention	   relative	   to	   the	   RA	   can	   be	   expected	   to	   affect	   the	   outcome,	   with	   this	  timing	  becoming	  more	  critical	   if	  the	  pilots	  allow	  the	  ATCO	  instruction	  to	  dominate	  (ignoring	  TCAS	  RA)	  as	  occurred	  at	  Überlingen.	  	  	  The	  analysis	  of	   timing	   is	   actually	   a	  bit	  more	   complicated	  because	   for	   the	  pilots	   to	  follow	  TCAS	  RA	  might	  require	  reversing	  an	  action	  already	  underway,	   the	  situation	  in	   which	   the	   BTC	   pilots	   found	   themselves.	   	   The	   BFU	   Report	   does	   not	   show	  sensitivity	   to	   the	   possible	   difficulty	   of	   reconceiving	   an	   emergency	   situation	   and	  reversing	  action	  in	  just	  a	  few	  seconds.	  	  The	  BFU	  Investigation	  Report	  lists	  two	  immediate	  causes	  of	  the	  accident,	  the	  ATCO’s	  lack	  of	  situation	  awareness	  and	  the	  BTC	  pilots	  not	  obeying	  TCAS	  (p.	  5):	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The	  TU154M	  crew	  followed	  the	  ATCO	  instruction	  to	  descend	  and	  continued	  to	  do	  so	  even	  after	  TCAS	  advised	  them	  to	  climb.	  This	  maneuver	  was	  performed	  contrary	  to	  the	  generated	  TCAS	  RA.	  	  However,	  the	  timeline	  of	  events	  (BFU	  Report,	  Appendix	  3)	  shows	  that	  the	  TU154M	  crew	  realized	  the	  collision	  danger	  by	  reading	  the	  TCAS	  display	  before	  the	  TCAS	  TA,	  so	   at	   least	   one	   pilot	   onboard	   (Left	   Officer	   Rear)	   was	   understood	   this	   system’s	  existence	  and	  function.	  More	  importantly,	  ATCO	  began	  instructing	  them	  to	  descend	  6	  or	  7	  seconds	  before	  the	  TCAS	  RA	  to	  climb.	   	  Yet	  the	  official	  conclusion	  of	  the	  BFU	  Report	  ignores	  (or	  at	  least	  disguises)	  the	  order	  of	  events.	  It	  is	  not	  clear	  whether	  the	  TU154M	  crew	  were	  giving	  priority	  to	  the	  ATCO	  instruction	  because	  it	  came	  first	  or	  that	   they	   viewed	   the	   ATCO	   as	   having	   more	   authority,	   or	   indeed	   that	   it	   was	  psychologically	   (or	   even	   physically)	   difficult	   to	   disengage	   from	   the	   interaction	  among	  the	  ATCO,	  pilots,	  and	  aircraft	  control	  system	  that	  was	  already	  in	  process.	  	  Notice	   the	  wording	   in	   the	  report	   that	   the	  maneuver	  was	  contrary	  to	  TCAS.	  But	   it	   is	  evident	   from	   the	   chronology	   that	   the	  maneuver	  occurred	   in	   the	   final	   second(s)	  of	  the	  ATC's	  instruction	  to	  descend	  and	  was	  within	  a	  second	  of	  the	  TCAS	  instructing	  to	  climb.	   	  The	   decision	   to	   descend	   in	   response	   to	   ATCO	   came	   before	   TCAS	   gave	   a	  contrary	   instruction.	   	  This	   is	   obvious	   in	   the	   timeline	   graphic	   (Figure	   6-­‐2)—notice	  the	  AP	  disengagement	  signal.	   	   In	  contrast	  with	  what	  appears	   in	   the	  BFU	  Report,	  a	  more	  fair	  statement	  would	  be:	  	   The	  TU154M	  crew	  was	  already	  following	  the	  ATCO	  instruction	  to	  descend	  
when	  TCAS	  advised	  them	  to	  climb.	  This	  maneuver	  continued	  contrary	  to	  the	  generated	  TCAS	  RA.	  	  It	   might	   be	   argued	   that	   the	   issue	   here	   is	   not	   who	   or	   what	   is	   viewed	   as	   having	  
authority—	  as	  if	  the	  TU154M	  crew	  weighed	  these	  two	  options	  impartially—but	  that	  
people	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  persist	  in	  an	  ongoing	  interaction,	  rather	  than	  shift	  attention	  
to	  a	  different	  agent	  giving	  direction	   in	  mid-­‐course,	   particularly	  in	   a	   life-­‐threatening	  situation	  when	  time	  is	  of	  the	  essence.	  	  	  Put	  another	  way,	   a	   committed	  and	  dangerous	   “activity	   in	  process”	   trumps	   further	  reasoning.	  	  Also,	  the	  constraints	  are	  not	  just	  mental	  processes	  occurring	  in	  a	  single	  mind.	  Although	  the	  BTC	  commander	  (CP	  R	  Front)	   is	  very	  obviously	   in	  control	  and	  making	  the	  key	  decision	  to	  ignore	  TCAS,	  the	  transcript	  reveals	  a	  group	  of	  interacting	  pilots	  with	  at	  least	  in	  principle	  the	  possibility	  of	  the	  commander	  being	  convinced	  to	  follow	   TCAS.	   As	   a	   team	   they	   fail	   to	   act	   on	   the	   first	   officer’s	   observation,	   “It	   says	  ‘climb'”	   and	   subsequent	   question,	   “Descend?”	  Hence	   group	   dynamics,	   which	  themselves	   involve	   authority,	   are	   of	   special	   interest	   here.	   To	   understand	   the	  outcome,	  we	  need	   to	  understand	   the	  Russian	   crew’s	   individual	   beliefs	   about	   each	  other,	  their	  protocols,	  and	  especially	  their	  roles	  and	  authority	  structure.	  Indeed,	  we	  would	  need	   to	  know	  considerably	  more	  about	   the	   commander’s	   and	   first	   officer’s	  experience	   and	   history	   relative	   with	   TCAS	   (e.g.,	   had	   they	   ever	   flown	   when	   TCAS	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issued	  an	  RA?	  	  As	  a	  special	  instructor	  onboard,	  did	  the	  commander	  actually	  have	  no	  training	  in	  TCAS	  or	  had	  he	  been	  trained	  to	  trust	  ATCO?).	  	  
	  
Figure	  6-­‐2:	  BFU	  Investigation	  Report	  Timeline	  (Appendix	  3):	  ATCO	  instruction	  
indicated	  by	  cursor	  occurs	  before	  TCAS	  RA	  (red).	  	  Blue	  squares	  represent	  
Russian	  crew	  utterances	  and	  actions.	  In	  short,	  although	  there	  is	  one	  “pilot	  flying”	  on	  the	  BTC,	  we	  start	  by	  assuming	  each	  person’s	  actions	  are	  the	  result	  of	  personal	  knowledge	  and	  practices	  interacting	  with	  a	   dynamic	   environment,	   which	   included	   the	   TCAS	   display,	   other	   crew	   member	  statements	   and	   questions,	   the	   ATCO	   directive,	   and	   what	   was	   ultimately	   visible	  outside	   the	   cockpit.	   We	   may	   want	   to	   simulate	   what	   beliefs,	   perceptions,	   and	  practices	  caused	  specific	  changes	   in	  control.	  An	  open	  question	   is	  whether	   the	  BTC	  PF	  acted	  relatively	  autonomously	  and	  why	  the	  crew	  didn’t	  more	  strenuously	  object.	  	  The	   BFU	   Report	   provides	   convincing	   evidence	   that	   the	   BTC	   pilots	   were	   indeed	  uncertain	   what	   to	   do.	   	   The	   descent	   begins,	   is	   halted,	   the	   ATCO	   intervenes	   again	  saying	  “Expedite!”	  and	  the	  descent	  is	  continued.	  	  During	  this	  time	  TCAS	  has	  told	  DHL	  to	  “Increase	  Descend!”	  but	  does	  not	  intervene	  with	  the	  BTC	  to	  “Increase	  climb!”	  until	  14	   seconds	   later.	   This	   delay	   allowed	   the	  BTC	   crew	   insofar	   as	   they	  were	  weighing	  whether	   to	   follow	  ATCO	  to	  be	  swayed	  by	  his	  repeated,	  more	  urgent	   instruction	   to	  expedite	  descent	  after	  the	  TCAS	  RA,	  during	  which	  time	  TCAS	  remained	  silent.	  	  This	  lack	  of	  parallelism	  of	  TCAS	  interventions	  in	  the	  two	  cockpits	  is	  not	  commented	  on	  in	  the	  BFU	  Report.	  	  Again,	   the	   BFU	   report’s	   claim	   that	   the	   crew	   continue	   to	   descend	   after	   TCAS	  instructed	  them	  to	  climb	  in	  not	  strictly	  correct.	  	  The	  complexity	  of	  the	  interaction	  is	  articulated	   in	   the	   BFU	   Report	   itself	   (p.	   10-­‐11,	   with	   interpretations	   in	   bracketed	  italics	  from	  p.	  72-­‐73):	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At	  21:35:02	  hrs,	  (six	  seconds	  after	  the	  RA	  “	  climb,	  climb”)	  the	  PF	  pulled	  the	  control	  column.	  As	  a	  result,	  the	  rate	  of	  descent	  ceased	  to	  increase.	  The	  vertical	  acceleration	  rose	   from	  0.75	   g	   to	  1.07	   g.	   The	   engine	   thrust	   remained	  unchanged	   in	   conjunction	  with	  this	  control	  input….	  	  
[This	  could	  either	  be	  a	  delayed	  reaction	  of	  the	  PF	  to	  the	  RA	  “climb,	  climb”	  or	  a	  reaction	  
to	  the	  exclamation	  of	  the	  copilot:	  “it	  says	  climb”.	  	  It	  is	  the	  BFU's	  opinion	  that	  this	  action	  
was	   taken	   to	   adjust	   the	   descent	   rate	   after	   a	   rapidly	   initiated	   descent.	   The	   analysed	  
TCAS	   data	   shows	   a	   continued	   rate	   of	   descend	   of	   approximately	   1	   200	   ft/min	   after	  
stabilisation.]	  	  	  At	  21:35:03	  hrs,	  the	  engine	  throttles	  were	  pulled	  back	  further.	  	  The	  discussion	  between	  the	  crew	  members	  was	  interrupted	  at	  21:35:03	  hrs	  by	  the	  controller	   instructing	   the	   crew	   once	   again	   to	   expedite	   descend	   to	   FL	   350	   (“...	  descend	   level	   350,	   expedite	   descend“).	   This	   instruction	   was	   immediately	  acknowledged	  by	  the	  PNF.	  The	  controller	  then	  informed	  the	  crew	  about	  other	  flight	  traffic	  at	  FL	  360	  in	  the	  2	  o’clock	  position	  (“...Ya,	   ...	  we	  have	  traffic	  at	  your	  2	  o’clock	  position	   now	   at	   3-­‐6-­‐0“)	   and	   the	   PIC	   asked:	   “Where	   is	   it?“,	   the	   copilot	   answered:	  “Here	   on	   the	   left	   side!“.	   At	   the	   time,	   the	   rate	   of	   descent	  was	   approximately	   1	   500	  ft/min.	  	  The	  voice	  of	  the	  flight	  navigator	  can	  be	  heard	  on	  the	  CVR	  saying:"	  It	  is	  going	  to	  pass	  beneath	  us!"	  while	  the	  controller	  was	  giving	  his	  last	  instruction.	  	  
[The	  conversation	  of	  the	  flight	  crew	  was	  interrupted	  by	  the	  controller	  who	  instructed	  
them	  once	  again	  to	  expedite	  descent	  to	  FL	  350.	  The	  second	  instruction	  of	  the	  controller	  
had	  become	  necessary	  as	   the	  TU154M	  crew	  had	  not	  verbally	   replied	   to	   the	   first	  one.	  
The	   disagreements	   have	   obviously	   prevented	   that	   the	   first	   instruction	   was	   (sic)	  
acknowledged.	  The	  second	  instruction	  of	  the	  controller	  stopped	  the	  conversation	  of	  the	  
crew	  about	   the	  RA.	  For	   the	   two	  pilots	   it	  was	  another	  confirmation	  of	   the	  decision	   to	  
follow	   the	  ATC	   instruction,	  particularly	   since	   the	  other	  airplane	  was	  reported	  by	   the	  
controller	  to	  be	  at	  FL	  360.]	  	  At	  21:35:04	  hrs	  the	  roll	  channel	  of	  the	  autopilot	  was	  switched	  off.	  	  
[The	  second	  instruction	  of	  the	  controller	  at	  21:35:03	  hrs	  coincided	  with	  the	  retraction	  
of	  the	  thrust	  levers.	  It	  is	  the	  opinion	  of	  the	  BFU	  that	  this	  action	  was	  probably	  carried	  
out	   by	   the	   instructor.	   The	   PF	   held	   the	   control	   column	   pulled	   for	   about	   two	   more	  
seconds,	   before	   pushing	   the	   control	   column	   again	   in	   order	   to	   increase	   the	   rate	   of	  
descent.]	  	  At	   21:35:05	   hrs,	   the	   PF	   pushed	   the	   control	   column	   again	   and	   the	   rate	   of	   descent	  increased	  to	  more	  than	  2	  000	  ft/min.	  	  Five	   seconds	   later	   TCAS	   instructs	   the	   DHL	   to	   “Increase	   descent!”	   but	   does	   not	  correspondingly	  instruct	  the	  BTC	  to	  “Increase	  climb!”	  until	  21:35:24.	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One	  could	  complicate	  the	  situation	  in	  ways	  that	  make	  the	  importance	  of	  reasoning	  among	   the	   aircraft	   crew	   more	   salient.	   	   For	   example,	   if	   the	   Karlsruhe	   ATCO	   had	  intervened	  (contrary	  to	  regulations	  because	  he	  was	  not	  able	  to	  coordinate	  with	  the	  Zurich	   ATCO	   who	   was	   the	   responsible	   controller),	   the	   BFU	   Report	   argues	   that	  confusion	   might	   have	   resulted.	   If	   the	   Karlsruhe	   ATCO	   had	   given	   instructions	  contrary	  to	  TCAS,	  there	  is	  reason	  to	  believe	  the	  DHL	  pilots	  would	  have	  ignored	  him	  (so	  the	  outcome	  would	  be	  the	  same).	  	  In	  this	  case,	  he	  would	  have	  put	  the	  DHL	  pilots	  in	   the	  same	  situation	  as	   the	  Russians,	  having	   to	  decide	  whether	   to	   follow	  TCAS	  or	  the	  ATCO—though	  with	  two	  ATCOs	  saying	  the	  same	  thing,	  disregarding	  TCAS	  would	  perhaps	   have	   been	   easier.	   Or	   if	   the	   Karlsruhe	   ATCO	   gave	   instructions	   consistent	  with	   TCAS,	   the	   Russians	  would	   have	   received	   contrary	   instructions	   from	   the	   two	  ATCOs	  with	  no	  time	  to	  reason	  out	  who	  was	  correct—though	  delaying	  their	  descent	  further	  (as	  possibly	  occurred	  at	  21:35:02)	  or	  going	  with	  the	  majority	  (Karlsruhe	  and	  TCAS)	  might	  have	  avoided	  the	  collision.	  
6.8.4 Relation	  of	  flight	  level	  and	  descent	  timing	  The	  above	  analysis	  can	  be	  made	  more	  precise	  by	  referring	  to	  the	  altitudes	  of	  the	  two	  aircraft	   from	   the	   time	   descent	   began.	   	   To	   see	   the	   difficulty,	   notice	   the	   altitude	  discrepancies	  in	  Figure	  6-­‐3	  given	  the	  three	  sources	  (TCAS	  flash	  memory	  data,	  BTC	  Flight	  Data	  Recorder,	  and	  calculations	  provided	  by	  IAC	  Moscow).	  	  	  	  
	  
Figure	  6-­‐3:	  Flight	  levels	  of	  BTC	  and	  DHL	  aircraft	  at	  time	  of	  descent	  (from	  
“TCAS-­‐	  and	  FDR-­‐	  parameters	  (extracts)	  of	  B757-­‐200	  and	  TU154M,”	  BFU	  
Report,	  Appendix	  6).	  The	  chart	  shows	  that	  the	  planes	  were	  not	  precisely	  at	  FL360	  (i.e.,	  36000	  feet)	  and	  TCAS	  calculations	  are	  discrete	  (snapshots	  at	  points	  in	  time).	  	  TCAS	  places	  the	  planes	  at	  the	  same	  flight	  level	  at	  21:35:06,	  but	  other	  calculations	  show	  this	  occurred	  	  2	  or	  3	  seconds	  earlier.	  	  	  According	  to	  the	  calculated	  levels	  the	  aircraft	  DHL	  begins	  descent	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at	  least	  two	  seconds	  before	  the	  BTC;	  but	  TCAS	  shows	  it	  was	  the	  opposite,	  BTC	  was	  two	  seconds	  ahead	  of	   the	  DHL.	  Because	  two	  aircraft	  7	  nm	  apart	  descending	  at	   the	  same	   rate	   from	   the	   same	   flight	   level	   at	   different	   times	  will	   not	   collide,	   when	   the	  descent	   begins	   and	   the	   varying	   rate	   from	   the	   expedite	   instructions	   of	   ATCO	   and	  TCAS	  are	  pivotal	  in	  determining	  whether	  a	  collision	  occurs.	  	  	  Referring	  to	  the	  BTU	  Report	  timeline	  (Appendix	  3),	  we	  can	  infer	  that	  the	  two	  crews	  and	   their	   aircraft	   responded	   similarly	   to	   instructions,	   but	   BTC	   had	   a	   two	   second	  head	   start	   because	   of	   TCAS’s	   intervention.	   	   Both	   crews	   disengaged	   the	   autopilot	  (AP)	   2	   or	   3	   seconds	   after	   hearing	   the	   instruction	   to	   descend	   (BTC	   responding	   to	  ATCO	  and	  DHL	  to	  TCAS),	  and	  both	  aircraft	  reached	  FL358	  eight	  seconds	  after	  the	  AP	  was	  disengaged.	  	  This	  strongly	  implies	  that	  the	  BTC	  crew	  lost	  little	  time	  considering	  or	   discussing	   what	   to	   do;	   the	   pilot	   flying	   responded	   as	   quickly	   on	   both	   aircraft.	  	  After	  BTC	   first	   officer	   (Left	  Rear)	   said,	   “It	   says	   climb!,”	   at	   21:35:01	   instructor	   (CP	  Right	  Front)	  explained,	  “He	  is	  guiding	  us	  down”	  and	  the	  aircraft	  was	  already	  plainly	  on	   a	   descent	   path.	   (Though	   as	   presented	   in	   the	   previous	   section,	   the	   rate	   and	  possibly	   degree	   of	   commitment	   varied	   in	   the	   first	   7-­‐8	   seconds	   until	   the	   ATCO	  commanded	  them	  to	  expedite	  and	  indirectly	  forced	  their	  acknowledgement.)	  	  
Table	  6-­‐1:	  When	  aircraft	  crew	  heard	  instruction,	  reacted,	  and	  FL358	  was	  
attained.	  Flight	   Crew	  heard	  “descend!”	   AP	  disengaged	   Aircraft	  dropped	  200ft	  to	  FL358	  BTC	   21:34:53	  (CP	  R	  Front	  says	  “descend!”	  a	  second	  later)	  	   21:34:56	   21:35:04	  DHL	   21:34:55-­‐56	   21:34:58	   21:35:06	  	  In	   a	   subsequent	   section,	   this	   same	  data	   is	   interpreted	   from	   the	  perspective	  of	   the	  ATCO	  in	  terms	  of	  what	  appears	  on	  the	  radar	  display.	  
6.8.5 What	  the	  control	  strips	  reveal	  about	  timing	  The	  following	  analysis	  was	  inspired	  by	  a	  remark	  in	  an	  online	  blog	  in	  which	  air	  traffic	  controllers	  and	  pilots	  were	  commenting	  on	  	  the	  Überlingen	  accident:19	  	  	   Kontrolor	  :	  ultimately	   controller	   on	   duty	   cleared	   two	   planes	   on	   conflicting	   route	   to	   the	   same	  level.	  	  	  ATCO	  Watcher:	  Not	  quite	  correct	  my	  friend,	  he	  did	  not	  clear	  them	  together.	  The	  757	  was	   cleared	  off	   route	  direct	   by	  Geneva,	   and	   the	  Tu154	   cleared	  off	   route	  direct	   by	  Munich,	  on	  the	  strip	  he	  had	  them	  7	  minutes	  apart…	  	  Figure	   6-­‐4	   shows	   the	   flight	   control	   strips,	   which	   we	   can	   use	   to	   understand	   the	  second	   remark.	   	   The	   first	   box	   shows	   the	   destinations	   of	   the	   two	   flights,	   Brussels	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  19	  http://www.pprune.org/archive/index.php/t-­‐276578.html	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(EBBR)	  and	  Barcelona	  (LEBL).	  The	  second	  box	  indicates	  the	  planned	  altitude	  when	  the	  aircraft	  arrives	  in	  the	  Zurich	  sector,	  with	  the	  ATCO’s	  clearing	  the	  DHL	  for	  FL320	  during	   the	  handoff	  and	  clearance	   to	  FL360	  after	  dealing	  with	  six	  other	   flights	  and	  making	  his	  first	  call	  to	  Friedrichshafen.	  The	  third	  box	  indicates	  the	  planned	  altitude	  within	   the	   sector	   and	   that	   both	   request	   FL360.	   	   The	   last	   box	   indicates	   planned	  arrival	  times	  at	  waypoints	  before,	  within,	  and	  after	  the	  sector.	  	  
 
	  
Figure	  6-­‐4:	  DHL	  and	  BTC	  control	  strips	  (BFU	  Report,	  p.	  36).	  
	  
Figure	  6-­‐5:	  Aircraft	  positions	  (DHL	  blue,	  BTC	  red)	  and	  timings	  from	  BFU	  
Report,	  Appendix	  1,	  “Reconstruction	  of	  flight	  path	  according	  to	  radar	  data.”	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Table	  6-­‐2:	  Variance	  between	  control	  strip	  plan	  and	  actual	  timings	  for	  BTC	  and	  
DHL	  flights.	  	   NEGRA	  (BTC)	   KUDES	  (DHL)	  Control	  Strip	  Time	   2136	   2130	  Actual	  Time	  (approx.)	   21:34+	   21:33:30-­‐	  Variance	  from	  Expected	   -­‐2:00	   +3:30	  	  The	   actual	   position	   timings	   of	   the	   two	   aircraft	   relative	   to	   NEGRA	   and	   KUDES	  waypoints	   are	   summarized	   in	   Table	   6-­‐2,	   interpolating	   values	   given	   in	   the	   BFU	  Report	  (Figure	  6-­‐4).	  	  	  	  The	  waypoint	  times	  for	  NEGRA	  and	  KUDES	  were	  originally	  6	  minutes	  apart	  (2136	  –	  2130).	   	   Because	   of	   unaccounted	   timing	   variations	   (perhaps	   from	   DHL	   altitude	  change	   to	  360	  and	  redirection	   “direct	  ABESI”),	   they	  arrived	  at	  NEGRA	  and	  KUDES	  respectively	  only	  about	  30	  seconds	  apart.	   In	  this	  respect,	  given	  that	  the	  planes	  are	  known	  to	  have	  arrived	  at	   the	   intersection	  point	  within	  seconds	  of	  each	  other,	   	  we	  can	   infer	   that	   the	   variance	   for	   their	   individual	   passing	   of	  NEGRA	   and	  KUDES	   is	   a	  reasonable	  measure	  of	  the	  planned	  separation,	  that	  is,	  DHL	  would	  have	  crossed	  the	  intersection	  point	  at	  least	  5	  1/2	  minutes	  after	  the	  BTC	  (Table	  6-­‐2).	  	  The	   ATCO	  Watcher	   in	   the	   blog	   says,	   “on	   the	   strip	   he	   had	   them	   7	  minutes	   apart,”	  possibly	  referring	  to	  LOK	  and	  TRA,	  which	  are	  7	  minutes	  apart.	  	  	  According	   to	   the	   ANSA	   commentary	   (p.	   75),	   an	   ATCO	   would	   be	   considering	   and	  reading	  entry	  times	  from	  the	  control	  strips:	  	   Besides	   information	  on	  the	  call	  sign,	  aircraft	   type,	  speed,	  aerodromes	  of	  departure	  and	  destination	  and	  route	  of	  flight,	  they	  always	  contain	  the	  cleared	  flight	   level	  and	  the	  calculated	  time	  of	  entry	  into	  the	  respective	  control	  area	  (airspace	  sector). 	  It	  was	  reasonable	  for	  ATCO	  to	  clear	  the	  DHL	  to	  FL360	  because	  the	  BTC	  was	  not	  yet	  in	   his	   sector.	   Subsequently	   not	   adjusting	   	   the	   BTC	   altitude	   during	   the	   handover	  might	  have	  been	  reasonable	  if	  the	  ATCO	  were	  making	  decisions	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  the	  control	   strips	   alone,	   as	   “ATCO	   Watcher”	   comments	   on	   the	   blog.	   However,	   “Both	  airplanes	   had	   been	   cleared	   for	   a	   direct	   approach	   to	   Tango	   VOR	   (B757-­‐200)	   and	  Trasadingen	  VOR	  (TU154M)	  and	  thus	  the	  control	  strips	  did	  no	  longer	  correspond	  to	  the	  actual	  flight	  paths”	  (BFU	  Report,	  p.	  75).	  Crucially,	  at	  the	  time	  of	  handoff,	  it	  would	  not	  make	   sense	   to	   be	   referring	   to	   the	   control	   strips	   alone,	   given	   that	   the	   aircraft	  were	  both	  visible	  at	  this	  time	  on	  the	  radar	  display	  before	  him.	  Consequently,	  ATCO’s	  mental	  model	  appears	  to	  be	  based	  not	  on	  the	  control	  strips,	  but	  (as	  he	  indicated	  at	  the	  debriefing)	  that	  he	  did	  not	  believe	  the	  separation	  at	  the	  time	  of	  handoff	  (64	  nm)	  to	  merit	  concern.	  	  His	  priority	  was	  to	  handle	  the	  late	  arriving	  AEF	  flight.	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ATCO’s	  distraction	  at	  the	  time	  of	  the	  BTC	  handoff	  is	  obvious:20	  	  Immediately	  after	  his	  second	  attempt	  to	  reach	  Friedrichshafen,	  AEF	  1135	  called	  in	  simultaneously;	  he	  put	  AEF	  on	  hold,	  asked	  BTC	  to	  repeat,	  they	  stated	  “level	  360,”	  ATCO	  gave	  the	  frequency,	  and	   AEF	   1135	   interrupted,	   told	   them	   to	   wait	   a	   second	   time,	   then	   proceeded	   to	  handle	  two	  other	  flights,	  when	  AEF	  interrupted	  again,	  at	  which	  point	  he	  focused	  his	  attention	  on	  them.	  	  	  	  AEF’s	   persistent	   interruptions	   coming	   during	   and	   after	   the	   BTC	   handoff	   provides	  strong	   evidence	   that	   the	   ATCO	   is	   not	   referring	   to	   the	   control	   strips	   or	   viewing	  projected	   trajectories	   proactively,	   but	   is	   rather	   focusing	   entirely	   on	   processing	  handoffs	  in	  a	  reactive	  manner.	  
6.8.6 Effect	  of	  radar	  sweep	  delay	  A	   striking	   example	   of	   the	   interaction	   between	   automation,	   perception,	   situation	  awareness,	   and	   actions	   is	   revealed	  by	   the	   simple	   effect	   of	   the	   timing	   of	   the	   radar	  sweep	  to	  renew	  the	  display:	  	  …	  The	  B757-­‐200	  was	   already	   at	   FL	   356	  due	   to	   the	   descent	   initiated	   after	   the	  RA.	  However,	  the	  controller	  could	  not	  read	  the	  new	  flight	  level	  on	  the	  monitor,	  because	  the	  descent	  of	   the	  B757-­‐200	  was	  only	   to	  be	  seen	  after	   the	  radar	   image	  renewal	  at	  21:35:24	  hrs.	  With	  the	  preceding	  target	   image	  renewal	  at	  21:35:12	  hrs	  the	  FL	  359	  shown	  was	  still	  within	  tolerances.	  (BFU	  Report,	  p.	  76)	  	  When	   the	   controller	   observed	   on	   the	   left	   monitor	   (RP)	   that	   the	   TU154M	   had	  initiated	  the	  descent	  he	  considered	  the	  problem	  solved	  and	  once	  again	  turned	  to	  the	  right	  monitor	  (RE).	  	  (p.	  76)	  	  Even	   with	   the	   aural	   alert	   the	   ATCO	   would	   not	   have	   been	   able	   to	   recognise	   the	  situation	  was	  not	   evolving	   as	  he	   expected	  until	   further	   information	  was	   available.	  The	  TU154M	  was	  already	  complying	  with	  the	  descent	  instruction	  and	  the	  ATCO	  did	  not	  know	  the	  B757-­‐200	  had	  initiated	  an	  RA	  related	  descent.	  He	  would	  not	  have	  been	  able	  to	  recognise	  the	  B757-­‐200	  was	  descending	  until	  the	  screen	  update	  at	  21:35:12	  hrs	  or	  if	  he	  had	  heard	  the	  crew’s	  TCAS	  descent	  call	  a	  few	  seconds	  later.	  (p.	  89)	  	  First,	  notice	  that	  the	  BFU	  report	  has	  contradictory	  claims	  about	  when	  the	  descent	  of	  the	  DHL	  would	  be	  visible:	  page	  76	  states	  21:35:24	  and	  page	  89	  states	  21:35:12.	  	  He	  is	   telling	   BTC	   to	   expedite	   its	   descent	   from	   21:35:03	   to	   21:35:17	   (BFU	   Report	  Timeline,	  Appendix	  2).	  	  Apparently	  the	  remark	  on	  p.	  89	  is	  incorrect;	  he	  would	  have	  had	  to	  wait	  7	  seconds	  (until	  21:35:24)	  to	  confirm	  that	  the	  separation	  problem	  was	  resolved.	   	   If	   he	   had	   waited,	   he	   would	   have	   seen	   the	   DHL	   at	   FL352!	   Instead	   he	  returned	  to	  the	  right	  workstation	  to	  deal	  with	  AEF	  1135,	  which	  had	  interrupted	  him	  during	  his	  urgent	  call	  to	  the	  BTC	  to	  expedite	  their	  descent.	  	  Examining	   the	   available	   altitude	   and	   timeline	   data	   shows	   that	   the	   report’s	   claims	  are	   contradictory	   and	   inconsistent—he	   could	   not	   have	   seen	   that	   the	   BTC	   was	  descending	   until	   four	   seconds	   after	   he	   completed	   the	   expedite	   instruction.	   	   Also,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  20	  Refer	   to	   transcript	   of	   this	   period	   in	   Section	   9.7	   and	   annotated	   Brahms-­‐GÜM	   log	   of	   events	   in	  Appendix	  26.	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there	  is	  no	  argument	  why	  ATCO	  gave	  priority	  to	  the	  AEF	  instead	  of	  calling	  the	  DHL	  and	   telling	   them	   to	   climb	   (and	   probably	   change	   course).	   Table	   6-­‐3	   relates	   the	  display	  and	  actual	  altitudes	  with	  the	  radar	  updating	  process.	  
Table	   6-­‐3:	   Given	   and	   inferred	   flight	   levels,	   emphasizing	   DHL	   &	   BTC	   data	  
visible	   to	   ATCO	   at	   35:12	   when	   he	   called	   BTC	   to	   expedite	   descent.	   “Radar	  
Refresh”	   	   indicates	   when	   DHL	   aircraft	   data	   is	   refreshed	   on	   Zurich	   display	  
(indicated	   by	   X).	   “Timeline”	   values	   are	   interpolated	   from	   BFU	   Report	  
Appendix	  1	  map	  (Figure	  6-­‐5).	  “Chart”	  values	  are	  interpolated	  from	  the	  graph	  
in	  BFU	  Report	  Appendix	  6	  (Figure	  6-­‐6).	  	  
 24:48 24:54 24:35:00 35:06 35:12 35:18 35:24 
Radar Refresh X  X  X  X 
BTC Timeline  360 360 360 358 356 354 352? 
BTC Chart  360 360 360 358 357 354  
BTC Display 360 360 360 360 FL356? 354 352? 
DHL Timeline  360 360 360 358 356 354 352? 
DHL Chart  360 360 360 359 357 355  
DHL Display 360 360 360 360 FL359 354 355? 	  Given	   that	   the	  scan	   (rotation	  of	   radar	  dish)	   requires	  12	  seconds	  per	  cycle,	   rotates	  clockwise,	  and	  the	  planes	  are	  about	  90	  degrees	  apart	  with	  the	  BTC	  coming	  from	  the	  east	  and	  the	  DHL	  from	  the	  south,	  then	  if	  the	  DHL	  signal	  is	  updated	  at	  35:00,	  35:12,	  35:24,	   etc.	   as	   the	   BFU	   report	   states,	   then	   the	   BTC	   data	   would	   be	   updated	  approximately	  3	  seconds	  earlier	  at	  34:57,	  35:09,	  35:21,	  etc.	  	  	  At	  the	  24:35:12	  DHL	  refresh	  the	  radar	  probably	  showed	  the	  location	  of	  the	  BTC	  at	  24:35:09	  when	  it	  was	  nearing	  FL356	  and	  the	  DHL	  at	  FL359.	  	  The	  BTC	  image	  would	  be	   updated	   at	   approximately	   24:35:21	   or	   4	   seconds	   after	   ATCO	   completed	   his	  expedite	  instruction,	  when	  he	  was	  already	  at	  the	  other	  workstation	  talking	  to	  AEF.	  	  Therefore,	   the	  claim	  that	   the	  ATCO	  “considered	   the	  problem	  solved”	   (p.	  76)	   is	  not	  supported	  by	  what	  the	  BFU	  report	  implies	  was	  visible	  on	  the	  screen	  and	  ATCO’s	  lack	  of	  communication	  with	  the	  DHL.	  	  Once	  again,	  we	  see	  that	   the	  events	  are	  extremely	  time	  sensitive—to	  the	  point	   that	  radar	  data	   itself	   is	   insufficient	   in	   a	   collision	   situation	   given	   the	  12	   second	   refresh	  and	   differential	   time-­‐delay	   depending	   on	   where	   an	   object	   is	   in	   the	   sky.	   We	   can	  conclude	  that	  the	  delay	   in	  radar	  refresh	  (i.e.,	   lack	  of	  current	  aircraft	   location	  data)	  must	   be	   included	   as	   a	   cause	   of	   the	   collision.	   	   Actual	   data	   at	   24:35:18—just	   one	  second	   after	   completing	   the	   BTC	   expedite	   instruction—would	   have	   shown	   both	  aircraft	  at	  FL354.	  This	  analysis	  illustrates	  what	  is	  required	  to	  develop	  a	  work	  practice	  simulation	  and	  how	  it	  amounts	  to	  understanding	  the	  cognitive	  and	  physical-­‐perceptual	  interactions	  that	   affect	   human	   behavior—and	   this	   understanding	   is	   necessary	   to	   understand	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how	   a	   human-­‐automation	   system	   behaves	   (or	   put	   another	   way,	   how	   people	   and	  their	   tools	   interacting	   cause	   air	   flight	   events).	   	   In	   this	   respect,	   the	  purpose	  of	   our	  analysis	   is	   analogous	   to	   Johnson’s	   (2004b):	   “Our	   aim	   has	   been	   to	   go	   beyond	   the	  existing	  recommendations	  and	  extract	  any	  additional	  lessons	  that	  might	  be	  learned	  from	  this	  very	  unfortunate	  incident.”	  (p.	  20)	  The	  deviating	  statements	  in	  the	  accident	  reports	  (Section	  6.1),	  in	  themselves,	  show	  how	  current	  analysis	  methods	  lead	  to	  differing	  interpretations	  from	  same	  available	  facts	  and	  there	  is	  a	  need	  for	  better	  tools	  to	  assist	  analysis.	  Our	  analysis	  of	  timing	  and	  sequencing	  in	  this	  section	  shows	  that	  classifying	  events	  into	  causal	  categories	  (such	  as	  HFACS,	  Section	  6.5)	  shows	  how	  a	  work	  practice	  analysis	  reveals	  interactions	  that	  are	  omitted,	  glossed	  over	  and	  difficult	  to	  describe	  in	  accident	  reports.	  	  The	  following	  section	   presents	   the	  Brahms	  work	   practice	  modeling	   framework	  we	  have	   applied	  for	  modeling	  and	  simulating	  the	  Überlingen	  work	  system	  and	  events.	  	  
 
Figure	  6-­‐6:	  Larger	  excerpt	  from	  aircraft	  altitudes	  vs.	  time	  chart	  in	  BFU	  Report	  
Appendix	  6.	  Initial	  descent	  velocity	  (blue	  line)	  has	  been	  added	  for	  comparison.	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7 Brahms	  Work	  Practice	  Modeling	  Overview	  As	   previously	   described,	   the	   primary	   requirement	   of	   the	   research	   program	   is	   to	  develop	   methods	   for	   assessing	   flight-­‐critical	   systems	   with	   respect	   to	   safety	  implications	   of	   the	   assignment	   of	   authority	   and	   autonomy.	   	   Assessment	   includes	  testing	   that	   the	   design	   is	   comprehensive,	   lacking	   conflicts	   or	   ambiguities,	   and	  resilient	   in	   the	   context	   of	   degradations	   of	   agent	   capability,	   delegation	   and	   or	  transition	   of	   A&A,	   and	   the	   dynamics	   of	   interacting	   roles.	   The	   simulation	   should	  facilitate	   what-­‐if	   analysis	   of	   alternative	   system	   configurations	   and	   designing	  alternative	  operational	  concepts.	  	  We	  have	  described	  in	  Chapters	  1	  and	  3	  the	  research	  problem	  and	  general	  properties	  of	   Brahms	   that	   make	   it	   suitable	   for	   the	   research	   objectives	   of	   this	   project.	   	   This	  chapter	  provides	  a	  general	  introduction	  to	  the	  Brahms	  modeling	  framework	  	  and	  its	  relevance	  to	  verification	  and	  validation	  of	  work	  systems	  and	  reviews	  the	  history	  of	  the	  Brahms	  tool	  and	  how	  it	  relates	  to	  other	  human-­‐systems	  modeling	  methods.	  	  The	  next	  major	  section	  then	  describes	  the	  design	  of	  the	  Brahms	  Generalized	  Überlingen	  Model	  (Brahms-­‐GÜM).	  
7.1 Introduction	  to	  Brahms	  Work	  Systems	  Modeling	  Framework	  The	  Brahms	  simulation	  tool	  was	  originally	  developed	  in	  the	  early	  1990s	  by	  NYNEX	  and	   the	   Institution	   for	   Research	   on	   Learning	   to	   complement	   business	   process	  modeling	   tools	   that	  were	  based	  on	  manufacturing	  (assembly	   line)	  models	  of	  work	  (Clancey	  et	  al.	  1998).	  The	  description	  here	  is	  intended	  only	  as	  a	  broad	  introduction,	  not	   as	   a	   primer	   on	   the	   language.	   Numerous	   articles	   and	   online	   documentation	  describe	  the	  model	  in	  detail	  (e.g.,	  Sierhuis	  et	  al.	  2009).	  	  Most	  work	  process	  modeling	  tools	  represent	  how	  tasks	   flow	  and	  are	  transformed;	  they	  are	  oriented	  around	  functions	  of	  people	  and	  automation,	  represented	  as	  input-­‐output	  relationships:	  “Job	  X”	  flows	  from	  agent	  A	  (which	  modified	  it	  by	  function	  F)	  to	  agent	  B	  (which	  applies	  function	  G).	  	  	  Brahms	  turns	  task/functional	  models	  inside	  out	  by	  representing	  how	  agents	  behave,	  that	  is	  what	  they	  do,	  rather	  than	  describing	  what	  
their	   work	   accomplishes.	   Behaviors	   of	   people	   and	   automation,	   represented	   as	  located,	   time-­‐sensitive	  activities,	   that	   is,	  where	   they	  are,	   and	  what	   they	  are	  doing.	  	  For	   example,	   in	   Brahms	   we	   might	   model	   that	   a	   person	   is	   sitting	   in	   front	   of	   a	  computer	   display	   reading	   information	   and	   conveying	   it	   on	   the	   telephone;	   a	  functional,	   process-­‐oriented	  model	  might	   simply	  model	   that	   the	   person	   “handoffs	  the	  flight	  to	  the	  control	  tower”	  without	  specifying	  where	  and	  how,	  or	  how	  the	  time	  required	  might	  vary	  because	  of	  the	  particulars	  of	  a	  given	  situation.	  	  In	  a	  simulation	  of	   activities,	   perception	   (detecting	   information	   of	   interest)	   and	   timing	   are	  interactive	  dependent	  variables.	  	  In	   the	   case	   of	   people,	   activities	   are	   conceptual;	   activities	   represent	   a	   person’s	  understanding	  of	  “what	  I	  am	  doing	  now,”	  which	  is	  often	  a	  form	  of	  “who	  I	  am	  being	  now”	  (e.g.,	  an	  air	  traffic	  controller	  working	  alone	  on	  the	  night	  shift”)	  or	  “what	  I	  am	  responsible	  for	  now”	  (e.g.,	  all	  of	  the	  responsibilities	  of	  the	  supervisor	  in	  addition	  to	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the	  ATCO);	  thus	  Brahms	  models	  can	  be	  used	  to	  simulation	  a	  social	  world.	   	  Brahms	  simulations	  also	  represent	  what	  is	  happening	  in	  a	  simulated	  physical	  world	  (called	  the	   “geography”)	  with	   respect	   to	   clock	   time,	  which	  may	   be	   simulated	   at	   different	  granularity	  (one	  simulation	  tick	  could	  simulate	  5	  seconds	  or	  5	  minutes,	  etc.).	  	  	  	  
7.1.1 Beliefs	  and	  behaviors	  of	  agents	  and	  objects	  The	   simulation	   engine	   can	   be	   said	   to	   “run”	   the	   model,	   to	   create	   a	   chronology	   of	  behaviors	  of	   events.	  At	   each	   clock	   tick	   the	  Brahms	   simulation	   engine	   inspects	   the	  model	  to	  update	  the	  state	  of	  the	  world,	  which	  includes	  all	  of	  the	  agents	  and	  objects	  in	  the	  simulated	  world.	  	  Agents	  and	  objects	  have	  states	  (factual	  properties)	  that	  may	  change	  (e.g.,	  where	  the	  ATCO	  is	  located;	  whether	  a	  telephone	  is	  operational).	  They	  usually	  have	  capabilities	  to	  model	  world	  (e.g.,	  ATCO	  may	  believe	  that	  the	  phones	  are	  operational	  and	  then	  discover	  that	  he	  cannot	  make	  phone	  calls).	  Facts	  are	  “a	  god’s-­‐eye	   view	   of	   the	   world”	   and	   therefore	   constitute	   an	   “objective,”	   true	   model;	   an	  agent’s	  or	  object’s	  models	  of	  the	  world	  can	  be	  incorrect	  (inconsistent	  with	  the	  facts)	  and	  hence	  constitute	  beliefs.	  	  (Treating	  an	  object’s	  model	  of	  the	  world	  as	  being	  a	  set	  of	   “beliefs”	   is	   different	   from	   the	   use	   of	   the	   term	   “belief”	   in	   psychology,	   but	   is	   a	  convention	   in	   artificial	   intelligence	   where	   one	   might	   refer	   to	   a	   robot’s	   beliefs.)	  	  Consequently,	   the	   instruments	   in	   the	   cockpit	   are	   modeled	   as	   being	   able	   to	  communicate	  “beliefs”	  about	  the	  state	  of	  aircraft.	  	  Similarly,	  what	  the	  ATCO	  reads	  on	  a	   radar	   display	   are	   the	   “beliefs”	   of	   the	   display.	   	   Agents	   and	   objects	   communicate	  with	  each	  other	  and	  may	  act	  to	  change	  their	  own	  state,	  beliefs,	  or	  other	  facts	  about	  the	  world.	  	  For	   each	   modeled	   agent,	   the	   simulation	   engine	   determines	   the	   agent’s	   new	   or	  modified	   beliefs	   and	   behaviors,	   which	   include	   inferences	   (via	   thoughtframes	   or	  consequences	   of	  workframes),	   communications	   with	   objects	   (e.g.,	   reading	   a	   radar	  display)	   and	  other	   agents	   (e.g.,	   talking);	   	  movement	   from	  one	  modeled	   location	   to	  another;	  and	  other	  primitive	  actions	  (i.e.,	  non-­‐decomposed	  activities	  that	  take	  time,	  such	   as	   changing	   the	   radio	   frequency	   in	   a	   cockpit).	   For	   each	  modeled	  object	   (e.g.,	  aircraft),	  the	  simulation	  engine	  determines	  the	  object’s	  state	  (“facts”;	  via	  factframes)	  and	  new	  or	  modified	  “beliefs”	  (i.e.,	  representations	  about	  the	  world	  represented	  in	  the	  object,	  such	  as	  records	  in	  a	  database).	  	  Some	   objects	   are	   not	   physical	   things	   in	   the	  world,	   but	   rather	   conceptual	   entities,	  called	   conceptual	   classes	   in	   the	   Brahms	   language.	   These	   represent	   processes,	   a	  complex	   of	   people,	   physical	   objects,	   and	   locations	   (e.g.,	   flights),	   and	   institutional	  systems	  (e.g.,	   airlines)	   that	  people	  know	  about	  and	  refer	   to	  when	  organizing	   their	  work	  activities.	  	  	  	  Particular	   “instances”	   of	   a	   conceptual	   class	   are	   called	   conceptual	   objects.	   	   A	  particular	   flight	   (e.g.,	   DHX611,	   a	   conceptual	   object)	   is	   operated	   by	   a	   particular	  airline	   and	   consists	   of	   a	   particular	   crew	   (a	   group)	   of	   pilots	   (agents)	   who	   file	   a	  particular	  flight	  plan	  document	  (an	  object),	  and	  so	  on.	  	  All	  of	  these	  agent	  and	  object	  instances	  have	  behaviors	  defined	  by	  workframes	  that	  are	  inherited	  from	  their	  group	  (for	   agents)	   or	   class	   (for	   objects).	   	   That	   is,	   behaviors	   are	   usually	   modeled	   at	   a	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general	   level	   and	   all	   members	   of	   a	   group/class	   have	   the	   same	   capabilities	  (represented	  as	  activities,	  workframes,	  and	  thoughtframes).	  	  	  Of	  course	  at	  any	  time	  during	  the	  simulation,	  agent	  and	  object	  behaviors,	  beliefs,	  and	  facts	   about	   them	   will	   vary	   depending	   on	   their	   initial	   beliefs/facts	   and	   the	  environment	  with	  which	   they	  are	   interacting.	   In	  particular,	  everyone	  working	   in	  a	  given	   ATCC	   might	   inherit	   some	   characteristics	   (e.g.,	   knowing	   how	   to	   use	   the	  phones),	  but	  people	  playing	  different	   roles	  would	   inherit	  behaviors	   from	  different	  groups.	   The	   two	  ATCOs	   in	   Zurich	  ATCC	   are	  modeled	   as	   having	   identical	   activities	  with	   the	   same	   workframes	   and	   thoughtframes	   by	   virtue	   of	   belong	   to	   the	   same	  Brahms	   groups;	   but	   at	   a	   given	   time	  during	   the	   simulation	   one	  ATCO	  might	   be	   on	  break	  while	  the	  other	  is	  handling	  flights.	  That	  is,	  their	  active	  activities,	  locations,	  and	  facts	  about	  them	  can	  be	  different	  at	  a	  particular	  point	  in	  time.	  	  As	  another	  example,	  the	  PrimarySurveillanceRadar	  (PSR)	  is	  an	  object	  class	  that	  is	  a	  simplified	   model	   of	   the	   PSR	   in	   the	   Air	   Traffic	   Control	   Radar	   Beacon	   System.	  Instances	   of	   this	   class,	   PSR	   objects,	   include	   particular	   radar	   systems	   located	   near	  Zurich	  and	  Karlsruhe.	  	  Each	  PrimarySurveillanceRadar	  object	  has	  attributes	  defined	  by	  the	  class	  (comments	  follow	  “//”):	  	   AirSector	  airSector;	  	   //	  description	  of	  sector	  configuration	  (conceptual	  object)	  int	  range;	  	   	   //	  range	  of	  radar	  in	  miles,	  e.g.	  60	  miles	  radius	  double	  altitudeMin;	  	   //	  floor	  of	  radar	  coverage,	  e.g.	  not	  below	  200	  feet	  int	  rateOfDetection;	   	  //	  renewal	  rate	  of	  radar	  	  int	  displayUpdateRate;	  //	  renewal	  rate	  for	  display	  in	  seconds	  	  When	  the	  simulation	  run	  begins,	   the	  PSR	  objects	  have	  “initial	  beliefs,”	   for	  example	  the	  time	  period	  required	  for	  the	  PSR	  to	  sweep	  the	  sky	  is	  set	  to	  12	  seconds:	  	   	  (current.rateOfDetection	  =	  12)	  	  Each	  PrimarySurveillanceRadar	  object	  monitors	  planes	  moving	  within	  its	  particular	  air	   space.	  When	   planes	   are	   detected,	   the	   information	   is	   sent	   to	   air	   traffic	   control	  computer	  servers	  associated	  with	  the	  PSR	  at	  the	  start	  of	  the	  simulation	  (part	  of	  the	  initial	   configuration	   that	   defines	   a	   scenario).	   The	   ATCC	   servers	   then	   send	   the	  information	   to	   radar	   screens	   in	   the	  ATCC.	   	   The	   PSR’s	   behavior	   is	  modeled	   by	   the	  
Inform_Plane_Inside_Airspace	  workframe:	  	   workframe	  Inform_Plane_Inside_Airspace	  {	  	   priority:	  20;	  	  	   //	  priority	  determines	  order	  for	  applying	  the	  workframes	  	   variables:	  	  	   //	  variables	  are	  specific	  objects	  or	  values	  referenced	  here	  	   	   foreach(Aircraft)	  plane;	  	   	   foreach(Flight)	  flight;	  	   	   foreach(string)	  flightNumber;	  	   	   forone(AirSpace)	  airSpace;	  	  	   detectables:	   //	  these	  are	  world	  facts	  that	  the	  object	  can	  “perceive”	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   detectable	  Plane_Location	  {	  	   	   	   detect((plane.location	  =	  unknown));	  	   	   }	  	  	  …	  	   //	  there	  are	  similar	  detectables	  for	  longitude,	  heading,	  etc.	  	  	   	   detectable	  Planes_In_Airspace	  {	  	   	   	   detect((airSpace.numberOfPlanes	  =	  unknown));	  	   	   }	  	  
//	   the	  workframe	   is	   applied	  when	   the	   following	   conditions	  match	   the	   radar	  
object’s	  beliefs	  
	  	   when(knownval(current.airSpace	  =	  airSpace)	  and	  	   	   knownval(plane.altitude	  >	  current.altitudeMin)	  and	  	   	   …	  	   	   knownval(flight	  =	  plane.flight)	  and	  	   	   knownval(flightNumber	  =	  flight.flightNumber))	  	   	  
//	  applying	  the	  workframe	  results	  in	  the	  object	  updating	  its	  model	  of	  the	  world	  
(beliefs)	   and	   doing	   two	   “composite	   activities”	   (modeled	   by	   their	   own	  
workframes),	   namely	   communicating	   the	   information	   to	   registered	   radar	  
servers	   (informATCSystemPlaneInfo)	   and	   then	   updateRadarScanRate,	  
described	  below	  
	  do	  {	  	   	   conclude((airSpace	  planes	  plane));	  	   	   conclude((plane.flight	  =	  flight),	  fc:0);	  	   	   conclude((flight.flightNumber	  =	  flightNumber),	  fc:0);	  	   	   informATCSystemPlaneInfo(plane);	  	   	   updateRadarScanRate(plane,	  airSpace);	  	   }	  }//wf	  Inform_Plane_Inside_Airspace	  	  The	   composite	   activity	   updateRadarScanRate	   defines	   how	   often	   the	   plane’s	  information	   is	   updated	   within	   an	   air	   sector	   on	   the	   radar	   display.	   	   For	   example,	  suppose	   that	   there	   are	   three	   planes	  within	   an	   air	   sector	   and	   the	   radar	   scan	   rate	  (sweep)	   for	   the	   air	   sector	   is	   12	   seconds.	   Then	   each	   plane’s	   information	   will	   be	  updated	  on	  average	   every	   four	   seconds	   (12	   seconds	  divided	  by	  3	  planes).	  A	  more	  precise	   model	   would	   be	   based	   on	   the	   actual	   layout	   of	   the	   planes;	   this	   heuristic	  assumes	  they	  are	  evenly	  spaced	  (e.g.,	  three	  planes	  are	  120	  degrees	  apart).	  If	  there	  is	  only	  1	  plane	  in	  the	  air	  sector,	  then	  the	  plane’s	   information	  will	  get	  updated	  on	  the	  radar	  display	  every	  12	  seconds.	  	  This	   example	   illustrates	   how	   the	   Brahms	   modeling	   framework	   enables	   modeling	  and	   hence	   facilitates	   designing	   work	   systems	   at	   varying	   levels	   of	   detail.	   For	  example,	  in	  an	  initial	  model	  a	  work	  group	  might	  be	  represented	  as	  a	  single	  person	  (agent);	  for	  example,	  Brahms-­‐GÜM	  currently	  represents	  the	  aircraft	  crew	  by	  a	  single	  person,	   the	   pilot.	   	   By	   such	   an	   abstraction	   we	   would	   seek	   to	   replicate	   (most	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importantly)	  how	  the	  aircraft	   is	  controlled—that	   is	   the	  overall	  effect	  of	   the	  crew’s	  behavior—rather	  than	  how	  through	  the	  communications	  and	  actions	  of	  individuals	  observations,	  decisions,	  and	  controls/instruments	  were	  manipulated.	  	  	  An	  object	   is	  typically	  modeled	  only	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  properties	  that	  a	  person	  (or	  an	  automated	   system	   such	   as	   a	   robot)	   can	   perceive	   (a	   “detectable”)	   and/or	   modify.	  	  The	   radar	  display	   object	   could	  be	   simulated	   in	   greater	  detail	   to	   emulate	  when	   an	  update	  would	  actually	  occur	  given	  the	  aircraft’s	  location	  in	  the	  sector.	  In	  particular,	  a	   computer	   model	   could	   be	   coupled	   to	   the	   radar	   display	   object	   to	   update	   its	  facts/beliefs	  according	  to	  a	  precise	  mathematical	  simulation.	  	  A	  Brahms	  model	  is	  developed	  and	  tested	  incrementally	  by	  adding	  or	  refining	  agents,	  objects,	   and	   locations.	   	   Conceptually,	   every	   agent	   and	   object	   is	   an	   independent	  process:	  it	  simply	  behaves,	  interacting	  with	  its	  environment,	  which	  is	  also	  changing	  over	   time.	   	   This	   modeling	   and	   simulation	   flexibility	   facilitates	   verifying	   and	  validating	  proposed	  concepts	  and	  configurations	  early	  in	  the	  design	  process,	  as	  well	  as	  finding	  design	  problems	  in	  complex	  systems	  when	  they	  are	  probably	  easier	  to	  fix.	  	  	  
7.1.2 Relation	  of	  work	  and	  reasoning	  In	  the	  human-­‐centered	  perspective,	  the	  notion	  of	  work	   focuses	  on	  what	  people	  are	  doing,	   that	   is,	   their	  activities	   (how	   they	   conceive	  what	   they	   are	   doing	   in	   levels	   of	  abstraction	   ranging	   from	   broad,	   identity/role-­‐oriented	   	   to	   specific,	   task-­‐oriented	  terms),	   their	  beliefs	   about	   themselves	  and	   the	  world	   (including	  other	  agents),	   and	  
how	  they	  are	   interacting	  with	  the	  world	   (what	   they	   are	  perceiving,	   saying/writing,	  physically	  manipulating,	  etc.	  and	  how	  they	  are	  moving).	  	  	  	  	  Although	  Brahms	  incorporates	  representational	  constructs	  and	  processes	  from	  the	  methods	   of	   cognitive	   modeling	   (e.g.,	   beliefs,	   inference	   [thoughtframes],	   and	  conditional	  actions	  [workframes]),	  reasoning	  is	  simulated	  as	  just	  another	  activity	  in	  Brahms:	   	   Thinking	   about	   something	   takes	   time,	   occurs	   in	   some	   conceptual	   and	  physical	  context,	  and	  often	  involves	  interacting	  	  with	  objects	  in	  the	  world	  in	  a	  back	  and	  forth	  process	  of	  manipulating,	  looking,	  and	  changing	  beliefs	  (as	  in	  using	  a	  radar	  display	   to	   get	   information	   about	   a	   flight).	   In	   a	   typical	   cognitive	  model,	   agents	   are	  modeled	  only	  in	  terms	  of	  beliefs	  and	  how	  “inputs”	  change	  beliefs	  (like	  a	  calculating	  machine).	   In	   Brahms	   beliefs	   form	   an	   important	   basis	   for	   action,	   but	   they	   are	  contained	  within	  a	  contextual	  model	  of	  a	  changing	  world	  and	  the	  agent’s	  activities.	  Beliefs	   determine	   what	   workframes	   will	   apply	   and	   hence	   determine	   an	   agent’s	  behavior	  and	  perceptions,	  but	  the	  organization	  and	  focus	  of	  the	  model	  is	  in	  terms	  of	  what	   the	   agent	   is	   doing,	   not	   only	   what	   he	   or	   she	   is	   thinking.	   	   Put	   another	   way,	  thoughtframes	  are	  used	  to	  model	  reasoning,	  but	  reasoning	  is	  not	  the	  driving	  engine	  of	   simulated	   behavior;	   rather	   reasoning	   serves	   at	   the	   periphery	   and	   to	   affect	  interpretations,	  choice	  of	  methods,	  and	  prioritization	  of	  activities.	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7.1.3 The	  work	  system	  In	  a	  Brahms	  model,	  the	  system	  being	  modeled	  is	  the	  entire	  work	  system,	  including:	  	  
• people,	  represented	  as	  agents	  and	  groups	  to	  which	  they	  belong	  
• facilities	  (buildings,	  rooms,	  offices,	  spaces	  in	  vehicles),	  represented	  as	  “areas”	  within	  a	  geography	  
• tools	  (e.g.,	  radio,	  radar	  display/workstation,	  telephone,	  vehicles),	  represented	  as	  objects	  
• representational	  objects	  (e.g.,	  a	  phone	  book,	  a	  control	  strip),	  represented	  as	  objects	  
• automated	  subsystems	  (e.g.,	  TCAS),	  represented	  as	  object	  or	  agents	  if	  they	  are	  controlled	  by	  activities	  and	  internal	  model	  of	  the	  world	  (e.g.,	  robots).	  	  All	  of	  these	  are	  located	  in	  an	  abstracted	  geography	  represented	  as	  areas	  and	  paths	  (for	  simulating	  movement	  between	   locations).	   	  Thus	   the	  notion	  of	   “human-­‐system	  interaction”	  in	  Brahms	  terms	  is	  more	  precisely	  a	  combination	  of	  interactions	  among	  behaviors	  of	  agents	  and	  objects	  in	  a	  work	  system.	  	  As	  an	  example	  of	  how	  workframes	  model	  the	  interaction	  among	  an	  agent’s	  beliefs,	  perception,	  and	  actions	  in	  a	  dynamic	  environment,	  consider	  how	  a	  pilot	  deploys	  the	  aircraft	   landing	   gear.	   A	   pilot	   uses	   the	   onboard	   landing	   control	   and	   then	   confirms	  that	   the	   landing	   gears	   are	   deployed	   while	   monitoring	   the	   aircraft’s	   trajectory	   on	  Primary	  Flight	  Display.	  This	  is	  modeled	  in	  Brahms-­‐GÜM	  as	  follows:	  a	  pilot	  (e.g.,	  the	  DHL	   pilot)	   is	   a	   member	   of	   the	   PilotGroup,	   which	   has	   a	   composite	   activity,	  	  
manageAircraftEnergyConfiguration. Before	   landing,	   the	   following	   workframe	  (whose	  name	  comes	  from	  the	  Pritchett	  et	  al.	  WMC	  simulation	  described	  in	  Appendix	  	  17)	  becomes	  activated:	  	   workframe	  Confirm_Gears_Changed	  {	  repeat:	   true;	   //	   this	   workframe	   is	   repeatedly	   activated,	   which	   models	   the	  
pilot’s	  continuing	  monitoring	  of	  the	  pfd	  until	  the	  gears	  are	  deployed	  	   variables:	  	   	   foreach(AircraftLandingControl)	  control;	  	   	   forone(PrimaryFlightDisplay)	  pfd;	  	  
//	  when	  the	  action	  (“do”	  part)	  of	  this	  workframe	  is	  being	  applied,	  the	  pilot	  can	  
detect	  the	  following	  fact	  in	  the	  world	  and	  thus	  form	  a	  corresponding	  belief	  	  
	  detectables:	   	  	  	   	   detectable	  Plane_Gears	  {	  	   	   	   detect((plane.gearsDeployed	  =	  unknown));	  	   	   }	  	  
//	  for	  this	  workframe	  to	  apply,	   it	  must	  be	  the	  case	  that	  the	  plane	  has	  not	  yet	  
touched	  down	  and	   is	  not	   stopped	   (i.e.,	   flying,	   not	  preparing	   for	   take-­‐off),	   the	  
pilot	   is	   in	   the	   control.location	   of	   the	   cockpit	   (inclusion	   of	   the	  Primary	   Flight	  
Display	  location	  is	  to	  facilitate	  future	  modeling	  of	  co-­‐pilot;	  it	  is	  unnecessary	  in	  
	  	  
WORK	  PRACTICE	  SIMULATION	  OF	  COMPLEX	  HUMAN-­‐AUTOMATION	  SYSTEMS	  IN	  SAFETY-­‐CRITICAL	  SITUATIONS	   8
4 	  
a	  model	   with	   one	   pilot),	   and	   the	   Aircraft	   Landing	   Control	   does	   not	   already	  
indicate	  that	  the	  plane’s	  landing	  gear	  is	  deployed	  
	   	  	   when	  (knownval(plane.touchdown	  =	  false)	  and	  	   	   knownval(current.location	  =	  control.location)	  and	  knownval(current.location	  =	  pfd.location)	  and	  knownval(control.isGearsDown	  !=	  plane.gearsDeployed)	  and	  knownval(plane.airSpeed	  >	  0))	  	   do	  {	   readPrimaryFlightDisplay(pfd,	  plane,	  1,	  3);	  	   	   }	  }//wf	  Confirm_Gears_Changed	  
7.1.4 Scenarios	  	  A	   Brahms	   simulation	   model	   configuration	   consists	   of	   the	   modeled	   geography,	  agents,	   and	   objects	   as	   well	   as	   initial	   facts	   and	   beliefs	   of	   agents	   and	   objects.	   	   For	  example,	  the	  departure	  time	  for	  a	  flight	  might	  be	  an	  initial	  fact	  about	  that	  flight.	  One	  can	  modify	   the	  model	   for	   different	   departure	   times	   to	   define	   different	   simulation	  
runs.	  That	  is,	  the	  same	  model	  may	  be	  run	  with	  different	  configurations	  to	  perform	  a	  what-­‐if	  analysis.	  	  	  	  Initial	  facts	  may	  include	  work	  schedules.	  	  For	  example,	  an	  air	  traffic	  controller	  might	  be	   working	   alone	   in	   the	   ATCC	   at	   a	   certain	   time	   in	   one	   configuration,	   but	   two	  controllers	   might	   be	   working	   together	   at	   different	   workstations	   in	   another	  configuration.	  	  	  Initial	  beliefs	  of	  an	  agent	  might	  be	  broad	  preferences	  affecting	  behavior	  (e.g.,	  “TCAS	  should	   overrule	   the	   ATCO”),	   thus	   initial	   beliefs	   can	   be	   used	   as	   switches	   to	   easily	  specify	  alternative	  configurations	  of	  interest.	  	  	  	  Alternative	  Brahms	  model	  configurations	  are	  called	  scenarios.	   	  Thus	  for	  example,	  a	  scenario	  might	  be	  a	  variation	  of	  the	  Überlingen	  collision	  in	  which	  two	  aircraft	  have	  inter-­‐route	  flight	  times	  that	  put	  them	  on	  an	  intersecting	  path	  over	  Überlingen,	  there	  is	  a	   late	  arriving	   flight	   for	  Friedrichshafen,	  and	  maintenance	  degrades	   the	  radar—but	  the	  telephones	  are	  operative.	  	  Or	  the	  phones	  might	  be	  inoperative	  but	  the	  STCA	  Optical	  alert	  functions	  normally.	  	  Generally	  speaking,	  a	  Brahms	  model	  is	  designed	  by	  the	  model	  builder	  with	  sufficient	  flexibility	  to	  allow	  investigating	  scenarios	  of	  interest.	   	  The	  set	  of	  “causal	  factors”	  of	  interest	   (e.g.,	   use	   of	   control	   strips	   when	   approving	   aircraft	   altitude	   changes,	  availability	  of	  telephones)	  constitute	  states	  of	  the	  world	  and	  behaviors	  that	  can	  be	  configured	   through	   initial	   facts	   and	   beliefs.	   The	   initial	   settings	   define	   a	   space	   of	  
scenarios.	   	  Using	  Brahms	   to	  evaluate	  designs	  within	   this	  space,	  while	  using	   formal	  methods	  to	  help	  modelers	  understand	  its	  boundaries	  so	  they	  can	  refine	  the	  model	  to	  explore	  alternative	  scenarios,	  constitutes	  the	  main	  research	  objective	  of	  this	  project.	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By	   configuring	   the	   simulation	   model	   to	   represent	   variations	   in	   the	   environment	  (e.g.,	   ATCC	   tools,	   flights)	   and	   basic	   agent	   behaviors	   (e.g.,	   following	   TCAS	   or	   	   the	  ATCO)	  we	  can	  simulate	  what	  happens	   in	  different	  scenarios.	   	  These	  “outcomes”	  (a	  chronology	  of	  system	  states	  and	  events)	  are	  actually	  predictions	  of	  how	  a	  particular	  set	   of	   events	   (here	   the	  Überlingen	   collision)	  might	  play	  out	  differently	   if	   different	  combinations	  of	  the	  known	  causal	  factors	  were	  present.	  	  Besides	  allowing	  a	  variety	  of	   scenarios,	   Brahms-­‐GÜM	   is	   general	   in	   the	   sense	   that	   the	   components	   can	   be	  adapted	  and	  reconfigured	   for	  entirely	  different	   situations,	   such	  as	  a	  very	  different	  set	   of	   flights,	   revised	   systems	   (e.g.,	   TCAS	   7.1,	   which	   can	   reverse	   instructions	   to	  pilots),	  agents	   following	  different	  work	  practices	  (e.g.,	  an	  air	   traffic	  controller	  who	  would	  have	  told	  AEF	  to	  call	  the	  tower	  after	  two	  failed	  phone	  attempts),	  etc.	  In	  this	  manner,	   the	  model	   that	  was	   developed	   for	   exploring	   variations	   of	   the	  Überlingen	  scenario	   can	   be	   adapted	   (edited	   and/or	   elaborated)	   to	   represent	   and	   assess	  different	  work	  system	  designs	  related	  to	  air	  transportation	  systems.	  	  	  	  	  In	  summary	  Brahms-­‐GÜM	  is	  not	  a	  simulation	  of	  a	  particular	  accident	  or	  restricted	  to	  understanding	   variations	   of	   the	   Überlingen	   scenario.	   The	  models	   of	   ATCC,	   ATCO,	  flights,	  aircraft,	  radar,	  etc.	  can	  be	  reconfigured	  and	  populated	  to	  simulate	  different	  air	   sectors	   and	   flight	   combinations.	   In	   effect,	   Brahms-­‐GÜM	   can	   be	   viewed	   as	  providing	   a	   library	  of	   agent	   and	  object	  models	   that	   can	  be	  used	  and	  extended	   for	  different	  purposes	  in	  NextGen	  research.	  
7.1.5 Roles	  and	  responsibilities	  Assignment	  of	  responsibility	  among	  people	  and	  automated	  systems	  is	  another	  form	  of	   flexibility	   of	   particular	   interest	   for	   AFCS	   research.	   Ideally,	   the	   Brahms	   model	  should	   be	   designed	   to	   enable	   flexibility	   by	  which	   a	   given	   agent/system	   can	   have	  more	   than	   one	   role/responsibility	   at	   a	   given	   time	   and	   these	   can	   change	   (be	  reassigned)	  during	  operations	  in	  a	  situation-­‐dependent	  manner.	  More	  specifically,	  a	  person/system	  has	  more	  than	  one	  role/responsibility	  at	  the	  same	  time	  and	  different	  roles/responsibilities	   at	  different	   times	  during	   the	   simulation.	  During	   	   operations,	  people	   and	   automated	   systems	   behave	   independently,	   in	   parallel,	   enacting	   their	  different	  roles/responsibilities.	  	  In	   a	   Brahms	  model	   roles/responsibilities	   are	   represented	   by	   group	  membership,	  which	   can	   be	   used	   to	  model	   defined	   roles	   (job	   position/functions)	   and	   activities.	  The	  Zurich	  ATCC	  on	  the	  evening	  of	  the	  accident	  was	  staffed	  by	  people	  carrying	  out	  the	   roles	   of	   the	   RE	   (Radar	   Executive),	   RP	   (Radar	   Planner)	   and	   CA	   (Controller	  Assistant).	   	  In	   the	   accident	   report,	   the	   controller	   is	   called	   an	   ATCO	   (Air	   Traffic	  Controller),	   who	   is	   carrying	   out	   the	   function	   of	   RP	   and	   RE	   simultaneously.	   	  To	  simulate	  how	  the	  Zurich	  ATCO	  is	  left	  alone	  to	  work	  two	  workstations,	  he	  is	  modeled	  as	   initially	   belonging	   to	   two	   groups.	   When	   the	   other	   ATCO	   goes	   on	   break,	   he	  communicates	   that	   he	   is	   leaving	   and	   reconfigures	   the	   A	   RE	   (right)	   radar	   display.	  	  The	   remaining	  ATCO	   then	   concludes	   that	   he	   is	  working	   at	   both	  workstations	   and	  that	  he	  is	  responsible	  for	  following	  the	  Friedrichshafen	  STAR	  procedures.	  Thus	  this	  ATCO	   will	   follow	   the	   behaviors	   required	   by	   two	   people	   working	   these	   two	  workstations,	  having	  to	  share	  his	  time	  and	  attention	  between	  them.	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  Here	  is	  the	  same	  description	  expressed	  in	  the	  Brahms	  language:	  
 To	  simulate	  how	  the	  Zurich	  ATCO	  (Brahms Agent ATCO_Zurich_RP)	  	  is	  left	  alone	  to	  work	  two	  workstations	  	  (Brahms Areas WorkstationArea_Zurich_ARTCC_A_RE 
WorkstationArea_Zurich_ARTCC_S_RE)	  he	  is	  modeled	  as	  initially	  belonging	  to	  two	  groups:	  	  (Brahms Groups RadarPlannerGroup 
AirTrafficApproachControlGroup).	  	  	  	  When	  the	  other	  ATCO	  	  (ATCO_Zurich_AR_RE,	  member	  of	  AirTrafficApproachControlGroup	  working	  at	  WorkstationArea_Zurich_ARTCC_A_RE)	  	  goes	  on	  break,	  he	  communicates	  that	  he	  is	  leaving	  and	  reconfigures	  the	  A	  RE	  radar	  display	  	  (ATC_Display_Zurich_ARTCC_Arfa_Sector)	  	  so	  that	  its	  airSectors	  property	  is	  AirSector_Zurich_East_ARTCC.	  	  	  	  The	  remaining	  ATCO	  (ATCO_Zurich_RP)	  then	  concludes	  that	  he	  is	  working	  at	  both	  workstations	  and	  that	  he	  is	  responsible	  for	  following	  the	  Friedrichshafen	  STAR	  procedures	  (i.e.,	  believes	  that	  his	  airportSTARs,	  the	  procedures	  to	  follow,	  includes	  STAR_EDNY_RWY_24).	  
7.1.6 Tool	  and	  environment	  advantages	  More	   broadly,	   the	   Brahms	   work	   practice	   modeling	   framework	   has	   several	  characteristics	  pertinent	  to	  air	  transportation	  systems	  simulation	  objectives:	  	  	  	  
• Generality—as	   explained	   above,	   the	   object-­‐oriented	   design	   of	   Brahms	  models	   makes	   them	   amenable	   to	   reuse,	   such	   that	   one	   can	   develop	   a	  “simulation	  toolkit”	  for	  an	  application	  area.	  The	  models	  of	  aircraft,	  cockpits,	  radio,	   telephone,	   ATCCs,	   pilots,	   etc.	   developed	   in	   the	   Brahms-­‐GÜM	   can	   be	  packaged	  for	  use	  by	  other	  research	  teams	  to	  develop	  ATS	  simulations.	  	  
• Variable	   Detail	   and	   Simulation	   Coupling—behaviors	   can	   be	   simulated	  coarsely,	   as	   in	   the	   example	   of	   the	   radar	   display	   above;	   object	   facts/beliefs	  can	  also	  be	  simulated	  by	  coupling	   the	  Brahms	  model	   to	  another	  simulation	  (or	  with	  appropriate	  APIs	  to	  an	  actual	  hardware/software	  system).	  	  
• Analytic	  Metrics—a	  conceptual	  object	  (e.g.,	  a	  flight)	  can	  be	  tracked	  during	  a	  simulation	   such	   that	   statistics	   involving	   agents,	   activities,	   and	   time	   can	   be	  recorded.	  For	  example,	  it	  would	  be	  possible	  to	  record	  the	  percentage	  of	  time	  an	   ATCO	   is	   working	   on	   different	   workstations	   during	   a	   simulated	   period.	  	  Such	  data	  measure	  properties	   are	   of	   interest	   for	   evaluating	   a	  work	   system	  design	   (e.g.,	   statistics	   about	   aircraft	   separation)	   and/or	   to	   justify	   further	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model	   refinement	   or	   human-­‐in-­‐the-­‐loop	   experiments	   with	   a	   proposed	  automation	  system.	  	  
• Visualization—the	   Brahms	   modeling	   environment	   includes	   the	  AgentViewer,	  a	   tool	   for	  displaying	  events	   in	  a	  simulation	  run	  on	  a	   timeline,	  such	   that	   interactions	   between	   selected	   objects	   and/or	   agents	   can	   be	  identified	  and	  analyzed.	  Collapsing	  the	  timeline	  allows	  visualizing	  aggregate	  patterns	  of	  interaction,	  such	  as	  recurrent	  agent/object	  communications	  (see	  Appendix	  25	  and	  Figure	  22-­‐4	  in	  Appendix	  22.5).	  
7.2 Relation	  of	  Brahms	  to	  Other	  Modeling	  Frameworks	  A	  wide	  variety	  of	  ATS	  research	  relates	  to	  the	  present	  project,	  including	  approaches	  to	   studying	   and	   modeling	   work	   (e.g.,	   cognitive	   task	   models),	   analyzing	   and	  formalizing	   system	   interactions	   (e.g.,	   resilience	   engineering),	   and	   experimenting	  with	  prototype	  systems	  (e.g.,	  human-­‐in-­‐the-­‐loop	  airspace	  simulations).	  	  The	  present	  project	   is	   effectively	   an	   experiment	   with	   an	   established	   approach,	   work	   practice	  analysis	  and	  simulation,	   in	  particular	   to	  evaluate	  Brahms	  suitability	   for	  simulating	  complex	  human-­‐automation	  systems	  in	  safety-­‐critical	  situations.	  	  	  This	   report	  details	  one	  year’s	   activity	  on	  an	  effort	   that	  would	  naturally	   require	   at	  least	   three	   to	   five	   years	   to	   reach	  maturity.	   Because	   of	   the	   great	   amount	   of	   detail	  required	   to	   convey	   the	   analysis,	   simulation,	   and	   results,	   no	   effort	   is	  made	  here	   to	  comprehensively	   survey	  and	  compare	   the	  existing	   literature	   in	  air	   traffic	   systems,	  human	   factors,	   formal	  methods,	   or	   any	  of	   the	   related	  disciplines	   (e.g.,	   psychology,	  organizational	   theory).	   The	   research	   and	   writing	   of	   such	   a	   report	   would	   merit	   a	  separately	  funded	  project.	  	  	  Instead	  our	  investigation	  of	  related	  research	  has	  focused	  on	  the	  significant	  body	  of	  scientific	   publications	   that	   explicitly	   cite	   the	   Überlingen	   collision	   and	   have	   been	  valuable	  for	  understanding	  the	  circumstances	  of	  the	  collision	  and	  how	  to	  analyze	  it	  (Chapter	  6).	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  alternative	  modeling	  and	  simulation	  approaches	  can	  be	   helpful	   to	   	   articulate	   and	   contrast	   the	   methods	   and	   benefits	   of	   work	   practice	  simulation.	   	  Rather	  than	  providing	  a	  complete	   literature	  review,	  we	  mention	  some	  related	  work	  to	  highlight	  the	  theoretical	  and	  practical	  contributions	  of	  this	  project.	  	  	  	  The	  explanation	  of	  work	  systems	  modeling	  in	  this	  chapter	  to	  this	  point	  has	  already	  highlighted	   how	   modeling	   and	   simulating	   activities	   as	   chronological,	   located	  behaviors	   in	   a	   simulated	   environment	   is	   fundamentally	   different	   from	   task-­‐functional	   modeling,	   the	   modeling	   method	   that	   is	   most	   common	   in	   large-­‐scale	  human-­‐system	  models	  (e.g.,	  see	  Air	  Force	  Office	  of	  Scientific	  Research	  Software	  and	  Systems	  research	  program).	  	  The	  most	  common	  multiagent	  simulation	  frameworks	  enable	   creating	   task-­‐function	   models	   (or	   runtime	   programs)	   grounded	   in	   a	   logic	  formalism.	  These	  logic-­‐based	  tools	  are	  directed	  at	  designing	  software	  agents	  whose	  behaviors	  are	  optimal	  with	  respect	  to	  formal	  definitions	  of	  rationality,	  information,	  economics,	   etc.	   	   These	   tools	   emphasize	   modeling	   and	   design	   of	   automated	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processes,	  in	  contrast	  with	  the	  objective	  of	  Brahms	  to	  simulate	  practice,	  how	  people	  actually	  behave.	  	  	  The	   following	   sections	   briefly	   review	   other	   Brahms	   simulations	   relevant	   to	   the	  present	   modeling	   effort,	   cognitive	   models	   of	   air	   traffic	   control,	   Reason’s	   “Swiss	  cheese”	   accident	   model,	   the	   NextGenAA	   agent-­‐based	   language,	   the	   approach	   of	  aviation	  safety	  problem	  analysis.	  
7.2.1 Hybrid	  Brahms	  Simulations	  	  As	   illustrated	   by	   the	   incorporation	   of	   a	   model	   of	   TCAS	   in	   the	   Brahms-­‐GÜM,	   the	  Brahms	   framework	   is	   designed	   to	   enable	   simulating	   automated	   systems	   and	   thus	  representing	   how	   people	   might	   behave	   when	   using	   or	   directed	   by	   automated	  systems.	   	   More	   generally,	   Brahms’	   framework	   enables	   incorporating	   other	  simulations	  or	  even	  actual	  software	  systems	  within	  a	  Brahms	  model:	  	  	  
• In	   the	   Brahms-­‐OCAMS	   simulation	   (Clancey	   et	   al.	   2008),	   a	   simulated	  backroom	  flight	  controller	  in	  Mission	  Control	  Center	  of	  Johnson	  Space	  Center	  interacts	   with	  Microsoft	   Office	   tools	   including	   Excel™	   and	  Word™	   that	   are	  integrated	  in	  the	  Brahms	  model	  through	  Microsoft	  Office	  APIs.	  	  
• An	  existing	  simulation	  of	  an	  air	  recycling	  system	  coupled	  to	  an	  automated	  air	  system	   control	   system	  was	   integrated	  with	   a	   Brahms	  model;	   the	   interface	  used	   by	   a	   simulated	   astronaut	   was	   modeled	   in	   Brahms	   with	   properties	  changed	  by	  the	  underlying	  automated	  system	  (called	  Brahms-­‐CONFIG).	  	  	  
• In	   Brahms-­‐VE	   a	   Brahms	   simulation	   of	   astronauts	   living	   and	   working	   in	   a	  Mars	   habitat	  was	   coupled	   to	   a	   virtual	   reality	   simulation	   of	   the	   habitat	   and	  astronauts,	   such	   that	  movements	   and	   gestures	   of	   the	   simulated	   astronauts	  were	   driven	   by	   the	   Brahms	   simulation	   and	   represented	   as	   a	   kind	   of	  dynamically	  constructed	  cartoon	  (Clancey	  et	  al.	  2005).	  	  Certainly	  the	  most	  relevant	  previous	  work	  is	  Brahms-­‐FACET,	  in	  which	  Brahms	  was	  coupled	   to	   FACET	   to	   simulate	   how	   airlines	   might	   directly	   affect	   traffic	   flow	  management	   (Wolfe	   et	   al.	   2008).	   The	   project	   explored	   alternative	   uses	   of	   the	  Brahms	   framework	  with	   respect	   to	   performance	   for	   a	   large-­‐scale	   simulation	  with	  many	   flights.	   Brahms-­‐FACET	   used	   Brahms	   to	   provide	   a	   simulation	   context	   for	  integrating	  FACET	  with	  algorithmic	  route	  selection	  methods,	  rather	  than	  modeling	  human	  reasoning	  and	  practices.	  	  	  Given	  the	   focus	  on	  modeling	   flows	   in	  defined	  air	   traffic	  routes,	   the	  Brahms-­‐FACET	  model	  did	  not	  simulate	  the	  work	  practices	  of	  pilots	  or	  air	  traffic	  controllers:	  	  	   The	   controllers	   themselves	  were	  modeled	  only	   as	   a	   constraint,	   i.e.,	   the	  number	  of	  flights	  that	  could	  follow	  a	  particular	  air	  route…considered	  as	  a	  route	  capacity….[The	  model]	   assigned	   one	   controller	   per	   route	   and	   did	   not	  model	   sectors.	   (Wolfe	   et	   al	  2008,	  p.	  3)	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The	  Traffic	  Management	  Unit	  was	  modeled	  as	   a	   single	   agent;	  modeling	  pilots	  was	  determined	   to	   be	   unnecessary	   given	   the	   focus	   on	   decision-­‐making	   involved	   in	  planning	  by	  the	  TMUs.	  	  	  The	  experience	  in	  developing	  the	  Brahms-­‐FACET	  model	  exemplifies	  the	  flexibility	  of	  the	  Brahms	  language	  and	  importance	  of	  scoping	  the	  model’s	  design	  to	  focus	  on	  what	  questions	  the	  model	  is	  intended	  to	  answer:	  	  	  	   Great	   care	   was	   taken	   to	   only	   represent	   the	   airspace	   components	   that	   were	   truly	  needed	   for	   agent	   decision	  making,	   and	   such	   components	  were	   represented	   in	   the	  most	  abstract	  (i.e.,	  compact)	  form	  possible.	  In	  some	  cases,	  such	  as	  the	  identification	  of	   the	   demand-­‐capacity	   imbalance,	   the	   processing	   was	   done	   in	   FACET	   (and	  supporting	   Java	  code)	  and	  only	  the	  outcomes	  were	  represented	  in	  the	  corresponding	  
agent’s	  belief	  model.	  	  (Wolfe	  et	  al.	  2008,	  p.	  6)	  
7.2.2 Cognitive	  models	  of	  air	  traffic	  control	  Other	  work	  in	  ATS	  simulation	  has	  demonstrated	  the	  feasibility	  for	  formal	  models	  of	  human	   interaction	   with	   automation,	   but	   usually	   at	   the	   local,	   one-­‐person–one-­‐procedure–one-­‐interface	   level	   (e.g.,	   an	   ATCO	   or	   pilot(s)/crew,	   but	   not	   both	  interacting).	   	   Examples	   include	   (Callantine	   2001,	   2005a,b;	   Corker	   et	   al.	   2000;	  Leuchter	  and	  Jürgensohn	  2000;	  Pompanon	  and	  Raufaste	  2009;	  Pritchett	  and	  Feigh	  2011).	   A	   more	   complete	   study	   of	   related	   work	   would	   compare	   and	   contrast	   the	  methods	  of	  	  Degani,	  Rushby,	  Freed,	  Leveson,	  Feary,	  Sherry,	  Palmer,	  and	  others.	  	  Cognitive	  simulations	  can	  be	  quite	  detailed	  in	  represent	  mental	  processes	  involving	  attention,	  planning,	  and	  inference.	  However,	  the	  notion	  of	  “activity”	  in	  these	  models	  corresponds	   only	   to	   mental	   activity	   that	   involves	   information	   (e.g.,	   “a	   perceptual	  activity”):	  	  	   Agents	   transform	   their	   belief	   set	   by	   performing	   activities,	   in	   accordance	  with	   the	  theory	   that	   all	   salient	   operator	   activities	   in	   complex	   human-­‐machine	   systems	  involve	  transforming	  or	  communicating	  contextual	  information	  (Callantine,	  2005).	  	  
 
In contrast, in Brahms activities are what people do, such as moving to another 
workstation, looking for a control strip, saying something out loud in a room, and 
sleeping in a break room. Thinking about something is also an activity—it occurs 
in some setting, takes time, and often occurs while using representational objects 
(e.g., consulting a manual).  The work of an ATCO involves more than 
transforming or communicating information and those that do, such as using a 
telephone require movement and take time. Indeed, it is through located 
interactions in the world over time that an ATCO discovers what information 
needs to be read, interpreted, recorded, communicated, etc. These caveats aside, it 
might be useful in future research to adapt and incorporate the Crew Activity 
Tracking System (CATS) activity model to create a more complete ATCO 
simulation than limited resources have allowed in developing Brahms-GÜM. 	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By focusing on the broader context, Brahms-GÜM demonstrates that the Brahms 
simulation tool has the potential to extend formal analysis of the ATS to a 
distributed set of agents, including people and automated systems, acting 
independently, cooperatively, or even competitively.  This is of interest because it 
extends the state-of-the-art and is directly relevant to NextGen goals.  
7.2.3 Reason’s	  “Swiss	  cheese”	  accident	  model	  
Different “accident models” can serve as frameworks for analyzing and explaining 
the events in an accident.  As detailed in the review of Normal Accident Theory 
(Chapter 5), this report applies a systemic perspective, which admits multiple, 
non-linear, dynamic “causes.” Prevalent alternative perspectives adopted by 
analysts include sequential, epidemiological, and event-based (root-cause) 
frameworks (Shappell	  and	  Wiegmann	  2000). 
 
One particularly common metaphor that appears in aerospace accident reports is 
the “Swiss cheese” model that integrated and elaborated Reason’s (1990) 
framework into the causal sequence analysis.   It	  is	  generally	  accepted	  that	  like	  most	  accidents,	  those	  in	  aviation	  do	  not	  happen	  in	  isolation.	  Rather,	  they	  are	  often	  the	  result	  of	  a	  chain	  of	  events	  often	  culminating	  with	  the	   unsafe	   acts	   of	   aircrew.	   Indeed,	   from	   Heinrich’s	   (Heinrich,	   Peterson,	   &	   Roos,	  1980)	  axioms	  of	  industrial	  safety	  to	  Reason’s	  (1990)	  “Swiss	  cheese”	  model	  of	  human	  error,	  a	  sequential	  theory	  of	  accident	  causation	  has	  been	  consistently	  embraced	  by	  most	  in	  the	  field	  of	  human	  error.	  Particularly	  useful	  in	  this	  regard	  has	  been	  Reason’s	  (1990)	   description	   of	   active	   and	   latent	   failures	   within	   the	   context	   of	   his	   “Swiss	  cheese”	  model	  of	  human	  error.	  (Shappell	  and	  Wiegmann,	  p.	  2) 
 
However, it is somewhat unfair to blame (or credit) Reason (1990) for the 
sequential theory of accident causation. Reason depicted levels or dimensions of 
analysis—organizational influences, unsafe supervision, preconditions for unsafe 
acts, and unsafe acts of operators. Shappell and Wiegmann similarly emphasize 
the notion of analytic dimensions or perspectives in the HFACS framework 
(Section 6.5).21 Although Reason depicted the dimensions as series of squares (p. 
208, Figure 7.8), giving rise to the Swiss cheese metaphor, he appears to 
emphasize instead that these are “levels” or “layers” of analysis, emphasizing that 
causes were systemic, not all located in one set of players or setting and having a 
historic, cultural nature. The caption where he introduces the metaphor refers to 
“the chance of such a trajectory of opportunity finding loopholes  in all of the 
defences at any one time” (p. 208), emphasizing the checks and balances that 
operate on many levels and across time in the organization, rather than a specific 
chain of events.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  21	  Indeed,	   Wallace	   and	   Ross	   (2006)	   argue	   that	   Reason’s	   model,	   which	   is	   based	   on	   deterministic	  causes,	  has	  the	  same	  fundamental	  weakness	  as	  Heinrich’s	  (1959)	  “domino”	  theory:	  “there	  is	  one	  set	  root	  cause	  that	  triggers	  another	  and	  then	  another	  until	  the	  accident	  happens”	  (p.	  26).	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As Shappell	   and	   Wiegmann	   observe, Reason’s conceptual framework is often 
represented as a sequence of events, implying that accident causes are lined up like 
dominos, one falling into the other. For example, in Figure	  7-­‐1, published in a June 
2012 NASA e-book (Merlin et al. 2012), Reason’s analytic levels are depicted and 
described as a “mishap chain.” The arrow represents time and the holes suggest 
weakness or gaps in a single system level. This diagram confounds an analysis 
based on different systemic perspectives (occurring at different organizational and 
temporal scales) with an analysis of an accident as temporally ordered causes—a 
sequence of events.   
 
 
Figure	  7-­‐1:	  Reason’s	  four	  dimensions	  portrayed	  as	  a	  “chain	  of	  events”	  leading	  
to	  an	  accident	  (Merlin	  et	  al.	  2012,	  Breaking	  the	  Mishap	  Chain,	  p.	  iv)	  
The implication of such diagrams is that if one event is missing, akin to moving a 
slice of cheese, so “the holes of vulnerability” (Merlin et al. 2012) do not line up 
in the same way, then the accident would not have occurred:  	  Organizational	  safety	  researcher	  James	  Reason	  likens	  the	  layers	  of	  supervision	  and	  management	   in	  an	  organization	  to	  slices	  of	  cheese—specifically,	  Swiss	  cheese.	  The	  holes	  in	  each	  slice	  of	  the	  cheese	  represent	  areas	  of	  safety	  vulnerability	  in	  the	  context	  of	  operations.	  When	  the	  holes	  are	  small	  and	  out	  of	  alignment	  with	  one	  another,	  safe	  operations	   ensue.	   But	  when	   the	   holes	   in	   the	   various	   layers	   line	   up,	   the	   “accident	  arrow”	  is	  allowed	  to	  pass	  through,	  resulting	  in	  an	  accident.	  (p.	  141)	  	  Such	   accidents	   and	   incidents	   rarely	   resulted	   from	   a	   single	   cause	   but	   were	   the	  outcome	   of	   a	   chain	   of	   events	   in	   which	   altering	   at	   least	   one	   element	   might	   have	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prevented	   disaster…even	   the	   most	   qualified	   individuals	   can	   become	   links	   in	   the	  mishap	  chain	  (pp.	  xiv-­‐xv)	  
 
Pictures like this may be easy to remember and have some pedagogical value, but 
they may lead analysts astray by suggesting that an accident can be understood as 
a simple sequence of events. Of course “things happen” at certain times as an 
accident unfolds. Indeed, the narratives we construct in telling the story of an 
accident are almost always chronologically ordered—it is one of the defining 
properties of narrative.   
 
The “narrative presupposition” is the assumption that the order of clauses in the 
narrative can be taken to mirror the order of events in some postulated real 
world.22  Consequently, any presentation of events is likely to be interpreted as a 
narrative sequence. This can become a problem for understanding events in 
complex systems because a “timeline of events” is mostly irrelevant to 
understanding complex interactions occurring across dimensions (e.g., 
organizational vs. electromechanical) and among subsystems at the same level of 
analysis (e.g., two ATCCs and two cockpits). 
 
In particular, the “holes” such as missing tools, automated processes, assistance 
from others, etc. may normally inter-operate, such that for example STCA Optical 
alert and phones are part of the ATCO’s support system. Removing both is like 
introducing two “holes” in the same slice of cheese. Such interactions at the same 
level of analysis/description are fundamental in understanding how situations 
become complex. But the “mishap chain” metaphor suggests that we are most 
interested in “holes” that “link” organizations, supervision, and controller actions. 
In fact, the supervisory actions are occurring within the same work system as the 
controllers.  What is really needed here—and that Reason’s model emphasizes—is 
understanding the work system with respect to all of the players with different 
roles at other times and places, not just the “operators” on the line when an 
accident occurs. Talk about holes and slices doesn’t offer much insight into such 
distributed practices, particularly those involving different authority and 
responsibility (e.g., the relation of the maintenance team to the Zurich ATCC). 
 
The further categorization of anomalies as being “lost defenses” (Merlin, et al. 
2012, p. xiii) again takes the metaphor of “accident barriers” too literally. Most 
tools and practices (e.g., control strips, telephones) are not “defenses” they are 
simply aspects of how the work is done. A missing alarm may be construed as a 
failed defense, but missing phones constitute a loss of workflow/coordination 
paths. Failure to do a task (e.g., perhaps ignoring AEF calls in the face of the 
DHL/BTC separation violation) is not in itself necessarily an “unsafe act.” 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  22	  See	   Linde	   (1993,	   p	   68)	   discussion	   of	   Labov’s	   (1972)	   analysis	   of	   the	   discourse	   structure	   of	  narrative.	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In reality, as we saw in the NAT discussion of Überlingen (Section 6.8.1), 
different processes are operating in parallel, simultaneously and coming into the 
interaction in unforeseen ways in the moments prior to the collision. System	  states	  may	  interrelate	  and	  become	  part	  of	  a	  network	  of	  causes.	  For example, it is possible 
that the ATCO might have intervened soon after the TCAS TA, such that TCAS 
would adapt its instruction to the BTC’s maneuver to advise them to descend. By 
intervening seconds before the TCAS RA, ATCO’s instruction might have come 
at the worst possible time relative to the operation of the TCAS algorithm, creating 
a situation for the pilots that required special training to react to correctly. 
 
People will naturally construct a narrative that inherently linearizes a network of 
causes; this is a consequence of the narrative presupposition discussed above.  The 
problem is that the choice of “events” to recount may be strongly governed by the 
necessity of story structure and telling a good story (the exigencies of rhetoric).  
Stories are good at highlighting heroes and villains, but insufficient and potentially 
misleading for expressing the interrelation of multiple, simultaneous causes. 
Within a narrative, one “chain” will tend to be highlighted over others. For 
example, by a retrospective analysis otherwise acceptable practices (e.g., not 
directing BTC or DHL to another altitude when they first contacted Zurich ATCO) 
may be viewed as “events” (failures to do a task) that contributed to an accident.  
 
In some respects the “chain of events” diagrams codifies the perspective of 
hindsight bias by which the sequence of events appears incredible.  Woods (2005, 
p. 306) explains how hindsight bias hinders accident analysis, such as in the 
Columbia Accident Investigation Board report (2003) which he was critiquing:   
 Hindsight	  is	  not	  foresight.	  After	  an	  accident,	  we	  know	  all	  of	  the	  critical	  information	  and	   knowledge	   needed	   to	   understand	  what	   happened.	   But	   that	   knowledge	   is	   not	  available	  to	  the	  participants	  before	  the	  fact.	  In	  looking	  back	  we	  tend	  to	  oversimplify	  the	  situation	  the	  actual	  practitioners	  faced,	  and	  this	  tends	  to	  block	  our	  ability	  to	  see	  the	  deeper	  story	  behind	  the	  label	  human	  error. 
 
Reconstruction after the fact leads to an oversimplification, which the Swiss 
cheese diagram exemplifies—failing to see the interaction of multiple factors, how 
normal practices make safety/production tradeoffs, and the mindset by which 
systematic vulnerabilities are dismissed.  
 
Leveson (2004) and Qureshi (2007) provide excellent reviews and critiques of 
linear, “chain of events” models.  Qureshi says: 
 Sequential	   and	   epidemiological	   accident	   models	   are	   inadequate	   to	   capture	   the	  dynamics	  and	  nonlinear	  interactions	  between	  system	  components	  in	  complex	  socio-­‐technical	   systems.	   New	   accident	   models,	   based	   on	   systems	   theory,	   classified	   as	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systemic	  accident	  models,	  endeavour	  to	  describe	  the	  characteristic	  performance	  on	  the	   level	  of	   the	  system	  as	  a	  whole,	   rather	   than	  on	   the	   level	  of	   specific	   cause-­‐effect	  “mechanisms”	  or	  even	  epidemiological	  factors	  (Hollnagel	  2004).	  	  	  A	   major	   difference	   between	   systemic	   accident	   models	   and	   sequential/	  epidemiological	   accident	   models	   is	   that	   systemic	   accident	   models	   describe	   an	  accident	  process	  as	  a	  complex	  and	  interconnected	  network	  of	  events	  while	  the	  latter	  describes	  it	  as	  a	  simple	  cause-­‐effect	  chain	  of	  events.	  Two	  notable	  systemic	  modelling	  approaches,	   Rasmussen’s	   (1997)	   hierarchical	   socio-­‐technical	   framework	   and	  Leveson’s	  (2004)	  STAMP	  (Systems-­‐Theoretic	  Accident	  Model	  and	  Processes)	  model,	  endeavour	  to	  model	  the	  dynamics	  of	  complex	  socio-­‐technical	  systems.	  
 
Leveson’ frames the systemic view this way: “The most effective models will go 
beyond assigning blame and instead help engineers to learn as much as possible 
about all the factors involved, including those related to social and organizational 
structures.” She argues for “an accident model founded on basic systems theory 
concepts” (p. 1). 
 
An analysis of a mid-air collision in Brazil by de Carvalho et al. (2009) applies 
Normal Accident Theory and the efficiency-thoroughness trade-off (ETTO) 
principle of Hollnagel (2004) to illustrate how ordinary system variations may not 
be perceived as signals or problems in the period preceding an accident, but rather 
are reinterpreted and chained together in hindsight: 
 We	   note	   that	   the	   Brasilia	   controller	   only	   informed	   about	   the	   communication	  frequency.	  He	  simply	  did	  not	  mention	  any	  of	  the	  ‘‘abnormal’’	  (at	  least	  in	  hindsight)	  indications	   they	   had	   on	   the	   radarscope.	   At	   this	   moment,	   he	   (or	   his	   supervisor)	  probably	   had	   already	   perceived	   the	   indication	   changes,	   but	   he	   did	   not	   think	   that	  these	   indications	   were	   important	   enough	   to	   be	   communicated	   to	   the	   fellow	  controller.	   This	   brings	   the	   important	   question	   regarding	   how	   the	   system	   functions	  
daily.	   If	   the	   situations	   uncovered	   by	   this	   accident,	   like	   loss	   of	   radar	   contact,	  communications	   difficulties,	   and	   level	   variations	   due	   height-­‐finding	   radar	  inaccuracy	   are	   frequent	   enough	   in	   a	  way	   that	   ‘‘abnormal’’	   indications	  were	   being	  considered	   ‘‘normal,’’	   then	   the	   ETTO	   principle	   and	   associated	   heuristics	   (these	  things	  always	  happen,	  it	  is	  not	  important	  to	  act	  now,	  the	  system	  is	  always	  changing	  symbols)	  function	  as	  an	  important	  factor	  for	  the	  construction	  of	  cognitive	  strategies.	  In	  this	  situation,	  we	  cannot	  attribute	  the	  cause	  of	  the	  accident	  to	  a	  chain	  of	  human	  errors.	  Doing	  so,	  we	  will	  be	  blind	  to	  address	  the	  real	  safety	  threats	  throughout	  the	  ATC	  system	  functioning.	  (pp.	  338-­‐339,	  emphasis	  added)	  
  
We also note that official accident investigation reports furnish the primary data 
for most accident histories.  The main function of these reports is to establish the 
legal liabilities in particular accidents, not to provide all the data required for 
scientific analyses.  We have already discussed a number of questions raised by 
the Brahms modeling process for which the BFU report does not furnish the data.  
Other analyses would doubtless find other omissions. 
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7.2.4 NextGenAA	  agent-­‐based	  language	  NextGenAA	   is	   a	   complementary	   NASA	   research	   project	   within	   the	   Authority	   and	  Autonomy	   theme.	   Comparing	   and	   contrasting	   the	   approaches	   helps	   elucidate	   the	  nature	  of	  agents	  and	  work	  system	  modeling	  in	  Brahms.	  	  General	   objectives	   of	   the	   NextGenAA	   project	   	   (Bass	   et	   al.	   2010a,	   b,	   2011b)	   are	  similar	  to	  the	  Brahms	  AFCS	  project:	  	  
• To	  develop	  a	  unified	  agent	  modeling	  language	  which	  can	  be	  used	  by	  both	  agent	  based	  simulation	  and	  model	  checking	  to	  model	  autonomy	  	  
• To	  develop	  and	  demonstrate	  a	  computationally	  tractable	  approach	  that	  allows	  formal	  model	  checking	  techniques	  to	  verify	  the	  bounds	  of	  human	  behavior	  and	  accountability	  in	  a	  distributed	  human-­‐automation	  system	  
• To	  develop	  and	  demonstrate	  an	  integrated	  tool-­‐suite	  through	  real-­‐world	  concepts	  under	  consideration	  for	  inclusion	  in	  Next	  Generation	  Air	  Transportation	  Systems	  via	  scenarios	  involving	  substantial	  human-­‐automation	  interaction.	  	  	  Table	   7-­‐1	   indicates	   how	   constructs	   in	   the	   NextGenAA	   framework	   can	   be	  represented	   in	   the	   Brahms	   language.	   Brahms	   constructs	   and/or	   semantics	   that	  appear	  not	   to	  be	   included	   in	   the	  NextGenAA	  framework	  are	  highlighted	   	   in	  yellow	  (see	  Section	  7.1	  for	  overview	  of	  Brahms).	  	  
Table	   7-­‐1:	   Relation	   of	   NextGenAA	   agent	   framework	   to	   Brahms	   language	  
constructs.	   Yellow	   highlight	   indicates	   model	   constructs	   in	   the	   Brahms	  
language	  that	  are	  not	  distinguished	  in	  NextGenAA.	  
NextGenAA	   BRAHMS	  Actions	  (atomic)	   Primitive	  Action	  (Behavior)	  Communication	  Action	  Movement	  Action	  Values:	  Effects	  of	  actions	  (turning	  a	  knob)	   Changed	  Beliefs	  represented	  in	  Conclude	  part	  of	  Workframe	  
	  
Detectables:	  Perceived	  facts	  in	  the	  world,	  probabilistically	  become	  beliefs.	  Activities:	  Composition	  of	  actions	  with	  varied	  control	  (procedure	  vs.	  alternatives)	   Composition	  of	  workframes	  (conditional	  actions)	  Semantics	  of	  activities:	  Conceptual,	  represent	  behaviors,	  correspond	  to	  agent’s	  conception	  of	  identity/role	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NextGenAA	   BRAHMS	  Communication	   Synchronous	  communications	  are	  modeled	  by	  explicit	  handshake	  in	  the	  interaction.	  	  Agent	  can	  only	  communicate	  beliefs.	  	  Objects	  represent	  facts	  about	  the	  world	  as	  beliefs	  (e.g.,	  a	  database).	  Changes	  in	  object	  state	  are	  modeled	  as	  facts.	  Objects	  can	  be	  contained	  in	  other	  objects	  (e.g.,	  a	  photograph	  in	  a	  camera;	  a	  file	  in	  a	  directory)	  Activity	  Abstraction	   Composition	  of	  groups	  having	  activities	  consisting	  of	  workframes	  
Inheritance:	  Subgroups	  and	  agents	  in	  groups	  inherit	  behaviors	  by	  membership.	  Scenario:	  Agents,	  Systems,	  Environment	  	  	   Scenario:	  	  Alternative	  work	  systems	  in	  alternative	  environment,	  consisting	  of	  geographic	  layout,	  facilities,	  vehicles,	  tools,	  
instruments,	  documents,	  etc.	  (world	  facts).	  Goal	  Annotation	  on	  Activities:	  	  
Safety	  Goals:	  expressible	  as	  temporal	  logic	  
Mission	  Goals	  (progress):	  Not	  verifiable,	  summary	  of	  purpose	  of	  action	  
<not	  included	  in	  Brahms	  language>	  
	  The	  focus	  of	  the	  NextGenAA	  is	  constructing	  models	  that	  can	  be	  verified	  using	  formal	  methods.	   	  Bolton	  et	  al.	  (2010)	  describe	  limitations	  of	  other	  task	  analysis	  languages	  that	  they	  sought	  to	  rectify:	  	   The	  power	  of	  these	  formal	  verification	  analyses	  is	   limited	  by	  the	  ability	  of	  the	  task	  analytic	   modeling	   notations	   to	   express	   normative	   human	   behavior.	   For	   example,	  CTT	  [9]	  and	  Field’s	   task	  modeling	  notation	  [20]	  do	  not	  support	  all	  of	   the	  temporal	  and	   cardinal	   relationships	   between	   activities	   and	   actions	   (referred	   to	   as	   sub-­‐acts	  below)	  of	  other	  task	  analytic	  modeling	  notations.	  	  	  They	   then	  summarize	  how	  the	   logical	   relationships	  of	   sub-­‐acts	  can	  be	  specified	   to	  control	   how	   activities	   or	   actions	   in	   a	   decomposition	   hierarchy	   execute.	   These	   are	  combinations	  of	  the	  number	  of	  sub-­‐acts	  that	  must	  execute	  for	  the	  parent	  activity	  to	  finish	  (zero,	  one	  or	  more,	  all,	  exactly	  one)	  and	  their	  temporal	  relations	  (one	  at	  a	  time,	  (possibly)	  concurrently,	  in	  specified	  ordered,	  synchronously).	  	  Applying	  a	   task	  analysis	   framework,	   the	  NextGenAA	  agent-­‐based	   language	  models	  work	   systems	   from	   a	   functional	   perspective,	   as	   opposed	   to	   the	   behavioral-­‐interactional	   descriptions	   in	   Brahms.	   As	   outlined	   in	   the	   table,	   Brahms	   models	  represent	  agents	  as	  having	  actions	  conditional	  on	  their	  beliefs;	  possible	  actions	  and	  initial	   beliefs	   are	   defined	   by	   group	  memberships.	   Agents	   move,	   perceive,	   reason,	  and	  change	  the	   independently	  modeled	  state	  of	   the	  world	  (consisting	  of	  simulated	  objects	  in	  modeled	  geography).	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  By	   abstracting	   the	  work	   system,	   a	   task	   analytic	   perspective	   does	   not	  model	   how	  perception,	  reasoning,	  action,	  and	  environment	  are	  related,	  in	  particular	  how	  agents	  and	   automated	   systems	   interact	   and	   may	   become	   co-­‐dependent	   through	  circumstances.	   For	   example,	   in	   practice	   perceiving	   something	   often	   depends	   on	  being	   in	   a	   certain	   location	   (e.g.,	   moving	   in	   a	   cockpit	   to	   read	   an	   instrument);	  communicating	   involves	   using	   tools	   (e.g.,	   telephones)	   that	   are	   also	   located	  (requiring	   movements),	   and	   object	   behaviors	   need	   to	   be	   modeled	   to	   simulate	  insofar	  as	  they	  become	  the	  “environment”	  for	  agent	  activities.	   	  Similarly,	  reasoning	  often	  involves	  interacting	  with	  objects	  (e.g.,.	  control	  strips)	  and	  is	  carried	  out	  in	  an	  ongoing	  activity	  with	  circumstantial	  layout	  and	  temporal	  interactions	  (e.g.,	  needing	  to	  move	  a	  chair	  to	  monitor	  two	  ATCC	  workstations).	  Often	  what	  you	  perceive	  affects	  what	   you	  want	   to	   know	  more	   about	   and	   hence	   direct	   both	   reasoning	   and	   action	  (e.g.,	  to	  get,	  confirm,	  record	  information).	  	  Because	   of	   the	   Brahms	   approach	   to	   modeling	   work	   systems	   as	   independently	  behaving	   objects	   and	   agents,	   the	   language	   and	   engine	   is	   based	   on	   an	   object-­‐oriented,	   modular	   approach.	   	   Consequently,	   the	   agents,	   systems,	   objects	   (e.g.,	  representations	   in	   the	   world),	   and	   the	   environment	   are	   all	   reconfigurable	   in	   a	  manner	  that	  minimizes	  dependencies.	   	  In	  particular,	  Brahms-­‐GÜM	  includes	  models	  of	   aircraft	   subsystems	   including	   cockpit	   instruments	   (radio,	   FMS)	   and	   ATCC	  subsystems	   (e.g.,	   radar)	   as	   well	   as	   what	   the	   people	   are	   thinking,	   perceiving,	   and	  doing.	  	  	  	  This	   modular	   approach	   means	   that	   timing	   of	   interactions	   among	   agents	   and	  subsystems	  is	  usually	  emergent	  in	  the	  simulation.	  Although	  other	  frameworks	  (e.g.,	  Pritchett’s	  WMC)	   use	   discrete	   event	   simulation	   like	   Brahms,	   they	  may	  model	   the	  “next	  action”	  in	  a	  programmatic	  way	  (similar	  to	  Brahms	  primitive	  activities),	  rather	  than	   having	   the	   timing	   determined	   dynamically	   during	   the	   simulation	   by	  interactions	   among	   independently	   modeled	   people	   and	   systems	   in	   a	   simulated	  world.	  	  It	   should	   be	   emphasized	   that	   Brahms	   was	   not	   designed	   for	   model	   checking,	   but	  emphasizes	   fidelity	   useful	   for	   detailed	   interactional	   design	   where	   temporal	   and	  spatial	   relations	   are	   most	   important,	   as	   occurs	   during	   the	   ATCO-­‐TCAS-­‐Pilot	  interactions	  during	  the	  Überlingen	  accident.	   	  The	  NextGenAA	  project	  aims	  to	  bring	  together	   task	   analysis	   and	  model	   checking	   in	   a	  manner	   informed	  by	   the	   needs	   of	  each	   other.	   Therefore,	   what	   constitutes	   an	   “agent”	   and	   an	   “action”	   is	   different	   in	  these	  two	  frameworks	  and	  should	  be	  assessed	  with	  respect	  to	  each	  project’s	  goals.	  It	  may	  be	  determined	   for	  example	   that	   the	   fidelity	  provided	  by	  Brahms	   in	  modeling	  complex	  human-­‐system	  interactions	  is	  too	  complex	  for	  present-­‐day	  model-­‐checking	  methods	   used	   in	   software	   engineering.	   Perhaps	   then	   the	   advantages	   of	   the	  work	  practice	  model	  might	   drive	   advances	   in	  model	   checking.	   The	  point	   of	   the	  Brahms	  AFCS	   project	   is	   to	   demonstrate	   applicability	   and	   advantages	   of	   an	   existing	   agent-­‐based	   modeling	   framework,	   and	   then	   to	   determine	   the	   implications	   and	   best	  application	  of	  model-­‐checking	  methods.	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  In	  summary,	  in	  this	  project	  we	  aim	  to	  use	  model	  checking	  as	  a	  tool	  for	  developing,	  refining,	  and	  applying	  simulation	  models—with	  the	  emphasis	  on	  using	  simulation	  as	  a	   means	   (a	   technique)	   for	   understanding	   and	   designing	   work	   systems	   involving	  complex	   human-­‐automation	   interactions.	   We	   focus	   on	   characteristics	   of	   work	  systems	   that	   we	   wish	   to	   model	   and	   understand,	   determine	   the	   	   strengths	   and	  weaknesses	  of	   the	  Brahms	   simulation	   framework	   in	   this	   regard	  and	   subsequently	  how	  model-­‐checking	  might	  enhance	  strengths	  and	  resolve	  some	  of	  the	  weaknesses.	  	  That	  is,	  the	  objective	  is	  not	  primarily	  a	  matter	  of	  “checking”	  the	  Brahms	  simulation,	  but	  using	  model	   checking	   to:	  1)	  develop	  better/appropriate	   simulation	  models	  by	  indicating	   gaps,	   assumptions,	   lack	   of	   generality,	   or	   lack	   of	   flexibility	   for	   exploring	  some	   subspace	   of	   scenarios,	   2)	   generate	   scenarios	   or	   through	   formal	   analysis	  provide	  scenario	  outcomes	  without	   running	   the	  model,	   and	  3)	  construct	  a	   tool	  kit	  for	   scientifically	   understanding	   the	   behavior	   in	   human-­‐automation	   systems	   and	  formulating	  principles	   for	  work	  system	  design.	  These	  points	  are	   taken	  up	  again	   in	  the	  discussion	  of	  future	  work,	  Chapter	  12.8.	  
7.2.5 Aviation	  safety	  problem	  analysis	  Improvements	   to	   automation	   after	  ATS	   failures	   (Kochenderfer	   2012a)	   reveal	   that	  because	   of	   uncertainties	   in	   the	   real	   world	   (the	   nature	   of	   a	   system	  with	   complex	  interactions)	  the	  use	  of	  a	  deterministic	  model,	  particularly	  one	  that	  excludes	  human	  behavior,	   to	   evaluate	   and	   certify	   automation	   is	   insufficient	   because	   “pilots	   do	   not	  always	   behave	   as	   assumed	   by	   the	   logic”	   (p.	   18).	   	   Consequently	   	   the	   “spectrum	   of	  responses”	   is	   not	   completely	   predictable,	   limiting	   the	   robustness	   of	   systems	   like	  TCAS,	  as	  demonstrated	  by	  the	  collision	  over	  Überlingen,	  explicitly	  mentioned	  by	  the	  Lincoln	  Laboratories	  report	  (p.	  18).	  	  The	  response	  of	  the	  automation	  designers,	  as	  exemplified	  by	  the	  history	  of	  TCAS,	  is	  usually	   to	   enhance	   “the	   surveillance	   and	   the	   advisory	   logic”	   (p.	   19)	   of	   the	  automation.	   	   But	   the	   new	   monitoring	   and	   advising	   algorithms	   (e.g.,	   ACAS	   X)	  continue	  to	  be	  designed	  and	  evaluated	  only	  within	  the	  often	  implicit	  assumptions	  of	  an	  artificially	  closed	  world.	  	  The	  TCAS	  design	  problem	  is	  described	  as	  “specifying	  an	  encounter	  model	  and	  using	  computational	  methods	  to	  find	  the	  logic	  that	  optimizes	  performance	  against	  a	  set	  of	  metrics”	  (Kochenderfer	  et	  al.	  2012b,	  p.	  29).	  	  Such	  models	  and	  analyses	  fail	  to	  acknowledge	  that	  the	  function	  of	  systems	  like	  TCAS	  is	   to	  convince	   the	  pilot	   to	  change	  course.	  From	  the	  perspective	  of	  engineering,	   the	  matter	  is	  often	  couched	  as	  “TCAS	  has	  authority.”	  But	  from	  the	  perspective	  of	  pilots	  in	   an	   uncertainly,	   highly	   risky	   situation,	   the	   situation	   is	   more	   like,	   “I	   know	   I’m	  supposed	   to	   obey	   TCAS,	   but	   do	   I	   believe	   its	   appraisal	   is	   correct	   and	   its	  recommended	  action	  is	  safe?”	  As	  recently	  as	  February	  2011,	  the	  FAA	  reported	  that	  “unnecessary	  deviations	  from	  ATCO	  clearance	  continue	  to	  be	  an	  important	  factor	  in	  the	   effectiveness	   of	   TCAS,”	   (FAA	   2011,	   p.	   44)	   though	   the	   frequency	   is	   decreasing	  through	  improvements	  to	  the	  logic	  (e.g.,	  a	  horizontal	  miss	  distance	  filter,	  p.	  29)	  and	  training.	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In	   particular,	   pilots	   need	   to	   learn	   how	   to	   interpret	   and	   interact	  with	   TCAS	   in	   the	  context	   of	   prior	   ATCO	   clearances.	   As	   illustrated	   by	   how	   one	  member	   of	   the	   BTC	  crew	   reacted,	   the	   mere	   presence	   of	   the	   TCAS	   display	   adds	   information	   that	   is	  difficult	   to	   ignore:	   “Aircraft	  have	  also	  been	  observed	  making	  vertical	  or	  horizontal	  maneuvers	   based	   solely	   on	   the	   information	   shown	   on	   the	   traffic	   display,	  without	  visual	  acquisition	  by	  the	  flight	  crew	  and	  sometimes	  contrary	  to	  their	  existing	  ATCO	  clearance.”	   	   In	   response	   to	   this	  problem,	  more	   information	  has	  been	  added	   to	   the	  display	  over	  time	  to	  guide	  the	  magnitude	  of	  altitude	  change	  (e.g.,	  pitch	  guidance,	  p.	  38),	   making	   the	   use	   of	   TCAS	   more	   complicated	   than	   just	   following	   a	   “climb”	   or	  “descend”	  instruction.	  	  In	  summary,	  most	  analyses	   for	  certifying	  systems	   like	  TCAS	  are	  modeled	   from	  the	  perspective	  of	  the	  aircraft	  and	  automated	  subsystems,	  as	  if	  people	  are	  not	  present:	  “Different	   aircraft	   can	   have	   different	   views	   of	   a	   situation	   because	   of	   sensor	  limitations”	   (p.	  26).	   	  The	   technological	  dimension	  of	   course	  must	  be	   incorporated,	  and	   the	  use	  of	  probabilistic	  evaluations	   is	  useful	   (Kochenderfer	  et	  al.	  2012a).	   	  But	  the	  fact	  remains	  that	  air	  traffic	  controllers	  are	  deliberately	  and	  completely	  dropped	  from	  technical	  characterizations	  of	  TCAS’s	  design—by	  omission	  this	  was	  equivalent	  to	  predicting	  that	  the	  events	  over	  Überlingen	  could	  never	  occur.	  	  Notice	  in	  particular	  that	  the	  BFU	  Report	  states	  as	  an	  immediate	  cause:	  	   The	  TU154M	  crew	  followed	  the	  ATC	  instruction	  to	  descend	  and	  continued	  to	  do	  so	  even	  after	  TCAS	  advised	  them	  to	  climb.	  This	  manoeuvre	  was	  performed	  contrary	  to	  the	  generated	  TCAS	  RA.	  (p.	  5)	  
 But	  the	  report	  offers	  no	  parallel	  cause:	  	   The	  Zurich	  ATCO	  contradicted	  the	  TCAS	  instruction	  to	  descend	  and	  continued	  to	  do	  so	   even	   after	   TCAS	   advised	   the	   pilots	   to	   climb.	   This	   intervention	   was	   performed	  contrary	  to	  the	  generated	  TCAS	  RA.	  	  	  The	  report	  nowhere	  mentions	  that	  the	  lack	  of	  information	  provided	  to	  ATCO	  about	  the	  TCAS	   instruction	  was	  pivotal	   in	   causing	   the	   collision	   (though	   there	   is	   analysis	  about	   the	  delay	   in	  DHL	   informing	  ATCO	   that	   they	  were	   in	  TCAS	  descent,	  which	   is	  part	  of	  TCAS	  operations	  protocol).	  	  Suppose	  for	  example	  that	  ATCO	  had	  seen	  the	  RA	  alert	   on	   his	   radar	   display	   while	   he	   was	   speaking—he	   could	   have	   easily	   stopped	  what	   he	   was	   saying	   and	   immediately	   say,	   “No,	   follow	   TCAS,	   climb	   immediately!	  Climb!”	   Instead	   of	   a	   system	   involving	   ATCO,	   aircraft,	   TCAS,	   and	   pilots,	   the	   TCAS	  certification	  models	  only	  aircraft	  and	  TCAS.	  	  The	   Brahms-­‐GÜM	   project	   picks	   up	   where	   a	   purely	   technological	   analysis	   and	  redesign	  leaves	  off	  by	  creating	  a	  socio-­‐technical	  simulation	  that	  combines	  models	  of	  systems	   (e.g.,	   aircraft,	   TCAS,	   radar)	   with	   behavioral	   models	   of	   people	   who	   are	  perceiving,	   interpreting,	   manipulating,	   and	   ultimately	   guided	   by	   or	   ignoring	   such	  systems.	  	  	  	  
	  	  
WORK	  PRACTICE	  SIMULATION	  OF	  COMPLEX	  HUMAN-­‐AUTOMATION	  SYSTEMS	  IN	  SAFETY-­‐CRITICAL	  SITUATIONS	   1
0
0 	  
The	  SSAT	  R&T	  Portfolio	  Project	  Plan	  1	  October	  2011	  emphasizes	  the	  importance	  of	  reflective	  agents	  that,	  for	  example,	  can	  detect	  failed	  goals	  that	  they	  might	  track	  to	  a	  missing	   assignment	   or	   a	   conflict	   in	   assignments.	   	   As	   a	   first	   effort	   grounded	   in	   a	  collision	  scenario,	  the	  Brahms-­‐GÜM	  model	  focuses	  more	  on	  what	  can	  go	  wrong	  than	  on	   the	   favored,	   dynamic	   capabilities	   of	   a	   reflective	  work	   system	  with	   checks	   and	  balances	   that	   adjusts	   to	   shortcomings	   and	   optimizes	   its	   performance.	   	   In	   many	  respects,	  the	  value	  of	  the	  Überlingen	  scenario	  is	  to	  highlight	  for	  analysts	  how	  much	  can	  go	  wrong	  at	   the	  same	  time,	  and	  thus	  as	  explained	   in	   the	  discussion	  of	  Normal	  Accident	  Theory	  (section	  5.3),	  how	  a	  merely	  complicated	  system	  becomes	  complex	  and	  out	  of	  control.	   	  With	  this	  baseline,	  further	  research	  could	  then	  focus	  on	  adding	  back	  the	  positive	  “what	  if’s”	  by	  which	  the	  work	  system	  might	  have	  compensated	  for	  deficiencies	  (Section	  6.7.3).	  
7.3 Broader	  Project	  Objectives	  and	  Approach	  
To review, this project addresses the general objective of developing a tool and 
methodology that will be useful early in the design of automation and air traffic 
management work systems to facilitate adaptation of NextGen automation, 
without the cost and effort to develop high-fidelity operations lab simulation 
experiments.  The approach of the Brahms-GÜM project is to use a work practice 
simulation of how people interact with each other and automated systems to 
provide a practical, relatively quick way to analyze the safety of proposed 
automation and changes to work practices.   
 
Because a work practice simulation may be configured for a very large space of 
circumstantial factors (such as equipment failure, weather, air traffic, staffing, 
human interactions), finding limitations in the work system design as embodied in 
the simulation model requires more than running a large number of scenarios (in 
which each scenario defines the initial conditions for a simulation run).  To guide 
and go beyond the scenario approach, the broader project in which we are engaged 
will use model checking methods that have been successful in software 
engineering. 
 Thus	  this	  project	  has	  three	  research	  problems:	  	   1. Formulate	  Brahms	  ATS	  simulation	  whose	  human-­‐systems	  interactions	  relate	  to	  A&A.	  	  
2. Define	  formal	  semantics	  that	  enable	  reformulating	  the	  Brahms	  model/trace	  (e.g.,	  using	  FSM	  &	  	  temporal	  logic),	  so	  specifications	  can	  be	  proven/disproven	  formally	  (Rungta	  et	  al.	  2013).	  	  3. Apply/adapt	  existing	  model-­‐checking	  tool	  to	  verify	  safety	  properties	  of	  the	  model	  with	  respect	  specifications.	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A	   key	   objective	   of	   this	   report	   is	   to	   document	   how	   the	   Brahms-­‐GÜM	   has	   been	  conceived,	   developed,	   and	   refined	   so	   the	   model-­‐checking	   method	   and	   processes	  relate	  to	  the	  practice	  of	  building	  a	  work	  practice	  simulation.	  	  In	  some	  respects,	  such	  a	  tool	  would	  be	  related	  to	  explanation	  systems	  that	  help	  model	  builders	  understand	  a	  simulation	  by	  enumerating	  why	  certain	  events	  didn’t	  occur	  (Clancey	  et	  al.	  1986).	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8 Method:	  Development	  and	  Structure	  of	  the	  Brahms	  
“Generalized	  Überlingen	  Model”	  	  This	   chapter	  describes	   the	  nature	   and	   advantages	   of	   a	  model	   that	   generalizes	   the	  Überlingen	   collision	   scenario,	   and	   the	   overall	   process	   by	   which	   the	   generalized	  model	  has	  been	  created	  by	  converting	  and	  refining	  an	  existing	  human-­‐systems	  flight	  simulation.	  
8.1 GÜM	  Concept	  and	  Motivation	  The	  overall	  strategy	  for	  developing	  the	  Generalized	  Überlingen	  Model	  was	  to	  create	  a	   series	   of	   complete	   Brahms	   models	   relating	   to	   the	   Überlingen	   scenario	   that	  incrementally	  add	  off-­‐nominal	  events	  and	  behaviors:	  	  	  
• Complete	   means	   that	   each	   model	   version	   provides	   a	   simulation	   that	   runs	  through	  complete	  sequences	  of	  events	  in	  which	  planes	  depart,	  fly,	  and	  land	  at	  destinations.	  	  	  
• Incremental	  means	   that	   each	   model	   in	   the	   series	   introduces	   more	   of	   the	  people,	   systems,	   and	   interactions	   that	   occur	   in	   the	   air	   traffic	   control	  work	  system.	  
• Relating	  to	  Überlingen	  means	  that	  the	  final	  model	  we	  produce	  in	  this	  series	  is	  not	   a	   specific	   replication	   of	   the	   Überlingen	   accident	   (e.g.,	   like	   a	   re-­‐enacted	  play),	   but	   more	   general,	   such	   that	   one	   of	   the	   scenarios	   models	   the	   work	  system	  configuration	  at	  that	  time.	  
• General	  means	  that	  initial	  conditions	  in	  the	  Brahms	  model	  (facts	  and	  beliefs),	  which	  we	  call	  “scenarios,”	  can	  be	  varied	  to	  produce	  different	  outcomes.	  	  The	  model	   is	   designed	   so	   any	   combination	  of	   initial	   conditions	   (as	  provided	  by	  the	  model’s	  design)	  can	  be	  specified.	  	  	  	  
• Off-­‐nominal	  refers	  to	  violations	  of	  air	  traffic	  regulations,	  as	  well	  as	  variations	  from	  standard	  practice	  in	  aspects	  of	  work	  that	  are	  not	  subject	  to	  regulations.	  	  Producing	  a	  series	  of	  models	  has	  many	  advantages:	  
• To	   always	   have	   runnable	   Brahms	   simulations	   available	   for	   the	   formal	  analysis	  aspect	  of	  this	  project.	  
• Modeling	   off-­‐nominal	   behavior	   on	   a	   foundation	   of	   idealized	   “correct”	  behavior,	  thus:	  
o Disciplining	   the	  modeling	  process,	   so	   that	  we	  represent	   the	  causes	  of	   variations	   in	   terms	  of	   agent	   beliefs	   and	   characteristics	   and	  world	  facts,	  rather	  than	  formalizing	  variations	  as	  fixed,	  given	  (“hardwired”)	  behaviors;	  
o Providing	   an	   experimental	   workbench	   in	   which	   a	   space	   of	  
scenarios	  can	  be	  generated	  by	  varying	   initial	  conditions	   (that	  are	  known	  by	  definition	   to	   be	   factors	   relevant	   to	   producing	   off-­‐nominal	  behavior	  and/or	  safety	  violations);	  
o Providing	  a	  Brahms	  library	  of	  reusable	  components,	  consisting	  of	  
“most	  general”	  groups/agents/objects	   (e.g.,	   the	   idealized	  air-­‐traffic	  controller)	   that	   are	   parameterized	   by	   initial	   conditions,	   	   enabling	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future	   models	   to	   be	   created	   more	   efficiently	   (through	   reuse)	   and	  effectively	  (by	  incorporating	  the	  same	  principled	  framework).	  
• To	  enable	  creating	  an	  increasingly	  more	  complex	  simulation	   that	  refines	  the	   combination	   of	   events	   (e.g.,	   number	   of	   flights),	   forms	   and	   behaviors	   of	  automation	   systems,	   and	   representation	   of	   how	   agent	   beliefs	   affect	  behaviors.	  
• To	  provide	  the	  initial	   formulation	  of	  a	  general	  design	   tool	   for	  NextGen,	  not	  just	  an	  analytic	  tool	  or	  replication	  of	  Überlingen.	  
 In	   short,	   instead	   of	   specifically	  modeling	   Überlingen’s	   work	   system	   configuration	  and	   events,	   we	   start	   by	   creating	   a	   more	   general	   model.	   This	   generalized	   model	  includes	  the	  activities	  and	  equipment	  that	  are	  included	  in	  the	  Überlingen	  scenario,	  but	  we	   start	  by	   simulating	   the	  proper	  practices	  of	  ATCOs	  and	  pilots	   and	  properly	  functioning	   equipment.	   Alternative	   behavior	   preferences	   and	   system	  dysfunctions	  are	   modeled	   as	   initial	   conditions,	   variations	   thus	   constituting	   different	  configurations	   of	   the	   generalized	  model	   (i.e.,	   different	   scenarios).	   So	   for	   example	  Brahms–GÜM	   enables	   running	   scenarios	   with	   telephones	   working,	   the	   BTC	   crew	  reversing	   course	  after	  TCAS	  RA,	   STCA	  optical	  working,	   two	  ATCOs	   instead	  of	  one,	  etc.	  	  	  	  A	  Brahms	  model	  could	  potentially	  model	  "the	  ideal	  pilot"	  and	  "the	  ideal	  ATCO"	  etc.	  	  in	   great	   detail	   (e.g.,	   Casner	   2007,	   Chapter	   7	   “Human	   factors	   of	   commercial	   pilot	  automation”	  lists	  specific	  best	  practices;	  also	  p.	  48,	  “how	  to	  be	  a	  responsible	  pilot”).	  For	   example	   one	  would	   include	  many	   circumstances	   in	  which	   it	   is	   necessary	   to	   "	  solicit	   information"	   from	   the	   flight	  management	   system	   (p.	   147,	   90ff).	   	   Then	   one	  could	   introduce	   particular	   pilot,	   ATCO,	   etc.	   agent	   models	   representing	   variations	  related	   to	   training,	   personal	   experience,	   and	   so	   on.	   	   One	   could	   also	   introduce	  complications	   of	   many	   sorts:	   false	   alarms,	   masked	   problems,	   manual	   operation	  (in)capabilities	  (p.	  104).	  	  To	  do	  this,	  one	  would	  have	  to	  model	  in	  detail	  how	  systems	  such	   as	   FMC,	   VNAV,	   LNAV,	   FMA,	   etc.	   work	   to	   allow	   variations	   of	   flight	  situations.	   	  But	   because	   of	   limited	   time	   and	   resources	   and	   a	   practical	   focus	   on	  formulating	  and	  demonstrating	  the	  value	  of	  a	  framework	  related	  to	  formal	  methods,	  the	   Brahms–GÜM	   has	   been	   scoped	   to	   include	   only	   the	   components	   required	   to	  simulate	  aircraft	  flight,	  including	  interactions	  with	  ATCOs,	  and	  that	  played	  a	  role	  in	  Überlingen	  (e.g.,	  telephones).	  	  In	  other	  respects,	  the	  nature	  of	  a	  work	  practice	  model	  dictates	  that	  certain	  aspects	  of	   the	  work	  system	  must	  be	   included	   in	  some	  detail.	   	  One	  may	   think	  of	   creating	  a	  Brahms	  model	   as	   like	  writing	  a	   script	   for	  a	  play:	   you	  must	   specify	   the	  geographic	  setting	   and	   the	   places	   (e.g.,	   airspaces,	   buildings,	   rooms)	  where	   the	   action	   occurs;	  you	  must	  include	  the	  key	  people	  and	  their	  “props,”	  such	  as	  chairs,	  documents,	  and	  devices	   (e.g.,	   telephones,	   computers);	   and	   you	   must	   model	   the	   behaviors	   of	   the	  players	  and	  devices—what	  they	  say	  and	  do,	  how	  the	  react	  to	  events	  around	  them	  (in	  a	   rule-­‐like	   way).	   When	   all	   of	   the	   people	   and	   objects	   are	   set	   in	   motion,	   their	  interaction	   produces	   a	   sequence	   of	   events—planes	   fly,	   pilots	   report	   to	   ATCOs,	  
	  	  
WORK	  PRACTICE	  SIMULATION	  OF	  COMPLEX	  HUMAN-­‐AUTOMATION	  SYSTEMS	  IN	  SAFETY-­‐CRITICAL	  SITUATIONS	   1
0
4 	  
ATCOs	   give	   directions,	   the	   FMS	   reports	   the	   aircraft	   status,	   and	   of	   course	   TCAS	  monitors	  the	  planes	  to	  produce	  appropriate	  alerts.	  	  	  	  Here	   is	  a	   summary	  of	  what	   is	   included	   in	   the	  Brahms–GÜM,	  constituting	   the	  main	  elements	  of	  what	  we	  call	  a	  “work	  system”:	  	  
• People:	  Pilots,	  ATCOs,	  ATCC	  assistants	  
• Air	  Traffic	  Control	  Centers:	  people,	  geography,	  devices,	  activities	  
• Specific	  flights	  with	  relations	  among	  crew,	  flight	  number	  and	  route,	  aircraft	  
• Communication	  protocols:	  for	  using	  radios,	  for	  ATCC	  sector	  handoff,	  for	  informing	  about	  TCAS	  RA,	  etc.	  	  One	  difference	  between	  a	  play	  and	  a	  Brahms	  model	  is	  that	  a	  Brahms	  model	  is	  always	  more	   general	   than	   a	   particular	   sequence	   of	   events.	   In	   effect,	   each	   simulation	   run	  produces	   something	   like	   a	   script	   of	   a	   play.	   	   The	  model	   is	   a	   kind	   of	   generator	   for	  different	  sequences	  of	  events.	  	  A	  Brahms	  model	   is	   always	  more	   complete	   than	   a	   script	   of	   a	   play.	   	   A	   play’s	   script	  indicates	   only	   that	   certain	   actors	   appear,	   say	   certain	   lines,	   and	   go	   off	   stage.	   	   In	   a	  work	   practice	   simulation	   each	   of	   the	   actors	   (agents)	   is	   always	   doing	   something	  (called	  activities).	  Details	  may	  be	  omitted	  of	  what	   is	  happening	  during	  an	  activity;	  for	  example,	  Brahms-­‐GÜM	  may	  be	  configured	  so	  one	  ATCO	  is	  “in	  the	  ‘break’	  activity”	  at	  a	  certain	  time,	  but	  the	  model	  does	  not	  represent	  what	  a	  break	  entails,	  only	  that	  it	  occurs	  in	  another	  location	  (i.e.,	   it	   is	  a	  primitive	  activity	  in	  Brahms).	   	  This	  approach	  allows	  in	  principle	  multiple	  shifts	  and	  days	  to	  be	  simulated,	  where	  only	  the	  activities	  of	   interest	  are	  modeled	  in	  detail.	   	  Furthermore,	   like	  a	  play,	   	   there	  may	  be	  multiple	  “settings.”	  	  But	  unlike	  a	  play,	  in	  Brahms	  models	  actors	  may	  be	  behaving	  on	  multiple	  “sets”	   at	   the	   same	   time.	   For	   example,	   in	   Brahms–GÜM	   agents	   are	   behaving	   in	  multiple	  aircraft	  and	  multiple	  ATCCs	  simultaneously.	  	  	  	  The	   “objects”	   in	   a	   Brahms	   model	   have	   their	   own	   ongoing	   activities;	   for	   example	  every	   telephone,	   radar	   display,	   radio,	   etc.	   is	   always	   in	   some	   state,	   regardless	   of	  whether	  a	  person	  is	  interacting	  with	  it.	   	   	  Again,	  overall	  the	  events	  that	  transpire	  in	  the	   simulation	   “run”	   are	   produced	   by	   the	   interactions	   of	   all	   agents	   and	   objects	  behaving	  “independently,”	  though	  of	  course	  they	  may	  be	  affecting	  each	  other.	  	  	  Finally,	   in	   Brahms	   further	   generality	   is	   attained	   for	   creating	   alternative	   work	  systems	  and	  scenarios	  by	  modeling	  pilots,	  ATCOs,	  etc.	   	  and	  aircraft,	   flights,	   radios,	  sectors,	  etc.	  “generically”	  using	  the	  agent	  group	  and	  object	  class	  constructs	  (Section	  7.1.1).	  	  
8.2 Notion	  of	  a	  Base	  Model:	  Origin	  of	  Scenario	  Definitions	  The	   concept	   of	   the	   Brahms–GÜM	   developed	   over	   time	   from	   the	   initial	   notion	   of	  incrementally	  developing	  a	  Brahms	  simulation	  of	   the	  Überlingen	  work	  system	  and	  events.	   Here	   we	   elaborate	   more	   carefully	   the	   evolution	   of	   our	   reasoning	   in	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developing	   the	  base	  model	  by	   formulating	  a	   sequence	  of	  models,	   and	   thus	   came	   to	  conceive	  of	  the	  Brahms	  simulation	  as	  being	  a	  generalization	  of	  the	  Zurich	  ATCC	  and	  aircraft/TCAS	   work	   system	   circa	   2002,	   rather	   than	   only	   a	   model	   of	   particular	  events.	  	  	  	  In	  effect,	  we	  interpreted	  the	  base	  model	  and	  incremental	  additions	  in	  a	  new	  way	  as	  we	  proceeded,	   such	   that	   building	   a	   series	   of	  models	   became	  not	   just	   a	  means	   for	  handling	  the	  complexity	  of	  the	  Überlingen	  collision,	  but	  more	  generally	  a	  method	  for	  experimenting	   with	   how	   the	   various	   known	   causative	   factors	   we	   were	   modeling	  affected	  each	  other.	  By	  ensuring	  that	  each	  added	  factor	  was	  configurable	  as	  part	  of	  initializing	  a	  Brahms	  simulation	  run,	  it	  was	  possible	  not	  only	  to	  accumulate	  factors	  and	  settings	  that	  replicated	  Überlingen’s	  work	  system,	  but	  also	  to	  experiment	  with	  any	   combination	   of	   factors	   (e.g.,	   the	   AEF1135	   flight	   is	   late	   but	   two	   ATCOs	   are	  present).	  	  	  	  The	   last	  model	  created,	  which	   includes	  all	  of	   the	   factors,	   is	   the	  Brahms-­‐GÜM;	  each	  combination	  of	  how	  its	  various	  entities	  can	  be	  configured	  (e.g.,	   telephones	  operate	  or	  not;	  BTC	  is	  one	  minute	  earlier	  in	  route)	  constitutes	  a	  scenario.	  	  Thus	  the	  original	  focus	  on	  creating	  a	  sequence	  of	  models	  shifted	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  development	  process	  to	  exploring	  experimentally	  a	  space	  of	  scenarios.	  	  	  The	  design	  concept	  of	  a	  series	  of	  models	  begins	  with	  a	  base	  model	  that	  includes	  all	  of	  the	  entities	  (people,	  flights,	  equipment)	  operating	  nominally.	   	  For	  each	  subsequent	  model	   we	   change	   one	   major	   causative	   factor	   at	   a	   time,	   starting	   with	   the	   most	  frequent/likely	   off-­‐nominal	   conditions.	   	  We	   call	   each	   such	   factor	   an	   “exception.”	  	  Applying	   this	   principle	   to	   the	   actual	   circumstances	   of	   the	   Überlingen	   accident	  suggested	   the	   following	   loosely	   ordered	   sequence	   of	   models	   (for	   brevity	   model	  versions	  #3	  and	  following	  are	  described	  by	  indicating	  only	  the	  exception	  added	  to	  the	  base	  model):	  	   1. Base	   model—all	   behaviors	   and	   events	   are	   correct	   or	   normative	   (includes	  DHL611,	  BTC2937,	  AEF1135	  flights	  and	  STCA	  &	  TCAS	  systems).	  2. Base	  model	  with	  exception	  that	  second	  Zurich	  ATCO	  is	  napping	  in	  the	  lounge	  (this	  had	  been	  generally	  accepted	  practice,	  though	  it	  violated	  regulations).	  3. AEF1135	  is	   late	  (call	   in	  to	  Zurich	  ATCO	  distracts	  from	  monitoring	  the	  other	  flights)	  4. DHL611	  and	  BTC2397	  depart	  late	  (specific	  timing	  places	  them	  on	  a	  collision	  course)	  5. Russian	  crew	  trusts	  air	  traffic	  controller,	  thus	  ignoring	  TCAS	  directive	  (given	  training	   variances,	   this	   is	   probably	   more	   likely	   than	   maintenance	   that	  disables	  the	  standard	  radar	  and	  phone	  system).	  6. An	  equipment	  upgrade	   in	  process	   in	  Zurich	  degrades	   the	  radar	  available	   to	  the	   Zurich	   ATCO	   	   (lack	   of	   optical	   STCA	   causes	   flight	   data	   display	   to	   be	  delayed)	  7. An	   equipment	   upgrade	   in	   process	   disables	   the	   primary	   and	   backup	   phone	  systems	  (this	  prevents	  ATCO	  from	  calling	  Friedrichshafen)	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  Originally,	  the	  Brahms	  model	  resulting	  from	  this	  process	  (model	  #7,	  which	  includes	  all	  of	  the	  factors	  of	  #2-­‐#6)	  was	  conceived	  as	  “the	  Überlingen	  simulation.”	  The	  base	  model	  concept	  was	  only	  intended	  to	  provide	  a	  systematic,	  incremental	  process	  that	  would	   break	   up	   the	   complex	   construction	   effort	   into	   small	   pieces	   that	   could	   be	  independently	   defined,	   modeled,	   and	   tested.	   (The	   modeling	   sequence/plan	   was	  adjusted	   over	   time	   to	   allow	   for	   modeling	   some	   aspects	   in	   detail	   and	   omitting	  others.)	  	  	  Inherent	  in	  the	  Brahms	  modeling	  framework	  is	  the	  notion	  that	  people	  and	  systems	  are	   simulated	   to	   a	   degree	   independently,	   in	   terms	   of	   their	   essential	   physical	   and	  behavioral	   properties,	   and	   thus	   that	   the	   resulting	   simulated	   events	   arise	   through	  the	   interactions	   of	   the	   parts,	   rather	   than	   being	   “hardwired”	   (fixed).	   	   That	   is,	   the	  models	   of	   the	   agents	   and	   objects	   are	   defined	   from	   the	   perspective	   of	   each	  agent/group	  and	  object/class,	  allowing	  the	  many-­‐to-­‐many	  combinations	  of	  states	  to	  emerge	   rather	   than	   being	   specified	   by	   the	   modeler.	   Thus	   for	   example,	   a	   radar	  display	  would	  simply	  behave	  according	  to	  its	  present	  settings	  and	  the	  aircraft	  in	  the	  vicinity,	  independently	  of	  what	  the	  air	  traffic	  controller	  was	  observing	  or	  doing,	  and	  the	  aircraft	  would	  fly	  independently	  of	  whether	  they	  were	  being	  tracked	  on	  radar.	  	  	  From	  this	  perspective,	  our	  analysis	  and	  simulation	  begins	  by	  characterizing	  proper	  operation	  (e.g.,	  how	  the	  phones	  are	  used	  in	  a	  handover	  process	  by	  the	  ATCO),	  then	  includes	  the	  particular	  configurations	  of	  the	  situation	  (e.g.,	  how	  many	  ATCOs	  were	  present	   and	   their	   assignments;	   the	   flight	   paths	   of	   aircraft	   entering	   the	   sector).	  Finally,	  off-­‐nominal	  conditions	  are	  simulated	  (e.g.,	  the	  phones	  are	  not	  working;	  only	  one	  ATCO	  is	  present)	  and	  behaviors	  of	  the	  agents	  elaborated	  to	  simulate	  how	  they	  would	  normally	  cope	  with	  off-­‐nominal	  conditions.	  	  	  Insofar	  as	  creating	  a	  Brahms	  simulation	  is	  analogous	  to	  scripting	  and	  performing	  a	  play,	  the	  first	  step	  in	  creating	  the	  base	  model	  is	  actually	  to	  establish	  the	  geography	  model.	  The	  boundaries	  of	  the	   initial	  geography	  are	  established	  by	  the	  collection	  of	  events	  that	  model	  is	  designed	  to	  simulate.	  	  Thus	  we	  included	  all	  of	  the	  cities	  where	  the	  players	   (the	  aircraft	  and	  air	   traffic	   controller)	  would	  be	   located	   (e.g.,	  Moscow,	  Bergamo,	  Zurich)	  and	  the	  “rooms”	  where	  people	  would	  be	  performing	  (e.g.,	  aircraft	  cockpit,	  ATCC).	  	  Detail	  is	  determined	  by	  the	  purpose	  and	  focus	  of	  the	  model—so	  we	  modeled	   that	   the	   cockpit	   is	   part	   of	   the	   aircraft	   because	   we	   needed	   to	   simulate	  aircraft	  in	  flight,	  and	  we	  modeled	  instruments	  in	  the	  cockpit	  because	  we	  were	  going	  to	  simulate	  pilots	  interacting	  with	  instruments.	  Similarly,	  we	  modeled	  workstations	  and	  their	  location	  in	  an	  ATCC,	  but	  we	  didn’t	  model	  specifically	  where	  the	  ATCC	  was	  located	   in	   a	   region	   because	   that	   was	   irrelevant	   to	   the	   interactions	   and	   events	   of	  interest.	  	  	  	  In	   summary,	   the	   geography	  model,	   as	  well	   as	   all	   the	  modeled	  players	   and	  objects	  and	   their	   behaviors,	   are	   defined	   according	   to	   the	   processes	   and	   events	   that	   the	  simulation	   is	   designed	   to	   include.	   This	   is	   no	   different	   from	   any	   other	   scientific	  model,	  which	  defines	  certain	  aspects	  of	  the	  world	  and	  ignores	  everything	  else.	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  Just	   as	   a	   scientific	   model	   can	   be	   augmented	   by	   adding	   new	   parameters	   and	  relations,	   or	   a	  play	  might	  be	   elaborated	  by	   adding	   another	  player,	   scene,	   prop,	   or	  set,	  a	  Brahms	  model	  can	  be	  directly	  modified	  by	  changing	  the	  agents,	  their	  activities,	  objects,	  or	   the	  geography.	  For	  example,	   to	  add	  another	   flight	  one	  might	  add	  other	  cities	  to	  the	  geography	  (indicating	  relative	  distances	  to	  those	  already	  in	  the	  model),	  and	   literally	  copy	  and	  edit	  existing	  objects	   in	   the	  model	   to	  create	  another	  aircraft,	  crew,	  and	  flight	  definition,	  etc.	  Through	  the	  group	  inheritance	  process,	  all	  flights	  for	  example	   share	   the	   same	   definition	   structure,	   so	   adding	   a	   flight	   entails	   adding	  another	  “instance”	  of	  the	  class	  of	  flights	  and	  specifying	  its	  properties	  (e.g.,	  origin	  and	  destination,	  waypoints).	  
8.3 Overview	  of	  Modeling	  Process	  	  The	   following	   are	   the	   general	   steps	  we	   followed	   in	   creating	   the	   Brahms–GÜM	   by	  adapting	   an	   existing	   simulation,	   creating	   a	   sequence	   of	   models,	   and	   refining	   the	  simulation	  to	  fit	  known	  ATCO	  and	  pilot	  practices	  and	  the	  Überlingen	  variations.	  	  
1. Adapt	   “Work	   Model	   that	   Computes”	   constructs	   to	   develop	   basic	   Brahms	  
ATS	  simulation	  	  Pritchett	   (2011)	  developed	   a	   framework	   that	   extends	   “qualitative	  Cognitive	  Work	  Analysis	   (CWA)	   to	   a	   form	   suitable	   for	   computational	   simulation	   of	   multi-­‐agent	  socio-­‐technical	   systems.”	   They	   chose	   a	   simple,	   problem-­‐free	   flight	   from	   San	  Francisco	   to	   Los	   Angeles,	   modeling	   the	   landing	   at	   LAX.	   The	   extended	   CWA	  framework	   models	   the	   work	   domain	   as	   an	   abstraction	   graph	   of	   mean-­‐ends	  relationships:	  	  	  
Functional	  Purposes	  (representing	  mission	  goals	  of	  the	  system),	  Priorities	  and	  Values	  (representing	   principles	   or	   values	   that	   the	   system	   must	   follow	   or	   preserve),	  
Generalized	   Functions	   (representing	   process	   descriptions	   entailed	   to	   achieve	  mission	   goals),	   Physical	   Functions	   (representing	   capabilities	   of	   agents	   and	  equipment),	   and	   Physical	   Form	   (representing	   physical	   characteristics	   of	  equipment).23	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  In	  related	  work,	  Ho	  and	  Burns	  (2003)	  applied	  the	  similar	  “Work	  Domain	  Analysis”	  abstraction	  hierarchy	  to	  modeling	  the	  function	  and	  operation	  of	  TCAS	  to	  “establish	  information	   requirements”	   and	   develop	   enhanced	   displays.	   The	   objective	   of	   this	  analysis	   was	   to	   relate	   TCAS’s	   function	   to	   information	   it	   provides	   to	   the	   pilot,	  identifying	  additional	  information	  that	  might	  be	  useful	  (e.g.,	  traffic	  path	  prediction).	  As	  applied	  here	  WDA	  focuses	  on	  the	  TCAS	  interface	  and	  does	  not	  actually	  model	  the	  pilot’s	  work	  or	  reasoning.	  	  	  Pritchett’s	   project	   sought	   to	   convert	   the	   related	   CWA	   framework	   from	   a	   strictly	  functional	  hierarchy	  into	  a	  “work	  model	  that	  computes”	  by	  incorporating	  a	  cognitive	  
task	  analysis	  model	   that	   identifies	  “the	  worker’s	  states	  of	  knowledge	  and	  how	  they	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  23	  Pritchett,	  “Work	  Modeling	  Paper	  8.1.2011”	  p.	  2.	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are	   processed”	   (p.	   3).	   The	   overall	   framework	   incorporates	   as	   well	   an	   operating	  
strategy	   model	   by	   representing	   different	   “control	   modes”;	   it	   also	   incorporates	   a	  
social	  organization	  model	  by	  representing	  distribution	  of	  tasks.	  	  	  	  Specifically,	  the	  project	  converted	  a	  static	  CWA	  model	  into	  a	  simulation	  that	  models	  
pilot-­‐flight	  deck	  function	  allocation,	  involving	  three	  flying	  modes	  (autopilot,	  manual,	  and	   hybrid).	   	   The	   resulting	   simulation	   is	   called	   “the	   work	   model	   that	   computes”	  (WMC).	  	   	  Representing	   the	   WMC	   constructs	   in	   Brahms	   provided	   a	   way	   to	   bootstrap	   a	  simulation	   of	   Überlingen	   events	   by	   virtue	   of	   incorporating	   airspace	   systems	   and	  processes	   essential	   to	   any	  model	   of	   flight;	   the	  Brahms	  WMC	  model	   and	  modeling	  process	  are	  described	  in	  Appendix	  17.	  	  	  The	  conversion	  of	  WMC	  to	  Brahms	  also	  provides	  a	  direct	  contrast	  of	  functional	  and	  behavioral	  simulation	  approaches	  (Section	  8.4).	  	  The	  use	  of	  the	  Brahms	  framework	  also	   demonstrates	   the	   advantages	   of	   using	   a	   structured	   agent-­‐world	   modeling	  framework	   (in	   contrast	   with	   C++)	   for	   experimentation	  with	   alternative	   scenarios	  and	   reuse	  of	   the	  ATS	  model	   components.	   	   Furthermore,	   the	  design	  of	   the	  Brahms	  engine	  was	  hypothesized	  to	  be	  directly	  amenable	  to	  creating	  a	  model	  checker.	  	  
2. Elaborate	   Brahms	   WMC	   to	   create	   work	   system	   model	   with	   distributed	  
spatial-­‐temporal	  interactions	  The	   WMC	   model	   does	   not	   represent	   a	   complex	   multi-­‐agent	   team;	   it	   is	   instead	   a	  baseline	  simplification	  of	  actual	  ATS	  flight	  systems,	  probably	  the	  simplest	  case—one	  person	  on	   the	  ground	   (air	   traffic	   controller,	  ATCO),	  one	   in	   the	  air	   (pilot),	   and	  one	  automation	   system	   onboard	   (FMS),	   with	   no	   conflicts.	   The	   focus	   in	   WMC	   is	   on	  modeling	  function	  allocations	  to	  simulate	  emergent	  interactions	  such	  as	  workload;	  our	   concern	   in	   Brahms–GÜM	   is	   on	   simulating	   the	   interactions	   among	   people	   and	  automated	  systems	  work	  system,	  to	  show	  how	  interacting	  processes	  over	  time	  and	  space	  produce	  emergent	  overall	   system	  properties	   (e.g.,	   a	   safety	  violation).	  Hence	  much	  more	  detail	   is	   required	   in	   simulating	   the	  people	   and	   systems	   (including	   for	  example	  aircraft	  radios	  and	  the	  communication	  protocols).	  	  
3. Develop	  Brahms-­‐GÜM	  incrementally	  as	  series	  of	  models	  	  With	   the	   framework	   and	   plan	   in	   place,	   the	   Überlingen	   scenario	   was	   gradually	  modeled	  in	  Brahms;	  for	  details	  see	  Section	  8.6.	  	  
4. Sensitivity	  Analysis	  and	  Experimentation	  After	   the	   initial	  modeling	   effort	   to	   incorporate	   all	   of	   the	   relevant	   entities,	   normal	  behaviors,	   and	   exceptions,	   we	   shifted	   to	   analyzing	   traces	   (simulation	   logs)	   to	  understand	  	  the	  timing	  sensitivity	  of	  events—what	  minor	  adjustments	  to	  presumed	  durations	   of	   “primitive	   activities”	   would	   change	   the	   outcome?	   Are	   the	   duration	  ranges	   plausible?	   	   Experiments	  were	   undertaken	   to	   force	   certain	   event	   orderings	  and	   thus	   verify	   that	   interactions	   occurred	   as	   anticipated	   and	   further	   understand	  sensitivity	  of	  outcome	  to	  minor	  variations	  (e.g.,	  how	  soon	  must	  the	  ATCO	  intervene	  
	  	  
WORK	  PRACTICE	  SIMULATION	  OF	  COMPLEX	  HUMAN-­‐AUTOMATION	  SYSTEMS	  IN	  SAFETY-­‐CRITICAL	  SITUATIONS	   1
0
9 	  
after	  the	  TCAS	  TA	  and	  before	  the	  RA	  for	  the	  descent	  instruction	  to	  the	  Russian	  BTC	  to	   be	   effective?).	   	   The	   transcripts	   and	   available	   documentation	   were	   repeatedly	  reanalyzed	   to	  extract	  data	  about	   the	  operation	  of	  TCAS	   (e.g.,	  why	  doesn’t	   the	  BTC	  receive	  an	  expedite	   instruction	  at	   the	  same	   time	  as	   the	  DHL?),	  how	  the	  ATCO	  and	  the	  pilots	  behaved	  (e.g.,	  delay	  time	  from	  instruction	  to	  aircraft	  response)	  and	  why	  people	  behaved	  in	  a	  certain	  way	  (e.g.,	  why	  did	  ATCO	  repeat	  call	  to	  BTC	  to	  descend?).	  See	  Chapters	  9	  and	  10	  	  for	  detailed	  discussion.	  	  
5. Refinements	  to	  Model	  and/or	  Brahms	  Engine	  for	  Formal	  Semantics	  In	   parallel	  with	   the	   Brahms–GÜM	   effort,	   other	   researchers	  were	   investigating	   the	  use	   of	   formal	   semantics	   of	   the	   Brahms	   language	   in	   applying	   formal	   methods	   for	  analyzing	   Brahms	   models	   and	   simulation	   outcomes	   (Rungta	   et	   al.	   2013).	   For	  example,	   it	   was	   discovered	   that	   workframes	   were	   ordered	   based	   on	   when	   the	  workframes	   became	   “available”	   (conditions	   satisfied),	   rather	   than	   being	   random.	  Given	  that	  the	  intention	  of	  the	  Brahms	  framework	  was	  for	  ordering	  available	  WFs	  to	  be	   arbitrary	   (which	   is	   in	   accord	  with	   the	   formal	   language	  definition),	   the	  Brahms	  engine	   was	   modified.	   	   Application	   of	   model	   checking	   to	   Brahms–GÜM	   is	   mostly	  future	  work	  (Chapter	  12.8).	  	  The	   following	   sections	   explain	   the	   challenges	   and	   processes	   for	   creating	   a	   work	  practice	   simulation	   from	   the	   Brahms	   model	   converted	   from	   WMC,	   how	   Brahms	  WMC	   was	   modified	   incrementally	   to	   create	   Brahms-­‐GÜM,	   and	   then	   the	   initial	  experimentation	  with	   ten	   Brahms-­‐GÜM	   scenarios	   varying	   key	   factors	   causing	   the	  accident.	  
8.4 Elaborating	  Brahms	  WMC	  Model	  to	  Work	  Practice	  Simulation	  Developing	  Brahms–GÜM	  from	  the	  Brahms	  WMC	  model	   (detailed	   in	  Appendix	  17)	  required	  adding	  geographic	  locations	  and	  facilities,	  agents	  and	  their	  activities,	  many	  subsystems	   (e.g.,	   radio,	   radar),	   and	   of	   course	   multiple	   aircraft	   and	   crew.	   The	  transcript	   of	   the	   Überlingen	   accident	   and	   BFU	   Report	   provided	   the	   basic	  information	   required,	   supplemented	   by	   independent	   analyses	   (Chapter	   6).	   	   The	  process	  of	  creating	  a	  work	  system	  simulation	  based	  on	  the	  Überlingen	  accident	  from	  the	  WMC	  functional-­‐allocation	  model	  accomplishes	  the	  following:	  	  
▪ Demonstrates	   flexibility	   and	   adaptability	   of	   an	   object-­‐oriented	   framework	   like	  Brahms	  
▪ Elucidates	   WMC	   strengths	   and	   limitations	   for	   simulating	   human	   behavior	  compared	  to	  a	  work	  practice	  model	  
▪ Provides	   a	   structured	   analysis	   and	   model	   of	   the	   Überlingen	   accident’s	  anomalous	  conditions	  to	  understand	  systemic	  interactions	  of	  nominal	  behaviors,	  equipment	  dysfunctions,	  and	  human	  errors.	  	  In	   the	   first	   step	   of	   creating	   the	   Brahms	  WMC	  model,	   the	  WMC	   formulation	   (Kim	  2011;	  Pritchett	  et	  al.	  2011)	  is	  effectively	  converted	  to	  a	  multi-­‐agent	  simulation,	  such	  that	  the	  agents	  are	  independently	  behaving	  processes.	  	  “Functional	  allocation”	  (FA)	  is	   an	   approach	   to	   work	   system	   design,	   involving	   functional	   decomposition	   and	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mapping	  of	  functions	  to	  people	  and	  systems	  (for	  example,	  see	  Kim	  2011).	  	  FA	  allows	  for	   different	   modes	   (i.e.,	   mappings	   can	   change	   during	   operations),	   different	  strategies	   for	   accomplishing	   a	   function,	   and	   abstract	   levels	   of	   functions	   in	   which	  responsibility	  may	  be	  joint	  or	  distributed.	  	  FA	  emphasizes	  logical	  requirements	  and	  capabilities	  of	  people	  and	  systems,	   that	   is,	   it	   is	  a	  rational	  analysis	   that	  explains	  all	  behavior	  as	  procedure-­‐following	  or	  logically	  derived	  from	  inferences.	  	  	  	  Creating	   Brahms	  WMC	   involved	   converting	   the	  WMC	   functional	   descriptions	   that	  characterize	  essentially	  the	  procedure	  in	  flying	  the	  plane	  (in	  terms	  of	  steps	  and	  what	  each	  accomplished)	  to	  an	  activity-­‐behavior	  model	   	  that	  characterizes	  how	  each	  step	  is	  accomplished	  by	  the	  pilot	  through	  interactions	  with	  flight	  management	  computer,	  the	   radio,	  and	   the	  air	   traffic	   controllers.	   	   (While	  as	  well,	   the	  air	   traffic	   controller’s	  work	  context	  and	  behaviors	  are	  affecting	  the	  pilots	  and	  flight	  of	  the	  aircraft.)	  	  In	   contrast,	   the	   WMC	   model	   focuses	   on	   general	   agent	   decision	   making	   and	  capacities:	  	   Rather	   than	   attempting	   to	  model	   the	   work	   of	   each	   agent	   as	   descriptions	   of	   their	  activities	  embedded	  within	  the	  agent	  models,	  the	  framework	  uses	  agents	  as	  a	  means	  to	  further	  allocate	  and	  regulate	  the	  decision	  and	  temporal	  actions	  described	  outside	  the	  agents	  in	  the	  work	  model.	  	  In	  effect	  the	  simulation	  of	  human	  behavior	  in	  WMC	  involves	  having	  a	  generic	  agent	  process	   interpret	   a	   separately	   described	   functional	   model	   of	   the	   work.	   This	  approach	   enables	   a	   theoretical	   analysis,	   as	   WMC	   demonstrates	   in	   characterizing	  workload	   under	   different	   modes	   of	   operation.	   Such	   a	   functional	   analysis	   is	  particularly	  useful	  as	  a	  method	  for	  evaluating	  a	  work	  system	  design	  with	  respect	  to	  resources,	  timing,	  safety,	  and	  other	  constraints.	  	  	  In	   Brahms,	   rather	   than	   being	   identical,	   agents	   with	   the	   same	   roles	   may	   have	  different	   beliefs,	   preferences,	   and	   behaviors,	   all	   of	   which	   constitute	   individual	  practices.	  	  Agents	  inherit	  beliefs	  and	  behaviors	  (activities)	  from	  (possibly	  multiple)	  groups,	   so	   variations	   need	   not	   be	   reprogrammed	   for	   all	   agents	   individually.	   If	  identical	  “work	  and	  mission	  goals”	  are	  desirable	  in	  the	  model,	  all	  of	  the	  agents	  can	  inherit	  beliefs	   that	   affect	   their	  behavior	   strategically.	   	  Using	  a	  hierarchical,	   object-­‐oriented	   structure	   as	   in	   Brahms,	   one	   has	   the	   advantage	   of	   uniformity	   across	   the	  system	  and	  variability	  when	  it	  is	  desired.	  	  	  	  The	  WMC	  structure	  makes	  an	  important	  simplification	  by	  making	  decision	  making	  (“deliberation”	  or	  inferential	  reasoning)	  the	  driver	  of	  every	  action.	  Brahms	  is	  based	  on	   the	   perspective	   of	   situated	   cognition	   (e.g.,	   Clancey	   1997,	   2002),	   making	   the	  activity	  structure	  	  of	  the	  groups	  to	  which	  the	  agent	  belongs	  the	  organizing	  construct	  of	  the	  simulation.	  	  We	  are	  thus	  able	  to	  model	  work	  practices	  (how	  people	  behave)	  in	  dynamic	   contexts	   (not	   pre-­‐defined	   or	   necessarily	   anticipated	   by	   the	   modeler).	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Furthermore,	   this	   is	   accomplished	   in	   a	  manner	   that	   provides	   an	   easily	  modifiable	  and	  extendable	  model	  developed	  from	  a	  library	  of	  components.	  	  	  	  Details	   about	   the	   advantage	   of	   the	   Brahms	   framework	   for	  modeling	  multitasking	  and	  shifts	  of	  attention	  are	  explained	  in	  subsequent	  subsections.	  	  	  
8.5 Additions	  to	  Brahms	  WMC	  Model	  to	  Create	  Brahms-­‐GÜM	  Our	   first	   step	   in	   converting	   the	   Brahms	   WMC	   model	   to	   simulate	   the	   Überlingen	  accident	  was	  to	  add	  and	  configure	  components	  to	  model	  an	  idealized	  scenario	  based	  on	   the	   Überlingen	   flights	   without	   any	   complications:	   two	   flights	   (FL2397	   from	  Moscow	   to	  Barcelona	   and	  FL611	   from	  Bergamo,	   Italy	   to	  Brussels),	   two	  ATCOs	  on	  duty	  in	  Zurich,	  and	  all	  ATCC	  equipment	  functional.	  	  The	  planes	  depart	  on	  schedule,	  and	   this	   alone	   averts	   the	   collision.	   Creating	   just	   this	   “simple”	  model	   required	   the	  following	  entities	  to	  be	  added	  to	  Brahms	  WMC:	  	  	   a. Agents:	  i. Pilots	  in	  each	  aircraft	  ii. ATCOs	  (Zurich,	  Karlsruhe)	  b. Groups:	  i. Air	  traffic	  controllers	  and	  “communicators”	  (agents	  who	  engage	  in	  protocol-­‐based	  verbal	  exchanges)	  ii. Flight	  crew	  iii. Pilots	  and	  DHL	  Pilots	  c. Geography:	  i. Airports	  (Moscow,	  Bergamo,	  Barcelona,	  Brussels)	  and	  runways	  ii. Air	  space,	  air	  routes,	  waypoints	  iii. Air	  traffic	  control	  centers	  (Zurich,	  Karlsruhe)	  and	  work	  station	  areas	  	  iv. Aircraft	  areas:	  cockpit,	  cabin	  	  d. Objects:	  i. Aircraft:	  DHL,	  BTC	  (flights	  are	  conceptual	  objects	  associated	  with	  these)	  ii. Flight	  Management	  Computer	  (FMC)	  with	  Cruise	  &	  Standard	  Terminal	  Arrival	  Route	  (STAR)	  modes	  for	  DHL	  &	  BTC	  e. Activities:	  i. Flight	  	  1. Take-­‐off	  Phase:	  	  a. Clock	  in	  ATCC	  announcing	  time	  for	  departure	  b. ATCO	  communicates	  departure	  approval	  c. FMC	  guides	  with	  Standard	  Instrument	  Departure	  d. Pilot	  activities	  &	  communications	  2. Cruise	  Phase:	  	  a. FMC	  flying	  in	  auto-­‐pilot	  mode	  using	  flight	  plan	  b. Pilot	  activities	  &	  communications	  3. Landing	  Phase:	  	  a. Pilot	  activities	  &	  communications	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ii. ATCOs	  handoff	  &	  accept	  flights	  	  Creating	  this	  model	  soon	  revealed	  that	  getting	  the	  planes	  to	  collide	  at	  all	  and	  for	  this	  to	   occur	   near	   Überlingen	   required	   interpolating	   data	   from	   the	   BFU	   Report	   to	  determine	  both	  the	  exact	  route	  and	  flight	  times	  between	  waypoints	  (such	  as	  ATCO	  clearing	  DHL	  for	  a	  “direct	  ABESI”	  path).	   	  The	  waypoints	  (intermediate	  locations	  on	  route)	   and	   timing	   of	   the	   BTC	   flight	   from	  Moscow	   were	   not	   available	   in	   the	   BFU	  Report,	   and	   could	   only	   be	   estimated	   from	   maps	   and	   by	   analogy	   with	   current	  commercial	  flights.	  	  With	   the	   skeletal	   model	   of	   aircraft	   in	   flight	   in	   place,	   we	   turned	   to	   modeling	   the	  proper	   ATCO-­‐pilot	   handoff	   communication	   protocol,	   which	   required	   modeling	  radios	  and	  how	  they	  were	  operated.	  Modeling	   the	  radar,	  STCA,	  and	  TCAS	  were	  all	  substantial	   projects	   themselves,	   followed	   by	   modeling	   ATCO	   monitoring	   a	   single	  and	  then	  multiple	  workstations,	  and	  so	  on.	  	  The	  following	  general	  plan	  was	  followed	  for	  developing	  the	  Brahms-­‐GÜM:	  	   1. Complete	  interactions	  among	  Pilot,	  Flight	  Systems,	  and	  Aircraft	  for	  climb	  and	  cruise	  with	  European	  geography	  for	  single-­‐plane	  DHL	  flight	  plan	  (i.e.,	  adapt	  Brahms	  WMC	  model).	  2. Add	  BTC	  flight,	  flight	  plan	  (two	  versions:	  on-­‐time	  and	  delayed	  with	  collision)	  and	   geography	   —	   this	   is	   independent	   of	   ATCO	   actions,	   to	   confirm	   that	  simulation	  reproduces	  collision	  with	  flight	  paths	  actually	  flown.	  3. Add	  Radar	  Systems	  and	  Displays	  with	  ATCOs,	   located	   in	  ATCCs,	  monitoring	  when	   flights	   are	   entering	   and	   exiting	   each	   European	   flight	   sector	   in	   flight	  plans.	  4. Complete	   handover	   interactions	   between	   Pilot	   and	   ATCOs	   for	   each	   flight	  phases.	  5. Two	  ATCOs	  in	  Zurich	  (Radar	  Planner	  and	  ARFA	  Radar	  Executive)	  assigned	  to	  two	  workstations	  (RE	  has	  nothing	  to	  do	  under	  these	  conditions).	  6. Add	   TCAS	   with	   capability	   to	   detect	   separation	   violations,	   generate	   Traffic	  Advisory	  (TA)	  and	  Resolution	  Advisory	  (RA)	  a. DHL	  and	  BTC	  are	  delayed	  (i.e.,	  on	  collision	  course,	  which	  tests	  TCAS)	  b. Pilots	  follow	  TCAS	  instructions	  c. ATCO	  might	   intervene	  prior	   to	  alert,	  depending	  on	   information	   from	  radar	  displays.	  7. Third	  plane,	  the	  AEF	  flight,	  arrives	  late,	  requiring	  ATCO	  communications	  and	  handoff	  to	  Friedrichshafen	  control	  tower:	  a. Handled	  by	  ATCO	  in	  Zurich	  at	  right	  workstation	  (ARFA	  RE	  sector)	  and	  not	  left	  RP	  sector	  workstation.	  	  b. Phone	  communications	  for	  flight	  handovers	  c. Methods	  used	  by	  ATCO	  when	  phone	  contact	  doesn’t	  work:	  i. Ask	  CA	  to	  get	  another	  number:	  requires	  about	  3	  minutes	  for	  CA	  to	  return	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ii. After	  that	  number	  fails,	  discuss	  with	  CA	  other	  options	  about	  30	  seconds	  iii. When	  not	  busy	  handling	  other	  flights,	  try	  second	  number	  again	  iv. When	   plane	   is	   within	   a	   certain	   (configurable)	   distance	   of	  airport,	  method	  of	  last	  resort	  is	  to	  call	  pilots	  on	  radio	  and	  ask	  them	  to	  contact	  the	  tower	  directly	  8. STCA	   optical	   subsystem	   added	   to	   ATCO	   workstations;	   ATCO	   responds	   to	  alert	  by	  advising	  Pilot	  to	  change	  flight	   level	  based	  on	  next	   flight	  segment	  of	  flight	  plan.	  9. Reduce	  ATCC	   staff	   to	   one	   Zurich	  ATCO	   (this	  model	   begins	   the	   sequence	   of	  variations	  from	  the	  nominal	  situation)	  a. Requires	   ATCO	   managing	   workload	   and	   communications	   (e.g.,	  associate	   workstation	   with	   flight	   frequency)	   from	   both	   RE	   and	   RP	  workstations	  b. Priority	   is	   given	   to	   the	   late-­‐arriving	   AEF	   flight	   over	   monitoring	   the	  airspace	  10. Handover	   interactions	  when	  one	   Zurich	  ATCO	   goes	   on	   break,	   requiring	  RE	  workstation	  to	  be	  configured	  for	  ARFA	  sector.	  	  The	   sequence	   is	   based	   on	   simulating	   normal	   operations	   before	   introducing	  exceptions.	  TCAS	  was	   added	   relatively	   early	   to	  be	   sure	   that	   independent	   of	  ATCO	  advice,	   it	  would	   operate	   correctly.	   	   Two	  ATCOs	  were	  modeled	   before	   reducing	   to	  one,	  so	  the	  two	  positions	  were	  well	  formulated	  and	  reduction	  could	  be	  modeled	  by	  simply	  having	  one	  ATCO	  adopt	  behaviors	  of	  both	  roles	  (Brahms	  groups).	  	  	  Over	  time,	  as	  described	  in	  Section	  8.2,	  it	  was	  recognized	  that	  the	  model	  needed	  to	  be	  systematically	   structured	   to	   enable	   independently	   reconfiguring	   the	   modeled	  equipment	  and	  automation	  to	  simulate	  the	  entire	  space	  of	  scenarios	  the	  particular	  factorization	  of	  the	  work	  system	  in	  terms	  of	  people	  and	  systems	  allows.	  That	  is,	  all	  of	   the	   combinations	   of	   initial	   facts	   and	   beliefs	   (scenarios)	  must	   produce	   logically	  correct	   behaviors	   and	   interactions	   in	   the	   simulation.	   Some	  of	   the	  details	   required	  and	  complications	  are	  described	  in	  Chapter	  9.	  
8.6 Defining	  the	  Sequence	  of	  Test	  Scenarios	  The	   concept	   of	   a	   sequence	   of	   scenarios	   created	   by	   configuring	   Brahms-­‐GÜM	   (the	  final	  model	  in	  the	  development	  sequence	  described	  in	  the	  preceding	  section)	  began	  with	   the	   idea	   that	   we	   would	   simulate	   the	   Überlingen	   situation	   first,	   then	   vary	  factors	  experimentally	  to	  identify	  key	  factors	  and/or	  interactions.	  	  These	  variations	  were	  based	  on	  the	  primary	  causal	  factors	  (“exceptions”):	  	  
• Überlingen	  as	  it	  occurred	  (1	  ATCO,	  no	  phones,	  no	  STCA	  Optical,	  AEF	  arriving,	  DHL	  and	  BTC	  on	  collision	  path)	  
• Two	  Zurich	  ATCOs	  were	  present	  (second	  controller	  does	  not	  go	  on	  break)	  
• One	  Zurich	  ATCO	  but	  phones	  operational	  
• One	  Zurich	  ATCO	  but	  without	  delayed	  AEF	  flight	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• One	  Zurich	  ATCO	  but	  AEF	  flight	  is	  treated	  differently	  (flight	  is	  put	  on	  hold,	  tower	  is	  contacted	  sooner,	  or	  landing	  AEF	  flight	  is	  	  treated	  as	  lower	  priority)	  when	  phone	  problem	  is	  discovered	  so	  that	  monitoring	  other	  flights	  is	  not	  impaired	  or	  delayed	  
• One	  Zurich	  ATCO	  but	  STCA	  Optical	  operational	  	  Also,	  our	  plan	  was	  that	  if	  a	  collision	  still	  occurred	  with	  two	  air	  traffic	  controllers,	  we	  would	  change	  (“add	  back”)	  exceptions	  to	  determine	  whether	  they	  made	  a	  difference.	  	  Our	  initial	  hypothesis	  was	  that	  either	  two	  Zurich	  ATCOs	  would	  suffice	  to	  avoid	  the	  collision	  or	  one	  Zurich	  ATCO	  with	  any	  of	  the	  key	  exceptions	  resolved.	  	  The	  list	  above	  was	  then	  formalized	  and	  systematized	  (about	  six	  months	  into	  model	  development)	  by	  reversing	  the	  sequence	  to	  test	  Überlingen	  last,	  starting	  with	  a	  fully	  nominal	  configuration	  and	  adding	  exceptions	  until	  the	  “fully	  degraded”	  Überlingen	  scenario	  was	  replicated	  (Table	  8-­‐1;	  Table	  24-­‐1).	  This	  enabled	  testing	  more	  directly	  the	  hypothesis	   that	  all	  or	  most	  of	   the	  anomalies	  were	  required	   for	   the	  collision	   to	  occur	  and	  would	  reveal	  without	  single	  or	  simple	  combinations	  of	  exceptions	  could	  alone	   cause	   the	   collision.	   	   This	   approach	   would	   also	   reveal	   whether	   the	   “Swiss	  cheese”	   perspective	   (Section	   7.2.3),	   which	   postulated	   that	   all	   exceptions	   were	  required	  for	  the	  collision	  to	  occur,	  was	  valid	  for	  the	  Überlingen	  situation.	  	  	  In	  the	  table,	  “Y”	  and	  “N”	  indicate	  whether	  a	  characteristic	  is	  present	  or	  not.	  Thus	  the	  
exceptions	   are	   defined	   as	   number	   of	   Zurich	  ATCOs	   is	   one,	   AEF	   Flight	   present	   (Y),	  BTC	  Pilots	   follow	  TCAS	  (N),	   	  STCA	  Optical	  absent	  (N),	   	  and	  phones	  absent	  (N).	   	  To	  enable	  verifying	  that	  the	  planes	  would	  collide,	  TCAS	  can	  also	  be	  disabled	  (N).	  	  	  The	  sequence	  (rows	  in	  this	  table)	  is	  designed	  to	  sequentially	  and	  cumulatively	  add	  anomalies	   (e.g.,	   compare	   scenarios	   2A	   ,	   B,	   and	   C).	   The	   scenario	   labeling	   scheme	  refers	  to	  the	  number	  of	  Zurich	  ATCOs;	  thus	  all	  scenario	  labels	  starting	  with	  2	  have	  two	  ATCOs.	   	  This	  table	  was	  extended	  as	  simulation	  outcomes	  suggested	  additional	  scenario	  combinations	  to	  test	  (Chapter	  10).	  	  The	  test	  sequence	  had	  the	  important	  side	  effect	  of	  making	  explicit	  a	  modeling	  design	  constraint	   that	   had	   been	   implicit	   in	   the	   original	   notion	   of	   “base	  model	   versions,”	  namely	   that	   each	   aspect	   (such	   as	   the	   behavior	   of	   the	   radar	   system)	   had	   to	   be	  independent	   of	   the	   others.	   In	   particular,	   it	   had	   to	   be	   possible	   to	   run	   a	   simulation	  having	   a	   different	  work	   system	   configuration	  without	   rewriting	   any	   aspect	   of	   the	  model.	   In	   Brahms	   terms,	   the	  model	   had	   to	   be	   properly	   parameterized	   by	   “initial	  beliefs”	  of	  agents	  and	  “initial	   facts”	  about	  agents	  and	  objects.	   	  Thus,	  a	  scenario	  can	  be	  defined	  by	  changing	  certain	  “declarations”	  in	  Brahms-­‐GÜM	  rather	  than	  changing	  the	   model	   of	   how	   people	   behave	   or	   systems	   operate	   in	   general	   (i.e.,	   activities,	  workframes,	   thoughtframes,	   etc.).	   	   Appendix	   24	   indicates	   the	   actual	   model	  configurations	  corresponding	  to	  the	  ten	  scenarios	  in	  the	  test	  sequence	  table.	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Table	  8-­‐1:	  Ten	  Test	  Scenarios	  Definitions	  and	  Predicted	  Outcomes,	  Given	  BTC	  
and	  DHL	  on	  Collision	  Course	  
Scenario	  










0)	  Null	   YES	   0	   N	   —	   —	   —	   —	  
2A)	  Normal	   NO	   2	   Y	   Y	   Y	   Y	   Y	  
2B)	  Normal	  w/o	  
Phones	   No,	  	  expect	  1st	  Zurich	  ATCO	  to	  advise	  BTC	  early	  enough	   2	   Y	   Y	   Y	   Y	   N25	  
2C)	  Phones	  out	  &	  
Radar	  degraded,	  
but	  TCAS	  rules	   Is	  BTC	  advised	  in	  time	  so	  TCAS	  not	  activated?	  If	  not,	  does	  BTC	  reversal	  occur	  in	  time?	   2	   Y	   Y26	   N	   Y	   N	  
2D)	  …	  but	  Zurich	  
ATCO	  rules	   Yes?	  BTC	  advised	  early	  enough?	   2	   Y	   N	   N	   Y	   N	  
1A)	  Normal-­‐
SMOP	   No?	  BTC	  advised	  early	  enough,	  so	  TCAS	  not	  activated?	   1	   Y	   Y	   Y	   Y	   Y	  
1B)	  SMOP	  w/o	  
Phones	   No?	  STCA	  alert	  compensates	  for	  distraction?	   1	   Y	   Y	   Y	   Y	   N	  
1C)	  SMOP	  w/o	  
Radar	   No?	  Attends	  to	  radar?	   1	   Y	   Y	   N	   Y	   Y	  
1D)	  Actual,	  but	  
TCAS	  Followed	   Yes?	  Zurich	  ATCO	  advises	  too	  late;	  BTC	  reversal	  ineffective?	   1	   Y	   Y	   N	   Y	   N	  
1E)	  Überlingen	   YES	   1	   Y	   N	   N	   Y	   N	  	  Given	  that	  the	  model	  is	  always	  scoped,	  such	  that	  behaviors	  are	  limited,	  some	  aspects	  of	  the	  model	  had	  to	  be	  reconstructed	  from	  the	  initial	  design	  to	  achieve	  the	  desired	  configurability.	   For	   example,	   the	  modeler	   needed	   to	   know	  whether	   the	  DHL	   pilot	  would	  always	   follow	  TCAS,	  given	  that	   this	  variation	  was	  not	  specified	   in	   the	   table.	  	  This	   question	   clarified	   the	   general	   principle	   that	   the	   pilots	   should	   be	  modeled	   as	  clones	  (agents	  who	  all	  inherit	  behaviors	  from	  the	  same	  group),	  except	  for	  behaviors	  that	  needed	  to	  be	  varied,	  such	  as	  response	  to	  TCAS.	  	  It	  must	  be	  possible	  in	  principle	  to	  easily	  configure	  and	  run	  scenario	  arbitrary	  variations	  (e.g.,	  DHL	  ignores	  TCAS	  and	  BTC	  follows	  TCAS,	  reversing	  course	  after	  Zurich	  ATCO	  instruction).	  	  There	  should	  be	  nothing	  inherent	  in	  the	  model	  that	  builds	  in	  behaviors	  of	  DHL	  and	  BTC	  pilots	  in	  any	  way	   (especially	   because	   we	   were	   not	   modeling	   how	   the	   aircraft	   crews	   behaved	  among	   themselves).	   	   Consequently,	   the	   behaviors	   required	   for	   "following	   TCAS"	  including	  reversing	  after	  an	  ATCO	  instruction	  are	  modeled	  at	  the	  pilot	  level.	  ATCOs	  are	  similarly	  clones;	  but	  also	  have	  contingent	  behaviors	   (e.g.,	   	  potentially	  advising	  BTC	  to	  climb	  or	  advising	  DHL	  instead	  of	  BTC	  depending	  on	  circumstances).	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  24	  Prediction	   refers	   our	   expectation	   of	   outcome	   in	   simulation	   run	   for	   given	   scenario.	   Questions	  indicate	  that	  outcome	  is	  not	  obvious	  given	  alternative	  sequences	  of	  events	  that	  might	  occur.	  25	  When	  phones	  don’t	  operate,	  ATCO	  asks	  for	  assistance.	  26	  “BTC	   following	  TCAS”	   implies	  pilots	  will	   ignore	  ATCO	   if	   TCAS	   advises	   first	   or	  pilots	  will	   reverse	  course	  if	  ATCO	  advises	  first	  and	  TCAS	  gives	  contrary	  instruction.	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The	   next	   chapter	   details	   the	  main	   challenges	   discovered	  when	   creating	   or	   testing	  the	  ten	  scenarios.	  The	  subsequent	  chapter	  picks	  up	  the	  story	  of	  simulation	  outcomes	  and	   necessary	   refinements	   to	   increase	   fidelity	   of	   Brahms-­‐GÜM	   (generally	   details	  and	  timings)	  for	  accuracy	  and	  validity.	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9 Method:	  Modeling	  Challenges	  and	  Abstractions	  Given	   the	   modeling	   objectives	   and	   work	   practice	   perspective,	   the	   Überlingen	  accident	  transcript	  provided	  by	  ANSA	  and	  BFU	  Report	  timeline	  provides	  most	  of	  the	  essential	  behaviors	  of	  key	  players.27	  	  The	  BFU	  Report	  text	  provides	  many	  additional	  details	   and	   analysis	   required	   for	   constructing	   the	   model;	   it	   was	   apparently	  produced	   by	   researchers	   sensitive	   to	   organizational	   and	   psychological	   human	  factors.	  	  	  	  However,	  constructing	  Brahms–GÜM	  was	  complicated	  and	  made	  difficult	  for	  several	  quite	  different	  reasons:	  
• Missing	  information	  about	  the	  work	  system	  
o Basic	   information	  about	  Überlingen	  work	   systems	   is	  not	  mentioned	  in	  published	  accident	  reports	  and	  analyses	  (e.g.,	  what	  region	  is	  visible	  on	  radar	  display	  configured	  for	  ARFA	  sector?).	  
o Modeling	   flights	  and	  routes/waypoints	   requires	  a	  great	  deal	  of	  data	  that	   is	   not	   readily	   available	   (e.g.,	   routes	   of	   the	   flights	   Zurich	   ATCO	  directs	  before	  and	  after	  BTC	  enters	  his	  sector,	  including	  AEF	  1135).	  
o Normally	  a	  Brahms	  model	   is	  constructed	  from	  observational	  data	  of	  an	  ongoing	  work	  practice.	  	  Without	  such	  ethnographic	  data	  about	  air	  traffic	  work	  practices	  at	  Überlingen	   in	  2002,	  we	  do	  not	  know	  when	  Zurich	   ATCOs	   typically	   detected	   and	   acted	   on	   separation	  infringement;	  to	  what	  extent	  they	  relied	  on	  STCA	  or	  equivalent	  alerts	  and	  specifically	  what	  happens	  when	  alerts	  are	  not	  present;	  and	  so	  on.	  (See	  Section	  12.6.4	  for	  further	  discussion.)	  
• Limited	  modeling	  resources	  
o Simulating	   each	   of	   the	   complicated	   subsystems	   would	   normally	  require	  a	  modeler	  (e.g.,	  radar	  server,	  TCAS)	  to	  create	  the	  simulation	  more	   quickly;	   simulating	   even	   simplified	   versions	   reduced	   time	  available	   for	   the	   single	  modeler	   to	   test	   configurations	   (drawing	   out	  the	  modeling	   process	   puts	  more	   demands	   on	   the	   research	   team	   to	  remember	  and	  track	  details).	  
o Simulating	   crew	   interactions	   with	   participants	   having	   different	  knowledge	   and	   training	   particularly	   about	   TCAS	   (as	   in	   the	   BTC	  cockpit	   and	   in	   contrast	  with	   the	   DHL	   crew)	  would	   itself	   be	   a	   year-­‐long	  effort.	  
• Complexity	  of	  interactive	  details	  
o Simulating	  ATCO	  visual	  perception	  in	  reading	  and	  interpreting	  radar	  display	  and	  similarly	  simulating	  pilot’s	  line	  of	  sight	  and	  interpretation	  of	   “intruder”	   aircraft	   is	   not	   appropriate	   for	   Brahms	   work	   practice	  simulation	  (but	  could	  be	  readily	  integrated	  with	  the	  model).	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  27	  The	  significant	  events	  of	   interest	  are	  represented	   in	  the	  BFU	  Report	  chart	   in	  Report_02_AX001-­‐1-­‐
2_%C3%9Cberlingen_Appendix_1-­‐3.pdf	  on	  pages	  2	  and	  3.	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In	   some	   cases,	   an	   aspect	   of	   the	   work	   system	   that	   raised	   substantial	   research	  problems	   on	   its	   own	   could	   be	   ignored.	   	   For	   example,	   the	   BFU	   Investigation	  determined	  that	  the	  STCA	  audible	  alarm	  was	  apparently	  sounded	  at	  21:35	  directed	  to	   the	   RE	   (right	   workstation),	   but	   was	   unable	   to	   determine	   and	   provides	   no	  conjectures	  why	  no	  one	  in	  the	  Zurich	  ATCC	  heard	  it	  (BFU	  Report,	  p.	  42).	  	  We	  do	  not	  even	  know	  for	  example	  whether	  a	  radio	  call	   from	  a	  pilot	  could	  mask	   the	  sound	  of	  the	  alarm	  or	  where	  it	  is	  located	  in	  the	  ATCC	  relative	  to	  the	  workstations.	  	  Given	  that	  the	  research	   issue	  for	  ATCC	  work	  systems	  design	   is	  why	  the	  alarm	  was	  not	  heard,	  the	  existence	  of	  the	  alarm	  and	  its	  state	  could	  be	  ignored	  for	  our	  purposes.	  Further,	  the	  alarm’s	  sounding	  at	  6.5	  nm	  make	  it	  irrelevant	  to	  the	  analysis	  because	  ATCO	  had	  just	  completed	  instructing	  the	  BTC	  pilots	  at	  that	  point.	  	  As	  the	  list	  above	  shows,	  scoping	  the	  Brahms-­‐GÜM	  modeling	  effort	  to	  fit	  the	  time	  and	  resources	   available	   required	   both	   omitting	   and	   simplifying	   aspects	   of	   the	   work	  system.	   In	   particular	   the	   “base	  model”	   (refer	   to	   description	   in	   Appendix	   23)	   is	   a	  greatly	  simplified	  version	  of	  the	  actual	  work	  system	  at	  Überlingen	  in	  2002:	  	  	  	  
• The	  aircraft	  crews	  consist	  only	  of	  a	  pilot	  who	  does	  all	  the	  work,	  rather	  than	  pilot	  flying	  (PF)	  and	  not	  flying	  (PNF)	  roles;	  pilot’s	  activity	  model	  is	  limited	  to	  manual-­‐only	  mode	   (see	  Chapter	  17)	   for	   takeoff,	   cruise,	   and	   landing	  phases,	  handoff	  and	  instruction-­‐following	  protocol	  with	  ATCOs,	  and	  TCAS	  response.	  
• Except	   for	   ATCO–pilot	   handoff	   and	   ATCO–CA	   regarding	   phones,	  communications	   and	   other	   interactions	   between	   people	   are	   not	   modeled.	  These	  include:	  
o BTC	   cockpit	   crew	  arguments	   about	   interpretation	   of	   TCAS	   alert	   and	  what	  action	  to	  take	  
o ATCO	  and	  engineers’	  interaction	  at	  time	  of	  maintenance	  	  	  
o ATCOs	  and	  supervisor	  interaction	  prior	  to	  his	  departure	  
• Additional	   flights	   controlled	   by	   Zurich	   during	   the	   simulated	   period	   are	  omitted:	   EXS6497,	   THA933,	   TAR4575,	  NMB286,	   BVR305,	   EZS935,	   CRX256,	  LTU7791,	   SRR6073,	   MON6521,	   PGT505.	   These	   are	   treated	   instead	   in	   the	  aggregate	  as	  a	  periodic	  ATCO	  activity	  of	  “handling	  other	  flights”;	  implications	  are	  discussed	  in	  Section	  9.7.	  
• Several	   arguably	   reasonable	  ATCO	  behaviors	   that	   did	   not	   occur	   during	   the	  Überlingen	  accident	  and	  might	  have	  prevented	  the	  collision	  are	  not	  modeled,	  for	  example:	  	  
o Putting	  BTC	  at	  a	  different	  flight	  level	  on	  initial	  arrival	  in	  Zurich	  sector	  (noticing	  it	  is	  at	  the	  same	  altitude	  as	  DHL)	  
o Not	  approving	  DHL	  FL360	  given	  that	  control	  strip	  indicates	  BTC	  is	  at	  FL360	  	  
o Putting	  late-­‐arriving	  AEF	  into	  holding	  pattern	  to	  be	  sure	  larger	  sector	  is	  being	  monitored	  properly28	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  28	  The	  BFU	  Report	  refers	   to	   this	   flight	  only	  as	   “a	   late-­‐arriving	  Airbus	  320”	  whose	  schedule	  was	  not	  known	   to	   the	   two	  ATCOs.	   The	  ANSA	   transcript	   identifies	   the	   flight	   as	   “AEF1135	  Aero	   Lloyd	   (Aero	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o SYMA	  or	  ATCO	  testing	  phones	  when	  maintenance	  work	  is	  reported	  
o Supervisor	   (DL)	   informing	   ATCOs	   not	   to	   go	   on	   break	   until	  maintenance	  completes	  
o Karlsruhe	   ATCO	   contacting	   BTC/DHL	   on	   emergency	   frequency	  despite	  not	  having	  approval	  from	  Zurich	  ATCO	  via	  phone	  
• Simulations	  of	  all	  automated	  systems	  are	  greatly	  simplified:	  radar,	  onboard	  flight	   management	   system,	   TCAS,	   phones	   (operating	   or	   not	   throughout	   a	  simulation	   run).	   	   Simulated	   flights	   travel	   over	   VOR	  waypoints	   rather	   than	  nearby.29	  	  	  	  In	  summary,	  the	  version	  of	  Brahms-­‐GÜM	  reported	  here	  does	  not	  replicate	  all	  of	  the	  	  pilot	   and	   ATCO	   actions	   that	   are	   apparent	   in	   the	   accident	   transcript,	   nor	   does	   it	  include	   the	   “obvious”	   behaviors	   that	   might	   have	   occurred	   to	   handle	   distractions	  and/or	  detect	  and	  avoid	  the	  collision.	  Instead,	  the	  approach	  for	  this	  project	  has	  been	  to	   create	   a	   flexible	   comprehensive	  model	  with	   all	   of	   the	   key	   players	   and	   systems	  involved	  in	  Überlingen	  to	  be	  sufficiently	  complex	  to	  merit	  model-­‐checking	  research	  and	   sufficiently	   general	   to	   allow	   future	   extensions	   without	   significantly	   re-­‐formalizing	  the	  existing	  model	  of	  object	  and	  agent	  behaviors.	  	  	  Certain	  processes	  crucial	  for	  simulating	  the	  accident	  could	  not	  ignored,	  but	  because	  of	  the	  missing	  information	  and/or	  lack	  of	  resources	  could	  not	  be	  modeled	  in	  detail	  without	   making	   broad	   assumptions	   or	   simplifications.	   These	   crucial	   aspects	   and	  how	  they	  are	  modeled	  are	  discussed	  in	  subsequent	  sections:	  the	  radar	  display	  and	  how	   it	   is	   read;	   ATCO	   intervention	   with	   BTC;	   TCAS;	   crew’s	   interpretation	   of	  TCAS/ATCO	   interventions;	   and	   timing	   of	   ATCO	   routine	   activities	   not	   explicitly	  modeled	  (especially	  other	  flights).	  	  	  Most	  of	  these	  issues	  came	  to	  our	  attention	  while	  analyzing	  the	  simulation	  logs	  after	  the	   “base	   model”	   development	   sequence	   was	   completed	   and	   the	   Überlingen	  scenario	   itself	  was	  run.	   	   	  We	  expected	  to	   learn	  about	  the	   important	  behaviors	  that	  needed	   to	   be	   included	   and/or	  modeled	  more	   accurately	   only	   after	   experimenting	  with	   Brahms-­‐GÜM	   scenarios	   and	   analyzing	   the	   simulation	   logs.	   	   However,	   it	   was	  somewhat	  surprising	  that	  timing	  of	  events	  at	  the	  level	  of	  a	  few	  seconds	  made	  such	  a	  difference	   in	  the	  simulation	  outcomes.	  We	  had	  not	  encountered	  such	  sensitivity	  to	  timing	   and	   emergent	   interaction	   sequences	   in	   any	   of	   the	   prior	   Brahms	   models	  created	  over	  two	  decades.	  	  This	  result	  is	  consistent	  with	  the	  claim	  that	  the	  degraded	  Überlingen	   work	   system	   was	   complex	   (Chapter	   5)	   and	   provides	   evidence	   that	  Brahms-­‐GÜM	  appropriately	   represents	   and	   allows	   simulating	   a	  work	   system	  with	  complex	  human-­‐automation	  interactions.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Lloyd	  Flugreisen)”	  (p.	  57).	  Neither	  report	  indicates	  the	  flight	  path	  of	  the	  aircraft,	  but	  it	  certainly	  was	  at	  a	  much	  lower	  altitude	  than	  the	  DHL	  and	  BTC	  flights.	  29	  It	  was	  assumed	  that	  extensions	  of	  Brahms-­‐GÜM	  would	  integrate	  existing	  simulations	  of	  TCAS	  and	  flight	  systems	  or	  even	  actual	  operating	  hardware/software	  systems	  with	  appropriate	  APIs	   into	   the	  simulation;	  e.g.,	  Clancey	  and	  Lowry	  2012;	  Clancey	  et	  al.	  2012).	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For	  convenience,	  we	  collect	  here	  the	  most	  important	  modeling	  challenges,	  including	  how	   we	   abstracted	   complicated	   behaviors	   and	   subsystems.	   	   The	   exposition	   is	  loosely	   ordered	   compositionally,	   relating	   systems	   to	   individual	   behaviors	   to	  interactions	   about	   multiple	   systems.	   	   This	   list	   mixes	   aspects	   known	   to	   be	  complicated	   when	   initially	   constructing	   the	   model	   (e.g.,	   the	   workstation	   radar	  display)	   with	   those	   understood	   better	   by	   analyzing	   interactions	   that	   occurred	  during	  simulation	  runs	  (e.g.,	  priorities	  of	  ATCO’s	  activities).	  	  	  	  The	  following	  chapter	  describes	  in	  more	  detail	  the	  process	  of	  running	  the	  model	  and	  the	   analyses	   (including	   further	   research)	   that	   revealed	   what	   refinements	   were	  necessary	  or	  desirable.	  Together	  these	  chapters	  reveal	  how	  subtle	  issues	  of	  timing	  in	  human-­‐automation	  interactions	  may	  arise	  when	  degraded	  or	  missing	  subsystems	  result	   in	   lack	   of	   information	   and	   inability	   to	   communicate,	   transforming	   a	   given	  configuration	  of	  flights	  that	  are	  routine	  in	  a	  normal	  work	  system	  to	  a	  situation	  too	  complex	  to	  handle.	  
9.1 ATCC	  Workstation	  Radar	  Display	  	  Modeling	   the	   radar	   display	   involves	   calculating	   data	   about	   the	   planes	   and	  transmitting	  it	  to	  the	  display,	  representing	  a	  changeable	  sector	  (geographic	  region)	  on	  the	  display,	  and	  updating	  the	  display	  periodically.	  	  As	   summarized	   in	   Figure	   9-­‐1,	   the	   model	   of	   the	   Primary	   Surveillance	   Radar	   (a	  Brahms	  object)	  examines	   the	  airspace	  within	  an	  Air	  Sector	  and	  communicates	   the	  basic	  flight	  data	  to	  the	  ATC	  Server	  (object),	  which	  in	  turn	  communicates	  it	  to	  all	  of	  the	  ATC	  Displays	  handled	  by	  this	  server.	  	  	  	  The	   ATC	   Display	   has	   properties	   indicating	  what	   region	   of	   the	   airspace	   should	   be	  represented	   on	   the	   screen.	   	   The	   region	   is	   defined	   in	   terms	   of	   its	   origin	   x-­‐y	  coordinate	  and	  range	   from	  the	  origin.	   	  When	  a	   simulation	  run	  begins,	   the	  Min	  x-­‐y	  coordinate	  (farthest	  South-­‐West	  point	  from	  origin)	  and	  Max	  x-­‐y	  coordinate	  (farthest	  North-­‐East	  point)	  are	  calculated,	  given	  the	  range.	  If	  an	  aircraft	  is	  within	  this	  square	  and	  the	  flight	  level	  is	  within	  the	  altitude	  range	  of	  the	  air	  sector,	  then	  the	  ATC	  Display	  has	  a	  property	  indicating	  that	  the	  aircraft	  is	  present	  (visible).30	  	  We	   are	   uncertain	   what	   the	   Zurich	   workstation	   was	   displaying	   at	   any	   moment	  because	  we	  do	  not	  know	  how	  the	  sweep	  of	  the	  radar	  related	  to	  the	  positions	  of	  the	  planes	  on	  the	  screen—data	  for	  a	  plane	  might	  be	  current	  or	  up	  to	  12	  seconds	  in	  the	  past.	   	   As	   a	   simplification,	   the	   radar	   model	   defines	   the	   update	   interval	   to	   be	   12	  seconds	  divided	  by	  the	  number	  of	  planes	  in	  the	  monitored	  air	  space.	  	  For	  example,	  if	  only	  DHL	  is	  in	  the	  air	  space,	  Zurich	  Radar	  reports	  the	  DHL	  plane’s	  data	  to	  the	  Zurich	  ATCO	   server	   every	   12	   seconds.	   	   After	   Zurich	   Radar	   detects	   the	   AEF	   flight	   in	   its	  monitored	   air	   space	   (so	   there	   are	   now	   two	   planes	   in	   the	   displayed	   airspace),	   it	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  30	  Determining	   distance	   of	   the	   aircraft	   from	   the	   ATC	   Display	   origin	   would	   have	   required	   a	   Java	  calculation,	  which	  was	  avoided	  whenever	  possible	  so	  as	  to	  keep	  as	  much	  of	  the	  simulation	  within	  the	  Brahms	  syntax	  for	  future	  model-­‐checking	  research.	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reports	  the	  DHL	  plane’s	  data	  to	  the	  Zurich	  ATCO	  server	  in	  the	  first	  6	  seconds,	  then	  6	  seconds	  later	  reports	  the	  AEF	  plane’s	  data.	  	  When	  Zurich	  Radar	  also	  detects	  the	  BTC	  flight	  in	  its	  monitored	  air	  space,	  it	  updates	  the	  data	  for	  the	  three	  planes	  sequentially	  4,	  8,	  and	  12	  seconds	  during	  each	  12-­‐second	  sweep.	  	  
	  
Figure	  9-­‐1:	  Communication	  of	  Air	  Sector	  data	  among	  PSR,	  Server,	  STCA,	  
Display,	  and	  ATCO	  Each	   of	   the	   two	   workstations	   in	   Zurich	   ATCC	   were	   modeled	   to	   represent	   the	  East/South	  sectors.	  When	  the	  second	  ATCO	  goes	  on	  a	  break,	  the	  right	  workstation	  is	  reconfigured	   to	   display	   only	   the	   ARFA	   Sector.	   Because	   the	   ARFA	   Sector’s	  geographical	  boundaries	  are	  an	  irregular	  polygon,	  the	  coordinates	  were	  determined	  combining	  information	  from	  the	  BFU	  Report	  Appendix	  3	  diagram,	  BFU	  Investigation	  Report	   1872	   (“Areas	   of	   Responsibility”),	   and	   Google	   Earth.	   Figure	   9-­‐2	   shows	   a	  simplified	  approximation	  of	  the	  ARFA	  sector	  outlined	  in	  black,	  superimposed	  on	  the	  BFU	  Report	  Appendix	  1	  map.	  The	  green	  internal	  section	  is	  the	  ARFA	  FL95-­‐,	  which	  is	  not	  relevant	  to	  these	  operations.	  	  	  	  The	  approaching	  BTC	  (red)	  and	  DHL	  (blue)	  aircraft	  are	  shown	  at	  approximately	  30	  nm	  separation,	  when	   the	  STCA	  optical	   alert	  would	  have	  been	  visible	  on	   the	   radar	  display	  if	  it	  had	  been	  operational.	  	  
	  	  




Figure	  9-­‐2:	  Approximate	  boundary	  (in	  black)	  of	  ARFA	  Sector	  monitored	  by	  
Zurich	  ATCC	  on	  A	  RE	  (right)	  workstation	  In	   Brahms-­‐GÜM,	   the	   ARFA	   Sector	   is	   modeled	   simply	   as	   a	   square	   whose	   east	  boundary	   corresponds	   to	   where	   the	   BFU	   Report	   indicates	   that	   the	   BTC	   became	  visible	   on	   the	   display;	   the	   southern	   boundary	   is	   estimated	   as	   just	   south	   of	   Lake	  Constance,	   which	   fits	   approximately	   where	   and	   when	   the	   DHL	   was	   reported	   as	  becoming	  visible	  on	  the	  display.31	  
9.2 ATCO	  Reading	  Radar	  Display	  and	  Detecting	  Separation	  Infringement	  Visual	   processing	   is	   an	   important	   topic	   in	   simulating	   human	   performance,	  particularly	   for	   air	   traffic	   control	   (Freed	   1998).	   Brahms-­‐GÜM	   does	   not	   represent	  how	  a	  person	  might	  visually	  interpret	  the	  radar	  display	  (e.g.,	  perceiving	  geometries	  of	  flight	  paths),	  but	  rather	  models	  looking	  and	  reading	  the	  display	  as	  if	  it	  were	  text,	  consisting	   of	   data	   about	   the	   aircraft.	   In	   Brahms	   terms,	   the	   Radar	   Display	   object	  (shown	  in	  Figure	  9-­‐1	  above)	  has	  “beliefs”	  about	  this	  data	  that	  are	  communicated	  to	  the	  ATCO	  when	  he	  monitors	  the	  display.	  The	  ATCO	  engages	  in	  a	  “communicate	  act”	  in	  which	  he	  “asks”	  the	  display	  for	  certain	  parameters.	  	  	  	  The	  definition	  of	   the	   communicate	  activity	  monitorPlane	   shows	   the	  values	  ATCO	  receives	  from	  the	  radar	  display:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  31	  Initial	   testing	   of	   Brahms-­‐GÜM	  with	   the	   Überlingen	  work	   system	   configuration	   revealed	   that	   the	  initial	   ARFA	   Sector	   Radar	   model	   was	   a	   bit	   too	   far	   west	   and	   north,	   given	   times	   of	   BTC	   and	   DHL	  appearance	   on	  A	  RE	   radar	   display	   noted	   in	   BFU	  Report	   in	   Appendix	   3.	   This	   reduced	   the	   time	   the	  simulated	  ATCO	  might	  observe	  both	  planes	  together	  while	  working	  at	  right	  workstation	  to	  assist	  AEF	  late-­‐arriving	  flight.	  	  After	  the	  simulated	  ATCO	  was	  made	  less	  conservative	  in	  intervening,	  moving	  the	  boundary	  had	  no	  effect.	  	  
	  	  




communicate	  monitorPlane(string	  dispStr,	  int	  minDur,	  int	  maxDur,	  Aircraft	  plane,	  Flight	  flight,	  
AirTrafficControlDisplay	  atcDisplay)	  {	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  display:	  dispStr;	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  random:	  true;	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  min_duration:	  minDur;	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  max_duration:	  maxDur;	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  with:	  atcDisplay;	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  about:	  receive(plane.location	  =	  unknown),	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  receive(plane.waypoint	  =	  unknown),	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  receive(plane.timeToWaypoint	  =	  unknown),	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  receive(plane.heading	  =	  unknown),	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  receive(plane.flight	  =	  unknown),	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  receive(plane.latitude	  =	  unknown),	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  receive(plane.longitude	  =	  unknown),	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  receive(plane.altitude	  =	  unknown),	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  receive(flight.flightNumber	  =	  unknown),	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  receive(flight.airSector	  =	  unknown),	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  receive(flight.flightInBoundary	  =	  unknown),	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  receive(flight.flightLateralSeparation	  =	  unknown),	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  receive(flight.flightClosest	  =	  unknown),	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  receive(flight.isFlightClosestCrossing	  =	  unknown),	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  receive(flight.flightVerticalSeparation	  =	  unknown);	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  }//com	  monitorPlane	  
	  To	   model	   the	   geometric	   perception	   of	   detecting	   separation	   distance	   and	   path	  crossings,	   the	   ATC	   Radar	   Display	   object	   makes	   the	   essential	   calculations	   and	  conveys	  these	  to	  the	  ATCO	  (flight	  attributes	  shown	  in	  bold	  above).	  	  In	  particular,	  the	  radar	   display	   computes	   where	   flight	   paths	   are	   crossing,	   which	   flight	   is	   closest,	  lateral	   and	   vertical	   distances	   between	   flights.	   	   The	   attributes	   in	   bold	   are	   only	  communicated	  by	  the	  display	  if	  STCA	  Optical	  is	  operating.	  	  	  This	   example	   illustrates	   that	  work	   practice	  modeling	   in	   Brahms	   is	   not	   concerned	  with	   layout	  of	   the	  radar	  display	  or	  how	  the	  ATCO	   is	  actually	  scanning	   the	  display.	  The	  emphasis	   instead	   is	  on	  what	   information	  can	  be	  determined	   from	   the	  display	  and	  most	  importantly	  when	  the	  ATCO	  monitors	  the	  display	  and	  the	  duration	  of	  that	  activity.	  	  	  If	  the	  STCA	  Optical	  is	  operating,	  then	  the	  Radar	  Display	  will	  receive	  a	  belief	  from	  the	  STCA	   object	   that	   corresponds	   to	   the	   STCA	   Optical	   alert.	   	   The	   belief	  (“flightInBoundary”)	  indicates	  for	  a	  given	  flight	  the	  closest	  aircraft	  that	  violates	  the	  STCA	  Optical	  minimum	  separations.	  Specifically,	  for	  a	  given	  flight,	  another	  aircraft	  is	  modeled	  as	  being	  flightInBoundary	  120s	  before	  the	  aircraft’s	  approach	  is	  less	  than	  6.5	  NM	  lateral	  separation	  and	  1500	  ft	  vertical	  separation	  (BFU	  Report,	  p.	  37).	   	  For	  example,	   referring	   to	   the	   above	   workframe:	   	   with	   respect	   to	   flightNumber	   DHL	  3611,	   if	   isFlightClosestCrossing	   is	   true	   for	   the	   flightClosest	   (e.g.,	   BTC2937),	  flightLateralSeparation	   =	   30	   NM,	   and	   flightVerticalSeparation	   <	   1500	   ft,	   then	  flightInBoundary	   will	   be	   true	   for	   the	   closest	   flight	   (BTC2937,	   i.e.,	  DHL611.flightInBoundary	  =	  BTC2397).	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  Knowing	   flightInBoundary	   is	   true,	   ATCO	   will	   intervene,	   based	   on	   the	   following	  remarks	  in	  the	  BFU	  Report:	  	   If	   the	  optical	  STCA	  had	  been	  available	   it	  would	  have	  resulted	   in	  an	  alert	  about	  2.5	  minutes	   before	   the	   collision	   and	   almost	   2	   minutes	   before	   the	   ATCO	   started	   his	  descent	  instruction	  to	  the	  TU154M.	  It	  would	  have	  been	  visible	  at	  both	  the	  RE	  and	  RP	  radar	   screen	   and	   would	   have	   drawn	   the	   ATCO's	   attention	   to	   the	   situation	  developing	   in	   the	   upper	   airspace.	   He	   would	   have	   had	   ample	   time	   to	   issue	  instructions	   to	  avoid	  a	  separation	   infringement.	   In	   this	  case,	  TCAS	  would	  not	  have	  become	  active.	  (p.	  88-­‐89) 	  If	  STCA	  Optical	  is	  not	  operating,	  ATCO	  can	  receive	  the	  beliefs	  about	  the	  closest	  flight,	  but	   flightInBoundary	   will	   be	   unknown	   (no	   belief	   will	   be	   received	   from	   the	  AirTrafficControlDisplay	  object).	  	  Instead,	  the	  need	  for	  intervention	  can	  be	  inferred	  by	  ATCO	  by	  a	  thoughtframe:	  	  
thoughtframe	  Flight_Conflict_Loss_Of_Separation	  {	  
variables:	  
	   foreach(Flight)	  flight;	  
	   foreach(Flight)	  otherFlight;	  
	   foreach(AirTrafficControlDisplay)	  atcDisplay;	  
when(	   known(flight.sectorFrequency	  )	  and	  
	   knownval(flight.isFlightClosestCrossing	  =	  true)	  and	  
	   knownval(flight.flightClosest	  =	  otherFlight)	  and	  
	   known(otherFlight.sectorFrequency	  )	  and	  
	   knownval(current.location	  =	  atcDisplay.location)	  and	  
knownval(atcDisplay.minLateralSeparation	  >	  flight.flightLateralSeparation)	  and	  
	   knownval(atcDisplay.minVerticalSeparation	  >	  flight.flightVerticalSeparation))	  
do	  {	  
	   conclude((flight.flightInBoundary	  =	  otherFlight));	  
}	  
}//tf	  Flight_Conflict_Loss_Of_Separation	  	  In	  this	  thoughtframe,	  a	  Brahms-­‐GÜM	  parameter	  (minLateralSeparation)	  models	  the	  ATCO’s	   threshold	   for	   the	   separation	   requiring	   intervention	   (i.e.,	   ATCO	   acts	   if	  minLateralSeparation	   <	   flightLateralSeparation).	   	   A	   similar	   parameter	  models	   the	  vertical	   separation	   tolerance	   (set	   to	  1500	   feet).	   	  These	  parameters	   are	  among	   the	  initial	  conditions	  that	  define	  a	  scenario	  and	  can	  be	  modified	  prior	  to	  any	  simulation	  run.	  	  	  	  	  
	  	  




Figure	  9-­‐3:	  Separation	  distances	  between	  DHL	  (blue)	  and	  BTC	  (red)	  aircraft	  at	  
times	  of	  BTC	  handoff	  to	  Zurich	  (64	  nm);	  approximate	  point	  where	  BTC	  became	  
visible	   in	   ARFA	   Sector	   radar	   (30	   nm,	   21:32:38);	   recommended	   last	   point	   at	  
which	   Zurich	   ATCO	   should	   have	   acted	   (red,	   20	   nm	   at	   21:33:49);	   and	  where	  
TCAS	  TA	  is	  generated	  (yellow,	  9.94	  NM).32	  Without	  ethnographic	  data,	  we	  inferred	  minLateralSeparation	  from	  the	  particulars	  of	  the	  Überlingen	  events.	  Originally	  the	  value	  of	  minLateralSeparation	  was	  set	  to	  65	  nm	  given	  commentary	   that	  ATCO	  might	  have	  acted	  at	   the	   time	  of	  BTC	  handoff	   (at	  21:30:11	  when	  separation	  was	  64	  nm,	  BFU	  Report	  p.	  75).	  However,	  the	  Zurich	  ATCO	  testified	  that	  the	  did	  not	  believe	  "the	  imminent	  approach	  to	  be	  crucial”	  at	  that	  time	  (BFU	  Report,	  p.	  105),	  which	  suggests	  that	  his	  minLateralSeparation	  is	  substantially	  less	  than	  64	  nm.33	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  32	  The	   timing	   of	   last	   recommended	   point	   for	   intervention,	   which	   is	   one	  minute	   earlier	   than	   what	  actually	   occurred,	   is	   based	   on	   a	   normal	   rate	   of	   descent	   of	   1000	   ft/minute	   to	   provide	   1000	   ft	   of	  separation	  (FL350)	  when	  the	  planes	  would	  be	  approximately	  7	  nm	  apart	  (BFU	  Report,	  p.	  75).	  33	  Note	  that	  ATCO’s	  remark	  cited	  here	  is	  inconsistent	  with	  the	  claim	  elsewhere	  in	  the	  BFU	  report	  that	  “the	  controller	  did	  not	  notice	  that	  the	  B757-­‐200	  had	  just	  reached	  the	  same	  flight	  level	  and	  that	  both	  airplanes	  were	  approaching	  each	  other	  at	  right	  angles”	  (p.	  75).	  	  Not	  noticing	  a	  fact	  and	  not	  believing	  it	  to	  be	  crucial	  are	  quite	  different.	  
	  	  
WORK	  PRACTICE	  SIMULATION	  OF	  COMPLEX	  HUMAN-­‐AUTOMATION	  SYSTEMS	  IN	  SAFETY-­‐CRITICAL	  SITUATIONS	   1
2
6 	  
Simulation	   runs	   confirmed	   that	   with	   minLateralSeparation	   set	   to	   65	   nm,	  intervention	   occurs	   at	   the	   time	   of	   the	   BTC	   handoff	   and	   the	   collision	   is	   avoided.	  	  Subsequently,	  minLateralSeparation	  was	  reset	  to	  25	  nm	  to	  better	  model	  the	  Zurich	  ATCO’s	  behavior	  at	  Überlingen.	  	  	  To	  understand	  this	  tradeoff	  between	  65	  nm	  and	  25	  nm,	  consider	  when	  and	  where	  the	   key	   events	   occurred	   within	   the	   ARFA	   Sector	   (Figure	   9-­‐3).	   If	   for	   example	   the	  STCA	  Optical	  had	  been	  operational,	   then	  an	  alert	  would	  have	  been	  provided	  when	  separation	  was	  less	  than	  31	  nm.34	  	  This	  alert	  would	  have	  been	  visible	  on	  the	  radar	  display	  when	  both	  planes	  were	  first	  displayed	  in	  the	  ARFA	  Sector	  because	  they	  were	  30	  nm	  apart.	  Using	  this	  graphic	  we	  can	  calculate	  roughly	  the	  separation	  distance	  at	  which	  an	  ATCO	  can	  be	  expected	  to	  take	  action	  to	  redirect	  flights	  to	  avoid	  separation	  infringement.	  	  In	  particular,	  if	  the	  ATCO	  is	  attending	  to	  this	  radar	  display—	  actively	  monitoring	  the	  aircraft	  for	  issues—and	  his	  “sensitivity”	  for	  taking	  action	  (minLateralSeparation)	  is	  between	   30	   nm	   and	   20	   nm	   (the	   recommended	   last	   time	   to	   intervene	   given	   the	  aircraft	  trajectories	  and	  velocities),	  he	  will	  catch	  the	  imminent	  collision	  well	  before	  the	  TCAS	  TA	  occurs	  at	  about	  10	  nm.	  	  Therefore	  25	  nm	  separation	  was	  deemed	  to	  be	  a	  good	  estimate	  of	  when	  an	  ATCO	  would	   conclude	   “I	  need	   to	  act	  on	   this	  now”	   (in	  contrast	  with	  “this	  is	  something	  I’ll	  need	  to	  handle	  eventually”).	  	  Furthermore,	  given	  that	  both	  planes	  were	  visible	  on	  both	  workstations	  during	  this	  interval	   (BFU	  Report,	  p.	  76)	  when	  ATCO	  was	  preoccupied	  by	   the	  AEF	   flight	   (from	  the	  AEF’s	  third	  call	  at	  21:32:15	  until	  he	  completes	  the	  handoff	  at	  21:34:38),	  and	  the	  separation	  was	  less	  than	  would	  urgently	  require	  action	  on	  his	  part	  (i.e.,	  less	  than	  20	  nm),	   we	   can	   conclude	   that	   ATCO	   was	   not	   actively	   monitoring	   either	   display	   for	  
separation	  issues	  during	  this	  2	  ¼	  minute	  period.	   	  In	   summary,	  Brahms-­‐GÜM	  represents	  ATCO	  as	   “apprehending”	  aircraft	   separation	  when	  monitoring	   the	  radar	  display,	  modeling	  perception	  of	   the	  STCA	  Optical	  alert	  and	   immediately	   acting	   upon	   it,	   if	   it	   is	   operational.	   The	   same	   conclusion	   can	   be	  made	   through	   inference	   when	   STCA	   is	   not	   operational,	   but	   ATCO	   allows	   for	   less	  separation	   (25	   nm).	   In	   both	   cases,	   ATCO	   must	   be	   actively	   monitoring	   the	   radar	  display.	  Other	  activities	  such	  as	  handoff	  for	  a	  landing	  aircraft	  and	  responding	  to	  calls	  from	  aircraft	  have	  higher	  priority,	  so	  when	  that	  workload	  increases,	  less	  time	  will	  be	  devoted	   to	   scanning	   the	   radar	   display	   for	   separation	   issues—which	   is	   what	  occurred	  in	  the	  Überlingen	  situation.35	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  34	  “Separation”	  of	  course	  takes	  into	  account	  both	  horizontal	  and	  vertical	  distances.	  Because	  the	  DHL	  and	   BTC	   flights	   are	   both	   at	   FL360,	   their	   separation	   is	   their	   horizontal	   (lateral)	   distance	   apart,	  represented	  by	  the	  slanted	  lines	  on	  the	  map	  graphic.	  	  	  35	  By	  modeling	   the	  STCA	  Optical	  alert	  as	   “detectable,”	   its	  presence	  could	  be	  simulated	  as	  becoming	  known	   to	   the	   ATCO	  without	   his	   scanning	   the	   display	   and	   cause	   other	   activities	   to	   be	   interrupted.	  However,	   a	   unrealized	   shortcoming	   in	   the	   Brahms	   language	   makes	   the	   detectable	   location-­‐independent,	  which	  was	  not	  desirable	  (see	  discussion	  of	  language	  limitations	  Section	  28.4).	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 As	  is	  typical	  in	  a	  Brahms	  model	  of	  work	  practice,	  Brahms–GÜM	  does	  not	  represent	  the	  design	  of	  the	  interface	  or	  the	  searching,	  reasoning,	  and	  time	  required	  to	  get	  data	  from	  the	  radar	  display.	  	  Such	  a	  simulation	  could	  be	  coupled	  to	  Brahms	  if	  that	  level	  of	  detail	  were	  deemed	  relevant	   to	  understanding	  and	  simulating	  the	  broader	  aspects	  of	   roles,	   facilities,	   and	   human-­‐systems	   interaction.	   In	   Brahms–GÜM	   the	   time	   is	  modeled	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  periodicity	  and	  duration	  range	  of	  activities	  that	  involve	  the	  radar	  display	  (Section	  9.7).	  
9.3 ATCO	  Intervention	  Instruction	  for	  Separation	  Infringement	  About	  11	  seconds	  after	  resolving	  the	  AEF	  landing	  situation	  (by	  advising	  the	  pilot	  to	  contact	  Friedrichshafen	  directly),	  ATCO	  has	  shifted	  to	  the	  other	  workstation	  and	  is	  urgently	   advising	   BTC	   to	   descend.	   ATCO	   might	   have	   seen	   the	   imminent	  infringement	   within	   the	   ARFA	   sector	   (right	   workstation)	   display,	   or	   more	   likely	  shifted	   his	   attention	   to	   monitoring	   the	   broader	   region	   on	   the	   left	   workstation’s	  radar	  display.	  	  The	  aircraft	  are	  visible	  on	  both	  displays	  at	  that	  time.	  	  Why	  the	  Zurich	  ATCO	  chose	  to	  instruct	  the	  BTC	  pilots	  and	  not	  DHL	  and	  why	  he	  told	  them	  to	  descend	  rather	  than	  to	  climb	  are	  not	  addressed	  in	  BFU	  Investigation	  Report.	  The	   choice	  might	  have	  been	  based	  on	  presence	  of	  other	   aircraft	   in	   the	   sector,	   the	  altitude	  (36,000	   ft),	   	   confidence	   in	   the	  BTC’s	   location,	  or	  a	  psychological	   “recency”	  effect	   from	   having	   last	   communicated	  with	   BTC	   flight	   (five	  minutes	   prior)	   rather	  than	  the	  DHL	  flight	  (eight	  minutes	  prior).	  	  Another	   likely	   cause	   of	  ATCOs	  decision	   is	   that	   the	   control	   strip	   for	   the	  BTC	   flight	  indicated	   a	   route	   that	   involved	   lowering	   to	   FL350	   after	   FL360	   (and	   hence	   the	  critique	   that	   this	   directive	   should	   have	   been	   issued	   at	   the	   time	   of	   the	   initial	  interaction	   with	   the	   BTC	   flight).	   	   In	   Brahms-­‐GÜM	   the	   ATCO	   intervenes	   with	   the	  aircraft	   at	   the	   higher	   latitude.	  Without	   relevant	   accident	   or	   general	   ethnographic	  data,	  we	  chose	  to	  model	  ATCO’s	  selection	  by	  a	  plausible	  heuristic,	  namely	  that	   the	  ATCO	  might	  have	  been	  reading	  the	  radar	  display	  from	  top	  to	  bottom,	  and	  hence	  saw	  the	  BTC	  which	  was	   further	   north	   first.	   	   The	   intervention	   instruction	   itself	   is	   then	  based	  on	  comparing	  the	  flight	  level	  for	  the	  “next	  route”	  to	  the	  “current	  route”	  on	  the	  control	  strip.	  	  If	  nextRoute.flightLevel	  <=	  route.flightLevel,	  ATCO	  advises	  the	  pilot	  to	  descend;	  otherwise	  he	  advises	  to	  climb.	  	  	  The	   following	   is	  one	  of	   several	   related	  workframes	   that	   are	  part	  of	   the	  activity	  of	  resolving	   a	   detected	   separation	   infringement.	   	   The	   action	   (“do”)	   effectively	  determines	   what	   the	   pilot	   will	   be	   told,	   communicates	   with	   the	   pilot	  (radioFlightInfo),	   simulates	   a	   “talk	   delay”	   of	   between	   2	   and	   4	   seconds	   and	   then	  continuing	  to	  monitor	  the	  planes.	  	  
workframe	  Request_Descend_Next_Flight_Level	  {	  
variables:	  
forone(FlightProgressStrip)	  strip;	  
	   forone(FlightPlan)	  plan;	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   forone(FlightSegment)	  route;	  
	   forone(FlightSegment)	  nextRoute;	  
	   forone(double)	  newFL;	  
	   forone(PilotGroup)	  pilot;	  
	   forone(AirTrafficControlRadio)	  radio;	  
when(	   knownval(current.commReason	  !=	  "flightLevel")	  and	  
	   knownval(route	  =	  flight.route)	  and	  	  	   //	  current	  flight	  segment	  or	  route	  
	   knownval(plan.flight	  =	  flight)	  and	  
	   knownval(current.location	  =	  strip.location)	  and	  
	   knownval(strip.flightPlan	  =	  plan)	  and	  
	   knownval(strip	  routes	  nextRoute)	  and	  
	   knownval(nextRoute	  !=	  route)	  and	  
	   knownval(nextRoute.flightLevel	  <	  route.flightLevel)	  and	  
	   knownval(newFL	  =	  route.flightLevel	  -­‐	  current.heightSeparation)	  and	  
	   knownval(pilot.flight	  =	  flight)	  and	  
	   knownval(radio	  =	  pilot.commMedium))	  
do	  {	  
	   conclude((route.flightLevel	  =	  newFL),	  fc:0);	  
	   conclude((current.flight	  =	  flight),	  fc:0);	  
	   conclude((current.commReceiver	  =	  pilot),	  fc:0);	  
	   conclude((current.commReason	  =	  "flightLevel"),	  fc:0);	  
	   conclude((current.commPerformative	  =	  "REQUEST"),	  fc:0);	  
	   radioFlightInfo(radio,	  flight,	  true);	  	   	   //	  give	  new	  route	  level	  
	   talkOnRadio(radio,	  2,	  4,	  true);	  
	   monitorPlanesInConflict(plane,	  flight);	  
}	  
}//wf	  Request_Descend_Next_Flight_Level	  	  The	   direction	   advice	   given	   by	   the	   Zurich	   ATCO	   at	   Überlingen	   is	   not	   related	   in	   an	  obvious	  way	   to	  which	   aircraft	   data	   is	  more	   accurate,	   given	   how	   the	   radar	   sweep	  shows	  the	   flights	  shifting	  on	  each	  rotation.	   If	   the	  BTC	  data	   is	  more	  current	  (which	  the	  ATCO	  might	  be	  assuming	  by	  instructing	  them	  to	  descend),	  then	  because	  DHL	  is	  about	   90	   degrees	   apart	   coming	   from	   the	   south,	   its	   data	   will	   be	   updated	   about	   4	  seconds	  later.	  But	  if	  this	  was	  the	  ATCO’s	  	  reasoning,	  he	  might	  also	  have	  questioned	  the	   accuracy	   of	   the	   DHL	   flight	   level	   displayed	   	   (FL360)	   and	   waited	   for	   it	   to	   be	  updated	  (see	  Section	  6.8.6	  for	  further	  discussion).	  
9.4 TCAS	  Alerts	  TCAS’s	  algorithm	  for	  generating	  advisories	  is	  based	  on	  the	  basic	  formula:	  	  	  	   Time	  =	  Distance	  /	  Speed	  	  	  Applied	  to	  two	  aircraft	  on	  an	  intersecting	  route:	  	   	  Time	  to	  Collision	  (TAU)	  =	  (current	  separation	  /closing	  velocity)	  x	  3600	  	  	  where	   TAU	   is	   in	   seconds,	   current	   separation	   is	   “slant	   range”	   in	   nm,	   and	   closing	  velocity	   of	   two	   planes	   is	   expressed	   as	   nm/hr.	   	   Slant	   range	   accounts	   for	   different	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aircraft	  orientations	   in	  3d	  space.	   	  TAU	  thus	  corresponds	  to	  the	  time	  until	  the	  closest	  
point	  of	  approach	  (CPA).	  	  To	  scope	   the	  simulation	  effort,	  we	  decided	   to	  model	  TCAS	  accurately	  only	   for	   two	  planes	   flying	   level	   at	   the	   same	   altitude	   (that	   is,	   in	   the	   same	   plane).	   The	   closing	  velocity	  is	  then	  given	  by	  the	  law	  of	  cosines:	  	  TAU	  =	  (current	  separation	  in	  nm	  /	  √	  (V1*2	  +	  V2*2	  -­‐	  2	  x	  V1	  x	  V2	  x	  cosine	  A))	  x	  3600	  	  where	  the	  units	  of	  V1	  and	  V2	  are	  nm/hr	  and	  A	  is	  the	  angle	  of	  intersection.	  	  Brahms-­‐GÜM	  uses	  TAU	  =	  48	  sec	  for	  TA	  alert	  and	  35	  sec	  for	  RA	  alert,	  the	  published	  values	  for	  cruise	  altitudes.	  	  Thus,	  Brahms-­‐GÜM	  will	  accurately	  model	  when	  TA	  and	  RA	  are	  given	  relative	  to	  the	  collision	  point	  (CPA)	  and	  closing	  velocity	  using	  the	  TAU	  calculation	  and	  thresholds.	   	  The	   locations	  (and	  hence	   lateral	  separation)	  and	  clock	  time	  will	  vary	  from	  Überlingen	  events	  because	  the	  simulated	  speeds	  of	  the	  aircraft	  are	  averages	  given	   in	  the	  BFU	  Report	  (actual	  speeds	  before	  TCAS	  TA	  occurred	  are	  unknown).	  The	  relative	  timing	  between	  TA	  and	  RA	  of	  13	  seconds	  in	  the	  simulations	  is	  the	  same	  as	  in	  the	  Überlingen	  sequence	  of	  events.	  	  	  	  In	   particular,	  with	   average	   cruise	   velocities	   using	   the	   formula	   above	  with	   A	   =	   92	  degrees,	   TAU	   =	   48	   sec	   at	   8.95	   nm	   lateral	   separation	   compared	   to	   9.94	   nm	   that	  occurred	  at	  Überlingen	  (modeled	  speed	  for	  DHL	  is	  470	  kt	  versus	  516	  kt	  	  actual	  and	  for	  the	  BTC	  463	  kt	  vs.	  499	  kt;	  BFU	  Report,	  p.	  72).	  The	  TCAS	  TA	  will	  therefore	  occur	  1	  nm	   closer	   than	   Überlingen,	   which	   is	   about	   8	   seconds,	   well	   within	   the	   expected	  accuracy	   of	   Brahms-­‐GÜM	   in	   replicating	   the	   Überlingen	   scenario.	  What	  matters	   is	  that	   the	   causal	   relations	   and	   relative	   timings	   are	   accurate	   (e.g.,	   when	   TCAS	   TA	  occurs	  relative	  to	  aircraft	  closing	  velocity).	  As	   in	  the	  real	  world,	  how	  much	  time	  is	  spent	  on	  AEF	  and	   the	  other	   flights	  will	  make	   the	  difference	   in	  whether	  ATCO	  acts	  before	  or	  after	  the	  TCAS	  TA,	  which	  is	  the	  crucial	  variable	  affecting	  the	  outcome.	  	  	  	  The	   simulated	  BTC	   and	  DHL	   flights	   are	   not	   exactly	   at	   same	   altitude,	   but	   can	   vary	  from	   FL360	   according	   to	   the	   initialization	   of	   the	   model	   (particular	   scenario	  definition).	   	   Consequently,	   the	   TCAS	   RA	   advice	   will	   vary	   in	   different	   scenarios,	  sometimes	  advising	  DHL	  to	  climb	  and	  BTC	  to	  descend.	  
9.5 Scenarios	  Without	  TCAS	  When	   reconfiguring	   the	   model	   for	   the	   different	   scenario	   configurations,	   we	  discovered	   that	   certain	   simplifications	   made	   some	   behaviors	   dependent	   on	   each	  other.	   In	   effect,	   reconfiguring	   the	  model	   for	  different	   scenarios	   tested	   the	  model’s	  generality	  and	  led	  to	  improving	  it.	  Most	  typically,	  a	  more	  principled	  representation	  was	   required	   to	   allow	   components	   and/or	   behaviors	   to	   be	   configured	  independently.	  	  For	   example,	   well	   into	   the	   modeling	   process	   we	   determined	   that	   from	   a	   certain	  perspective	  TCAS’s	  RA	   intervention	  was	  a	   cause	  of	   the	   collision—if	   the	  DHL	   flight	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had	  not	  been	  advised	  by	  TCAS	   to	  descend	  and	  continued	   to	   fly	  at	  FL360,	   then	   the	  Zurich	   ATCO’s	   instruction	   to	   the	   BTC	   to	   descend	   would	   likely	   have	   averted	   the	  collision.	  	  This	  hypothesis	  suggested	  that	  for	  testing	  the	  model	  we	  add	  the	  scenario	  of	  TCAS	  being	  absent	  (Section	  8.6).	  	  	  	  The	   existence	   of	   TCAS	   is	   modeled	   by	   an	   initial	   fact;	   for	   example	   object	  TCAS_BTC2937,	  an	  instance	  of	  the	  TrafficCollisionAvoidanceSystem	  class,	  has	  initial	  fact	  (current.inAircraft	   =	   Tupolev154_BTC2937).	   If	   this	   fact	   is	   omitted	   from	   a	  scenario	  configuration,	  then	  TCAS	  does	  not	  exist	  in	  that	  simulated	  aircraft.	  	  However,	   a	   difficulty	   arose	   because	   the	   calculations	   for	   determining	   whether	   a	  plane	   has	   collided	   with	   another	   plane	   are	   performed	   within	   the	   TCAS	   object;	  removing	  TCAS	  resulted	  in	  the	  simulated	  plane	  not	  “knowing”	  that	  it	  had	  collided,	  so	  it	  would	  keep	  flying	  its	  planned	  route.	  	  This	  design	  stems	  from	  a	  limitation	  in	  Brahms—objects	  cannot	  perform	  calculations	  when	  a	  “move”	  activity	  is	  occurring.	  In	  particular,	  an	  aircraft	  object	  cannot	  perform	  calculations	  while	   the	   aircraft	   is	   simulated	   as	   flying	   between	  waypoints,	  which	   is	  always	   the	   case	   during	   a	   flight.	   Thus,	   it	  was	   convenient	   to	   have	  TCAS,	  which	  was	  calculating	  and	  detecting	  separation,	  communicate	  the	  collision	  event	  to	  the	  aircraft	  (so	  that	  it	  could	  appropriately	  remove	  itself	  from	  the	  sky). 	  	  	  Therefore,	  to	  model	  the	  “TCAS	  doesn’t	  exist”	  scenario,	  we	  added	  a	  binary	  attribute	  TCAS.isBroadcastOn.	  When	  false,	  TCAS	  doesn’t	  sound	  alerts/advisories	  to	  pilots	  or	  sends	  information	  to	  Navigation	  Displays,	  which	  is	  equivalent	  to	  its	  absence	  in	  that	  scenario.	  (Having	  a	  redundant	  object	  perform	  the	  same	  calculation	  as	  TCAS	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  detecting	  a	  collision	  would	  be	  more	  elegant,	  but	  would	  only	  add	  to	  the	  modeling	  and	  testing	  required,	  without	  offering	  any	  benefit	  to	  the	  project.)	  
9.6 Aircraft	  Crew’s	  Interpretation	  of	  TCAS	  The	  BFU	  Report	  transcript	  clearly	  indicates	  that	  the	  BTC	  First	  Officer	  sitting	  at	  the	  left	  rear	  seat	  was	  attending	  to	  the	  TCAS	  display	  and	  understood	  the	  indication	  of	  an	  approaching	   aircraft	   on	   a	   potential	   collision	   path,	   as	   well	   as	   the	   meaning	   of	   the	  subsequent	  TA	  and	  RA:	  	   For	  the	  time	  between	  about	  21:33:00	  hrs	  and	  21:34:41	  hrs	  the	  CVR	  recorded	  crew	  discussions	  concerning	  an	  airplane	  approaching	  from	  the	   left	  which	  was	  displayed	  on	  the	  vertical	  speed	  indicator	  (VSI/TRA)	  which	  is	  part	  of	  the	  TCAS.	  All	  flight	  crew	  members	   with	   the	   exception	   of	   the	   flight	   engineer	   were	   involved	   in	   these	  discussions.	   These	   recordings	   suggest	   that	   the	   crew	   strived	   to	   localize	   the	   other	  airplane	  as	  to	  its	  position	  and	  its	  flight	  level.	  At	  21:34:36	  hrs,	  the	  commander	  stated:	  “Here	  it	  is	  in	  sight“,	  and	  two	  seconds	  later:	  “Look	  here,	  it	  indicates	  zero“.	  During	  the	  time	   from	   21:34:25	   hrs	   to	   21:34:55	   hrs,	   the	   airplane	   turned	   at	   a	   bank	   angle	   of	  approximately	  10°	  from	  a	  magnetic	  heading	  (MH)	  of	  254°	  to	  264°. 	  At	  21:34:42	  hrs,	  TCAS	  generated	  a	  TA	  (“traffic,	  traffic“).	  The	  CVR	  recorded	  that	  both	  the	  PIC	  and	  the	  copilot	  called	  out	  “traffic,	  traffic.“	  (BFU	  Report,	  p.	  8) 
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  In	  the	  absence	  of	  the	  intervention	  by	  the	  Zurich	  ATCO	  to	  descend,	  we	  do	  not	  know	  for	  sure	  what	  the	  BTC	  pilot	  (the	  commander)	  would	  have	  done.	  Given	  their	  probable	  detection	   of	   the	   DHL	   and	   turn	   prior	   to	   the	   TCAS	   TA—and	   keeping	   in	   mind	   the	  statistic	   that	  24%	  of	  pilots	  maneuvered	  opposite	   to	  TCAS	   instruction	   in	  one	  study	  (Kuchar	  and	  Drumm	  2007)—it	  is	  possible	  that	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  ATCO	  intervention	  the	  BTC	  crew	  would	  have	  used	   their	  own	   judgment	   in	  modifying	   their	  course	  and	  altitude,	  regardless	  of	  what	  TCAS	  instructed.	  	  Because	   the	   BFU	   Report	   associates	   pilots’	   properly	   following	   TCAS	   with	   their	  training	   experience,	   Brahms-­‐GÜM	   models	   pilots	   that	   follow	   TCAS	   and	   disregard	  ATCO	   instructions	   as	   being	  members	   of	   the	   group	   of	   pilots	   who	   were	   trained	   in	  TCAS	  (PilotTCASTrainedGroup).	  The	  combination	  of	  following	  or	  disregarding	  ATCO	  and	  TCAS	  leads	  a	  variety	  of	  behaviors	  that	  needed	  to	  be	  simulated.	  	  Table	  9-­‐1	  shows	  the	  possible	  cases	  that	  can	  occur	  in	  Brahms-­‐GÜM,	  where	  the	  events	  of	   interest	  are	  instructions	  from	  ATCO	  or	  TCAS,	  and	  “follows”	  means	  that	  the	  pilot	  executes	   the	   instruction.	   	   For	   example,	   if	   BTC	   does	   not	   follow	   TCAS,	   and	   ATCO	  speaks	   before	   RA	   occurs	   (3rd	   row),	   then	   the	   ATCO	   instruction	   is	   followed	   and	  subsequent	   RA	   is	   ignored.	   	   By	   this	   design,	   any	   pilot	   on	   any	   flight	   in	   the	   Brahms	  simulation	   can	   be	   modeled	   as	   following	   TCAS	   or	   not;	   these	   combinations	   define	  different	  scenarios	  that	  were	  tested	  when	  developing	  Brahms-­‐GÜM.	  	  
Table	  9-­‐1:	  Meaning	  of	  “BTC	  Pilot	  follows	  TCAS”	  (member	  of	  
PilotTCASTrainedGroup).	  
BTC	  Behavior	   First	  Event/Response	   Second	  Event/Response	  BTC	  follows	  TCAS	   ATCO/follows	   RA/follows,	  reversing	  if	  necessary	  RA/follows	   ATCO/ignores	  BTC	  does	  not	  follow	  TCAS	   ATCO/follows	   RA/ignores	  RA/ignores	   ATCO/follows	  
9.7 ATCO	  Workload	  and	  Interaction	  Durations	  ATCO’s	  priorities	  are	   simulated	  by	  workframe	  priorities:	   the	  activities	  of	  handling	  planes	   that	  are	   landing	  or	   imminently	   colliding	  have	   the	  highest	  priority,	   carrying	  out	  sector	  handoff	  and	  calls	  from	  pilots	  have	  intermediate	  priority,	  and	  monitoring	  the	   radar	   display	   has	   the	   lowest	   priority.	   	   On	   examining	   the	   ANSA	   transcript,	  we	  realized	   that	   omitting	   the	   other	   flights	   that	   were	   requiring	   handoff	   and	   making	  requests	  (omitted	  because	  of	  the	  limited	  modeling	  resources)	  resulted	  in	  ATCO	  have	  more	   time	   to	  monitor	  and	  hence	  detect	   the	  DHL	  and	  BTC	   flights	  at	   the	  S	  RE	  (left)	  workstation.	  	  	  We	   can	   see	   this	  workload	   clearly	   in	   the	  ANSA	   transcript	   (BFU	  Report,	   pp.	   60-­‐61)	  excerpt	  below.	  When	  the	  excerpt	  begins	  ATCO	  is	  at	  S	  RE	  (left	  workstation)	  working	  on	   phones	   for	   approximately	   30	   seconds.	   There	   is	   a	   cascade	   of	   interruptions,	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requiring	  ATCO	  to	  shift	  between	  the	  workstations	  four	  times	  in	  about	  2	  ½	  minutes,	  as	   he	   handles	   BTC,	   AEF,	   and	   two	   other	   flights	   (transcript	   lines	   begin	   <receiver>	  <station	  calling>	  <time>):	  
	  
AEF	  1135	  calls	  in,	  heard	  on	  right	  workstation,	  apparently	  having	  been	  approved	  by	  
Karlsruhe	  to	  begin	  descent	  to	  Friedrichshafen—	  
A RE 1135  21:30:07 “Zürich grüezi”, äh... AEF äh...1135, descending flight level 80 
BTC	  interrupts,	  heard	  on	  left	  workstation	  tuned	  to	  different	  frequency—	  
S RE 2937 :11  Zurich, good evening, BTC2937 
ATCO	  shifts	  to	  right	  workstation	  to	  put	  off	  the	  AEF	  call	  so	  he	  can	  handle	  BTC;	  AEF	  
flight	  has	  not	  yet	  appeared	  on	  the	  ARFA	  Sector	  (right)	  radar	  display—	  
1135 A RE :18  AEF1135, roger, äh... call you back 
ATCO	  didn’t	  hear	  BTC’s	  interruption;	  he	  shifts	  to	  left	  workstation	  and	  asks	  for	  repeat;	  
BTC	  reports	  back	  and	  they	  carry	  out	  handoff—	  
2937 S RE :26  station calling say again, please 
S RE 2937 :28  äh, Zurich, good evening, BTC2937, level 360 
ATCO	  approved	  DHL	  to	  FL360	  less	  than	  3	  minutes	  earlier;	  he	  either	  doesn’t	  realize	  BTC	  
is	  on	  potential	  collision	  path	  or	  decides	  to	  handle	  it	  later	  because	  AEF	  is	  waiting	  and	  
interrupts	  him—	  
2397 S RE :33  BTC2937, squawk äh.. 7520 
Speaking	  over	  ATCO	  on	  the	  frequency	  broadcast	  by	  the	  right	  workstation,	  AEF	  
interrupts;	  it	  still	  is	  not	  visible	  on	  the	  ARFA	  sector	  radar—	  
A RE 1135 :34  and AEF äh..1135 is inbound the final approach fix for ILS runway 
24 
ATCO	  shifts	  to	  right	  workstation	  and	  responds	  to	  AEF	  and	  defers	  the	  pilot	  a	  second	  
time—	  
1135 A RE :44  “ja” expect so, call you back shortly  
ATCO	  shifts	  back	  to	  left	  workstation	  to	  monitor	  larger	  airspace	  (possibly	  shortly	  before	  
AEF	  appears	  on	  ARFA	  radar	  at	  21:30:52);	  he	  handoffs	  two	  flights	  during	  the	  next	  
minute—	  
933 S RE 31:15  THA933, contact now Munich 132 decimal 140, good-bye 
S RE 933 :20 132 140, THA933, good-bye 
5621 S RE :26 MON5621, contact Reims 133 decimal 830, bye-bye 
S RE 5621 :32 133 830, MON5621 
After	  a	  pause,	  AEF	  calls	  in	  again	  on	  right	  workstation	  frequency	  requesting	  permission	  
to	  descend	  for	  the	  Friedrichshafen	  approach—	  
A RE 1135 :32:15 and AEF äh...1135, request lower 
ATCO	  shifts	  to	  right	  workstation	  and	  responds	  to	  AEF,	  which	  he	  can	  now	  see	  on	  radar	  
there—	  
1135 A RE :19 AEF1135, descend flight level 70 
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All	  of	  this	  is	  the	  prelude	  to	  the	  collision,	  with	  ATCO’s	  concern	  with	  the	  phones	  being	  down	   preventing	   	   a	   proper	   handoff	   to	   the	   Friedrichshafen	   tower	   throughout.	   	   In	  reviewing	   this	   period,	   we	   determined	   that	   excluding	   the	   other	   flights	   had	   a	  significant	   effect	   on	   the	   simulated	   ATCO’s	   workload,	   and	   thus	   this	   aspect	   of	   the	  Überlingen	   scenario	   (the	   arrival	   of	   other	   flights	   requiring	   attention)	   should	   be	  modeled	  more	  accurately.	  	  If	  we	  simply	  count	  up	  time	  handling	  other	  flights	  that	  appear	  in	  ANSA	  transcript	  in	  the	   period	   prior	   to	   BTC	   handover,	   we	   find	   that	   every	   minute	   he	   is	   handling	   an	  average	   of	   1.8	   flights	   requiring	   28	   sec/flight	   (including	   radar	   interpretation	  time).	  	  	  All	  of	  these	  conversations	  occur	  at	  the	  S	  RE	  Workstation	  (left).	  	  
Table	  9-­‐2:	  Durations	  of	  Communication	  Activities	  in	  ANSA	  Transcript	  
Total	  time	  period	  (sec)	   616	  
#	  flight	  conversations	  
Duration	  of	  conversations	  
18	  
497	  
Average	  time/flight	  (sec)	   28	  
Periodicity	  (flights/min)	   1.8	  
Touch	  time	  (sec)/minute	   48	  
 To	  accurately	  model	  the	  frequency	  and	  duration	  of	  these	  conversations,	  we	  added	  a	  workframe	   “Handling	  Other	   flights”	   that	   repeats	  every	  minute	  and	  has	  a	  primitive	  activity	  requiring	  48	  seconds	  every	  minute	  (48	  sec	  =	  1.8	  *	  28).	  	  Combined	  with	  DHL	  and	  BTC	  arrivals,	  this	  should	  fit	  the	  mostly	  non-­‐stop	  work	  that	  evident	  in	  the	  ANSA	  transcript.	   	  Priority	  of	   this	  WF	  lies	  between	  the	  high	  priority	  activities	  of	  handling	  aircraft	  separation/landing	  and	  the	  lower	  priority	  of	  scanning	  the	  radar	  display.	  	  In	   effect,	   this	   WF	   is	   a	   placeholder	   for	   the	   missing	   13	   flights	   in	   the	   scenario	  configuration.	   	  If	  we	   included	   these	   flights	   in	   the	  model,	   then	   the	   simulated	  ATCO	  would	   be	   busy	   handling	   them.	   	  Again,	   this	   simplification	   was	   part	   of	   the	   scoping	  decisions	  made	  for	  implementing	  the	  base	  model	  listed	  at	  the	  start	  of	  this	  chapter.	  	  To	  model	  the	  talking	  time	  and	  multiple	  back	  and	  forth	  remarks	  (e.g.,	  confirming	  an	  instruction)	   in	   the	   ATCO-­‐pilot	   conversations,	   duration	   for	   communicating	   a	   new	  flight	  level	  (relevant	  to	  AEF,	  BTC,	  DHL)	  was	  set	  to	  range	  between	  20	  to	  30	  seconds,	  in	   accord	   with	   the	   durations	   in	   the	   transcript.	   	   Other	   handoff	   interactions	   are	  modeled	  at	  15	  to	  20	  seconds	  including	  listening	  and	  talking	  time.	  	  	  Strikingly,	  ATCO	  asks	  AEF	  to	  call	  back	  twice,	  so	  he	  can	  process	  handoffs	  and	  aircraft	  calling	  in.	  	  Following	  the	  pattern	  we	  observe	  in	  the	  transcript,	  if	  the	  simulated	  ATCO	  can't	  see	  an	  aircraft	  calling	  in	  on	  the	  radar	  when	  he	  has	  other	  flights	  to	  handle,	  he	  asks	  the	  calling	  pilot	   to	  call	  back.	   	  A	  simulated	  pilot	   told	  to	  call	  back	  does	  so	   in	  30	  seconds.	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The	  simulated	  ATCO	  can	  hear	  calls	  broadcast	  from	  a	  radio	  monitor	  at	  a	  workstation	  other	  than	  where	  he	   is	  sitting.	   	  For	  example,	  when	  ATCO	  is	  at	   the	   left	  workstation	  and	  AEF	  calls	   in	  on	  radio	  broadcast	  by	  right	  workstation,	  he	  can	  hear	  the	  AEF	  call	  and	  moves	  to	  the	  right	  workstation	  to	  respond.	   	  However,	  unlike	  what	  occurred	  at	  Überlingen,	   the	  ATCO	  always	   comprehends	  what	   is	   being	   said	   on	   the	  other	   radio,	  and	  does	  not	  need	   to	   ask	   the	   caller	   to	   repeat	   the	   call,	   even	   though	  he	  might	  have	  been	   talking	   to	   someone	   else	   when	   the	   other	   call	   occurred.	   	   It	   would	   have	   been	  possible	  to	  simulate	  this	  more	  precisely,	  so	  ATCO	  would	  not	  receive	  communicated	  beliefs	   when	   communicating	   with	   someone	   else,	   but	   the	   effort	   was	   not	   deemed	  worthwhile.	  	  Finally,	   the	  attempts	   to	  make	  a	   call	   to	  Friedrichshafen	  are	  modeled	  at	  30	   seconds	  each,	   which	   is	   in	   addition	   to	   time	   spent	   interacting	   with	   the	   ATCC	   CA	   about	   the	  Friedrichshafen	  control	  tower’s	  phone	  number.	  	  As	   a	   side	   effect	   of	   having	   modeled	   as	   an	   aggregate	   “handle	   other	   tasks”	   activity	  rather	   than	   individually	   detected	   and	   handled	   flights,	   the	   ATCO	   is	   simulated	   as	  being	  busy	  doing	  this	  activity	  for	  48	  seconds	  as	  explained	  above,	  during	  which	  time	  he	  is	  not	  actually	  monitoring	  the	  radar	  display.	  	  In	  particular,	  he	  will	  not	  detect	  that	  any	  aircraft	  are	  closer	   than	  25	  nm.	  Simulation	  runs	  showed	  that	   the	  ATCO	  was	  so	  busy	  “handling	  other	  flights”	  he	  rarely	  noticed	  when	  BTC	  and	  DHL	  were	  in	  conflict	  at	   the	  same	   time.	  This	  problem	   illustrates	   indirectly	  why	  modeling	  all	  objects	  and	  processes	   that	   might	   interact	   is	   important	   and	   what	   happens	   when	   events	   and	  actions	  that	  might	  be	  modeled	  more	  properly	  as	  composite	  activities	  are	  aggregated	  into	  primitives	  such	  as	  “handling	  other	  flights.”	  	  	  The	  method	  for	  dealing	  with	  this	  aggregation	  problem	  in	  a	  Brahms	  model	  is	  to	  use	  the	   “detectable”	   construct	   to	   cause	   the	   “handling	   other	   flights”	   activity	   to	   be	  interrupted	  when	  aircraft	  are	  closer	   than	  25	  nm.	   	   In	  effect,	   to	   fix	  one	  shortcut,	  we	  needed	   to	   introduce	   another.	   In	   particular,	   in	   Brahms-­‐GÜM	  an	   aircraft	   separation	  fact	   is	   asserted	   as	   a	   property	   of	   the	   S	   RE	   workstation	   area	   when	   a	   TCAS	   TA	   is	  triggered.	   	  Therefore,	   if	  ATCO	  is	   in	   the	  S	  RE	  display	   location	  handling	  other	   flights	  (or	  in	  any	  activity	  for	  which	  this	  is	  a	  detectable),	  he	  detects	  the	  aircraft	  separation	  issue	  and	  acts	  upon	   it	   (radioing	  a	  pilot	   to	   climb	  or	  descend).	   If	  ATCO	   is	   the	  ARFA	  workstation	  area,	  he	  will	  not	  detect	  that	  the	  separation	  fact.	   	   In	  short,	  when	  ATCO	  works	  at	  S	  RE	  (left)	  workstation	  between	  time	  of	  TCAS	  TA	  and	  RA,	  he	  will	  detect	  the	  imminent	   collision,	   fitting	   the	   behavior	   of	   the	   Zurich	   ATCO	   during	   the	   events	   at	  Überlingen.	  Put	  another	  way,	  the	  model	   is	  based	  on	  the	  assumption	  and	  replicates	  the	  behavior	   that	  any	  ATCO	  working	  at	   the	  radar	  display	  would	  see	   the	   imminent	  collision	  when	  the	  planes	  are	  so	  close	  as	  to	  require	  a	  TCAS	  TA.	  	  
9.8 Summary	  of	  Design	  Principles	  for	  Modeling	  Simplifications	  To	  review,	  the	  initial	  “base	  model”	  (Section	  8.2)	  was	  conceived	  to	  simulate	  nominal	  configurations	   and	   behaviors,	   omitting	   all	   of	   the	   anomalies	   thought	   to	   have	  contributed	   to	   the	   Überlingen	   collision.	   	   The	   base	  model	   is	   a	   gross	   simplification	  that	  abstracts	  the	  actual	  structure	  and	  behaviors	  of	  aircraft,	  crew,	  automation,	  etc.	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considerable	  scoping	  of	  the	  base	  model	  with	  only	  one	  modeler.	  Thus	  the	  base	  model,	  as	   a	   first	   step	   in	   simulating	   complex	   scenarios,	   is	   itself	   a	   framework,	   a	   kind	   of	  simulation	   sketch,	   of	   the	   basic	   work	   system	   of	   pilots	   interacting	   with	   an	   aircraft	  subsystems	  and	  ATCOs	  interacting	  with	  ATCC	  subsystems.	  Aircraft	  are	  assumed	  to	  follow	  a	  strict	   flight	  plan	  with	  a	  constant	  cruise	  speed.	  Interactions	  between	  pilots	  and	   air	   traffic	   controllers	   are	   limited	   to	   handoffs	   and	   collision	   intervention.	   	   The	  simulated	  TCAS	  is	  precise	  only	  for	  aircraft	  flying	  at	  the	  same	  altitude.	  	  The	   modeling	   process	   was	   then	   conceived	   as	   incrementally	   adding	   to	   the	   base	  model	   to	  model	   absent	   subsystems	   and	   other	   variations	   from	   ideal	   behavior	   in	   a	  sequence	  of	  increasingly	  complex	  scenarios	  such	  that	  Überlingen	  work	  system	  could	  be	   simulated	   and	   the	   events	   related	   to	   the	   published	   transcript	   and	   analyses	  (Section	  8.5).	  	  In	   effect,	   the	   research	   shifted	   to	   verifying	   that	   the	   various	   components	   interacted	  properly	  by	  testing	  them	  in	  different	  configurations	  of	  the	  given	  model	  components	  (Section	   8.6).	   This	   scenario	   sequence	   was	   defined	   to	   verify	   that	   each	   aspect	   was	  modeled	   with	   sufficient	   fidelity	   and	   completeness	   to	   simulate	   the	   Überlingen	  collision—with	   of	   course	   the	   primary	   interest	   of	   revealing	   what	   might	   have	  occurred	   if	   different	  work	   system	  aspects	  were	  present	   or	  not	   (e.g.,	   if	   the	  phones	  worked	  properly).	   	   In	   this	   respect,	   each	   test	   (new	  scenario	  or	   simulation	   run	  of	   a	  scenario)	   constituted	   an	   experiment	   in	   using	   the	   Brahms	   simulation	   to	   test	   a	  hypothesis	   about	   the	   role	   of	   a	   factor	   in	   the	   collision.	   	   The	   following	   chapter	  describes	  the	  results	  of	  these	  experiments	  and	  how	  the	  model	  was	  further	  refined	  as	  interactions	  and	  timings	  became	  salient	  and	  suggested	  ways	  to	  improve	  the	  fidelity	  of	  the	  model	  to	  better	  simulate	  how	  ATCOs	  and	  pilots	  behaved.	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10 Results:	  Refinement	  and	  Analysis	  of	  the	  Generalized	  
Überlingen	  Model	  The	   previous	   chapters	   detailed	   how	   Brahms-­‐GÜM	   was	   simplified	   and	   refined	   to	  model	  the	  Überlingen	  work	  system	  configuration,	  focusing	  on	  broad	  work	  practices	  (e.g.,	   reading	  the	  radar	  display)	  and	  timings	  of	  activities	  (e.g.,	  duration	  of	  a	   typical	  ATCO-­‐pilot	  radio	  conversation).	  	  	  This	   chapter	   begins	   with	   an	   overview	   of	   how	   scenarios	   are	   configured,	   run,	   and	  documented	   (Section	   10.1)	   and	   details	   the	   analysis	   and	   refinement	   process	  following	  initial	  formulation	  of	  Brahms-­‐GÜM	  (Section	  10.2).	  	  In	  the	  context	  of	  this	  project,	  “results”	  relate	  to	  the	  initial	  question	  of	  suitability	  of	  the	   Brahms	   framework	   for	   modeling	   and	   simulating	   complex	   human-­‐automation	  systems.	  The	  main	  discussion	  therefore	  details	  the	  process	  of	  establishing	  Brahms’	  suitability	   through	   a	   sequence	   that	   demonstrates	   completeness,	   generality,	   and	  
accuracy	  of	  Brahms-­‐GÜM	  (Section	  10.3).	  	  	  We	   then	  demonstrate	  how	   the	  model	   is	  useful	   by	   refining	   it	   to	  answer	   interesting	  questions	  about	  key	  factors	  that,	  when	  timings	  are	  varied,	  can	  change	  the	  simulation	  outcome.	   In	   particular,	   we	   show	   (Section	   10.4)	   by	   defining	   scenario	   initial	  conditions	   and	   controlling	   probabilistic	   variability	   of	   event	   timings	   and	   durations	  one	  can	  establish	  bounds	  on	  when	  an	  unpredictable,	  non-­‐routine	  event	  can	  disrupt	  normal	  procedures	  and	  in	  this	  case	  lead	  to	  a	  separation	  infringement.	  	  The	   chapter	   ends	  with	   a	   summary	  of	   the	  pivotal	   events	   and	   configurations	   in	   the	  Überlingen	  scenario,	  as	  clarified	  by	  the	  simulation	  experiments	  (Section	  10.5).	  	  
10.1 Logging	  and	  Charting	  Simulation	  Outcomes	  As	   described,	   different	   scenarios	   are	   simulated	   by	   reconfiguring	   the	   initial	   facts,	  beliefs,	  and	  relations	  (“parameter	  settings”)	  of	  Brahms-­‐GÜM	  that	  define	  aspects	  of	  the	  work	  system	  contributing	  to	  the	  collision	  (Section	  8.6).	  	  Recall	  that	  Brahms-­‐GÜM	  without	   such	   reconfiguration	   is	   designed	   as	   a	   “normative”	   model	   in	   which	   both	  Zurich	  ATCOs	  are	  present	  and	  all	  subsystems	  are	  working	  properly.	   	   (However,	   in	  all	  the	  scenarios	  we	  have	  configured,	  the	  DHL	  and	  BTC	  flights	  are	  defined	  as	  having	  intersecting	  routes.)	  Generally,	   just	  a	  few	  behaviors	  and	  anomalies	  are	  modified	  to	  configure	   Brahms-­‐GÜM	   for	   each	   scenario;	   	   these	  were	   documented	  manually	   and	  stored	  with	  a	  copy	  of	  the	  edited	  model	  and	  log	  file	  of	  scenario	  events.	  Appendix	  	  24	  indicates	  the	  actual	  model	  revisions	  that	  define	  the	  scenarios.	  	  Key	  events	  that	  occur	  during	  the	  simulation	  are	  logged	  chronologically	  in	  a	  file	  that	  constitutes	   a	   readable	   trace	   of	   the	   interactions	   among	   the	   ATCO,	   pilots,	   and	  automated	   systems.	   	  The	   log	   is	   defined	   by	   “print”	   actions	   in	   workframes	   (see	  annotated	  example	  Appendix	  26).	  	  Logged	  events	  include:	  	  
• ATCO-­‐pilot	  interaction	  regarding	  handoffs,	  route	  changes,	  including	  flight	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levels	  and	  instruction	  
• Flight	  strip	  activities	  (printing,	  moving,	  reading)	  
• Separation	  violation	  events	  detected	  by	  TCAS,	  including	  TAU	  value;	  TCAS	  actions;	  collision	  or	  resolution	  events	  
• Radar	  display	  monitoring	  activity	  and	  flight	  information	  read	  
• Separation	  violation	  detected	  by	  ATCO	  when	  monitoring	  radar,	  including	  flights	  
• STCA	  optical	  or	  aural	  alerts,	  including	  separation	  detected	  
• Agent	  movements	  (e.g.,	  ATCO	  shifting	  between	  workstations)	  
• Aircraft	  movements,	  including	  departure,	  entering	  and	  exiting	  sectors,	  waypoint	  arrival,	  landing,	  collision	  
• Aircraft	  control	  changes	  (e.g.,	  autopilot	  disengaged)	  
• Radio	  frequency	  tuning	  and	  calls,	  including	  communicated	  beliefs	  
• Phone	  calls	  that	  fail	  to	  complete	  	  A	   spreadsheet	   was	   then	   created	   to	   compare	   the	   multiple	   runs	   of	   the	   Überlingen	  scenario	  by	  transcribing	  data	  from	  the	  chronological	  logs.	  	  This	  data	  includes:	  	  
• Simulation	  Run	  Number	  
• Whether	  a	  collision	  was	  avoided	  
• Brief	  explanation	  of	  events	   	  
• Times	  when	  the	  following	  occurred:	  
o BTC	  Handover	  to	  Zurich	  
o ATCO	  Advises	  BTC;	  Second	  intervention	  (if	  any)	  
o TCAS	  TA,	  RA,	  Second	  RA	  (if	  any)	  
o DHL	  &	  BTC	  Auto-­‐Pilot	  Off	  
o AEF	  calls	  ZATC	  first	  time	   	  
o ATCO	  informs	  AEF	  to	  call	  EDNY	  tower	  
o DHL	  &	  BTC	  Cross	  Paths	  
• Intervention	  Advice	  Sense	  (Climb/Descend)	  
o TCAS	  RA	  
o ATCO	  
• TCAS	  TA	  &	  RA	  Range	  Separation	  (nm)	  and	  Vertical	  Separation	  (ft)	  
• Which	  flight	  ATCO	  advises	  to	  avoid	  separation	  violation	  
• ATCO	  intervenes	  Before/	  During/	  After	  TCAS	  TA?	  	  The	   model	   is	   also	   instrumented	   to	   record	   in	   the	   file	   the	   BTC	   and	   DHL	   aircraft	  altitudes	   from	   the	   time	   of	   the	   TCAS	   RA	   to	   when	   their	   paths	   cross	   to	   facilitate	  graphing	  their	  trajectories	  and	  thus	  making	  visible	  whether	  the	  aircraft	  converge	  or	  diverge.	   Another	   key	   chart	   shows	   for	   each	   run	   relates	   1)	   when	   the	   AEF	   flight	  contacted	   ACTO,	   2)	   when	   ATCO	   notices	   the	   separation	   infringement,	   and	   3)	   the	  occurrences	  of	   the	  TCAS	  TA	  and	  RA.	  As	   the	  analysis	  proceeded,	   this	   chart	  became	  the	   reference	   point	   for	   critiquing	   and	   comparing	   the	   simulation	   runs,	   facilitating	  detection	  of	  patterns	  such	  as	  implausible	  timings	  and	  missing	  outcomes.	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10.2 Summary	  of	  Analysis	  and	  Refinement	  Process	  To	  review,	   the	  process	  of	  experimenting	  with	  scenarios	  and	  refining	  Brahms-­‐GÜM	  proceeded	  by	  creating	  Brahms-­‐GÜM	  incrementally,	  adding	  aspects	  of	  the	  ATS	  work	  system	   relevant	   to	   the	   Überlingen	   accident.	   We	   then	   tested	   the	   model	   on	   ten	  scenarios	   (Table	   8-­‐1)	   each	   of	  which	   “added	  back”	   one	  putative	   causal	   factor	   (e.g.,	  what	  if	  the	  phones	  were	  working?).	  	  	  At	  this	  point,	  we	  then	  added	  the	  scenario	  in	  which	  TCAS	  is	  disabled,	  producing	  the	  	  outcomes	  summarized	  in	  Table	  10-­‐1.	  	  	  Moving	   now	   from	   the	   sequence	   of	   building	   the	   model	   to	   experimenting	   with	  reconfigurations,	   we	   reformulated	   the	   analysis	   by	   defining	   the	   space	   of	   48	  configurations/scenarios	   implicitly	  defined	  by	  all	   combinations	  of	   “primary	   causal	  factors”	   that	   the	   model	   design	   allows	   to	   be	   varied	   by	   editing	   initial	   facts	   and	  beliefs.36	  	  We	  decided	  not	   to	   run	   the	  other	  38	  valid	  combinations,	  pending	   further	  analysis	   of	   the	   “Überlingen	   scenario”	   (Scenario	   1F),	   that	   is,	   in	   which	   the	   work	  system	   is	   configured	   as	   it	   was	   at	   the	   time	   of	   the	   accident.	   In	   fact,	   analyzing	   and	  improving	   Brahms-­‐GÜM	   by	   repeatedly	   running	   the	   Überlingen	   scenario	   then	  occupied	  the	  remainder	  of	  the	  research	  effort	  presented	  in	  this	  report.	  In	  effect,	  we	  shifted	   from	   studying	   variation	   in	   outcomes	   caused	   by	   reconfiguring	   the	   work	  system	   (different	   scenarios)	   to	   studying	   variation	   in	   outcomes	   caused	   by	  probabilistic	  events	  in	  a	  single	  scenario.	  	  	  Put	   another	   way,	   we	   realized	   that	   there	   was	   no	   point	   in	   experimenting	   with	  scenario	   variations	   until	   we	   had	   verified	   and	   validated	   the	   Überlingen	   scenario	  itself,	   for	   which	   we	   had	   substantial	   quantitative	   data.	   	   Correspondingly,	   our	  modeling	  focus	  shifted	  from	  questions	  like	  “what	  if	  the	  phones	  had	  been	  working?”	  (which	   predictably	   prevented	   the	   collision	   from	   occurring)	   to	   the	   more	   general	  question,	  “Are	  the	  range	  of	  timings	  of	  ATCO	  actions	  and	  aircraft	  location/velocities	  generated	  by	  the	  simulation	  in	  accord	  with	  the	  events	  at	  Überlingen?”	  	  In	  effect	  we	  were	   moving	   from	   modeling	   timings	   and	   frequencies	   of	   individual	   behaviors	  (Chapter	  9)	   to	  verifying	  emergent	  durations	  and	  relations	  of	  events	   (e.g.,	  duration	  between	  BTC	  arriving	  in	  sector	  and	  ATCO	  advising	  pilots	  to	  descend).	  	  Focusing	  on	  verifying	  timings	  between	  different	  events,	  resulting	  from	  interactions	  of	  aircraft	   arrivals,	  ATCO,	  pilots,	   and	  TCAS,	   led	   	  us	   to	   shift	   from	   the	   final	  outcome	  (whether	  a	  collision	  occurs)	  to	  the	  detection	  of	  the	  impending	  separation	  violation	  and	  what	   timings	  of	  prior	  events	  most	  critically	  affected	  detection	  (e.g.,	  when	  AEF	  calls	  Zurich	  ATCC).	  In	  grasping	  this	  overall	  picture,	  we	  were	  better	  able	  to	  say	  what	  aspects	  of	  the	  work	  system	  should	  be	  emphasized	  to	  avoid	  a	  separation	  violation.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  36	  Referring	   to	   Table	   10-­‐1,	   six	   binary	   factors	   yields	   26	  =	   64	   combinations,	   but	   “BTC	   pilots	   follow	  TCAS”	   is	   not	  meaningful	   if	   TCAS	   is	   disabled,	  which	   gives	  48	   valid	   combinations	  plus	   the	  null	   case,	  which	   omits	   the	   ATCOs	   and	   TCAS	   (first	   row	   of	   Table	   10-­‐1).	   Of	   course,	   other	   combinations	   are	  possible	  using	  Brahms-­‐GÜM	  such	  as	   “DHL	  pilots	  don’t	   follow	  TCAS”	  and	  an	   infinity	  of	   flight	   routes	  and	  schedules.	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0)	  Null	   YES—no	  ATC	  or	  TCAS	  intervention;	  proves	  flight	  paths	  are	  on	  collision	  course	  and	  timing	  leads	  to	  intersection	  near	  Überlingen	  
0	   N	   —	   —	   —	   —	  
2A37)	  Normal	  	   NO—ATCO	  observes	  in	  radar	  	  “loss	  of	  separation”	  between	  DHL	  and	  BTC	  before	  a	  TCAS	  TA	  is	  triggered	   2	   Y	   Y	   Y	   Y	   Y	  
2B)	  Normal	  w/o	  
Phones	  
NO—Zurich	  ATCO	  advices	  BTC	  to	  descend	  early	  enough	  to	  avoid	  collision.	   2	   Y	   Y	   Y	   Y	   N38	  
2C)	  Phones	  out	  &	  
Radar	  degraded,	  
but	  TCAS	  rules	  
NO—BTC	  advised	  in	  time	  so	  TCAS	  not	  activated	   2	   Y	   Y39	   N	   Y	   N	  
2D)	  …	  but	  Zurich	  
ATCO	  rules	  
NO—BTC	  is	  advised	  early	  enough.	   2	   Y	   N	   N	   Y	   N	  
1A)	  Normal-­‐
SMOP	  
NO—Zurich	  ATCO	  advises	  BTC;	  TCAS	  announces	  “Traffic!	  Traffic!”	  but	  RA	  not	  activated	   1	   Y	   Y	   Y	   Y	   Y	  
1B)	  SMOP	  w/o	  
Phones	  
NO—STCA	  alert	  compensates	  for	  distraction	  of	  AEF	  &	  phone	  not	  working.	   1	   Y	   Y	   Y	   Y	   N	  
1C)	  SMOP	  w/o	  
Radar	  
NO—BTC	  pilot	  already	  started	  following	  TCAS	  advisory	  before	  Zurich	  ATCO	  gives	  descent	  instructions.	   1	   Y	   Y	   N	   Y	   Y	  
1D)	  Actual,	  but	  
TCAS	  Followed	  
NO—BTC	  pilot	  already	  started	  following	  TCAS	  advisory	  before	  Zurich	  ATCO	  gives	  descent	  instructions.	   1	   Y	   Y	   N	   Y	   N	  
1E)	  Actual,	  but	  
TCAS	  not	  
enabled40	  
YES—Zurich	  ATCO	  advises	  BTC	  pilot	  to	  descend	  too	  late	  while	  DHL	  remains	  on	  course.	   1	   N	   —	   N	   Y	   N	  
1F)	  Überlingen	   Depends	  on	  when	  Zurich	  ATCO	  intervenes	  relative	  to	  TCAS	   1	   Y	   N	   N	   Y	   N	  Correspondingly,	   we	   recognized	  more	   clearly	   what	   actions	   and	   timings	   were	   not	  significant	  and	  could	  be	   fixed	   in	   the	  model,	  similar	   to	   the	  original	  decision	  to	  only	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  37 	  Numbering	   indicates	   number	   of	   air	   traffic	   controllers	   in	   Zurich;	   analysis	   ignores	   potential	  Karlsruhe	  contribution.	  38	  When	  phones	  don’t	  operate,	  ATCO	  asks	  for	  assistance	  39	  BTC	  following	  TCAS	  implies	  will	  ignore	  ATCO	  if	  TCAS	  advises	  first	  or	  will	  reverse	  course	  if	  Zurich	  ATCO	  advises	  first	  40	  Überlingen	  situation	  without	  TCAS.	  	  Note:	  When	  BTC	  continues	  flight	  (ignores	  or	  does	  not	  receive	  advice	   from	  Zurich	  ATCO	  or	  TCAS)	  but	  DHL	  reacts	   to	  RA	  and	  descends	  at	   slow	  rate	  of	  20	   feet/sec	  instead	  of	  30	  ft/s,	  collision	  occurs.	  In	  different	  runs	  of	  1F,	  there	  is	  no	  RA	  so	  DHL	  remains	  on	  course	  while	  Zurich	  ATCO	  tells	  BTC	  to	  descend,	  which	  avoids	  collision.	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experiment	   with	   scenarios	   in	   which	   DHL	   and	   BTC	  were	   on	   a	   collision	   course.	   In	  particular,	  we	  recognized	  that	  the	  pilots’	  manual	  control	  of	  the	  aircraft	  to	  avoid	  the	  collision	  (after	  being	  alerted	  by	  TCAS	  or	  the	  ATCO)	  was	  not	  the	  focus	  of	  our	  study	  and	  could	  simplified	  by	  making	  this	  behavior	  deterministic.	  In	  this	  respect,	  we	  were	  segmenting	   the	   simulation,	   separating	   all	   events	   that	   occurred	  prior	   to	   the	   pilot’s	  detection	  of	  the	  separation	  violation	  from	  those	  that	  occurred	  after.	  	  Subsequent	   sections	   describe	   this	   refinement	   process	   chronologically,	   detailing	  some	  of	   the	   particular	   observations	   in	   simulations	   runs	   and	   changes	  made	   to	   the	  model.	  
10.3 First	  Phase:	  Verifying	  and	  Refining	  Probabilistic	  Interactions	  	  After	  initial	  conversations	  about	  Brahms-­‐GÜM	  with	  research	  colleagues	  focusing	  on	  model	   checking,	   we	   realized	   that	   variability	   inherent	   in	   different	   runs	   of	   a	   given	  scenario	   (caused	   by	   probabilistic	   durations	   of	   primitive	   activities;	   Appendix	   27)	  must	   be	   documented	   and	   understood.	   Our	   experiments	   with	   different	   scenarios	  (Table	  10-­‐1)	  established	  that	  Brahms-­‐GÜM	  could	  in	  principle	  be	  reconfigured	  as	  we	  intended—that	   is,	   the	   different	   components	   interacted	   without	   error	   producing	  plausible	  outcomes.	  	  But	  we	  could	  not	  trust	  or	  interpret	  the	  results	  further	  without	  understanding	  why	  a	  collision	  is	  avoided	  or	  not	   in	  the	  simulation	  runs,	   that	   is,	  did	  the	   interactions	   and	   timings	   make	   sense	   or	   were	   spurious	   events	   occurring	   that	  affected	  the	  outcome?	  	  We	   then	   began	   a	   more	   systematic	   process	   of	   verifying	   and	   validating	   the	   model	  relative	   by	   comparing	   outcomes	   to	   the	   events	   recorded	   in	   the	   BFU	   Report.	  	  Accordingly,	  we	  generated	  one	  hundred	  simulation	  runs	  of	  the	  Überlingen	  scenario	  (1F)	  and	  discovered	  that	  nineteen	  resulted	  in	  a	  collision.	  	  Again,	  in	  these	  simulation	  runs,	  the	  model,	  including	  all	  initial	  conditions	  defining	  the	  scenario,	  are	  held	  fixed;	  the	   variations	   are	   caused	   by	   probabilistic	   durations	   of	   primitive	   activities	   (other	  probabilistic	   features	  are	  possible,	   including	   	  particularly	  uncertainty	  of	  an	  action,	  but	   are	   not	   used	   in	   Brahms-­‐GÜM).	   In	   some	   of	   these	   runs	   no	   collision	   will	   occur	  because	  of	  variances	  in	  departure	  or	  cruise	  flight	  times	  (i.e.,	  the	  aircraft	  arrive	  at	  the	  crossing	  point	  of	  their	  routes	  at	  different	  times).	  	  We	  analyzed	  the	   first	   ten	  runs	  of	   the	  one	  hundred	   in	  which	  the	  aircraft	  were	  on	  a	  collision	   course,	   focusing	   on	   the	   interactions	   of	   the	   independently	   operating	  processes	   (radar,	   TCAS,	   ATCO).	   We	   determined	   that	   whether	   or	   not	   a	   collision	  occurred	  was	  particularly	  dependent	  on	  the	  timing	  of	  ATCO’s	  intervention	  with	  the	  BTC	   flight	   relative	   to	   the	  TCAS	   intervention	  with	  DHL.	  Furthermore,	   the	   timing	  of	  the	   late-­‐arriving	   AEF	   flight	   determined	   when	   and	   whether	   ATCO	   noticed	   the	  separation	   violation.	   In	   particular	   in	   the	   ten	   simulation	   runs	   of	   the	   Überlingen	  scenario	   at	   hand,	  we	   observed	   two	  of	   the	   three	   possible	   times	  when	  ATCO	  might	  intervene:	  	  	  
• Before	  TA—No	   collision	   occurs:	  ATCO	   intervention	   before	  TA	   results	   in	  TA	  not	  occurring	  or	  subsequent	  RA	  takes	  BTC’s	  descent	  into	  account	  and	  advises	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DHL	   to	   climb;	   however,	   if	   ATCO	   intervention	   is	   shortly	   before	   TA,	   altitude	  change	  might	  not	  be	  sufficient	  yet	  to	  be	  taken	  into	  account	  by	  TCAS,	  but	  it	  is	  sufficient	  to	  avoid	  collision.	  
• After	   RA—If	   ATCO	   intervention	   occurs	   sufficiently	   after	   RA,	   no	   collision	  occurs	  because	  BTC	  pilots	  ignore	  TCAS	  RA,	  and	  DHL	  has	  already	  descended	  sufficiently	  so	  although	  both	  aircraft	  are	  descending,	   they	  cross	  at	  different	  altitudes.	  	  Only	  the	  Überlingen	  case	  itself	  (ATCO	  intervention	  between	  TA	  and	  RA)	  is	  missing	  from	  these	  ten,	  which	  is	  not	  too	  surprising	  because	  the	  period	  between	  the	  TA	  and	  RA	  is	  only	  about	  13	  seconds	  with	  the	  given	  aircraft	  trajectories	  and	  velocities.	  	  Several	   of	   the	   timings	   in	   the	   ten	   analyzed	   simulation	   runs	   were	   suspect.	   For	  example,	   when	   BTC	   flew	   level	   and	   DHL	   was	   advised	   to	   descend,	   how	   could	   a	  collision	  occur	  18	  seconds	  later?	  	  This	  prompted	  more	  detailed	  analysis	  comparing	  the	   simulation	   logs	   to	   the	   BFU	   Report	   details	   and	   ANSA	   transcript.	   We	   analyzed	  outcomes	  with	  respect	  to	  when	  ATCO	  intervenes,	  why	  and	  why	  not,	  and	  especially	  the	  sensitivity	  of	  the	  timing	  of	  intervention	  between	  the	  TCAS	  TA	  and	  RA	  relative	  to	  a	  collision	  occurring.	  	  	  We	  discovered	  validity	  shortcomings	  in	  the	  model	  with	  respect	  to	  duration	  of	  events	  and	  behaviors	  involving	  TCAS	  alerts,	  ATCO-­‐pilot	  conversations,	  radar	  display	  of	  the	  ARFA	   sector,	   and	   ATCO’s	   attempted	   phone	   calls	   and	   sensitivity	   to	   potential	  separation	   infringement.	   	   Often	  we	   needed	   to	   change	   both	   how	   a	   subsystem	  was	  modeled	  (e.g.,	  the	  radar	  display)	  and	  how	  ATCO	  interacted	  with	  it	  (including	  activity	  of	  monitoring,	   perception	   of	   information,	   and	   reaction	   to	   information).	   The	  main	  factors	  we	  discovered:	  	  
• ATCO	   too	   sensitive	   to	   separation:	   The	   simulated	   ATCO	   was	   detecting	  separation	  violation	  when	  the	  actual	  Zurich	  ATCO	  should	  have,	  at	  the	  time	  of	  BTC	   handover,	   well	   before	   TCAS	   TA,	   and	   about	   two	   minutes	   before	   the	  intervention	  actually	  occurred	  at	  Überlingen.	  Analysis	  surfaced	  minor	  issues	  in	   the	   model	   of	   the	   ARFA	   sector	   shape	   and	   coordinates	   (Section	   9.1).	   But	  more	   importantly,	   the	   simulated	   ATCO’s	   separation	   threshold	   for	  intervening,	   which	   becomes	   pivotal	   when	   the	   STCA	   optical	   alert	   is	   not	  functioning,	  was	  far	  too	  conservative	  relative	  to	  the	  Zurich	  ATCO’s	  testimony	  (detailed	  in	  Section	  9.2).	  In	  particular,	  the	  Zurich	  ATCO	  testified	  that	  certain	  observed	   distances	   were	   too	   large	   to	   merit	   action	   at	   that	   time	   (relative	  perhaps	  to	  priority	  of	  other	  tasks).	  
• ATCO	  not	  observant	  enough.	  The	  converse	  of	  ATCO	  intervening	  too	  soon	  was	  not	  noticing	  the	  aircraft	  on	  the	  radar	  display	  when	  they	  were	  already	  10	  nm	  or	   less	  apart	   (i.e.,	  between	   the	  TCAS	  TA	  and	  RA).	   In	   this	  version	  ATCO	  was	  too	  busy	  handling	   the	   other	   flights.	   Given	   that	   he	  was	   looking	   at	   the	   radar	  display	  during	  this	  activity,	  he	  might	  have	  noticed	  the	  separation	  problem,	  so	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we	   included	   this	   as	   a	   “detectable”	   for	   the	   workframes	   that	   involved	  monitoring	  the	  display.	  Again,	  we	  use	  a	  detectable	  to	  simulate	  perception.	  In	  effect,	  visual	  relation	  of	  an	   impending	   collision	   is	   generated	   as	   a	   Brahms	   “fact”	   by	   the	  TCAS	  model	  (essentially	   “a	   separation	  problem	  exists	  with	  aircraft	  X	  and	  Y”).	  The	  ATCO	  detects	   this	   fact	   when	   he	   is	   located	  	   at	   and	   reading	   information	  (“communicating	  with”)	  a	  radar	  display	  after	  the	  TCAS	  TA	  occurs.41	  	  
• TCAS	   model	   too	   coarse:	   The	   initial	   TCAS	   model,	   only	   intended	   as	   a	  placeholder	   for	   purposes	   of	   the	  base	  model,	   as	   not	   sufficiently	   accurate.	   In	  particular,	   the	   simplified	   TCAS	   model	   caused	   the	   TA	   to	   be	   given	   with	   a	  separation	   distance	   of	   2.4	   nm	   greater	   (about	   15	   sec	   earlier)	   than	   what	  occurred	   at	   Überlingen.	   We	   determined	   that	   the	   TAU	   must	   be	   calculated	  accurately	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  intersection	  angle	  of	  the	  aircraft.	  Comparisons	  to	  Überlingen	  were	  complicated	  because	  the	  speed	  of	  the	  planes	  varies	  and	  the	  simulation	  is	  based	  on	  averages	  (detailed	  in	  Section	  9.4).	  
• ATCO	   tasks	   and	   timings	   inaccurate:	   The	   activity	   durations	   for	   attempting	  phone	   calls	   (to	   Friedrichshafen)	   and	   routine	   ATCO-­‐pilot	   radio	   calls	   were	  much	   too	   short	   compared	   to	   averages	   in	   the	   Überlingen	   transcript	   (2	   -­‐	   4	  seconds	   instead	   of	   20	   –	   30	   seconds).	   Similarly,	   Zurich	   ATCO’s	   activity	   of	  handling	  other	  planes	  takes	  so	  much	  time	  this	  workload	  must	  be	  modeled	  as	  well	  (detailed	  in	  Section	  9.7).	  	  Notice	  that	  this	  analysis	  concerns	  verifying	  the	  accuracy	  of	  the	  model	  relative	  to	  the	  specific	  work	  practice	  of	  the	  Zurich	  ATCO	  (e.g.,	   the	   intervention	  threshold)	  as	  well	  what	  we	  assume	  to	  be	  widely	  shared,	  routine	  practices	  (e.g.,	  replicating	  the	  duration	  of	  ATCO’s	  activities).	  This	  mixing	  of	  arguably	  non-­‐optimal	  and	  acceptable/expected	  behaviors	   is	   characteristic	   of	   a	   work	   practice	   simulation.	   The	   modeling	   effort	  straddles	  between	  replicating	  a	  particular	  work	  and	  style	  of	  interactions	  occurring	  at	   Überlingen—a	   matter	   of	   verifying	   by	   comparing	   the	   simulation	   to	   a	   given	  design—and	   modeling	   the	   general,	   regulated	   practices	   applicable	   in	   other	  situations—a	   matter	   of	   validating	   by	   comparing	   the	   simulation	   to	   generalizable	  patterns.	   In	   contrast,	   a	   typical	   process	   model	   would	   model	   agents	   as	   following	  regulations	  and	  official	  procedures.	  Brahms-­‐GÜM	  could	  be	  used	   in	   that	  manner	   to	  test	  normative	  behaviors,	  but	  as	  the	  present	  project	  illustrates,	  what	  is	  especially	  of	  interest	   for	   understanding	   resilience	   of	   a	   work	   system	   is	   what	   happens	   when	  procedures	  are	  not	  followed	  and/or	  systems	  are	  not	  operating	  properly.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  41	  This	  is	  an	  example	  of	  how	  behaviors	  can	  be	  “programmed”	  in	  Brahms	  when	  details	  are	  unknown	  or	  unimportant	  relative	  to	  the	  objective	  of	  the	  modeling	  effort.	  We	  have	  TCAS	  assert	  the	  “visual	  fact”	  simply	   for	  modeling	   efficiency;	   one	   could	   just	   as	  well	   have	   the	   radar	   display	  make	   the	   calculation	  (and	   consequently	   simulate	   other	   kinds	   of	   visual	   facts	   that	   ATCO	   could	   detect	   relative	   to	   aircraft	  locations	  and	  trajectories).	  The	  detectable	  could	  also	  be	  probabilistic	  (say	  50%	  certainty	  of	  noticing)	  to	  simulate	  different	  degrees	  of	  attention.	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In	   summary,	   to	   this	   point	   the	   model	   building	   process	   involved	   what	   are	   in	  retrospect	   standard	   modeling	   stages	   of	   scoping	   the	   model,	   creating	   a	   complete	  simulation,	  verifying	  for	  accuracy,	  and	  generalizing	  the	  model:	  	  
• Analyze	  Work	  Setting	  and	  Scope	  Model:	  	  
o Analyze	   documents	   to	   determine	   causal	   factors	   of	   Überlingen	  accident;	   determine	   the	  model	   components	   (e.g.,	   radar	   display)	   and	  players	   (e.g.,	   CA)	   required	   to	   simulate	   these	   events,	   building	   on	   the	  Brahms-­‐WMC	  model.	  
• Develop	  Complete	  Model:	  	  
o Develop	   a	   general	   model	   relative	   to	   the	   Überlingen	   work	   system	  (Brahms-­‐GÜM),	   defined	   in	   terms	   of	   a	   sequence	   of	   configurations	  (scenarios)	  in	  which	  each	  of	  the	  key	  components	  can	  be	  configured	  as	  dysfunctional/absent	   or	   functioning	   normally	   (e.g.,	   STCA	   Optical	  alert).	  	  
• Test	  Generality	  	  
o Run	   and	   analyze	   ten	   scenarios	   (Table	   8-­‐1	   and	   Table	   10-­‐1)	   that	  combine	   anomalous	   behaviors	   and	   events	   in	   simple	   ways.	   Confirm	  that	   the	   model	   produces	   meaningful	   chronology	   of	   behaviors	   and	  outcomes	  for	  each	  scenario	  (e.g.,	  the	  aircraft	  fly	  their	  planned	  routes,	  handoffs	  occur,	  TCAS	  operates,	  ATCO	  monitors	  radar).	  These	   variations	   establish	   generality	   of	   the	   model’s	   logic;	   that	   is,	  coordination	   of	   work	   flow	   occurs	   (e.g.,	   every	   arriving	   flight	   is	  announced	   and	  handoff	   occurs),	   regardless	   of	   the	  particular	   state	   of	  objects	   and	   agents	   and	   timing	   or	   sequencing	   of	   events.	   Put	   another	  way,	  objects	  and	  agents	  act	  “autonomously”	  to	  carry	  out	  their	  work	  in	  any	  simulated	  context.42	  
• Test	  Accuracy:	  	  
o Verify	   and	   validate	   the	   simulation	   outcomes	   with	   respect	   to	  interactions	   occurring	   among	   ATCO-­‐TCAS-­‐Pilots	   as	   measured	   by	  separation	   and	   timing	   documented	   in	   BFU	   Report	   and	   ANSA	  Transcript.	  
o Simulate	   the	   Überlingen	   scenario	   (termed	   “1F”)	   100	   times	   to	  determine	  timing	  and	  causal	  sensitivity	  of	  probabilistic	  interactions.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  42	  Note	  that	  some	  scheduled	  activities	  are	  configurable	  as	  initial	  Brahms	  facts	  and	  beliefs	  (e.g.,	  flight	  schedule,	   when	   second	   ATCO	   goes	   on	   break).	   But	   most	   dysfunctions	   are	   binary	   (e.g.,	   phones	   are	  modeled	  as	  working	  or	  not).	  The	  model	  could	  be	  designed	  to	  define	  timings	  as	  initial	  facts	  (e.g.,	  when	  phones	  begin	  working	  again),	  relate	  timings	  to	  contextual	  events	  (e.g.,	  when	  phones	  begin	  working	  again	   relative	   to	   when	   maintenance	   begins),	   or	   develop	   model	   so	   timings	   are	   emergent	   (e.g.,	  simulation	   the	   maintenance	   work	   in	   some	   detail).	   However,	   notice	   that	   this	   effort	   would	   not	  establish	  the	  model’s	  completeness	  and	  generality	  (e.g.,	  ATCO	  completes	  the	  phone	  call	  to	  the	  tower	  and	  hence	  doesn’t	  need	  to	  ask	  the	  CA	  for	  an	  alternate	  number)	  and	  would	  probably	  not	  clarify	  our	  understanding	  of	  what	  happened	  at	  Überlingen.	  Nevertheless,	  such	  modeling	  such	  timing	  variations	  might	  be	  useful	  if	  using	  the	  simulation	  to	  thoroughly	  explore	  unexpected	  interactions.	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o Refine	   Brahms-­‐GÜM	   components	   (radar,	   TCAS,	   ATCO	   and	   pilot	  behavior)	   to	   improve	   accuracy	   and	   generality,	   based	   on	   analysis	   of	  the	  first	  ten	  of	  the	  1F	  scenario	  runs.	  
• Control	  Variability:	  	  
o Verify	  and	  compare	  relative	  timings	  and	  duration	  of	  key	  events	  in	  ten	  Überlingen	   runs	   in	   order	   to	   determine	   how	   variations	   in	   timings	  affect	   agent	   behavior	   (e.g.,	   affect	   of	   time	   of	   AEF	   arrival	   on	  whether	  separation	  infringement	  was	  detected).	  	  
o Determine	  circumstantial	  variability	   that	   is	   confounding	   the	  analysis	  by	   multiplying	   possible	   outcomes	   without	   adding	   information	   (e.g.,	  relative	  altitudes	  of	  BTC	  and	  DHL	  at	  time	  of	  ATCO	  intervention).	  
o Refine	  the	  simulation	  to	  fit	  variability	  consistent	  with	  the	  known	  facts	  and	  work	  practices	  (e.g.,	  simplify	  ATCO	  choice	  of	  aircraft	  to	  advise	  so	  result	   is	  predictable	  and	  fixed	   for	  given	   flight	  paths,	  as	  well	  as	  being	  consistent	  with	  the	  scenario	  of	  interest).	  
o Control	   confounding	   variations	   in	   aggregate	   behaviors	   (e.g.,	   limit	  range	   of	   arrival	   times	   in	   Zurich	   sector	   by	   restricting	   possible	  departure	   times	   and	   removing	   time	   of	   flight	   variations	   between	  waypoints;	  fix	  velocity	  curves	  used	  to	  control	  plane	  flight	  when	  pilots	  are	  responding	  to	  TCAS/ATCO).	  	  Verification	   and	   refinements	   for	   accuracy	   were	   interleaved	   with	   improving	   the	  generality	   of	   the	  model.	   As	   the	   information	   the	   simulation	   could	   provide	   became	  more	   evident,	   we	   also	   fixed	   behaviors	   (making	   them	   less	   general)	   to	   scope	   the	  simulation	   and	   analysis	   effort.	   Putting	   this	   another	   way,	   having	   succeeded	   in	  simulating	  the	  complex	  human-­‐automation	  work	  system	  present	  at	  the	  time	  of	  the	  Überlingen	   accident,	   the	   simulation	   system	  was	   itself	   now	   complex—it	   produced	  many	  more	  outcomes	  than	  occurred	  at	  Überlingen	  (e.g.,	  ATCO	  advising	  BTC	  to	  climb	  because	   it	   arrive	   at	   higher	   altitude	   than	   DHL)	   and	   these	   outcomes	   had	  unpredictable	   timings	   and	   interactions,	   which	   made	   analysis	   and	   understanding	  difficult.	  The	  trick	  is	  then	  to	  control	  or	  limit	  the	  space	  of	  the	  variations	  produced	  by	  the	   simulation,	   without	   losing	   generality	   (e.g.,	   the	   set	   of	   scenarios	   or	   model	  configurations	  possible	  is	  not	  changed).	  	  In	  particular,	  we	  determined	  that	   it	  would	  be	  advantageous	  for	  ATCO	  and	  TCAS	  to	  give	   the	   same	  advice	  as	   in	   each	   simulation	   run,	   replicating	   the	  Überlingen	  events.	  Prior	  to	  this	  time,	  in	  some	  simulation	  runs	  ATCO	  would	  contact	  the	  DHL	  or	  instruct	  the	   BTC	   to	   climb	   instead	   of	   to	   descend.	   	   Accordingly,	   we	   adjusted	   the	   variability	  affecting	   the	  aircraft	   flights,	   so	  on	  entering	   the	  Zurich	   sector	  BTC	  would	  be	  above	  the	  DHL	  aircraft,	   thus	  ensuring	  that	  TCAS	  would	  instruct	  BTC	  to	  climb	  and	  DHL	  to	  descend	  (retaining	  generality	  of	   the	  ATCO	  model).	  We	  modified	   the	  heuristic	  used	  by	  ATCO	  for	  selecting	  the	  aircraft	  to	  advise,	  so	  that	  he	  would	  select	  the	  aircraft	  with	  the	   higher	   latitude	   (matching	   the	   BTC	   flight).	   The	   direction	   advised	   (to	   climb	   or	  descend)	   is	  determined	  by	   the	  aircraft’s	  control	  strip;	  BTC’s	  plan	   indicated	  FL350,	  suggesting	  advice	  to	  descend	  (Section	  9.3).	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  Notice	  that	  generality	  of	  Brahms-­‐GÜM	  is	  retained	  because	  behaviors	  were	  not	  fixed	  by	  “hard-­‐wire”	  programming,	  such	  as	  by	  writing	  an	  ATCO	  workframe,	  “Contact	  the	  BTC	   flight.”	   WFs	   and	   TFs	   never	   reference	   specific	   flights	   or	   scenario-­‐specific	  attributes.	  Instead,	  an	  abstraction	  of	  the	  states	  and	  behaviors	  of	  the	  given	  scenario	  is	  determined	  that	  is	  general	  and	  plausible;	  and	  because	  it	  fits	  the	  present	  situation	  it	  will	  affect	  the	  outcome.	  	  More	  generally,	  we	  were	  figuring	  out	  how	  to	  model	  and	  simulate	  events	  that	  were	  known	   or	   believed	  with	   high	   confidence	   to	   arise	   from	   a	   cumulative	   effect	   whose	  outcome	  was	  probabilistic	   (e.g.,	   relative	   altitudes	   of	   the	   aircraft	   at	   the	   time	   of	   the	  separation	   infringement),	   events	   that	   were	   also	   apparently	   chaotic	   (e.g.,	   the	  variations	   in	   velocity	   of	   the	   two	   aircraft	   during	   descent),	   and	   events	   for	   which	   a	  causal	  story	  could	  be	  constructed,	  but	  might	  be	  arbitrary	  (e.g.,	  ATCO’s	  choice	  of	  DHL	  vs.	   BTC).	   	   We	   had	   begun	   wanting	   Brahms-­‐GÜM	   to	   be	   very	   general,	   as	   the	   name	  attests.	  For	  example,	  the	  simulation	  allows	  for	  other	  flights	  to	  be	  included	  in	  initial	  conditions,	   for	   the	  BTC	  and	  DHL	   flights	   in	  particular	   to	  have	  different	   flight	  plans,	  and	  so	  on.	  But	  in	  focusing	  in	  the	  details	  of	  the	  interactions	  among	  different	  flights,	  ATCO’s	  actions,	  TCAS,	  and	   the	  pilots’	   actions,	   some	  of	   this	  generality	   in	   the	  model	  (e.g.,	   having	   ATCO	   follow	   a	   sophisticated	   set	   of	   rules	   for	   choosing	  which	   flight	   to	  advise)	   led	   to	   variances	   in	   the	   simulation	   runs	   that	   did	   not	   inform	   or	   clarify	   the	  temporal	  and	  causal	  effects	  of	  pivotal	  events.	  	  	  	  So	  for	  example	  just	  as	  it	  provided	  little	  information	  to	  run	  a	  simulation	  in	  which	  the	  phone	  system	  is	  operating	  normally	  or	  the	  second	  ATCO	  is	  on	  duty	  (Table	  8-­‐1),	  we	  were	  not	  learning	  anything	  by	  having	  BTC	  arrive	  at	  an	  altitude	  about	  200	  feet	  below	  the	   DHL	   (such	   that	   TCAS	   advises	   DHL	   to	   climb	   and	   ATCO	   still	   advises	   BTC	   to	  descend).	  	  Hence	  we	  adjusted	  the	  model	  to	  reduce	  variability	  in	  flight	  paths.	  	  	  This	   leads	   to	   an	   important	   realization	   about	   the	   modeling	   process:	   	   Controlling	  
unnecessary	   variability	   (relative	   to	   our	   interest	   and	   modeling	   purposes)	   makes	   the	  
results	  of	   the	   simulation	   runs	  more	  predictable	  and	  hence	   reduces	   the	   complexity	  of	  
the	  analysis	  required.	  	  	  Nevertheless,	  generality	   is	  not	  sacrificed	  and	  is	  evident	   in	  the	  simulation	  runs.	  For	  example,	  if	  during	  a	  simulation	  ATCO	  advises	  BTC	  to	  descend	  sufficiently	  soon,	  the	  TCAS	   RA	   will	   advise	   DHL	   to	   climb;	   and	   similarly,	   if	   ATCO	   intervenes	   sufficiently	  after	  the	  TCAS	  RA,	  he	  will	  detect	  that	  DHL	  is	  descending	  (which	  by	  then	  might	  also	  be	  	  reported	  by	  DHL)	  and	  advise	  BTC	  to	  climb.	  	  	  	  We	  reduce	  the	  space	  of	  outcomes	  that	  occur	  in	  multiple	  simulation	  runs	  of	  the	  same	  scenario	  by	  defining	  the	  initial	  conditions	  to	  fit	  the	  scenario	  of	  interest	  and	  limiting	  variability	   in	   the	  modeled	  behaviors	  of	   the	  people	  (as	  well	  as	   the	  behaviors	  of	   the	  automation	  if	  the	  simulation	  were	  being	  used	  to	  redesign	  TCAS	  for	  example).	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Limiting	   variability	   of	   modeled	   behaviors	   is	   accomplished	   in	   part	   by	   reducing	  
variability	   of	   the	   circumstances	   in	   which	   that	   behavior	   occurs	   (e.g.,	   location	   and	  timing	   of	   the	   aircraft)	   as	  well	   as	   by	  making	  simplifying	  assumptions	   about	   choices	  people	  were	  making,	  while	   still	  modeling	  activities	   in	  a	  general	  way	   (e.g.,	  perhaps	  ATCO	  scans	  the	  radar	  display	  from	  top	  to	  bottom,	  so	  he	  sees	  the	  BTC	  flight	  first	  and	  consequently	  chooses	  to	  call	  them).	  	  Such	  simplification	  is	  merited	  when	  we	  have	  no	  evidence	   or	   strong	   theory	   to	   explain	   why	   people	   did	   what	   they	   did	   during	   the	  Überlingen	   events.	   Going	   forward	   in	   creating	   similar	   Brahms	   models,	   we	   would	  perhaps	   be	   more	   careful	   in	   using	   Occam’s	   Razor	   to	   generalize	   from	   the	   known	  behaviors	  we	  are	  simulating	  without	  making	  the	  model	  more	  complicated	  than	  the	  available	  data	  suggests	  or	  that	  the	  modeling	  purposes	  require.	  	  	  This	  is	  the	  first	  Brahms	  model	  we	  have	  created	  in	  which	  the	  variability	  of	  primitive	  activity	  durations	  (e.g.,	  the	  time	  duration	  a	  flight	  waits	  after	  nominal	  departure	  time	  to	  get	  clearance	  for	  takeoff)	  can	  significantly	  change	  what	  occurs	  in	  the	  simulation.	  This	   sensitivity	   to	   timing,	   leading	   to	   unpredictable	   sequencing	   and	   durations,	   is	  entirely	  consistent	  with	  the	  claim	  that	  the	  work	  system	  at	  the	  time	  of	  the	  accident	  was	  complex	  (Section	  5.9).	   	   	  Some	  of	  the	  complexity—the	  many	  ways	  in	  which	  the	  events	  at	  Überlingen	  could	  have	  occurred	  differently	  (such	  as	  ATCO	  contacting	  DHL	  instead	  of	  BTC)—can	  be	  “damped	  down”	  when	  the	  matter	  at	  hand	  is	  to	  model	  and	  understand	  better	  what	  occurred	  with	  given	   initial	  conditions	  (e.g.,	  when	  BTC	  and	  DHL	  arrive	  in	  the	  Zurich	  sector).	  Scoping	  what	  needed	  to	  be	  more	  accurate	  and	  what	  could	  be	  fixed	  by	  making	  reasonable	  assumptions	  and	  simplifications	  became	  even	  more	   important	   during	   the	   next	   phase,	   as	   we	   shifted	   to	   using	   the	   simulation	   to	  provide	  metrics	  about	  specific	  causal	  interactions.	  
10.4 Second	  Phase:	  Defining	  Questions	  and	  Scoping	  Simulation	  Variability	  	  	  During	   this	   phase	   of	  modeling,	  we	   shifted	   from	   “making	   the	  model”	   to	   “using	   the	  model.”	   We	   started	   to	   study	   the	   simulation	   itself	   as	   a	   system	   and	   improve	   it	   in	  interesting	  ways.	  Having	  improved	  the	  model	  so	  that	  ATCO’s	  activities	  and	  decisions	  as	  well	  as	  TCAS’s	  alerts	  were	  simulated	  more	  accurately,	  we	  examined	  again	  when	  and	  why	   a	   collision	  was	   averted	   or	   not,	   focusing	   on	   the	   temporal	   sensitivity	   and	  variability	  of	  the	  interactions	  among	  ATCO,	  TCAS,	  and	  the	  pilots.	  	  	  We	  started	  to	  realized	  what	  questions	  the	  simulation	  might	  answer,	  such	  as	  “Given	  that	   the	  arrival	  of	   the	  AEF	   flight	   is	  disrupting	   the	  ATCO’s	  monitoring	  of	   the	   larger	  airspace	   (e.g.,	   if	   it	   arrives	   sufficiently	   late,	   no	   collision	  occurs),	  what	   is	   the	  period	  (relative	  to	  the	  BTC	  and	  DHL	  flights	  paths)	  when	  AEF’s	  arrival	  can	  cause	  collision?	  	  During	  this	  period,	  does	  a	  collision	  always	  occur	  or	  are	  there	  variations	  of	  how	  the	  AEF	  handoff	  occurs,	  such	  that	  sometimes	  the	  separation	  infringement	  is	  averted?”	  	  	  	  We	  emphasize	  that	  the	  model	  was	  not	  designed	  to	  answer	  such	  questions,	  rather	  we	  were	   focusing	   on	   what	   factors	   to	   include	   (Section	   6.6)	   and	   how	   to	   simulate	  complicated	   behaviors	   (Chapter	   9).	   It	   never	   occurred	   to	   us	   until	   a	   year	   into	   the	  project	   that	   the	   Brahms-­‐GÜM	   simulation	   might	   provide	   new	   information	   about	  sensitivity	  of	  event	  times	  and	  durations.	  However,	  once	  this	  interest	  developed,	  our	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analysis	  indicated	  ways	  in	  which	  to	  bound	  the	  simulation	  (what	  to	  include	  and	  with	  what	  fidelity)	  to	  provide	  quantified	  answers	  to	  these	  questions.	  	  	  Refinements	   for	   improving	  accuracy	  continued	  when	  errors	  were	   found,	  but	  what	  
fidelity	  was	  desirable	  (and	  hence	  where	  it	  was	  discovered	  to	  be	  missing)	  became	  less	  a	   matter	   of	   replicating	   Überlingen	   events	   to	   controlling	   variability	   that	   was	  unnecessarily	  complicating	  our	  analysis.	  This	  process	  began	   in	   the	   first	  phase,	  but	  took	  on	  a	  different	  character	  as	  we	  studied	  the	  simulation	  itself	  to	  understand	  what	  affected	  whether	   and	  when	  ATCO	  detected	   the	   impending	   collision.	  Consequently,	  how	   pilots	   reacted	   to	   ATCO/TCAS	   and	   how	   the	   trajectories	   of	   the	   aircraft	   varied	  represented	  a	  different	  part	  of	  the	  simulation	  in	  which	  the	  model	  could	  be	  simplified	  to	  facilitate	  analyzing	  what	  came	  before.	  	  	  In	  particular,	  we	  began	  to	  appreciate	  better	  the	  shape	  of	  the	  aircraft	  trajectories	  and	  their	   sensitivity	   to	   the	   pilots’	   reaction	   time,	   and	   the	   effect	   of	   TCAS’s	   and	   ATCO’s	  instructions	  to	  expedite	  descent:	  	  	  
• On	  comparing	  the	  simulation	  log	  to	  the	  BFU	  Report	  Appendix	  3	  timeline,	  we	  realized	   for	   the	   first	   time	  that	   the	  BTC	  pilot	  during	  the	  Überlingen	  accident	  reacted	  to	  the	  ATCO	  immediately,	  before	  acknowledging	  or	  informing	  ATCO	  about	  his	  actions	  (and	  this	  was	  the	  reason	  for	  ATCO’s	  subsequent	  “expedite	  descent”	  instruction	  7	  seconds	  after	  the	  initial	  intervention).	  	  
• Despite	   the	  Auto-­‐Pilot	   being	   disengaged	  while	   the	  ATCO	  was	   speaking,	   the	  BTC	  isn’t	  shown	  in	  the	  BFU	  Report	  timeline	  as	  having	  dropped	  200	  feet	  until	  7	  seconds	  after	  it	  AP	  disengaged.	  
• The	  altitude	  data	  in	  the	  BFU	  Report	  timeline	  enables	  determining	  the	  descent	  rate	  in	  response	  to	  TCAS	  and	  ATCO	  instructions	  (e.g.,	  average	  rate	  of	  descent	  for	   both	   aircraft	   is	   31	   ft/sec,	   with	   BTC	   descent	   starting	   about	   2	   seconds	  sooner	  than	  DHL	  because	  of	  timing	  of	  ATCO	  instruction).	  	  	  
• Modeling	   of	   some	   interactions	   that	   didn’t	   always	   occur,	   involving	  combinations	   of	   behaviors,	   needed	   to	   be	   verified	   (e.g.,	   if	   a	   pilot	   who	   is	  already	  descending/climbing	  because	  of	  ATCO	  intervention	  is	   later	  directed	  by	   TCAS	   RA	   to	   follow	   the	   same	   advice,	   the	   pilot	   should	   continue	  descent/climb	  and	  inform	  ATCO	  about	  the	  TCAS	  advisory).	  	  In	  this	  set	  of	  ten	  simulation	  runs	  (again	  eliminating	  those	  in	  which	  the	  aircraft	  are	  not	  on	  collision	  course),	  ATCO	  intervened	  three	  times	  between	  the	  TCAS	  TA	  and	  RA.	  	  When	  ATCO	  notices	  separation	  problem	  depends	  on	  when	  ATCO	  completes	  handoff	  of	   AEF	   flight	   to	   Friedrichshafen	   (by	   informing	   the	   pilot	   to	   contact	   the	   tower	  directly).	   In	   order	   to	   simulate	   how	   the	   separation	   problem	   is	   not	   noticed	   until	  immediately	   after	   the	  AEF	  handoff	   is	   completed,	   the	   	   simulated	  ATCO’s	   activity	  of	  handling	  a	  landing	  flight	  has	  priority	  over	  general	  monitoring	  of	  the	  radar,	  and	  the	  methods	  require	  a	  great	  deal	  of	  time,	  effectively	  fixating	  on	  this	  task	  at	  the	  expense	  of	  everything	  else.	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However,	  another	  combination	  of	  events	  occurred	  in	  one	  of	  the	  simulation	  runs,	  in	  which	  monitoring	  occurs	  during	  the	  activity	  of	  handling	  the	  AEF	  flight.	  In	  particular,	  after	   the	   third	   failed	  phone	  call	  attempt,	  ATCO	  requests	   the	  CA	  to	  get	  an	  alternate	  phone	  number.43	  While	  waiting	  for	  CA,	  ATCO	  moves	  to	  S	  RE	  workstation	  to	  handle	  other	   flights,	  which	   includes	   the	   activity	   of	  monitoring	   the	   airspace.	   In	   particular,	  ATCO	  might	   move	   to	   the	   S	   RE	   workstation	   to	   respond	   to	   BTC’s	   arrival.	   As	   he	   is	  reading	   the	   BTC	   flight	   control	   strip,	   he	   might	   also	   monitor	   other	   flights.	   When	  monitoring,	  he	  might	  detect	  that	  separation	  of	  BTC	  and	  DHL	  flights	   is	   less	  than	  25	  nm/1500	  ft	  and	  intervene.	  Also	  as	  described	  in	  the	  previous	  section,	  if	  the	  TCAS	  TA	  has	  occurred,	  he	  will	  detect	  the	  visual	  fact	  of	  an	  impending	  collision,	  leading	  him	  to	  intervene	  (with	  a	  priority	  that	  interrupts	  other	  activities).44	  	  We	  do	  not	  know	  what	  the	  Zurich	  ATCO	  was	  actually	  doing	  while	  waiting	  for	  the	  CA	  or	  how	  much	  time	  he	  spent	  talking	  with	  her	  after	  her	  return.	  	  In	  the	  transcript	  there	  is	   a	   period	   of	   48	   seconds	   in	  which	   nothing	   occurs	   between	   his	   third	   call	   attempt	  ending	  and	  his	  call	  to	  AEF	  to	  tell	  the	  pilots	  to	  contact	  the	  control	  tower	  themselves.	  As	  the	  simulation	  shows,	  if	  he	  looked	  at	  the	  radar	  display	  he	  would	  see	  the	  obvious	  separation	  violation.	  	  It	   is	   also	   possible	   for	   the	   AEF	   flight	   to	   arrive	   much	   later	   (a	   range	   of	   at	   least	   5	  minutes	   is	  possible	  because	  of	  probabilistic	  variations	   in	  pilot	  activities	   that	  affect	  flight	   times).	   Because	   he	   is	   not	   preoccupied	   by	   the	   AEF	   flight,	   ATCO	   might	   then	  notice	  the	  separation	  problem	  prior	  to	  the	  TCAS	  TA.	  Subsequently,	  he	  becomes	  busy	  monitoring	  the	  conflict	  and	  this	  delays	  the	  AEF	  handoff.	  	  In	  particular,	  the	  priority	  of	  handling	   a	   conflict	  will	   prevent	   ATCO	   from	   noticing	   that	   the	   AEF	   flight	   is	   getting	  close	   to	   the	   TOD	  point,	  which	  would	   trigger	   telling	   the	   pilot	   to	   contact	   the	   tower	  directly.	  	  	  Analysis	   of	   these	   ten	   runs	   also	   suggested	   that	   rate	   of	   descent	   of	   each	   plane	   was	  crucial.	   On	   examining	   the	   BFU	   Report	   data	   we	   observed	   that	   the	   planes	   were	  chasing	  each	  other	  down,	  with	  DHL	  starting	  about	  4	  seconds	  after	  BTC	  and	  catching	  up	  by	  accelerating	  its	  rate	  of	  descent	  after	  the	  TCAS	  “Increase	  Descent!”	  instruction.	  In	  the	  last	  4	  seconds	  DHL	  accelerates	  to	  -­‐71	  ft/sec.	  	  	  	  A	  few	  critical	  points	  became	  salient	  in	  studying	  when	  descent	  begins	  relative	  to	  the	  instruction	  given	  to	  the	  pilots:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  43	  The	  modeled	   landing	  handoff	  procedure	   involves	   three	  attempts	   to	   call	   the	   tower,	   asking	  CA	   for	  alternate	   phone	   number,	   using	   the	   alternative	   number	   after	   CA	   returns	   (not	   mentioned	   in	   ANSA	  transcript);	  giving	  up	  and	  asking	  pilot	  to	  call	  tower	  directly.	  Also,	  the	  ATCO	  will	  skip	  to	  the	  last	  step	  if	  the	  aircraft	  gets	  close	  to	  the	  point	  (Top-­‐of-­‐Descent;	  TOD)	  where	  descent	  to	  final	  approach	  altitude	  for	  landing	  would	  normally	  begin.	  44	  Priorities	   of	   relevant	   activities	   in	   this	   version	   of	   Brahms-­‐GÜM:	   	   Deciding	   on	   conflict	   resolution	  (climb/descent)	   for	   intervention	   (priority	   =	   100);	   respond	   to	   pilot	   call-­‐in	   arrival	   in	   sector	   (60);	  respond	  to	  pilot	  report	  about	  TCAS	  climb/descent	  (50);	  handling	  landing	  flight	  (40);	  handling	  “other	  flights”	  (10);	  monitoring	  radar	  display	  (5).	  	  See	  Appendix	  	  23	  for	  a	  list	  of	  all	  workframe	  priorities.	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1) “AP	  disengage”	  shown	  in	  the	  BFU	  Report	  timeline	  is	  a	  key	  moment	  in	  the	  sequence,	   it	   proves	   that	   the	   pilots	   are	   responding	   to	   an	   instruction	   by	  taking	  manual	  control	  of	  the	  aircraft.	  2) ATCO’s	  initial	  instruction	  to	  BTC	  to	  descend	  requires	  7	  seconds;	  TCAS’s	  instruction	  requires	  2	  seconds.	  	  During	  ATCO’s	  utterance	  a	  BTC	  crew	  member	  repeats	  “Descend!”;	  AP	  is	  disengaged	  before	  ATCO	  finishes	  speaking.45	  3) For	  both	  BTC	  and	  DHL,	  the	  AP	  is	  disengaged	  in	  the	  next	  second	  after	  the	  pilot	  hears	  the	  descend	  instruction	  (according	  to	  timeline	  in	  BFU	  Report,	  Appendix	  3).	  	   	  4) Altitude	  and	  descent	  rates	  (given	  by	  tables	  in	  BFU	  Report,	  pp.	  57	  and	  59)	  indicate	  that	  the	  BTC	  aircraft	  changes	  altitude	  about	  4	  seconds	  after	  AP	  disengage	  and	  DHL	  changes	  about	  6	  seconds.	  We	  used	  5	  seconds	  in	  the	  model,	  consistent	  with	  assumption	  made	  in	  the	  TCAS	  algorithm	  (p.	  69).	  	  The	  rate	  of	  descent	  tables	  also	  reveal	  that	  the	  vertical	  rate	  of	  descent	  is	  not	  constant	  but	  changes	  for	  both	  aircraft:	  	  1) According	   to	   the	   BFU	   Report	   tables,	   the	   BTC	   aircraft	   vertical	   rate	   of	  descent	  between	  21:34:40	  –	  21:34:58	   is	   about	   -­‐1.6	   ft/sec,	   roughly	  30	   ft	  drop.	  (The	  table	  shows	  the	  altitude	  as	  the	  same	  during	  these	  18	  seconds	  [35968	   ft]	   because	   data	   resolution	   is	   128	   ft.)	   	  Also,	   aircraft	   climbs	   at	  21:34:50.	   Given	   that	   AP	   is	   engaged	   and	   in	   prior	   period	   the	   vertical	  velocity	  indicates	  a	  drift	  up,	  this	  appears	  to	  be	  an	  AP	  compensation	  to	  get	  it	  back	  to	  a	  set	  altitude,	  not	  a	  response	  by	  BTC	  pilots	  to	  TCAS	  TA.	  2) Tables	  indicate	  that	  aircraft	  both	  start	  at	  35968	  ft	  and	  descend	  to	  35840	  ft	   within	   2	   seconds	   of	   each	   other.	   DHL	   is	   two	   seconds	   behind	   because	  ATCO	  has	  intervened	  with	  BTC	  just	  prior	  to	  TCAS	  RA.	  	  	  3) Descent	   rate	   curves	   of	   the	   two	   aircraft	   are	   similar,	   reaching	   about	   -­‐30	  ft/sec	   (-­‐1800	   ft/min,	  which	   is	   consistent	  with	   recommended	   -­‐1500	   to	   -­‐2000	   ft/min,	  p.	  50).	  However,	  DHL	  catches	  up	  with	  BTC	  perhaps	  due	   to	  TCAS	   “Increase	   descent!”	   at	   21:35:12,	   increasing	   descent	   to	   about	   -­‐40	  ft/sec	  within	  about	  4	  seconds	   (-­‐2400	   ft/min,	   somewhat	   less	   than	   -­‐2500	  ft/min	  recommended	  for	  responding	  TCAS	  “increase”	  RA,	  p.	  50).	   	  BTC	  is	  reaching	   -­‐39	   ft/second	   at	   same	   time,	   perhaps	   in	   response	   to	   ATCO	  “Expedite	  descent!”	  instruction	  at	  21:35:04.	  4) In	   final	   four	   seconds	  before	  collision,	  DHL	   increases	  descent	   rate	   to	   -­‐71	  ft/seconds;	   BTC	   has	   increased	   to	   -­‐39	   ft/sec	   about	   14	   sec	   after	   ATCO	  Expedite,	  but	  that	  drops	  to	  about	  -­‐30	  ft/sec	  in	  final	  ten	  seconds,	  so	  they	  are	  holding	  back.	  	  	  5) Both	  crews	  appear	  to	  recognize	  that	  the	  preferred	  (or	  inevitable)	  passing	  is	   for	   the	   DHL	   to	   be	   below	   the	   BTC	   aircraft.	   BTC	   NAV	  Mid	   remarks	   at	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  45	  A	   Brahms	   agent	   cannot	   carry	   out	   another	   action	   while	   “listening”	   in	   a	   communication	   activity.	  Therefore,	  the	  duration	  of	  the	  ATCO	  intervention	  utterances	  is	  shortened	  in	  the	  model	  accordingly	  to	  match	   when	   the	   AP	   disengage	   action	   occurred	   (i.e.,	   to	   allow	   the	   pilot	   to	   react	   at	   the	   same	   time	  relative	  to	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  utterance).	  This	  limitation	  is	  discussed	  in	  Appendix	  28.2.	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35:14	   “It	   is	   going	  below	  us”;	  BTC	  FE	  R	   spots	  DHL	  on	   the	   left	  7	   seconds	  later.	  	  BFU	  Report	  graphic	  in	  Appendix	  7	  shows	  the	  DHL	  below	  at	  time	  of	  collision.	  	  Having	  now	  understood	  the	  complexity	  of	  the	  trajectories,	  and	  not	  having	  any	  data	  to	  properly	  relate	  the	  varying	  rates	  of	  descent	  to	  pilot	  actions,	  let	  alone	  their	  beliefs,	  we	  determined	  that	  modeling	  the	  varying	  rates	  of	  descent	  lies	  outside	  the	  scope	  of	  the	  present	  Brahms-­‐GÜM	  effort.	  Modeling	  descent	  properly	  would	  involve	  modeling	  the	   pilots’	   perceptions,	   inferences,	   and	   actions	   in	   coordinating	   the	   instruction	   to	  expedite	  descent	  while	  projecting	  the	  point	  of	   intersection	  and	  working	  within	  the	  dynamics	  of	  the	  aircraft.	  	  	  In	  summary,	  this	  second	  phase	  analysis	  of	  Überlingen	  simulation	  runs	  revealed	  that	  descent	  of	   the	   two	  aircraft	  begins	  within	  2	  seconds	  of	  each	  other,	  and	   the	  varying	  descent	   accounts	   for	   the	   collision.	   The	  BFU	  Report	   states,	   “Once	   the	  TU154M	  and	  B757-­‐200	  had	  initiated	  the	  descent	  the	  outcome	  was	  left	  to	  chance”	  (p.	  85),	  meaning	  that	   it	   is	   too	   late	   for	   the	  ATCO	   to	   influence	  events,	   and	  whether	  a	  collision	  occurs	  depends	  on	  how	  the	  pilots	  zigzag	  through	  the	  airspace.	  	  	  Until	  this	  point	  in	  developing	  Brahms-­‐GÜM,	  we	  had	  always	  been	  most	  interested	  in	  examining	   a	   simulation	   run	   to	   know	   whether	   a	   collision	   occurred.	   But	   now	   it	  became	  apparent	   that	  what	   is	  most	   important	  with	   respect	   to	   the	  purpose	  of	   this	  project	   is	   not	   whether	   a	   collision	   occurs—which	   is	   highly	   dependent	   on	   pilot	  maneuvers	   to	  avert	  collision—but	  on	   the	  occurrence	  of	  a	  separation	  violation	  and	  the	   causal	   circumstances.	   In	   short,	   at	   this	   point	   in	   creating	   the	   Brahms-­‐GÜM	   our	  attention	   shifted	   from	  attempting	   to	   replicate	   the	   collision,	   to	   focusing	   on	  ATCO’s	  actions	  in	  the	  few	  minutes	  prior	  to	  the	  separation	  infringement	  (which	  is	  marked	  by	  the	  TCAS	  RA,	  in	  the	  final	  second	  of	  ATCO’s	  instruction	  to	  the	  BTC).	  	  Having	  decided	  that	  we	  had	  no	  interest	  in	  what	  occurred	  after	  the	  pilots	  disengaged	  the	   AP,	   we	   abandoned	   our	   model	   of	   the	   pilot’s	   control	   of	   the	   aircraft	   during	   an	  emergency	  descent,	  why	  ATCO	  intervenes	  a	  second	  time,	  and	  the	  pilot’s	  adjustment	  of	   velocity	   in	   response	   to	   “expedite”	   instruction.	   Instead,	   we	   incorporated	   the	  descent	   tables	   from	  the	  BFU	  Report,	  such	  that	   the	  two	  simulated	  aircraft	  replicate	  the	  exact	  changes	  in	  velocity	  that	  occurred	  at	  Überlingen.	  To	  allow	  for	  uncertainty	  in	  aircraft	   locations,	  we	  defined	  a	  collision	  as	  occurring	   if	   the	  aircraft	  are	  within	  100	  feet	  of	  each	  other	  at	  the	  crossing	  point.	  This	  guarantees	  that	  a	  collision	  will	  occur	  in	  the	  simulation	   if	  TCAS	   instructs	  DHL	  to	  descend	  and	  ATCO	  instructs	  BTC	  similarly	  within	  a	  few	  seconds	  of	  the	  relative	  times	  these	  events	  occurred	  at	  Überlingen.	  (As	  shown	   below,	   the	   instructions	  may	   also	   lead	   to	   divergence,	   as	  well	   as	   BTC	   flying	  level	  while	  DHL	  climbs	  or	  descends.)	  	  At	   this	   time,	   as	   we	   became	   more	   sensitive	   to	   variations	   of	   a	   few	   seconds	   in	   the	  simulated	   events,	   we	   discovered	   a	   programming	   error	   in	   the	   TCAS	   model’s	   TAU	  calculation	  that	  was	  causing	  the	  advisories	  to	  occur	  too	   late.	  We	  also	  realized—on	  seeing	  the	  simulated	  TCAS	  issue	  “conflict	  cleared”	   for	  planes	  that	  were	  within	  100	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feet	   vertically	   and	   still	   on	   collision	   course—that	   the	   initial	   base	   model	   of	   TCAS	  released	  the	  advisory	  when	  TAU	  values	  no	  longer	  being	  below	  minimum	  thresholds.	  However,	  TAU	  is	  not	  used	  for	  determining	  when	  the	  conflict	  is	  cleared,	  specifically	  because	  the	  Vertical	  TAU	  can	  become	  quite	  large	  if	  the	  vertical	  changes	  in	  velocity	  are	  not	  constant.	  	  The	   correct	   algorithm	   for	   "Weakening	   Advisories”	   is	   fairly	   complex,	   with	   a	   few	  special	  cases	  (FAA	  2011,	  p.	  33).	  The	  simplest	  case	  involves	  one	  plane	  climbing	  and	  the	  other	  descending,	  called	  a	  "Positive	  Corrective	  RA"	  (FAA	  2011,	  p.	  32):	  	   During	   an	   RA,	   if	   the	   CAS	   logic	   determines	   that	   the	   response	   to	   a	   Positive	   RA	   has	  provided	  ALIM	  feet	  of	  vertical	  separation	  prior	  to	  CPA	  (i.e.	  the	  aircraft	  have	  become	  safely	  separated	  in	  altitude	  while	  not	  yet	  safely	  separated	  in	  range)	  before	  CPA,	  the	  initial	  RA	  will	  be	  weakened	  to	  either	  a	  Do	  Not	  Descend	  RA	  (after	  an	  initial	  Climb	  RA)	  or	   a	   Do	  Not	   Climb	  RA	   (after	   an	   initial	   Descend	  RA).	   This	   is	   done	   to	  minimize	   the	  displacement	  from	  the	  TCAS	  aircraft’s	  original	  altitude.	  	  In	  Version	  7.0	  and	   later,	   after	  ALIM	   [Altitude	  Limit,	  difference	   in	  altitude	  between	  the	  two	  aircraft]	  feet	  of	  separation	  has	  been	  achieved,	  the	  resulting	  Do	  Not	  Descend	  or	  Do	  Not	  Climb	  RA	  is	  designated	  as	  corrective.	  In	  Version	  7.0,	  the	  RA	  is	  annunciated	  as	  “Adjust	  Vertical	  Speed,	  Adjust.”	  	  	  	  For	  altitudes	  between	  20	  and	  40	  thousand	  feet,	  ALIM	  is	  600	  feet,	  with	  a	  minimum	  of	  300	   feet	   required	   at	   the	   lowest	   altitudes.	   Rather	   than	   modeling	   the	   multiple	  directives	   used	   by	   TCAS	   including	   "level	   off,"	   which	   are	   intended	   to	   avoid	   more	  displacement	   than	  necessary	  or	   the	  pilot	   reversing	   too	  steeply,	   the	  modeled	  TCAS	  only	  issues	  "Clear	  of	  Conflict."	  The	  pilot	  returns	  to	  the	  previously	  assigned	  altitude,	  informing	   ATCO	   (or	   acknowledging	   ATCO's	   instruction	   at	   that	   point).	   Of	   course,	  TCAS	  announces	  clearance	  of	  conflict	  after	  the	  closest	  point	  of	  approach	  (CPA).	  
10.5 Third	  Phase:	  Answering	  Questions	  from	  Multiple	  Simulation	  Runs	  	  At	   this	   point	  we	   had	   refined	   the	   simulation	   for	   accuracy	   and	   sufficient	   fidelity	   to	  enable	   relating	   key	   events	   leading	   up	   to	   the	   intervention	   by	   ATCO	   and	   TCAS.	  We	  contrast	   this	   perspective	   with	   the	   alternative	   scoping,	   “events	   leading	   up	   to	   the	  
collision,”	   which	   includes	   pilot	   conversations	   and	   control	   of	   the	   aircraft.	   In	   this	  section	  we	  review	  ten	  simulation	  runs	  of	  the	  Überlingen	  scenario	  (again	  eliminating	  a	   few	   runs	   in	   which	   the	   aircraft	   are	   not	   on	   collision	   course)	   and	   show	   what	  information	   can	   be	   learned	   from	   the	   emergent	   interactions	   that	   occur.	   The	   basic	  qualitative	  data	  appears	  in	  Table	  10-­‐2,	  indicating	  whether	  the	  planes	  collide;	  a	  brief	  explanation	  of	  what	  occurred;	  the	  direction	  of	  ATCO	  and	  TCAS	  advice;	  and	  when	  the	  ATCO	  intervened	  relative	  to	  the	  time	  of	  the	  TCAS	  TA	  and	  RA.	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Table	  10-­‐2:	  Outcomes	  of	  ten	  simulation	  runs	  of	  Überlingen	  scenario.	  Bold	  
indicates	  greatest	  potential	  for	  collision	  (ATCO	  intervenes	  between	  TA	  and	  
RA;	  both	  aircraft	  descending)	  
Run	  
#	  







TA/RA	  1	   No	   TCAS detects BTC plane descending due 
to ATCO; so advises DHL to Climb.	   Descend	   Climb	   Before	  2	   No	   TCAS detects BTC plane descending due 
to ATCO, so advises DHL to Climb.	   Descend	   Climb	   Before	  3	   No	   TCAS detects BTC plane descending due 
to ATCO, so advises DHL to Climb. AEF 
flight arrives very late after TCAS TA.	   Descend	   Climb	   Before	  4	   No	   DHL TCAS Descend; BTC above. Planes 
crossed > 100 ft vertical separation	   Descend	   Descend	   During	  5	   YES	   DHL TCAS Descend; BTC above. BTC 
AP turned off at DHL RA. Planes crossed 
< 20 ft vertical separation	   Descend	   Descend	   During	  6	   No	   DHL TCAS Descend; BTC above. ATCO 
later than RA, so BTC level. Planes 
crossed > 600 ft vertical separation	   Descend	   Descend	   After	  7	   No	   DHL TCAS Descend; BTC above. DHL 
AP turned off 2 seconds before BTC. 
Planes crossed > 100 ft vertical separation	   Descend	   Descend	   During	  8	   YES	   DHL TCAS Descend; BTC above. BTC 
AP  turned off at RA. Planes crossed < 50 
feet vertical separation	   Descend	   Descend	   During	  9	   No	   DHL TCAS Descend; BTC above. Planes 
crossed > 200 ft vertical separation	   Descend	   Descend	   During	  10	   No	   DHL TCAS Descend; BTC above. ATCO 
later than RA, so BTC level. Planes 
crossed > 600 ft vertical separation	   Descend	   Descend	   After	  	  As	   explained	   in	   previous	   sections,	   the	   model	   had	   been	   “tuned”	   so	   BTC	   flying	   is	  almost	  always	  slightly	  below	  DHL	  near	  the	  time	  of	  the	  interventions.46	  Nevertheless,	  interesting	  variations	  are	  immediately	  apparent:	  	  	  1. When	   ATCO	   intervenes	   before	   TCAS	   TA,	   but	   planes	   have	   not	   separated	  sufficiently,	  TCAS	  will	  take	  BTC’s	  descent	  into	  account,	  advising	  DHL	  to	  climb	  (runs	  1,	  2,	  3).	  2. When	  ATCO	  intervenes	  between	  TA	  and	  RA	  (as	  at	  Überlingen;	  runs	  4,	  5,	  7,	  8,	  9),	   	   outcome	   depends	   on	   timing	   with	   2/5	   runs	   resulting	   in	   a	   collision	  (defined	   as	   vertical	   separation	   less	   than	   100	   feet,	   which	   is	   within	   128	   ft	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  46	  DHL	   is	   still	   climbing	   to	   FL360	  when	   it	   arrives	   in	   the	   sector	   in	   the	   south,	  while	  BTC	  has	  been	   at	  FL360.	  Variability	  in	  the	  auto-­‐pilot	  model	  can	  result	  in	  the	  DHL	  aircraft	  being	  below	  BTC	  at	  the	  time	  of	  the	  intervention,	  in	  which	  case	  TCAS	  would	  both	  advise	  DHL	  to	  climb.	  ATCO	  always	  advises	  BTC	  to	  descend	   following	   the	   control	   strip	  plan,	   unless	  pilot	   calls	   in	   reporting	   an	  RA.	  These	   runs	   are	   also	  using	   the	   fixed	   descent	   tables	   from	   the	   BFU	   Report.	   Again,	   our	   focus	   is	   on	   events	   leading	   up	   to	  intervention;	  for	  our	  purpose,	  the	  paths	  after	  intervention	  are	  only	  of	  dramatic	  interest.	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precision	   of	   	   BFU	   Report	   values;	   runs	   5,	   8);	   TCAS	   issues	   “expedite”	   when	  vertical	   separation	   is	   improving	   quickly	   enough	   (runs	   4,	   5,	   7,	   8)—ATCO	  issues	   “expedite”	   to	   BTC	   in	   all	   ten	   runs	   because	   BTC	   pilots	   have	   not	  acknowledged	  his	  instruction.	  3. When	  ATCO	  intervenes	  about	  10	  seconds	  after	  TCAS	  RA—which	  BTC	  pilots	  ignore	  (or	  might	  be	  imagined	  as	  discussing	  for	  a	  long	  time)—BTC	  continues	  flying	  level	  while	  DHL	  descends,	  so	  they	  miss	  each	  other,	  separated	  by	  more	  than	  600	   ft	   at	   the	   crossing	  point	   (runs	  6,	   10).	   	   In	  other	   runs,	  we	  have	   also	  observed	   that	   ATCO	   intervenes	   so	   late,	   he	   actually	   takes	   the	   pilots'	   report	  about	  TCAS	  RA	  instructions	  into	  account.	  	  Table	  10-­‐3	  provides	   the	   timing	  data	   from	   the	  point	   of	   TCAS	   and	  ATCO	   resolution	  advisories	  from	  the	  ten	  simulation	  runs	  of	  the	  Überlingen	  scenario:	  	  
• Separation	  at	   the	   time	  of	  TCAS	  advisories	  (average	  TA	  =	  9.43	  nm	  and	  RA	  =	  6.96	  nm)	   fits	  Überlingen	  values	   closely	   (TA	  =	  9.94	  nm	  and	  RA	  =	  7.11	  nm);	  differences	  are	  caused	  by	  aircraft	  speed	  estimates	  used	  by	  the	  simulation	  and	  simplification	  of	  the	  TCAS	  model.47	  	  
• Vertical	  separation	  of	  aircraft	  at	  the	  time	  of	  TCAS	  TA	  and	  RA	  is	  less	  than	  10	  ft	  if	  ATCO	  doesn't	  intervene	  before	  TA,	  fitting	  BFU	  Report	  which	  shows	  them	  as	  being	  at	  the	  same	  altitude.	  	  	  
• Period	  between	  DHL	  AP	  off	  to	  evidence	  of	  response	  is	  13	  -­‐	  10	  sec;	  Überlingen	  is	  about	  12	  sec.	  	  	  
• Autopilot	  (AP)	  is	  switched	  off	  	  (Table	  10-­‐4)	  for	  DHL	  1	  –	  3	  sec	  after	  TCAS	  RA	  (average	  2	   sec;	   same	  as	  Überlingen),	   for	  BTC	  8	  –	  11	   sec	  after	  ATCO	  begins	  intervention	  (average	  9	  sec;	  Überlingen	  is	  7	  sec).48	  
• Cross-­‐path	  time	  is	  when	  paths	  intersect,	  with	  either	  a	  collision	  or	  one	  aircraft	  flying	   above	   the	   other.	   Two	   collisions	   (runs	   5,	   8)	   occur	   34	   sec	   and	   35	   sec	  after	  TCAS	  RA;	  Überlingen	  was	  36	  sec.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  47	  Because	  of	  a	  limitation	  in	  the	  Brahms	  engine,	  requiring	  all	  object	  activities	  to	  take	  time,	  the	  current	  model	   configuration	   results	   in	   the	  BTC	   and	  DHL	  TAs	  not	   being	   simultaneous,	   but	   up	   to	   5	   seconds	  apart	  (6	  runs;	  in	  4	  runs	  it	  is	  1	  second).	  	  Because	  simulated	  pilots	  do	  not	  respond	  to	  the	  TCAS	  TA,	  this	  discrepancy	  has	  no	  effect	  on	  the	  outcomes.	  48	  The	   two	   seconds	  discrepancy	  between	   these	   simulation	   runs	   and	   the	   timing	   at	  Überlingen	   is	   an	  artifact	  of	  how	  conversation	  between	  people	  (ATCO	  and	  pilot)	  using	  the	  radio	  is	  modeled	  compared	  to	   detecting	   the	   communication	   from	   an	   object	   (TCAS).	   	   The	   radio	   interaction—	   Pilot	   -­‐>	   Aircraft	  Radio	   -­‐>	   ATCC	   Radio	   -­‐>	   ATCO—requires	   at	   least	   7	   seconds.	   Pilot	   response	   then	   involves	   reading	  auto-­‐pilot	  setting	  on	  MCP	  (min	  =	  1	  sec,	  max	  =	  2	  sec)	  and	  disengaging	  auto-­‐pilot	  (min	  =	  1	  sec,	  max	  =	  2	  sec).	  Finding	  ways	   to	  modify	   this	   timing	  could	   result	   in	  different	   collision	  outcomes,	  but	  again	  our	  focus	   at	   this	   point	   in	   the	   research	   is	   on	   events	   leading	   up	   to	   the	   intervention,	   not	   what	   occurs	  afterwards.	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Table	  10-­‐3:	  Separation	  and	  Timing	  of	  TCAS	  and	  ATCO	  Intervention	  




















1 21:33:54 9.75 297.00 21:33:07 21:34:09 7.02 454.20 
2 21:33:53 9.44 133.00 21:33:24 21:34:06 7.09 270.19 
3 21:33:27 9.45 377.00 21:32:32 21:33:42 6.85 534.20 
4 21:33:47 9.68 7.00 21:33:59 21:34:05 6.77 7.00 
5 21:34:02 8.48 9.00 21:34:04 21:34:12 6.94 9.00 
6 21:34:04 9.40 8.00 21:34:31 21:34:19 7.02 8.00 
7 21:33:23 9.69 9.00 21:33:37 21:33:41 6.94 9.00 
8 21:33:34 9.58 7.00 21:33:43 21:33:51 6.90 7.00 
9 21:33:16 9.61 3.00 21:33:21 21:33:34 7.03 3.00 
10 21:33:30 9.24 5.00 21:34:00 21:33:44 7.00 5.00 	  	  
Table	  10-­‐4:	  Timing	  of	  Key	  Events	  in	  Überlingen	  Simulations	  






























1 21:32:37 21:32:19 21:35:25 21:34:12 21:33:15 21:34:49 0:01:35 Before 
2 21:32:46 21:32:30 21:35:46 21:34:09 21:33:32 21:34:44 0:01:23 Before 
3 21:31:15 21:33:32 21:35:39 21:33:45 21:32:40 21:34:16 after Before 
4 21:31:53	   21:32:46 21:36:56 21:34:07 21:34:10 21:34:37 0:01:01 During 
5 21:31:46	   21:32:28 21:35:43 21:34:14 21:34:12 21:34:46 0:01:34 During 
6 21:32:13	   21:33:06 21:35:41 21:34:20 21:34:41 21:34:53 0:00:58 After 
7 21:31:26	   21:32:45 21:36:06 21:33:43 21:33:45 21:34:13 0:00:38 During 
8 21:31:28	   21:32:09 21:35:16 21:33:53 21:33:51 21:34:26 0:01:25 During 
9 21:32:45 21:32:29 21:36:10 21:33:37 21:33:29 21:34:07 0:00:47 During 
10 21:32:17	   21:31:59 21:35:02 21:33:47 21:34:09 21:34:18 0:01:31 After 
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Figure	  10-­‐1:	  Key	  Events	  in	  Ten	  Runs	  of	  Überlingen	  Scenario	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Together	  with	   the	  use	  of	   the	  descent	   tables	   for	   specifying	   aircraft	  maneuvers,	   the	  data	  from	  these	  tables	  shows	  that	  we	  have	  replicated	  quite	  well	  the	  visible	  response	  of	   the	   pilots	   and	   aircraft	   from	   the	   point	   of	   the	   TCAS	   RA	   and	   ATCO	   initial	  intervention.	  	  However,	   as	   explained	   we	   view	   this	   part	   of	   the	   simulation	   as	   only	   having	   some	  “dramatic”	   interest	  because	  our	  primary	   interest	   is	  not	  how	   the	  pilots	   control	   the	  aircraft	  after	  an	  intervention,	  but	  the	  events	  and	  interactions	  affecting	  when	  ATCO	  intervenes.	  Table	  10-­‐4	  provides	  timing	  of	  three	  known	  important	  events:	  When	  BTC	  arrives	  in	  the	  sector,	  when	  AEF	  1135	  first	  contacts	  ATCO49,	  and	  when	  ATCO	  informs	  AEF	   to	   contact	   the	   tower	   directly.	   Figure	   10-­‐1	   shows	   graphically	   the	   relation	   of	  AEF’s	  first	  call	  to	  the	  times	  of	  TCAS	  TA,	  RA,	  and	  ATCO	  intervention.	  	  	  The	  results	  show	  that	  when	  Brahms-­‐GÜM	  is	  configured	  for	  the	  Überlingen	  scenario	  that	  in	  one	  case	  AEF’s	  first	  call	  is	  not	  until	  after	  the	  TCAS	  TA	  (run	  3;	  note	  location	  of	  “X”	  in	  Figure	  10-­‐1).	  Consequently	  ATCO	  advises	  the	  BTC	  to	  descend	  almost	  a	  minute	  before	  the	  TA,	  thus	  representing	  a	  normal,	  non-­‐disrupted	  interaction.50	  	  	  Otherwise,	  in	  the	  other	  nine	  runs,	  AEF	  first	  calls	  about	  1.5	  minutes	  or	  less	  before	  the	  TCAS	   TA;	   during	   the	   Überlingen	   events	   the	   interval	   was	   over	   4.5	  minutes,	   about	  which	   2.5	   minutes	   appears	   to	   be	   dedicated	   to	   this	   flight	   exclusively.	   In	   the	  simulation	  the	  multiple	  phone	  calls	  are	  completed	  sooner,	  rather	  than	  the	  third	  call	  occurring	  when	  AEF	  contacts	  ATCO	  the	  third	  time.	  Consequently,	  in	  some	  cases	  even	  though	   the	   handoff	   is	   not	   complete,	   the	   ATCO	   has	   an	   opportunity	   to	  monitor	   the	  radar	  display,	  such	  that	  the	  collision	  is	  averted	  (runs	  1,	  2;	  Figure	  10-­‐2).51	  	  We	  also	  observe	  that	  if	  AEF	  contacts	  ATCO	  one	  minute	  or	  less	  before	  the	  TCAS	  TA,	  then	  ATCO	  will	  not	  intervene	  until	  after	  TA	  (runs	  4,	  5,	  7,	  8,	  9)	  and	  possibly	  after	  the	  RA	  itself	  (runs	  6,	  10).	  	  Any	  outcome	  at	  that	  point	  is	  then	  possible.	  	  When	  ATCO	   intervenes	   in	   the	   period	   between	   the	   TA	   and	  RA	   (runs	   4,	   5,	   7,	   8,	   9),	  collision	   is	   possible,	   as	   at	   Überlingen.	   That	   is,	   ATCO	   has	   to	   intervene	   before	   TA	  advising	   BTC	   descent	   for	   BTC	   to	   respond	   sufficiently	   for	   TCAS	   to	   advise	   DHL	   to	  climb.	   	   In	   runs	   4	   and	   7	   (Figure	   10-­‐4)	   collision	   is	   narrowly	   averted	   because	   BTC	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  49	  As	  explained	  previously	  (e.g.,	  see	  Appendix	  17),	  during	  the	  Überlingen	  events,	  ATCO	  made	  his	  first	  phone	   call	   to	   Friedrichshafen	   more	   than	   four	   minutes	   before	   AEF	   contacted	   him	   for	   the	   landing	  handoff.	   	  Given	   that	  many	  other	   flights	  are	  handled	  during	   this	  period	  and	   the	  separation	  problem	  doesn’t	  require	  handling	  until	  after	   the	  call,	   it	  seems	  reasonable	  to	  view	  AEF’s	   first	  call	  as	  marking	  when	  ATCO	  became	  distracted	  from	  other	  tasks.	  	  	  	  50	  The	  simulated	  ATCO	  considers	  flights	  closer	  than	  25	  nm	  and	  vertical	  separation	  of	  less	  than	  1,500	  feet	  to	  be	  within	  each	  other’s	  boundary,	  hence	  requiring	  a	  change	  in	  flight	  path.	  	  51	  An	  air	  traffic	  controller	  who	  reviewed	  this	  case	  with	  us	  suggests	  that	  verifying	  once	  that	  a	  phone	  is	  not	  working	  should	  be	  sufficient,	  and	  the	  aircraft	  should	  have	  been	  told	  to	  contact	  the	  tower	  directly	  then.	  The	  Zurich	  ATCO	  devoted	  25	   seconds	   to	   this	   third	   call	   (21:32:50-­‐21:33:15),	   the	   second	   time	  trying	  the	  bypass	  number,	  followed	  by	  48	  seconds	  discussing	  with	  the	  CA	  “the	  options	  of	  relaying	  the	  information	   via	  Munich	   or	   contacting	   the	   technicians”	   (BFU	   Report,	   p.	   83)—during	   this	   1	  min	   13	  seconds	  the	  separation	  problem	  should	  have	  been	  detected	  and	  acted	  upon.	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begins	  descent	  4	  and	  5	  seconds	  after	  the	  TCAS	  RA,	  which	  is	  sufficient	  for	  a	  narrow	  miss	  (just	  over	  100	  feet).	  In	  run	  9	  the	  BTC	  descent	  begins	  5	  seconds	  before	  the	  RA,	  hence	  the	  aircraft	  miss	  by	  more	  than	  200	  feet).	  	  Runs	  5	  and	  8	  (Figure	  10-­‐3)	  lead	  to	  collision	   because	   the	   TCAS	   RA	   and	   BTC	   AP	   disengage	   occur	   at	   the	   same	   time,	   as	  happened	  at	  Überlingen.	  Because	   the	  model	  uses	   the	  Überlingen	  descent	   tables	   to	  control	  the	  BTC	  and	  DHL	  aircraft	  during	  the	  emergency	  descent,	  simulation	  matches	  the	  paths	  of	  the	  aircraft	  at	  Überlingen	  guaranteeing	  a	  collision	  (within	  defined	  range	  of	  error).	  In	  both	  cases,	  TCAS	  didn't	   instruct	  DHL	  to	  climb	  because	  BTC	  was	  above	  DHL	  at	  that	  time	  and	  of	  course	  hadn’t	  begun	  its	  descent.	  	  	  	  When	  ATCO	   intervenes	   after	   the	  RA	   (runs	   6,	   10;	   Figure	   10-­‐5),	   the	   simulated	  BTC	  pilots	   ignore	   the	   RA	   advice	   and	   continue	   level	   flight,	   which	   itself	   averts	   the	  collision—even	   though	   ATCO	   advises	   BTC	   to	   descend	   (which	   implies	   not	  considering	  that	  DHL	  is	  below	  them).	  We	  of	  course	  do	  not	  know	  what	  the	  BTC	  pilots	  would	  have	  done	  if	  ATCO	  hadn’t	  intervened.	  With	  more	  than	  one	  pilot	  interpreting	  TCAS	  correctly,	  it	  appears	  likely	  the	  BTC	  would	  have	  climbed.	  Also,	  the	  PF’s	  pulling	  back	  on	  the	  control	  column	  six	  seconds	  after	  the	  TCAS	  RA	  and	  thus	  slowing	  descent	  (BFU	  Report,	  p.	  8)	  indicates	  that	  they	  were	  weighing	  which	  instruction	  to	  follow—the	  ATCO’s	  second	  call	  to	  expedite	  descent	  then	  tipped	  the	  balance.	  	  The	  final	  AEF	  handoff	  (directing	  the	  pilots	  to	  contact	  the	  tower)	  always	  occurs	  in	  the	  simulation	  after	   the	  TCAS	  RA;	  at	  Überlingen	   it	  occurred	  prior	   to	   the	  TA.	  However,	  during	  the	  process	  of	  debugging	  the	  model	  other	  simulation	  runs	  produced	  different	  sequences,	  but	  were	  discarded	  because	  a	  Brahms	  engine	  bug	  prevented	  running	  the	  simulation	  to	  completion.	  These	  runs	   included	  examples	   in	  which	  the	  AEF	  handoff	  was	  completed	  prior	  to	  the	  TA	  and	  runs	  in	  which	  AEF	  reaches	  time	  of	  descent	  (TOD;	  when	   ATCO	  must	   shift	   strategy	   for	   trying	   phones	   to	   telling	   AEF	   to	   contact	   tower	  directly),	  just	  prior	  to	  TA	  or	  RA.	  	  It	  should	  also	  be	  possible	  for	  a	  sequence	  to	  occur	  in	  which	  the	  DHL	  pilot	  radios	  to	  Zurich	  about	   following	  the	  TCAS	  RA	  instruction,	  but	  ATCO	  might	  not	  hear	  the	  DHL	  pilot	  (or	  not	  immediately	  respond)	  because	  he	  is	  busy	  giving	  final	  directions	  to	  the	  AEF	  flight	  at	  the	  ARFA	  workstation.	  	  These	   variations	   suggest	   that	   we	   could	   run	   experiments	   perhaps	   using	   model	  checking	  methods	  to	  explore	  more	  systematically	  what	  happens	  if	  we	  adjust	  the	  AEF	  flight	   time	   and	   how	   the	   ATCO	   handles	   the	   phone	   calls.	   We	   expect	   that	   a	   more	  observant	  ATCO	  will	  detect	  the	  separation	  problem	  in	  time,	  and	  an	  ATCO	  persisting	  (apparently	  fixated	  on	  the	  handoff	  problem)	  will	  not.	  	  	  As	   it	   stands,	   the	  simulation	  results	  are	   interesting	  because	   they	  show	  the	  value	  of	  not	  fixing	  the	  model	  so	  rigorously	  according	  to	  what	  happened	  at	  Überlingen,	  even	  for	  what	  we	  have	  characterized	  as	  the	  “Überlingen	  scenario.”	  By	  allowing	  variability	  of	  AEF	  flight	  arrival	  time	  for	  example,	  we	  discovered	  that	  collision	  can	  occur	  even	  if	  the	  AEF	  arrived	  later	  than	  it	  did	  at	  Überlingen.	  	  	  	  To	  avoid	  getting	  lost	  in	  these	  details,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  remember	  that	  from	  a	  wider	  systemic	   perspective	   the	   separation	   violation	   didn’t	   only	   occur	   at	   Überlingen	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because	   of	   the	   arrival	   time	   of	   the	   AEF	   flight.	   Rather	   the	   skyguide	   company	   had	  tolerated	   a	   deviant	   form	   of	   SMOP	   during	   night	   operations:	   consequently	   nobody	  was	   carrying	   out	   the	   role	   of	   the	   supervisor	   (DL)	   in	   the	   ATCC.	   Nobody	   was	  responsible	  for	  the	  system,	  particularly	  during	  the	  maintenance	  process.	  Otherwise	  ATCO	  would	  have	  been	   informed	   that	   STCA	  Optical	   alert	  was	  not	   functioning	   and	  that	  the	  backup	  phones	  had	  been	  disabled.	  	  	  	  
	  
Figure	  10-­‐2:	  Simulation	  Run	  #1— TCAS	  detects	  BTC	  descending	  from	  earlier	  
ATCO	  intervention	  and	  advises	  DHL	  to	  climb.	  	  
	  	  




Figure	   10-­‐3:	   Simulation	   Run	   #8—Similar	   to	   Überlingen:	   TCAS	   advises	   DHL	  
descend;	   BTC	   is	   above.	   ATCO	   advises	   descent	   before	   RA;	   BTC	   autopilot	  
disengages	   at	   time	   of	   RA.	   Planes	   crossed	   <	   50	   feet	   vertical	   separation	  
(collision).	  
	  
Figure	  10-­‐4:	  Simulation	  Run	  #4—TCAS	  RA	  advised	  DHL	  descend;	  BTC	  is	  above.	  
Planes	  crossed	  >	  100	  ft	  vertical	  separation.	  	  
	  	  




Figure	  10-­‐5:	  Simulation	  Run	  #6—TCAS	  advises	  DHL	  to	  descend;	  BTC	  is	  above.	  
BTC	   ignores	   RA;	   ATCO	   then	   intervenes	   referring	   to	   control	   strip	   to	   advise	  
descent.	  Planes	  crossed	  >	  600	  ft	  vertical	  separation.	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11 Discussion:	  “Authority	  and	  Automation”	  Research	  Theme	  An	   important	   aspect	   of	   the	   “Authority	   and	   Autonomy”	   research	   theme	   is	  understanding	   the	   nature	   of	   authority	   in	   a	  mixed-­‐initiative	   system	   of	   people	   and	  automated	  systems.	  	  	  
	  Most	   human	   factors	   analyses	   focus	   on	   automation	   of	   part	   of	   the	   pilot’s	   role,	  particularly	  pilots’	  	  understanding	  of	  the	  automation	  mode.	  	  The	  TCAS	  issue	  central	  to	   the	  Überlingen	  case	  has	  a	  somewhat	  different	  character:	  TCAS	  does	  not	  control	  the	  plane	  and	  therefore	  is	  not	  a	  form	  of	  flight	  systems	  automation	  in	  the	  usual	  sense.	  Rather	  TCAS	  instructs	  the	  pilot	  how	  to	  fly	  the	  plane.	  The	  issue	  of	  authority	  arises	  for	  TCAS	   when	   contrary	   instructions	   are	   given	   by	   another	   source,	   as	   in	   the	   case	   of	  Überlingen	  between	  an	  ATCO	  and	  other	  officers	  in	  the	  cockpit.	  
11.1 Understanding	  “Authority”	  In	  Section	  3.2	  we	  cited	  two	  definitions	  from	  the	  research	  announcement	  related	  to	  this	  research:	  	  
• Authority	  refers	  to	  having	  the	  right,	  or	  power,	  to	  exercise	  controls	  or	  issue	  air	  traffic	   commands	   that	   impact	   the	   position,	   velocity,	   and/or	   attitude	   of	  aircraft	  during	  operations.	  	  
• Autonomy	   (or	   automation)	   refers	   to	   a	   function	   or	   system	   that	   can	   operate	  independently	  of	  pilot	  or	  air	  traffic	  controller	  intervention.	  	  	  In	  this	  chapter	  we	  elaborate	  and	  critically	  examine	  this	  definition	  of	  authority	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  issues	  that	  people	  in	  the	  aviation	  system	  face	  in	  working	  with	  other	  people	   and	   autonomous	   systems	   and	   within	   overlapping	   structures	   of	   authority	  (e.g.,	  airlines,	  air	  traffic	  control,	  federal	  and	  international	  regulations).	  	  	  
11.1.1 Two	  senses	  of	  “authority”	  In	   both	   ordinary	   conversation	   and	  within	   the	   social	   sciences	   “authority”	   has	   two	  distinguishable	  senses.	  The	  first	  sense	  of	  authority	  refers	  to	  the	  combination	  of	  the	  
right	   to	   perform	  a	   given	   action	   and	   the	   ability	   or	   power	   to	   perform	   it.	   	   This	   is	   the	  sense	   used	   in	   the	   NASA	   NRA	   definition;	   we	   might	   call	   this	   “authorization.”	   	   The	  second	  sense	  of	  authority	  refers	  to	  a	  particular	  class	  of	  actions:	  the	  act	  of	  instructing,	  
requesting	  or	  ordering	  another	  actor	  to	  perform	  a	  given	  action.	  This	  is	  a	  second-­‐order	  form	  of	  authority	  by	  which	  one	  agent	  has	  the	  right	  to	  delegate	  or	  command	  another	  agent	   to	   carry	   out	   an	   action.	   For	   simplicity,	   we	   will	   call	   this	   the	   authority	   to	  “command	  and	  control.”	  	  	  This	  distinction	  can	  be	  clarified	  by	  a	  simple	  example.	  	  Imagine	  a	  closed	  door	  with	  the	  sign:	   “Entrance	   by	   authorized	   personnel	   only.”	   Actor	   A	   may	   legitimately	   enter	  through	  the	  door	  because	  they	  have	  the	  authority	  to	  do	  so.	  With	  regard	  to	  the	  door,	  actor	  B	  may	  have	  a	  different	  kind	  of	  authority:	  the	  right	  and	  ability	  to	  instruct	  A	  to	  enter.	  Thus	  A	  has	  the	  right	  to	  enter;	  B	  has	  the	  jurisdiction	  to	  command	  and	  control	  A’s	  actions.	  	  In	  everyday	  life,	  A	  might	  be	  a	  child	  and	  B	  a	  parent,	  or	  A	  a	  citizen	  and	  B	  a	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policeman.	   (Other	  distinctions	  are	  possible	  considering	   the	  granting	  of	  a	   resource,	  such	  as	  a	  key	  that	  enables	  entering	  the	  door.	  Another	  resource,	  such	  as	  a	  completed	  form,	  may	  then	  give	  A	  the	  authority	  to	  request	  a	  key	  from	  an	  officer	  C	  who	  has	  the	  authority	  to	  physically	  provide	  keys.	  	  Such	  types	  and	  stages	  for	  giving	  authority	  are	  common	  in	  computer	  systems.)	  	  	  It	   is	   important	   to	   distinguish	   between	   the	   authority	   to	   act	   and	   the	   authority	   to	  
command	  or	  control	  that	  action,	  because	  they	  pose	  different	  questions	  for	  actors	  in	  situations	  of	  conflicting	  authority.	  	  	  	  The	  authority	  to	  act	  is	  involved	  when	  an	  actor	  must	  ask:	  “Do	  I	  have	  the	  authority	  to	  do	  X?’	   	  The	  authority	   to	  command	  and	  control	   is	   involved	  when	  actor	  A	  must	  ask:	  	  “Does	  B	  have	  the	  authority	  to	  tell	  me	  to	  do	  X?”	  	  As	  we	  see	  in	  the	  Überlingen	  case	  and	  other	   aviation	   accidents	   and	   incidents,	   both	   kinds	   of	   authority	   may	   be	   involved,	  requiring	  actors	  to	  make	  both	  kinds	  of	  determination:	  “Am	  I	  permitted	  to	  do	  X?”	  and	  “May	  B	  tell	  me	  to	  do	  X?”	  	   	  For	  the	  BTC	  pilots,	  this	  ambiguity	  took	  the	  form	  of	  what	  authority	  a	  pilot	  has	  when	  two	  other	  agents	  (ATCO	  and	  TCAS)	  are	  both	  believed	  to	  have	  authority	  to	  command	  a	  pilot	  what	  to	  do.	  
11.1.2 Legitimate	  authority	  The	  classic	  work	  on	   the	  authority	   to	  command	  and	  control,	   the	  authority	   to	  order	  someone	  else	   to	  do	  something,	   is	   that	  of	   the	   sociologist	  Max	  Weber.	  Weber	   raises	  the	   question	   of	   what	   the	   basis	   is	   for	   legitimate	   authority:	   authority	   that	   is	  recognized	  by	   the	  parties	   involved	   to	  be	  morally	   correct	  or	  proper,	   as	  opposed	   to	  brute	   force.	   	  Weber’s	   research	   focused	   on	   political	   and	   religious	   authority,	   but	   is	  relevant	  to	  the	  aviation	  context,	  in	  raising	  the	  question	  that	  faces	  any	  actor	  within	  a	  system	  of	  where	  authority	  resides	  in	  any	  given	  situation.	  	  Weber’s	  discussion	  distinguishes	  three	  basic	  types	  of	  legitimate	  authority:	  rational-­‐legal,	  traditional,	  and	  charismatic	  (Weber	  1999).	  	  	  
Rational-­‐legal	  authority	  depends	  on	  formal	  rules,	  and	  structured	  positions.	  	  Thus,	  an	  air	   traffic	   controller	  has	   legal	   authority,	   based	  on	   their	  position	  within	   the	   formal	  structure	   of	   the	   FAA,	   their	   training	   and	   certification	   for	   that	   position,	   and	   the	   air	  traffic	  control	  structure’s	  rules	  of	  procedure.	   	   In	   this	  case,	   the	  air	   traffic	  controller	  has	  authority	  to	  instruct,	  but	  it	  is	  still	  within	  the	  power	  of	  the	  flight	  crew	  not	  to	  obey	  an	  air	  traffic	  controller’s	  command.	  Indeed,	  there	  are	  situations	  in	  which	  disobeying	  air	  traffic	  control	  is	  the	  correct	  and	  legal	  decision	  on	  the	  part	  of	  the	  flight	  crew	  (e.g.,	  see	   ANSA+AIRRADIO	   2004,	   which	   refers	   to	   ATCO	   and	   TCAS	   as	   providing	  “assistance”	  and	  “advice,”	  “recommendations”).	  	  The	   second	   type	   of	   authority	   is	   traditional	   authority,	   which	   may	   depend	   on	  established	  customs.	   	  A	  political	  example	   is	  primogeniture:	  on	   the	  death	  of	  a	  king,	  the	  authority	  moves	   to	  his	  oldest	  son.	  This	   type	  of	  authority	   is	  not	  relevant	   in	   the	  aviation	  safety	  context.	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Finally,	   there	   is	   charismatic	   authority,	   which	   depends	   on	   the	   particular	  characteristics	  of	  an	  individual,	  as	  judged	  by	  those	  who	  choose	  follow	  the	  authority	  of	  that	  individual.	  	  Weber’s	  key	  examples	  are	  religious	  charisma.	  	  However,	  even	  in	  a	  technical	  environment,	  there	  are	  those	  who	  are	  considered	  to	  have	  authority	  not	  on	  the	   basis	   of	   their	   formal	   position	   alone,	   but	   on	   the	   basis	   of	   their	   personality,	  demeanor,	  and	  experience.	  For	  example,	  we	  might	  credit	  a	  particular	  researcher	  as	  being	  an	  “authority	  in	  the	  field”	  and	  hence	  “having	  power	  to	  influence	  thought	  and	  opinion,	  intellectual	  influence”	  (Merriam-­‐Webster	  2013).	  Such	  an	  person	  has	  social	  standing	  because	  of	  past	  deeds	  and/or	  presence	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  standards	  and	  values	  of	  the	  group.	  	  In	   the	   Mayday	   video	   of	   the	   Überlingen	   incident52 ,	   one	   of	   the	   Russian	   pilots	  interviewed	  argues	  that	  naturally	  one	  would	  obey	  a	  passionate	  urgent	  human	  voice,	  rather	   than	   a	   flat,	   dispassionate	   mechanical	   instruction.	   This	   argument	   implies	   a	  kind	  of	  	  charismatic	  authority	  based	  on	  human	  passion	  or	  intensity.	  
11.1.3 Authority	  as	  a	  relation/contract	  It	   is	   important	   to	   understand	   that	   authority	   can	   not	   be	   understood	   solely	   as	   a	  property	  of	  a	  single	  actor:	   it	   is	  an	  interactive	  relation	  established	  by	  the	  actions	  of	  social	   actors.	   Both	   of	   the	   two	   types	   of	   authority	   involve	   actions	   within	   a	   social	  system.	  	  	  	  In	  particular,	  a	  right	  to	  perform	  an	  action	  exists	  within	  a	  social	  system,	  insofar	  as	  the	  right	   is	   granted	   and	   the	   actions	   can	   be	   judged	   by	   others	   having	   appropriate	  authority	   (which	   is	   also	   socially	   granted	   and	   judged).	   Thus,	   although	   a	   pilot	  may	  have	   the	  physical	   capability	   to	  control	  an	  aircraft	   to	  climb	  or	  descend	   to	  a	  certain	  flight	  level,	  without	  instructions	  from	  an	  air	  traffic	  controller,	  the	  pilot	  does	  not	  have	  the	  right	  to	  do	  so.	  	  At	  issue	  in	  research	  on	  “authority	  and	  automation”	  is	  whether,	  how,	  and	  under	  what	  circumstances	   automation	   has	   authority.	   A	   given	   automation	   system	   may	   have	  capabilities	   to	   carry	   out	   goals	   through	   a	   combination	   of	   sensors/instruments	   and	  effectors/controllers.	   Putting	   people	   under	   the	   control	   of	   today’s	   automation	   is	  problematic	   because	   of	   the	   both	   the	   limitations	   of	   today’s	   technology	   and	   the	  standing	  of	  systems	  relative	  to	  human	  society.	  	  	  Put	   another	   way,	   today’s	   automation	   cannot	   engage	   in	   relations	   of	   responsibility	  with	  people	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  people	  do	  with	  each	  other.	  The	  most	  obvious	  limitation	  is	   technological:	  Most	   automation,	   like	  TCAS,	   operates	  within	   a	   fixed	   ontology	   for	  modeling	   the	   world,	   provided	   by	   the	   human	   designers/programmers.	   System	  behavior	  may	  be	  adaptable	  and	  flexible	  within	  the	  ontology,	  but	  it	  cannot	  contribute	  to	   the	   group’s	   ongoing,	   value-­‐based	   reconceptualization	   of	   the	   meaning	   of	  terms/parameters	   and	   their	   functional	   effect	   in	   operating	   procedures	   (e.g.,	   see	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  52	  Cineflix:	  Mayday	  (http://www.cineflixproductions.com/shows/28-­‐Mayday)	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Clancey	  1997).	  	  A	  system	  like	  TCAS	  cannot	  recognize	  that	  an	  event	  has	  occurred	  that	  lies	   outside	   its	   specification	   (e.g.,	   ATCO	   intervening	  between	   the	  TA	   and	  RA),	   and	  also	  decide	  on-­‐the-­‐fly	  how	   to	   respond	   (e.g.,	   attempt	   to	   convince	   the	  pilots	   that	   its	  advice	  is	  better	  because	  it	  has	  more	  complete	  information).	  	  	  We	   might	   imagine	   that	   someday	   automated	   systems	   may	   have	   the	   capability	   to	  conceive	  and	  judge,	  such	  as	  what	  we	  ascribe	  to	  the	  Zurich	  ATCO	  when	  we	  ask	  why	  he	  didn’t	  inquire	  about	  and	  test	  the	  effects	  of	  the	  maintenance.	  Automated	  systems	  might	   have	   human	   abilities	   to	   invent	   and	   articulate	   opportunities	   for	   improving	  practice	   through	   variations	   within	   the	   regulations	   (improvisations)	   or	   formulate	  conventionally	  allowed	  violations	  (workarounds).	  Then	  the	  notion	  of	  responsibility	  would	   shift	   from	   the	   issue	   of	   functional	   capability	   to	   the	   social	   domain.	   Could	   an	  automated	  system	  be	  a	  participant	  in	  an	  activity	  if	  it	  is	  not	  subject	  to	  the	  same	  laws	  and	   can	   be	   penalized?	   Would	   society	   agree	   to	   develop	   a	   community	   in	   which	  automated	   systems	   that	   have	   interests	   and	   emotions	   are	   treated	   reciprocally	   as	  persons,	  and	  so	  provide	  them	  a	  social	  identity?	  	  Such	   questions	   highlight	   the	   fact	   that	   regardless	   of	   how	   future	   technology	   and	  society	  might	   develop,	   systems	   like	  TCAS	   are	   in	   a	   different	   class	   entirely.	   Today’s	  automation	  lacks	  the	  ability	  to	  constructively	  contribute	  to	  work	  practices	  and	  thus	  has	   no	   ability—through	   lack	   of	   interests,	   values,	   and	   emotions—to	   have	   an	   equal	  social	   relation	   with	   people	   (of	   course,	   even	   among	   people	   the	   issue	   of	   “equal	  standing	   under	   the	   law”	   has	   been	   a	   matter	   of	   debate	   in	   matters	   of	   illegal	  immigration,	  marriage,	  etc.).	  	  	  Simply	  put,	  TCAS	  and	  similar	  automation	  cannot	  be	  held	  socially	  responsible	  for	  their	  actions	  in	  the	  same	  sense	  that	  we	  hold	  a	  pilot	  or	  ATCO	  responsible.	  	  In	  this	  respect,	  we	  may	   say	   that	   TCAS	   interfered	  with	   ATCO’s	   authority,	   abrogating	   his	   ability	   to	  carry	  out	  his	  responsibilities.	  	  But	  it	  is	  highly	  problematic	  to	  say	  that	  TCAS	  insofar	  as	  it	   is	  not	  a	  member	  of	  society—a	  social	  actor—has	  the	  authority	   to	  remove	  ATCO’s	  rights.	   Rather	   TCAS’s	   actions	   override	   the	   ATCO,	   who	  may	   be	   presumed	   to	   have	  himself	  abdicated	  his	  authority	  by	  failing	  to	  act	  sooner:	  “TCAS	  as	  an	  autonomous	  on-­‐	  board	  warning	  device…only	  serves	  the	  purpose	  to	  avoid	  collisions	  between	  aircraft	  by	  obedience	  to	  the	  collision	  warnings,	  when	  air	  traffic	  control	  has	  failed	  to	  fulfill	  its	  duties”	  (ANSA+AIRADIO	  2004,	  p.	  76).	  	  The	  question	  for	  the	  pilots	  of	  “who	  has	  authority,	  TCAS	  or	  ATCO?”	  reduces	  perhaps	  to	  something	   less	  philosophically	  complex	   than	  “Who	   is	   in	  control	  of	  my	  actions?”	  and	  is	  better	  stated	  instead	  as,	  “Where	  is	  the	  threat	  and	  what	  action	  should	  I	  take?”	  Because	   it	   is	  universally	  granted	   that	   the	  pilot	   is	  ultimately	  responsible	   for	  safety,	  the	   practical	   problem	   a	   pilot	   faces	   is	   not	   reasoning	   about	   authority,	   per	   se,	   but	  interpreting	  and	  acting	  on	  the	   information	  provided	  by	  different	  sources.	  He	  must	  do	   this	   cognizant	   of	   the	   operational	   context	   in	   which	   another	   pilot	   in	   an	   unseen	  aircraft	  may	  be	  following	  TCAS’s	  instruction.	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11.1.4 Multiple	  regimes	  of	  authority	  We	  have	  discussed	  that	  authority	  is	  not	  a	  property	  of	  an	  actor,	  but	  rather	  a	  relation	  of	  actions	  among	  social	  actors.	  Even	  this	  statement,	  though,	  is	  a	  simplification	  of	  the	  issue	  of	  authority	  in	  the	  aviation	  system.	  	  	  	  It	  is	  easy	  to	  think	  of	  authority	  as	  organized	  in	  a	  single	  hierarchical	  structure:	  within	  the	  cockpit,	  the	  captain,	  first	  officer	  and	  navigation	  officer	  (as	  in	  the	  case	  of	  the	  BTC	  Tupelov	  crew).	  	  However	  this	  structure	  is	  itself	  embedded	  within	  a	  larger	  authority	  structure	   of	   the	   airline,	   the	   local	   aviation	   authority,	   etc.	   A	   good	   example	   of	   an	  authority	  structure	  is	  provided	  by	  Rasmussen	  and	  Svedung’s	  socio-­‐technical	  model	  of	  systems	  operations	  (Figure	  11-­‐1).	  	  	  
	  
Figure	  11-­‐1:	  Rasmussen	  and	  Svedung’s	  socio-­‐technical	  model	  of	  system	  
operations	  (Leveson,	  2004,	  Figure	  2,	  p.	  10)	  This	  model	  is	  helpful	  because	  it	  broadens	  the	  issue	  of	  authority	  from	  the	  immediate	  context	   of	   the	   cockpit	   to	   the	   larger	   system	   in	  which	   it	   operates.	   However,	   it	   still	  focuses	  on	  a	  single	  system	  in	  which	  authority	  is	  managed.	  	  	  	  If	   we	   consider	   authority	   issues	   in	   the	   Überlingen	   case,	   we	   see	  multiple	   authority	  regimes,	  which	  overlap	  in	  complex	  ways	  (Figure	  11-­‐2).	  	  	  	  
	  	  




Figure	  11-­‐2:	  Direct	  authority	  relations	  in	  Überlingen	  Accident.	  	  The	  immediate	  actors	  in	  the	  accident	  are	  the	  crews	  of	  the	  two	  aircraft,	  DHL	  and	  BTC.	  	  They	  are	  each	  in	  communication	  with	  Zurich	  Air	  Traffic	  Control,	  though	  not	  directly	  with	   each	   other.	   Although	   the	   crews	   cannot	   communicate,	   their	   aircraft’s	   TCAS	  systems	  are	  continuously	  exchanging	  flight	  data.	  	  	  	  The	  authority	  structures	  in	  the	  two	  cockpits	  are	  fundamentally	  clear,	  although	  there	  is	  an	  ambiguity	  in	  the	  authority	  relation	  in	  the	  Tupelov	  cockpit	  between	  the	  captain	  and	  the	  training	  captain	  concerning	  who	  is	  in	  command	  of	  the	  aircraft.	  	  The	  following	  excerpts	  from	  the	  BFU	  Report	  offer	  several	  analyses	  of	  the	  authority	  relations	  among	  the	  BTC	  crew:	  	   The	  normal	  crew	  structure	  [of	   the	  BTC	  flight]	  had	  been	  altered	  by	  the	   inclusion	  of	  the	  Instructor,	  but	  the	  crew	  had	  restructured	  and	  operated	  in	  accordance	  with	  the	  normal	  procedures.	  The	  Instructor	  was	  in	  a	  familiar	  role	  as	  PIC	  and	  PNF,	  while	  the	  Commander	  in	  the	  left	  seat	  would	  have	  been	  less	  familiar	  in	  his	  role	  as	  PF	  without	  the	   responsibilities	   of	   being	   PIC.	   The	   duties	   of	   the	   navigator	   and	   flight	   engineer	  remained	  unchanged,	  while	  the	  copilot	  had	  no	  assigned	  duties.	  
 As	   the	   conflict	   situation	   developed	   the	   PNF	   was	   responsible	   for	   handling	   radio	  communications	   and	   was	   to	   acknowledge	   the	   ATC	   descent	   instruction.	   He	   was	  initially	  diverted	  from	  this	  task	  as	  he	  clarified	  his	  decision	  (as	  PIC)	  to	  the	  flight	  deck	  crew	  to	  follow	  the	  ATC	  instructed	  descent.	  His	  response	  to	  the	  second	  ATC	  descent	  instruction	  was	  immediate.	  
 The	  PNF	  was	  also	  expected	  to	  monitor	  and	  support	   the	  PF	   in	   the	  execution	  of	  any	  flight	   manoeuvres,	   including	   the	   ATC	   instructed	   descent.	   When	   the	   TCAS	   event	  started,	   his	   duties	   expanded	   by	   the	   need	   for	   a	   visual	   search	   for	   the	   conflicting	  traffic.	  It	  is	  probable	  that	  he	  at	  least	  monitored	  the	  PF	  as	  the	  descent	  was	  initiated,	  but	  he	  then	  trained	  his	  attention	  on	  the	  visual	  search.	  He	  did	  not	  advise	  the	  PF	  that	  they	  were	  cleared	  level	  of	  FL350.	  At	  this	  time	  the	  PNF’s	  attention	  was	  concentrated	  on	  the	  visual	  search,	  and	  was	  probably	  centred	  in	  the	  wrong	  sector.	  At	  21:35:12	  hrs	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the	  ATC	  controller	  passed	  the	  erroneous	  information	  that	  the	  conflict	  traffic	  was	  in	  the	  TU154M’s	  2	  o’clock	  position.	  This	   increased	  the	  confusion	  of	  the	  situation,	  and	  the	  distress	  of	  the	  crew.	  The	  crew	  was	  probably	  affected	  in	  their	  capacity	  to	  perform	  their	   tasks	   and	   distracted	   from	   the	   visual	   contact	   with	   the	   B757-­‐200	   in	   their	   10	  o’clock	  position.	  
 Nine	  seconds	  before	  the	  collision	  the	  PIC	  asked	  “where	  is	  it?”	  and	  the	  copilot	  replied	  “here,	  on	   the	   left”,	   implying	   that	   the	  PIC	  had	  concentrated	  his	   search	   in	   the	  sector	  suggested	  by	  ATC,	  while	   the	  copilot	  had	  maintained	  visual	   contact	  with	   the	  B757-­‐200	  on	  their	  left.	  
 About	  two	  seconds	  prior	  to	  the	  collision,	  the	  PF	  pulled	  the	  control	  column	  hard	  back,	  probably	   in	   response	   to	  visual	   contact	  with	   the	  now	  rapidly	   expanding	  B757-­‐200.	  The	  time	  available	  did	  not	  allow	  the	  avoidance	  manoeuvre	  to	  take	  effect.	  
 
Hierarchy	  in	  the	  cockpit	  
 Except	  for	  the	  inclusion	  of	  the	  Instructor,	  the	  flight	  deck	  crew	  was	  familiar	  with	  each	  other’s	   behaviour	   and	   position	   within	   the	   team.	   The	   usual	   flight	   deck	   hierarchy	  would	   have	   seen	   the	   Commander	   as	   PIC	   and	   the	   copilot	   next	   in	   the	   chain	   of	  command,	  with	   the	  navigator	  holding	  a	  more	  authoritative	  position	   than	  the	   flight	  engineer.	   For	   this	   flight	   it	   was	   prescribed	   according	   to	   NPP	   (comparable	   to	  Operations	  Manual)	   that	  the	   instructor	  be	  the	  PIC.	  The	  copilot	  was	  relegated	  to	  an	  uncertain	  and	  undefined	  position,	  as	  he	  had	  no	  assigned	  responsibilities	  within	  the	  crew.	  (BFU	  Report,	  p.	  98	  -­‐99)	  	  According	  to	  documentation	  (approval	  of	  flights)	  provided	  by	  the	  operator	  the	  pilot	  sitting	   on	   the	   left	   was	   the	   commander	   (PIC).	   According	   to	   documentation	  (instruction	   for	   the	   conduct	   of	   flights)	   provided	   by	   the	   Aviation	   Ministry	   the	  instructor	  sitting	  on	  the	  right	  was	  the	  pilot	  in	  command	  (PIC).	  
 According	   to	   the	   regulations	   of	   the	   aircraft	   operator,	   Barcelona	   airport	   was	  classified	   as	   an	   aerodrome	   in	   mountainous	   terrain.	   Each	   pilot	   flying	   to	   this	  destination	  had	  to	  make	  at	  least	  two	  flights	  with	  an	  instructor.	  For	  the	  commander	  (under	   supervision),	   this	  was	   the	   second	   flight	   to	  Barcelona.	  He	  was	   sitting	   in	   the	  front	   of	   the	   cockpit	   on	   the	   left	   while	   the	   instructor	   was	   sitting	   on	   the	   right.	   The	  instructor	  was	  –	   in	  the	  opinion	  of	  the	  BFU	  -­‐	   the	  pilot	   in	  command.	  (BFU	  Report,	  p.	  11) 	  The	  crews	  of	  both	  aircraft	  are	  subject	  to	  the	  regulations	  of	  their	  respective	  airlines	  in	  the	  form	  of	  company	  policies,	  training,	  etc.	  	  They	  are	  also	  subject	  to	  the	  authority	  of	   Eurocontrol,	   the	   European	   Union’s	   air	   traffic	   control	   agency,	   while	   they	   are	   in	  European	  airspace.	   	  Because	  both	  airlines	  fly	   in	   international	  airspaces	   in	  addition	  to	   the	   European	  Union,	   the	   airlines,	   and	   the	   crews	   of	   the	   two	   flights	   are	   at	   other	  times	   subject	   to	   the	   authority	   of	   other	   air	   traffic	   control	   agencies	   as	  well	   (Figure	  11-­‐3).	  Although	  Eurocontrol	  has	  jurisdiction	  for	  BTC’s	  flight	  in	  the	  Zurich	  sector,	  the	  primary	  authority	  for	  Bashkirian	  Airlines	  is	  the	  State	  Civil	  Aviation	  Authority	  of	  the	  Russian	  Federation.	  	  
	  	  




Figure	  11-­‐3:	  Authority	  Relations	  for	  BTC	  crew	  with	  Bashkirian	  Airlines,	  
Eurocontrol,	  and	  other	  air	  space	  jurisdictions;	  DHL	  has	  analogous	  relations.	  These	   overlapping	   authority	   relations	   are	   directly	   relevant	   to	   the	   Überlingen	  accident	  because	  at	  this	  time,	  TCAS	  was	  not	  mandated	  for	  aircraft	  flying	  within	  the	  airspace	   of	   the	   Russian	   Federation.	   Therefore	   the	   DHL	   and	   Bashkirian	   Airlines	  crews	  had	  different	  training	  in	  TCAS.	  	  The	  DHL	  crew	  had	  simulator	  training;	  the	  BTC	  crew	  had	  only	  written	  training.	  Bashkirian	  Airlines	  mainly	  flew	  within	  the	  airspace	  of	   the	  Russian	  Federation,	  which	  at	   that	   time	  did	  not	  require	  TCAS	  within	   its	  own	  airspace.	  
	  
Figure	  11-­‐4:	  Authority	  Relations	  for	  Zurich	  Air	  Traffic	  Control	  Center	  Once	   we	   move	   from	   the	   two	   aircraft	   to	   the	   ATCC,	   the	   issue	   becomes	   yet	   more	  complicated.	   The	   Zurich	   Air	   Traffic	   Control	   Center	   operates	   within	   a	   different	  though	  overlapping	  authority	  structure,	  subject	  to	  a	  different	  control	  hierarchy	  and	  different	   rules	   that	   those	   governing	   aircraft.	   Zurich	   Air	   Traffic	   Control	   Center	   is	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subject	   to	   the	   regulatory	   authority	   of	   the	   European	   Union’s	   Eurocontrol.	  It	   is	   also	   subject	   to	   the	   regulations	   and	   policies	   of	   its	   parent	   company,	   skyguide.	  	  Skyguide	  is	  also	  subject	  to	  regulations	  of	  the	  Swiss	  government,	  which	  we	  have	  not	  shown	  here.	  	   	  A	   final	   actor	   is	   TCAS.	   Much	   research	   is	   required	   to	   determine	   how	   the	  organizational	   authority	   structure	   influenced	   the	   design,	   certification,	   and	   its	  implementation,	   including	   how	   it	  was	   incorporated	   in	   the	   airspace	   and	   air	   traffic	  control	  regulations.	  	  We	   could	   add	   other	   authority	   regimes	   to	   this	   diagram;	   for	   example	   the	   national	  divisions	  of	  airspace	  into	  civil	  and	  military	  sectors	  led	  to	  a	  rather	  narrow	  corridor	  of	  civil	  airspace	  in	  this	  region	  of	  Germany	  and	  Switzerland.	  	  Nevertheless,	  this	  diagram	  of	   immediate	   actors	   is	   sufficiently	   complex	   to	   show	   that	   authority	   is	   not	   a	   simple	  matter,	   even	  at	   the	   sharp	  end	  of	   an	  accident,	   and	  becomes	  even	  more	   complex	  as	  our	   perspective	   is	   broadened	   to	   understand	   the	   socio-­‐historical	   and	   socio-­‐technological	  context	  of	  the	  Überlingen	  work	  system	  on	  that	  July	  evening	  in	  2002.	  
11.2 Authority	  in	  the	  Context	  of	  Human-­‐Automation	  Systems	  The	  Authority	  and	  Autonomy	  research	  theme	  considers	  authority	  specifically	  in	  the	  context	   of	   human-­‐automation	   systems.	   	   Although	   an	   automated	   function	   may	   be	  	  well-­‐defined,	   the	  complement	  of	   tasks	   left	   to	   the	  human	  manager(s)—the	  effect	  on	  
work	  practice—may	  be	  ambiguous	  and	  conflicted,	  as	  the	  Überlingen	  incident	  reveals.	  	  	  TCAS’s	   function	   involves	   formulating	   and	   issuing	   an	   instruction	   to	   pilots	   that	  will	  avoid	  a	  collision	  if	  acted	  upon	  strictly	  and	  quickly	  enough.	  Insofar	  as	  we	  cannot	  say	  that	   a	   pilot	   must	   always,	   inevitably,	   with	   no	   exception	   execute	   what	   TCAS	  instructs—which	  every	   regulation	  concerning	  TCAS	   is	   careful	  not	   to	   say—the	   effect	  on	   the	   pilot’s	   situation	   is	   neither	   well-­‐defined	   nor	   well	   understood.	   Instead,	   the	  pilot’s	  response	  is	  left	  general	  (“insure	  the	  safety	  of	  the	  aircraft”)	  and	  his	  actions	  left	  open	   to	   judgment	   on	   the	   spot—following	   TCAS	   is	   contingent	   (see	   discussion	   in	  Section	  4.3).	  In	  fact	  the	  pilot’s	  job	  has	  been	  made	  more	  complicated	  because	  now	  he	  must	  relate	  what	  TCAS	  says	  to	  the	  remarks	  of	  other	  crew	  members,	  a	  possible	  ATCO	  intervention,	  and	  his	  own	  judgment.	  	  We	  may	   say	   that	   the	   function	   of	   TCAS	   is	   simply	   to	   advise—it	   has	   no	   authority	   to	  command	  the	  pilot	   insofar	  as	  he	  is	  not	  required	  to	  obey.	   	  Nevertheless,	  the	  pilot	   is	  obligated	   to	   take	   this	   advice	   into	   account,	   weighing	   the	   possibility	   of	   false	   alerts	  (Kochenderfer	  et	  al.	  2012a,	  b;	  Kuchar	  and	  Drumm	  2007)	  and	  considering	  how	  the	  pilot	  on	   the	  other	  aircraft	  might	  be	  responding.	   	   It	   is	   interesting	   in	   this	   respect	   to	  compare	   the	   “Climb,	   Climb!”	   instruction	   to	   the	   “Pull	   up!”	   advice	   issued	   for	   a	   stall.	  Unlike	  the	  stall	  advice,	   the	  effectiveness	  of	   the	  TCAS	  RA	  depends	  on	  the	  actions	  of	  pilots	  in	  another	  aircraft.	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In	   related	   work,	   So	   Young	   Kim53	  describes	   the	   “technology-­‐centered	   perspective”	  that	  specifies	  automation	  capabilities	  in	  terms	  of	  “function	  allocations,”	  making	  the	  point	   that	   automation	   can	   not	   truly	   have	   final	   authority.	   Citing	   a	   wide	   range	   of	  studies,	  Kim	  summarizes	  the	  problems	  that	  have	  arisen	  in	  flight	  system	  automation:	  	  
• The	  crew’s	  assigned	  functions	  are	  scattered	  across	  the	  flight	  deck	  and	  do	  not	  necessarily	  work	  to	  their	  strengths.	  	  
• People	  are	  assigned	  to	  monitoring	  automation,	  despite	  consistent	  findings	  that	  they	  are	  ineffective	  at	  this	  task.	  
• The	  technology-­‐centered	  perspective	  allocates	  functions	  to	  the	  automation	  based	  on	  its	  capabilities.	  
• The	  complementary	  structure	  of	  the	  work	  to	  be	  performed	  by	  people	  is	  inefficient	  and	  incoherent,	  which	  may	  make	  their	  role	  ambiguous.	  	  	  With	  respect	  to	  “authority,”	  So	  Young	  recommends	  that	  this	  concept	  be	  interpreted	  and	  designed	  with	  respect	  to	  responsibility,	  meaning	  accountability:	  	   [W]hereas	   “authority”	   is	   generally	   used	   to	   describe	  who	   is	   given	   the	   resources	   to	  perform	  a	  function	  in	  operational	  sense,	  “responsibility”	  is	  used	  to	  identify	  who	  will	  be	  held	  accountable	  in	  an	  organizational	  and	  legal	  sense	  for	  the	  outcome.	  	  But	  unless	  automation	  can	  be	  “proven	  to	  provide	  safety	  in	  all	  foreseeable	  operating	  conditions,”	  people	  must	  remain	  responsible	   for	   the	  outcome	  of	   	  what	  automation	  actions.	   This	   requires	   continuous	   monitoring	   of	   automated	   systems,	   which	   if	  impractical	  requires	  trusting	  the	  automation	  to	  work	  autonomously.	  	  If	  the	  person	  “who	  is	  held	  responsible	  does	  not	  have	  the	  resources	  and	  capability	  to	  act	   with	   authority,”	   then	   there	   will	   be	   a	   mismatch	   between	   authority	   and	  automation.	  The	  information	  seeking	  and	  monitoring	  workload	  of	  the	  person	  will	  be	  substantially	   increased.	   Furthermore,	   it	   will	   be	   desirable	   to	   give	   people	   “the	  capabilities	   and	   the	   resources	   to	   judge	   and	   intervene	   to	   override	   automation’s	  functions	   if	  necessary,”	  characterized	  as	   the	  “responsibility-­‐authority	  double-­‐bind”	  (Woods,	  1985).	  Kim	  stresses	   that	   this	  problem	  originates	   in	  designing	  automation	  by	  allocating	  functions	  to	  automation	  without	  regard	  for	  the	  capabilities	  of	  people.	  Hutchins	  (2000)	  adopts	  the	  total	  systems	  design	  perspective	  that	  “the	  flight	  deck	  as	  a	  whole	  should	  be	  viewed	  as	  a	  cognitive	  system,”	  (p.	  54).	  His	  design	  method	  focuses	  on	   patterns	   of	   information	   flow,	   creating	   redundant	   (cross-­‐checking)	   processing	  among	  the	  crew	  (p.	  72).	  	  This	  is	  an	  important	  point:	  We	  will	  be	  performing	  an	  important	  service	  if	  we	  keep	  focused	  on	  how	  the	  various	  NextGen	  automated	  systems	  interact	  with	  one	  another	  and	  with	   the	   people	  who	  must	  manage	   them.	  A	   similar	   point	   is	  made	   in	   a	   recent	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  53 	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   MODEL-­‐BASED	   METRICS	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   HUMAN-­‐AUTOMATION	   FUNCTION	  ALLOCATION	   IN	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  WORK	   ENVIRONMENTS,	   Georgia	   Institute	   of	   Technology	   Dissertation.	  	  August	  2011.	  	  pp.	  26	  –	  28.	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Department	  of	  Defense	  study	  (Defense	  Science	  Board	  2012)	  that	  characterizing	  and	  analyzing	  autonomy	  as	   a	  property	  of	   a	   system,	   such	  as	   in	   “levels	  of	   autonomy,”	   is	  “counter-­‐productive	   because…[it]	   focuses	   too	   much	   attention	   on	   the	   computer	  rather	   than	   on	   the	   collaboration	   between	   the	   computer	   and	   its	  operator/supervisor…..”	   	   To	   design	   the	   total	  work	   system,	   this	   reports	  we	   should	  design	  autonomy	  for	  collaboration,	  not	  for	  operating	  without	  human	  interaction.	  	  Pilot/ATCO	  problems	  with	  TCAS	  highlight	  what	  happens	  when	  designers	  neglect	  the	  
distributed	  interactions	   of	   people	   and	  automated	   systems.	  By	   analogy	  with	  human	  factors	   critiques	  about	  designers	  who	  neglect	   the	   system	   interfaces,	  we	  might	   call	  this	  “interaction	  negligence.”	  
11.3 Summary	  of	  Authority	  Aspects	  of	  Überlingen	  Scenario	  In	  the	  sequence	  of	  events	  in	  the	  actual	  Überlingen	  accident,	  there	  were	  there	  no	  acts	  of	   exerting	   authority	   inappropriately—for	   example,	   the	   Karlsruhe	   ATCO	   didn’t	  violate	   the	   fundamental	   air	   traffic	   control	   rule	   of	   reaching	   outside	   his	   airspace	   to	  contact	  the	  DHL	  or	  BTC	  flights	  directly—but	  many	  failures	  to	  exert	  authority	  (acts	  of	  omission).	  	  	  	  We	  have	  argued	  in	  this	  chapter	  that	  in	  fact	  TCAS	  and	  the	  Zurich	  ATCO	  did	  not	  have	  overlapping	   authority,	   but	   rather	   the	   Zurich	   ATCO	   did	   not	   properly	   carry	   out	   his	  responsibility	   to	   safely	   maintain	   aircraft	   separation,	   an	   act	   of	   omission.	   We	  suggested	  that	  philosophically	  the	  question	   is	  not	  “who	  is	   in	  charge	  of	  what	  I	  do?”	  but	  more	   pragmatically,	   “Which	   trajectory	   is	  more	   likely	   to	   be	   correct?”	   and	   that	  might	   reduce	   to	   “Which	   advice	   do	   I	   trust?”	   One	   might	   argue	   that	   the	   BTC	   crew	  followed	   the	   ATCO’s	   advice	   because	   he	   spoke	   first	   and	   emotionally,	   and	   that	  was	  more	  persuasive.	  	  	  The	  BFU	  Report	   (p.	   76)	   argues	   as	  well	   that	   the	  Russians	  might	   have	   developed	   a	  more	  complex	  mental	  model	  about	  trajectories	  of	  other	  aircraft:	  	  The	  Russian	  Federation	  states	  that	  the	  Russian	  pilots	  were	  unable	  to	  obey	  the	  TCAS	  advisory	  to	  climb;	  the	  advisory	  was	  given	  when	  they	  were	  already	  at	  35500	  feet	  while	  the	  controller	  wrongly	  stated	  there	  was	  conflicting	  traffic	  above	  them	  at	  36000	  feet.	  Also,	  the	  controller	  gave	  the	  wrong	  position	  of	  the	  DHL	  plane	  (2	  o'clock	  instead	  of	  the	  actual	  10	  o'clock)...	  (TCAS	  2012)	  	  Perhaps	   the	  BTC	  crew	  rationally	   related	   the	  TCAS	  and	   the	  ATCO	   information,	   and	  they	  chose	  the	  most	  likely	  route	  to	  safety.	  	   	  Specifically,	  they	  might	  have	  concluded	  that	  TCAS	  was	  telling	  them	  to	  climb	  into	  traffic	  because	  ATCO	  had	  implied	  that	  an	  aircraft	  was	  above	  them.	  The	  combination	  of	  this	  information	  and	  ATCO’s	  repetition	  of	  the	  command	  (which	  TCAS	  did	  not	  do),	  made	  the	  “descend”	  advice	  appear	  more	  believable.	  	  Considering	  now	  the	  failures	  to	  exert	  authority,	  here	  is	  a	  summary	  of	  the	  factors	  we	  have	  discussed:	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1. Zurich	  ATCO	  had	  authority	  as	  Supervisor	  (DL)	  during	  the	  night	  shift	  but	  did	  not	  behave	  accordingly;	  he	  did	  not	  exercise	  his	  authority	  by	  reflecting	  on	  the	  larger	  situation	  and	  realizing	  that	  the	  staffing	  was	  inadequate	  (BFU	  Report,	  p.	  83).	  2. The	   Zurich	   supervisor	   did	   not	   exert	   his	   authority	   appropriately	   to	   brief	  ATCOs	  about	  risks	  involved	  in	  the	  technical	  work,	  i.e.,	  reviewing	  what	  might	  go	  wrong	  and	  what	  to	  do	  about	  it,	  such	  telling	  them,	  “Do	  not	  go	  on	  break	  until	  the	  work	  is	  done.”	  (p.	  88)	  3. System	  Manager	  technicians	  (SYMAs)	  were	  trained	  and	  aware	  of	  the	  system	  degradation,	   but	   did	   not	   exert	   their	   implicit	   authority	   to	   remind	   and/or	  educate	   the	   ATCO,	   “Because	   the	   technical	   work	   had	   been	   planned	   long	   in	  advance	   they	  assumed	  they	  were	  not	  responsible	  and	  did	  not	  see	  any	  need	  either.”	  (p.	  89)	  4. The	   two	  CIR	  CAs	  present	  at	  Zurich	  were	  not	  expected	   to	   reflect	  on	   the	  CIR	  situation	  and	  would	  not	  normally	  question	  the	  ATCO’s	  authority	  to	  handle	  air	  traffic	  problems	  (p.	  86).	  	  The	  number	  of	  omissions	   raises	   the	  question	  of	  who	   is	   responsible	   for	   safety	  and	  avoiding	  errors.	  In	  practice	  at	  the	  Zurich	  ATCC	  at	  the	  time,	  the	  answer	  was	  “only	  the	  person	  on	   the	   sharp	  end”	   (p.	  83,	  87).	   	   For	  example,	   the	  BFU	  Report	   says	   “the	  CIR	  system	  design	  helps	  defend	  the	  controller	  from	  making	  errors	  at	  the	  ‘sharp	  end’,	  but	  also	  monitors	  for	  these	  errors,	  so	  they	  can	  be	  managed.”	  (p.	  87)	  	  That	  may	  be	  so,	  but	  ultimately	  some	  people	  must	  feel	  responsibility	  and	  adaptively	  speak	  and	  act	  for	  the	  system	  by	  being	  sensitive	  to	  and	  responding	  to	  unusual	  situations.	  	  For	  example,	  the	  SYMA	  might	   have	   taken	   it	   upon	   himself,	   seeing	   that	   the	   supervisor	   and	   an	   ATCO	  were	   absent	   and	   the	   ATCO	   moving	   a	   bit	   frantically	   back	   and	   forth	   between	  workstations,	   to	   verify	   that	   systems	   were	   functioning	   that	   were	   expected	   to	   be	  operational,	  such	  as	  the	  backup	  phones.	  We	  draw	  a	  broader	  systemic	  conclusion	  not	  addressed	  by	  the	  BFU	  Report:	  narrow	  concepts	   of	   hierarchical	   job	   boundaries	   and	   responsibility	   are	   inadequate	   in	   a	  complex	  work	   system.	   	   People	  must	   be	   proactive	   to	   use	   their	   knowledge	   to	   help	  each	  other.	   	  Further	   it	  must	  be	  accepted	   that	   false	  positives	  will	  occur	  and	  people	  should	   not	   be	   penalized	   for	   speaking	   up	   (compare	   with	   Columbia	   Accident	  Investigation	  Board	  [2003]	  report	  about	  communications	  within	  the	  Johnson	  Space	  Center	   Mission	   Operations	   Directorate	   during	   Columbia	   mission).	   Somehow	   this	  must	   be	   balanced	   against	   the	   risks	   of	   intervening	   in	   time-­‐pressured	   emergency	  situations	   (e.g.,	   the	  Karlsruhe	  ATCO	  did	  not	  know	  what	  might	  be	  occurring	  on	   the	  aircraft	  or	  at	  the	  Zurich	  ATCC,	  reinforcing	  his	  understanding	  that	  intervention	  was	  inappropriate).	  From	  a	  logical	  perspective,	  we	  may	  think	  of	  authority	  as	  a	  property	  of	  an	  agent:	  one	  agent	   may	   clearly	   have	   authority;	   there	   may	   be	   a	   clear	   transfer	   or	   change	   of	  authority;	   it	   may	   be	   unclear	   which	   agent	   has	   authority;	   or	   the	   answer	   to	   the	  question	   of	   authority	   may	   need	   to	   be	   refined	   in	   terms	   of	   some	   kind	   of	   type-­‐structure,	  different	  agents	  having	  different	  types	  of	  authority.	  	  A	  major	  advantage	  of	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a	  work	  practice	  analysis	  as	  we	  have	  performed	   for	   the	  Überlingen	  work	  system	   is	  that	  we	  may	  find	  our	  theoretical	  frameworks—however	  logically	  and	  dimensionally	  complete	  they	  may	  be—do	  not	  fit	  the	  world	  we	  are	  modeling.	  	  To	  recapitulate	  what	  we	  have	  said	   in	   this	  chapter,	  Überlingen	  exemplifies	   that	   the	  “mantle	   of	   authority”	   notion,	   as	   something	   that	   can	   be	   transferred,	   doesn't	  necessarily	  fit	  real	  situations.	  	  Given	  that	  the	  pilot	  always	  has	  ultimate	  responsibility	  for	   safety,	   the	   issue	   of	   authority	   of	   ATCO	   versus	   TCAS	   is	   moot.	   	   The	   pilot	   has	  authority	  to	  do	  what	  is	  necessary:	  “TCAS	  does	  not	  alter	  or	  diminish	  the	  pilot's	  basic	  authority	  and	  responsibility	  to	  ensure	  safe	  flight”	  (FAA	  2011,	  p.	  39).	  TCAS,	  like	  ATCO,	  is	  a	  source	  of	  information.	  Neither	  ultimately	  can	  be	  said	  to	  be	  in	  control	  of	  pilots’	  actions.	  	  The	  pilots	  control	  the	  aircraft.	  “Authority”	   with	   respect	   to	   the	   TCAS	   might	   be	   better	   interpreted	   as	   meaning	  “providing	   the	  official	   source	  of	   information	  or	   advice,”	  what	   is	   colloquially	   called	  “speaking	  with	   authority.”	   But	   then	   the	   issue	   is	   not	   “transfer	   of	   authority”	   (as	   in	  transfer	  of	  control),	  but	  how	  the	  pilots	  weigh	  and	  interpret	  the	  information/advice.	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12 Discussion:	  Verification	  and	  Validation	  of	  a	  Work	  Practice	  
Simulation	  In	  general,	  verification	   is	  a	  process	  of	  checking	  that	  a	  product,	  service,	  or	  designed	  system	   (e.g.,	   a	   computer	   program)	   satisfies	   design	   requirements.	   In	   particular,	  verifying	   Brahms-­‐GUM	   includes	   comparing	   work	   simulation	   behaviors	   to	  regulations,	  as	  well	  as	  evaluating	  the	  regulations	  with	  respect	  to	  yet	  more	  abstract	  specifications	  of	   function	  and	  value	  (e.g.,	   safety,	  efficiency).	   In	   the	  context	  of	  work	  practice	   simulation,	   validation	   is	   a	   process	   of	   checking	   that	   the	   model	   correctly	  describes	   what	   occurs	   in	   an	   actual	   work	   system,	   that	   is,	   how	   people	   and	   system	  behave	  and	  interact.	  	  	  Verification	   of	   Brahms-­‐GÜM	   lies	   outside	   the	   scope	   of	   the	   effort	   reported	   here.	  Rather	  we	  take	  the	  first	  step	  of	  elucidating	  what	  it	  means	  to	  verify	  a	  work	  practice	  simulation.	   We	   provide	   here	   a	   framework	   for	   verifying	   Brahms-­‐GÜM,	   or	   more	  generally,	   for	   verifying	   any	   work	   practice	   simulation	   in	   a	   framework	   similar	   to	  Brahms	   that	   models	   both	   designed	   systems	   (e.g.,	   TCAS,	   radar	   display)	   and	   people	  (including	  specifically	  perception,	   conception	  of	  activities	  and	  methods,	   reasoning,	  movements,	  and	  communications).	  	  	  	  By	  intent,	  a	  Brahms	  work	  practice	  simulation	  is	  a	  simulation	  of	  a	  design.	  Insofar	  as	  it	  includes	  models	   of	   how	   people	   behave	   it	   is	   a	   scientific	  model.	   And	   of	   course,	   the	  model’s	  constructs,	  in	  combination	  with	  the	  simulation	  engine,	  constitute	  a	  software	  
program.	  These	  three	  perspectives—a	  design,	  a	  scientific	  model,	  a	  program—can	  be	  used	  to	  define	  what	  aspects	  need	  to	  verified	  and	  the	  relevant	  methods.	  	  	  In	   this	   chapter	   we	   first	   examine	   the	   relation	   of	   a	   software	   system	   to	   a	   design	  simulation	  and	  a	  scientific	  model.	  Then	  as	  important	  background	  for	  the	  discussion	  of	   verification,	   we	   clarify	   how	   regulations	   are	   represented	   in	   a	   work	   practice	  simulation.	   We	   next	   recapitulate	   the	   “total	   systems	   perspective,”	   to	   highlight	   the	  presence	   of	   non-­‐deterministic	   aspects	   in	   the	   model.	   Finally,	   we	   detail	   the	  relationships	   among	   work	   system	   requirements,	   design,	   model,	   and	   simulation	  behaviors	  (outcomes)	  and	  how	  these	  constrain	  and	  challenge	  verification.	  	  In	  practice,	  validating	  Brahms-­‐GÜM	  is	  a	  scientific	  process	  of	  finding	  evidence	  for	  the	  agent	   and	   object	   models,	   which	   is	   effectively	   a	   scientific	   activity.	   Validating	  object/subsystem	   simulations	   of	   systems	  with	   existing	   validating	  models,	   such	   as	  the	  TCAS,	  might	  be	  equated	  with	  verifying	  the	  Brahms-­‐GÜM	  model	  of	  the	  subsystem	  with	   existing	   formal	   specifications.	   Validating	   agent	   thoughtframes	   could	   adapt	  methods	   applied	   in	   cognitive	   modeling	   (e.g.,	   Kintsch,	   Miller,	   and	   Polson	   1984).	  Validating	   agent	  workframes	   (e.g.,	   of	   pilots	   and	  ATCO)	   entails	   evaluating	  whether	  the	   model	   properly	   describes	   how	   people	   behave.	   Such	   evidence	   begins	   by	  validating	  patterns	  of	  routine	  behavior,	  namely	  relating	  the	  conditionality,	  priority,	  and	   timing	   of	   workframes	   to	   methods	   people	   employ	   in	   the	   context	   of	   their	  activities.	   Collecting	   relevant	   evidence	   requires	   observing	   behavior	   and	   work	  system	  events	  over	  extended	  periods	  using	  ethnographic	  methods.	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  Accordingly,	   in	   this	   chapter	  we	   review	   the	  nature	  and	   importance	  of	   ethnography	  for	  creating	  and	  validating	  a	  work	  practice	  simulation.	   	  We	  follow	  this	  review	  by	  a	  case	  study	  of	  a	  shortcoming	  in	  the	  Brahms-­‐MER	  simulation,	  which	  reveals	  the	  kinds	  of	   omissions	   and	   modeling	   errors	   that	   may	   make	   a	   difference	   in	   work	   system	  design,	  and	  hence	  reveal	  what	  validation	  of	  Brahms-­‐GÜM	  might	  focus	  upon.	  	  Finally,	  we	   observe	   how	   because	   TCAS	   is	   fallible,	   certifying	   it	   requires	   a	   work	   practice	  simulation	   that	   models	   how	   people	   integrate	   its	   advice	   with	   other	   sources	   of	  information.	  	  
12.1 Comparing	  Software	  Programs,	  Design	  Simulations,	  and	  Scientific	  Models	  The	  strategic	  approach	  of	  the	  broader	  research	  project	  that	  includes	  Brahms-­‐GÜM	  is	  to	  apply	  model	  checking	  methods	  developed	  for	  software	  programing	  to	  verifying	  a	  Brahms	  simulation.	   	  Therefore,	   it	   is	  worth	  considering	  how	  a	  simulation	  of	  a	  work	  system	   design	   relates	   to	   a	   program,	   and	   then	   how	   a	   simulation	   of	   a	  work	   system	  
design,	   as	   a	   model	   of	   an	   existing	   or	   proposed	   real	   world	   system,	   relates	   to	   a	  scientific	  model.	  These	  perspectives	  could	  help	  direct	  research	  for	  developing	  tools	  that	  facilitate	  creating	  and	  evaluating	  Brahms	  models.	  	  On	   the	   one	   hand,	   a	   software	   program	   is	   a	   system	   with	   fixed,	   pre-­‐defined	  inputs/outputs,	   and	   such	   a	   system	   can	   be	   modeled	   formally.	   In	   software	  engineering	  model	   checking	   involves	   creating	   a	  model	   of	   a	   system	   (the	  program),	  while	  Brahms-­‐GÜM	  is	  by	  its	  very	  nature	  already	  a	  model	  of	  a	  system,	  the	  real	  world	  work	   system	   of	   people-­‐systems-­‐environment	   interactions.	   	   However,	   the	   Brahms	  model	   lacks	   formal	   semantics,	   and	   its	   behavior	   is	   determined	   by	   the	   Brahms	  simulation	   engine,	   a	   software	   program,	   whose	   correctness	   has	   not	   been	   formally	  established.	  	  	  	  Furthermore,	  in	  the	  broader	  intent	  of	  this	  research,	  a	  Brahms	  ATS	  model	  would	  in	  general	   be	   based	   on	   a	  work	   system	  design,	   a	   possible	  work	   system	   configuration,	  formulated	   perhaps	   in	   documents	   describing	   equipment	   specifications	   and	  operations	  procedures.	  Because	  Brahms	  simulations	  can	  reveal	  emergent	  properties	  of	  a	  work	  system	  design,	  model	  checking	  methods	  applied	  to	  such	  Brahms	  models	  would	  be	  checking	  emergent	  properties	  of	  a	  system	  design,	  such	  as	  whether	  regulated	  system	   or	   human	   behaviors	   are	   violated.	   From	   the	   perspective	   of	   work	   system	  design,	  we	  would	   therefore	   locate	  model	   checking	  within	   the	   iterative	   process	   of	  transforming	  ATS	  requirements	   (including	  regulations,	  procedures,	  and	  protocols)	  to	  prototype	  work	  system	  designs,	  defining	  scenarios,	   and	   	   interpreting/analyzing	  behaviors,	   then	   working	   back	   to	   revising	   requirements	   and/or	   the	   design.	   This	  process	  is	  detailed	  in	  Section	  12.5.	  	  A	  Brahms	  simulation	  model	  may	  incorporate	  a	  software	  program	  used	  in	  the	  work	  system	   being	   modeled	   (e.g.,	   TCAS).	   In	   this	   case,	   the	   work	   practice	   simulation	   in	  which	  the	  software	  program	  (or	   its	  simulation)	   is	  embedded	  can	  be	  used	  to	  verify	  that	  the	  program’s	  design	  is	  consistent	  and	  complete	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  system	  as	  a	  whole,	   especially	  work	  practices.	   In	  particular,	  Brahms-­‐GÜM	  shifts	   from	  certifying	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TCAS	  only	  in	  terms	  of	  flight	  configurations,	  to	  include	  its	  functional	  role	  of	  affecting	  human	  behavior.	  	  Finally,	  Brahms	  models	  are	  inherently	  simulations	  of	  cognition	  and	  action	  in	  people;	  hence	  model	   checking	  methods	   applied	   to	   Brahms	  models	   are	   checking	   emergent	  
properties	   of	   scientific	   models	   of	   socio-­‐psychological	   processes.	   Accordingly,	   it	   is	  important	  to	  understand	  and	  formalize	  how	  key	  events	  have	  probabilistic	  ordering	  and	   timing,	   and	   thus	   causally	   affect	   each	   other.	   What	   is	   the	   space	   of	   possible	  outcomes	  and	  what	  are	  the	  bounds	  of	  the	  domain	  under	  which	  the	  model	  is	  valid?	  Appendix	  27	  lists	  the	  probabilistic	  components	  in	  the	  Brahms	  language.	  	  From	  a	  scientific	  perspective,	  particularly	  for	  cognitive	  scientists,	  the	  mental	  models	  people	   have	   about	   automation	   relative	   to	   their	   ongoing	   activities	   is	   especially	  important	  in	  simulating	  work	  practices.	  Of	  particular	  interest	  is	  how	  people	  monitor	  and	   understand	   system	   behavior	   within	   the	   requirements	   of	   an	   operational	   role,	  which	  determines	  what	  model	  of	  their	  environment	  is	  useful,	  how	  it	  is	  maintained,	  and	   what	   they	   should	   be	   doing.	   Brahms	   provides	   an	   excellent	   framework	   for	  modeling	   interactions	   of	   people	   playing	   different	   roles	  with	   different	   expertise	   in	  different	  settings.	  For	  example,	  in	  simulating	  the	  world	  of	  the	  pilot	  in	  the	  plane	  and	  the	   ATCO	   in	   the	   ATC,	   Brahms-­‐GÜM	   simulation	   runs	   reveal	   how	  multiple	  practices	  
are	   coordinated	   in	   joint	  activity	   (or	   not	   coordinated	   in	   the	   case	   of	   the	   Überlingen	  accident).	  	  	  Brahms	  simulations	  by	  virtue	  of	  relating	  the	  processes	  in	  the	  environment	  to	  human	  activity	  show	  how	  perception	  occurs	  within	  activity	  and	  is	  thus	  affected	  by	  temporal	  and	   spatial	   relations.	   In	  particular,	  ATCO	   is	   engaged	   in	   “constraint-­‐based	  problem	  solving”—an	   ongoing	   process	   of	   actively	   monitoring,	   interpreting,	   prioritizing,	  posing	  what-­‐if	  questions,	  adjusting	  controls	  to	  stay	  within	  operational	  bounds,	  etc.	  	  With	  respect	  to	  mental	  models,	  model	  checking	  might	  emphasize	  how	  belief	  change	  occurs	   in	   Brahms	   simulations	   and	   how	   for	   example	   the	   work	   load	   or	   lack	   of	  communication	   affects	   situation	   awareness	   (e.g.,	   failure	   to	   know	   the	   state	   of	  automation,	  such	  as	  that	  optical	  STCA	  is	  not	  operational).	  	  In	  summary,	  Brahms	  simulations	  have	  a	  dual	  nature	  with	  both	  engineering	  value	  (as	  models	   of	   work	   system	   designs)	   and	   scientific	   value	   (as	   simulations	   of	   human-­‐system	   interactions).	   	   For	   the	   purpose	   of	   ATS	   and	   the	   broader	   NextGen	   research	  program	  we	  would	   emphasize	   the	   engineering	   value:	   the	  model	   is	   the	  means	   for	  solving	   a	   problem,	   not	   the	   end	   in	   itself	   (in	   the	   sense	   that	   scientific	   models	   are	  products	  of	  a	  research	  project).	   	   In	  this	  respect,	  developing	  Brahms-­‐GÜM	  might	  be	  better	   characterized	   as	   “doing	   analysis”	   rather	   than	   “modeling.”	   We	   are	   using	  Brahms	  to	  analyze	  patterns	  of	  interaction	  among	  human	  and	  automated	  systems—patterns	  we	   can	   identify	   in	   today's	   automation	   (e.g.,	   TCAS)	   and	   that	  will	   likely	   be	  present	  in	  the	  work	  systems	  of	  tomorrow.	  	  In	   developing	   models	   like	   Brahms-­‐GÜM	   we	   would	   over	   time	   create	   not	   only	   a	  library	   of	   components	   (e.g.,	   aircraft,	   radio,	   radar	   display),	   but	   also	   a	   collection	   of	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patterns	  of	  system	  configurations,	  extensible	  mini-­‐scenarios	  based	  on	  real	  incidents	  and	   accidents	   (such	   as	   “missing	   alert	   system”	   or	   “authority	   usurped	   from	   agent	  without	  notification”),	  and	  that	  are	  applicable	  to	  the	  analysis	  of	  proposed	  future	  air	  transportation	  systems.	  	  	  For	  those	  creating	  models	  like	  Brahms-­‐GÜM	  the	  analytic	  aspect	  is	  always	  salient,	  an	  effect	  common	  to	  modeling	  human	  behavior	  in	  general.	  	  We	  believe	  we	  can	  correctly	  understand	  small	  snippets	  of	  behavior.	  We	  can	  approximate	  or	  simulate	  these	  in	  a	  variety	   of	   ways.	   But	   when	   the	   time-­‐scale	   gets	   longer,	   the	   number	   of	   interacting	  agents	  grows,	  the	  choice-­‐points	  proliferate;	  then	  we	  need	  to	  use	  the	  computer	  as	  a	  bookkeeping	  tool	  to	  work	  out	  the	  implications	  of	  our	  simple	  hypotheses	  as	  they	  are	  composed	   into	  a	   larger	  system.	   In	  part	   the	  problem	   is	   tracking	  or	  anticipating	   the	  interactions	   that	  might	  occur	  given	   the	  preponderance	  of	   systems	  having	  multiple	  states.	  The	  difficulty	  also	  relates	  to	  emergent	  relations	  in	  the	  larger	  system	  that	  we	  can't	  either	   imagine	  easily	  or	   simply	  diagram	  on	  paper	   (e.g.,	  how	  the	   late	  arriving	  AEF	  affected	  Zurich	  ATCO’s	  awareness	  of	  other	   flights,	  by	  virtue	  of	   the	   relation	  of	  radio	  frequencies	  to	  the	  location	  of	  radar	  displays	  and	  phones).	  	  In	   short,	   creating	   Brahms-­‐GÜM	   could	   be	   viewed	   as	   fundamentally	   an	   analytic	  method	  for	  understanding	  what	  happened	  at	  Überlingen,	  as	  we	  believe	  this	  report	  demonstrates.	   The	   ability	   to	   grasp	   complexity	   and	   insightfully	   prioritize	   design	  problems	   is	   the	   purpose	   of	   the	   analysis.	   For	   example,	   one	   could	   argue	   from	   the	  Brahms-­‐GÜM	  simulation	  outcomes	  that	  it	  is	  extremely	  important	  that	  ATCO	  have	  a	  means	   of	   knowing	   that	   STCA	   optical	   is	   not	   working	   (effectively	   an	   alert	   that	   an	  alerting	  system	  has	  failed	  or	  is	  missing).	  	  	  	  In	   developing	   a	   “what	   if”	   simulation,	   one	   can	  make	   predictions	   that	   certain	  work	  system	  configurations	  are	  risky,	  leading	  to	  unsafe	  situations.	  	  Such	  predictions	  are	  of	  value	   for	   the	   design	   process,	   as	   an	   engineering	   tool.	   The	   notion	   of	   accurate	  prediction	  is	  also	  not	  apt	  because	  it	  is	  unlikely	  that	  any	  initial	  model	  state	  (including	  the	  modeled	  knowledge	  and	  behaviors	  of	  people)	  could	  exactly	  fit	  future	  conditions	  that	   would	   occur	   in	   the	   real	   world.	   Predictions	   based	   on	   work	   practice	   models	  (interpretations	  of	  a	  Brahms	  simulation	  outcome)	  must	  always	  be	  characterized	  as	  “in	   circumstances	   like	   these…interactions	   like	   these	   might	   occur.”	   When	   the	  simulation	  shows	  aircraft	  colliding	  or	  even	  repeated	  separation	  violations,	  then	  we	  know	  we	  have	  a	  problem	  worth	  investigating	  and	  can	  turn	  our	  attention	  to	  verifying	  and	  validating	  the	  model,	  and	  then	  trying	  alternative	  designs.	  	  Thus,	  the	  primary	  aim	  of	  the	  project	  is	  not	  accurate	  prediction	  of	  any	  particular	  work	  system	  configuration,	  but	  identifying	  general	  designs	  that	  merit	  improvement	  or	  further	  analysis.	  
12.2 Representing	  Regulations	  in	  a	  Work	  Practice	  Model	  Perhaps	   one	   of	   the	   most	   obvious	   evaluative	   questions	   we	   can	   ask	   about	   a	   work	  system	   is	   whether	   it	   follows	   all	   established	   regulations	   and	   procedures.	  Consequently,	   it	   is	   important	   to	   understand	   how	   regulations	   and	   procedures	   are	  modeled	  in	  a	  work	  system	  simulation.	  A	  fundamental	  point	  about	  a	  model	  of	  work	  practice	  is	  that	  unless	  people	  in	  practice	  actually	  read	  regulations	  and	  procedures	  or	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talk	  about	  them,	  they	  need	  not	  be	  explicit	  representations	  in	  the	  model.	  Most	  often,	  regulations	  and	  procedures	  will	  be	  implicit	  in	  the	  simulated	  behaviors—an	  observer	  (or	  monitoring	  process)	  must	  abstract	  what	  occurs	   in	  the	  simulation	  to	  verify	  that	  regulations	  and	  procedures	  are	  followed.	  	  	  If	  a	  simulation	  works	  by	  have	  agents	  read	  (refer	  to)	  a	  representation	  of	  regulations	  and	  procedures	  to	  determine	  how	  to	  act—and	  thus	  the	  representations	  control	  the	  agent’s	   behavior—the	   simulation	   is	   by	   definition	   not	   a	   work	   practice	   simulation,	  because	   that	   is	  not	  how	  people	  behave	   in	   the	  real	  world.	   Indeed,	  everyone	  knows	  that	  referring	  to	  a	  manual,	  written	  policies,	  etc.	  is	  not	  practical,	  and	  anyone	  doing	  so	  at	   every	   step	   would	   be	   unable	   to	   do	   their	   work.	   Within	   the	   Brahms	   framework,	  people	  are	  modeled	  as	  being	  mostly	  reactive,	  following	  well-­‐practiced	  and	  accepted	  patterns	   of	   behavior,	   rather	   than	   “reasoning	   from	   first	   principles”	   (i.e.,	   by	   which	  thoughtframes	  would	  deduce	  optimal	  behaviors	  in	  terms	  of	  their	  causal	  effects).	  	  However,	   we	   can	   design	   computer	   programs	   that	   do	   operate	   “mechanically”	   (or	  compile	  their	  behaviors	  from	  such	  representations),	  so	  it	  is	  important	  to	  recognize	  how	  a	  work	  practice	  simulation	  is	  different	  and	  the	  implications	  for	  verification.	  We	  begin	  with	  a	  general	  review	  of	  how	  different	  mechanisms	  that	  may	  produce	  it	  what	  an	  observer	  may	  abstract	  as	  behavior	  that	  follows	  a	  pattern.	  	  	  	  The	  behavior	  of	  a	  computer	  program	  may	  be	  regular	  by	  virtue	  of	  having	  an	  explicit	  set	  of	  rules,	  grammar,	  a	  procedure,	  and	  so	  on	  that	  generates	  the	  program’s	  behavior	  or	  the	  interacting	  processes	  may	  implicitly	  produce	  what	  an	  observer	  describes	  as	  patterns.	   	  This	  distinction	   is	  well	  known	   in	  natural	   language—the	  vast	  majority	  of	  people	  speak	  “grammatically”	  without	  necessarily	  knowing	  or	  deliberately	  applying	  explicit	   rules	   of	   grammar.	   	   (Indeed,	   explicit	   grammatical	   rules	  would	  not	  produce	  anything	   close	   to	  what	   people	   actually	   say,	   hence	   Chomsky’s	   distinction	   between	  competence	  and	  performance.)	  	  In	   developing	   a	   computer	   program	   to	   simulate	   human	   behavior	   a	   modeler	   may	  adopt	   a	   grammar-­‐based	   method	   or	   a	   more	   direct	   behavior-­‐based	   method.	   In	  particular,	   in	  simulating	  ATCO	  for	  example,	  we	  might	  have	   formulated	  a	   library	  of	  procedures	   and	   protocols	   that	   ATCO	  must	   follow,	   and	   the	   simulated	   ATCO	   agent	  would	  generate	  every	  individual	  action	  by	  interpreting	  this	  library.	  	  	  The	  Brahms	  framework	  allows	  for	  representing	  written	  manuals,	  online	  procedures,	  written	  “cheat	  sheets,”	  and	  so	  on,	  but	  such	  constructs	  are	   included	  only	   insofar	  as	  we	  know	  people	   actually	   look	  at,	   read,	   and	   follow	   them	  as	   references.	   Indeed,	  we	  might	  have	  modeled	  pilot	  behavior	  in	  more	  detail	  by	  specifying	  how	  they	  do	  in	  fact	  refer	  to	  written	  checklists	  before	  takeoff,	  etc.	  	  	  Simulating	   practice	   means	   representing	   what	   people	   actually	   do,	   emphasizing	  where	   the	   person	   looks,	   what	   is	   perceived	   (taken	   to	   be	   information),	   general	  movements,	   and	   when	   reasoning	   actually	   occurs.	   In	   general,	   if	   you	   examine	   a	  Brahms	   model	   of	   work	   practice	   you	   will	   not	   find	   a	   body	   of	   regulations	   or	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procedures	   packaged	   and	   labeled	   as	   such.	   But	   you	   will	   find	   on	   examining	   the	  simulation	  behaviors	  that	  pilots	  and	  ATCOs	  appear	  to	  follow	  procedures	  and	  adhere	  to	  regulations.	  	  As	  an	  example,	  consider	  a	  regulation	  such	  as,	  “When	  instructed	  by	  the	  ATCO,	  a	  pilot	  should	   change	   the	   radio	   frequency.”	   This	   statement	   does	   not	   appear	   in	   Brahms-­‐GÜM.	  	  However,	  the	  Pilot	  Group	  includes	  this	  top-­‐level	  	  workframe:	  	  workframe	  Tune_Radio	  {	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  priority:	  60;	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  variables:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  forone(AircraftRadio)	  radio;	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  forone(Flight)	  flight;	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  foreach(double)	  freq;	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  foreach(string)	  out;	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  when(knownval(current.location	  =	  radio.location)	  and	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  knownval(flight	  =	  current.flight)	  and	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  knownval(flight.handoff	  =	  true)	  and	  	   //	  pilot’s	  flight	  is	  in	  handoff	  process	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  knownval(radio.frequency	  !=	  flight.sectorFrequency)	  and	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  knownval(freq	  =	  flight.sectorFrequency))	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  do	  {	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  conclude((radio.frequency	  =	  freq));	   	   //	  new	  belief	  about	  radio’s	  frequency	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  println_d("tuning	  radio	  to	  %1",	  freq,	  out);	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  tuneRadio(out,	  radio);	   	   	   //	  change	  radio	  frequency	  (a	  fact)	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  printlnWithSimTime(out);	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  getCommTime();	  	  	   	   	   	   //	  call	  ATCC	  on	  new	  frequency	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  conclude((current.commPerformative	  =	  "INFORM"));	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  conclude((current.commReason	  =	  "flight"));	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  }	  }//wf	  Tune_Radio	  	  The	  workframe	  describes	  a	  situated	  action:	  the	  pilot	  is	  located	  by	  the	  radio,	  which	  is	  not	   tuned	   to	   the	  next	   sector’s	   	   frequency,	   and	   the	   flight	   is	   in	   	  handoff	  process.	  He	  tunes	  the	  radio	  (modeled	  as	  communicating	  with	  the	  radio)	  and	  then	  concludes	  that	  he	  must	  inform	  the	  ATCC	  about	  his	  flight	  arriving	  in	  the	  sector.	  	  	  In	  summary,	  what	  might	  be	  expressed	  as	  a	  prescriptive	  rule	  for	  the	  pilot	  to	  change	  the	   radio	   frequency	   is	   expressed	   procedurally	   (e.g.,	   the	   pilot	   changes	   the	   radio	  frequency	  after	  receiving	   the	   information,	   then	  contacts	   the	  ATCC).	   	   	  This	  “rule”	   is	  also	   modeled	   on	   multiple	   levels	   of	   abstraction	   (e.g.,	   the	   communications	   are	  modeled	  in	  the	  Radio	  Communicator	  Group	  to	  which	  the	  Pilot	  Group	  belongs)	  and	  within	   the	   Brahms	   framework	   that	   provides	   methods	   for	   modeling	   interactions	  among	   objects	   and	   agents	   (e.g.,	   tuning	   the	   radio	   frequency	   involves	  “communicating”	  with	  it).	  	  As	   this	  example	   illustrates,	   regulations	  and	  procedures	  are	  not	  generally	   found	  as	  statements	  in	  the	  model,	  but	  rather	  the	  modeled	  behaviors	  (practices)	  embody	  and	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respect	   such	   requirements.	   	   Indeed,	   one	   might	   draw	   an	   analogy	   of	   the	   relation	  between	   software	   requirements	   and	   the	   code	   itself	   as	   being	   like	   the	   relation	  between	  regulations/procedures	  and	  a	  model	  of	  work	  practice.	  	  In	  this	  respect,	  	  one	  could	   use	   a	   body	   of	   formalized	   regulations/procedures	   to	   verify	   that	   a	   Brahms	  simulation	  “fits	  specifications.”	  For	  example,	  comparing	  Brahms-­‐GÜM	  simulations	  to	  ATCC	  regulations,	  one	  would	  detect	  a	  violation	  when	  only	  one	  ATCO	  is	  on	  duty.	  	  Presenting	  this	  another	  way,	  looking	  for	  regulations	  in	  a	  model	  of	  work	  practice	  is	  a	  category	  error.	  	  As	  this	  is	  described	  by	  Gilbert	  Ryle	  (1949),	  after	  a	  tour	  of	  a	  campus	  one	   might	   say,	   “I	   see	   the	   student	   union,	   the	   library,	   and	   all	   the	   classrooms,	   but	  where	  is	  the	  university?”	  	  Or	  we	  might	  say,	  “I	  see	  the	  teachers	  and	  the	  students	  and	  all	  the	  classes,	  but	  where	  are	  the	  principles	  of	  higher	  learning?”	  	  Because	   of	   the	   emergent	   (unanticipated	   and	   difficult	   to	   predict)	   interactions	   that	  may	   occur,	   it	   is	   particularly	   important	   for	   an	   ATS	   work	   system	   simulation	   to	   be	  verified	  for	  adherence	  to	  safety	  properties,	  such	  as	  the	  separation	  between	  aircraft.	  	  As	  we	  have	  explained,	  the	  simulated	  ATCO	  does	  follow	  certain	  rules	  about	  when	  to	  handle	   a	  potential	   collision	   (Section	  9.2),	   but	   circumstances	   involving	   a	  particular	  sequence	   of	   events	   and	  priorities	   of	   other	   activities	  may	  delay	   or	   prevent	  ATCO’s	  actions.	   A	   separation	   violation	   occurred	   at	   Überlingen	   because	   of	   the	   failure	   to	  monitor	   the	   larger	   airspace	   while	   focusing	   on	   the	   AEF	   handoff;	   the	   same	   result	  occurs	  in	  some	  of	  the	  simulation	  runs	  of	  the	  Brahms-­‐GÜM	  scenario.	  	  	  Insofar	   judges	   in	   court	   disagree	   about	   the	   meaning	   of	   regulations,	   and	   different	  observers	  disagreed	  about	   to	  what	  extent	  ATCO	  or	   the	  BTC	  pilots	  were	  at	   fault	  at	  Überlingen,	  a	  work	  practice	  simulation	  can	  only	  be	  verified	  relative	  to	  an	  observer’s	  interpretation	   of	   what	   the	   regulations	   mean.	   	   In	   a	   model	   checking	   process,	   this	  interpretation	  would	   correspond	   to	   a	   formal	   representation	   of	   the	   “semantics”	   of	  the	  regulation.	  That	  is,	  a	  model	  of	  the	  regulations	  will	  be	  checked	  against	  a	  model	  of	  the	  work	  system.	  As	  for	  the	  remarks	  made	  about	  accuracy	  of	  prediction,	  what	  is	  at	  issue	  in	  verification	  is	  not	  so	  much	  whether	  the	  work	  system	  design	  is	  “correct”	  (i.e.,	  objectively,	   from	  any	  point	  of	  view),	  but	  whether	  problems	  can	  be	  detected	  and	  to	  characterize	  perhaps	  the	  space	  of	  scenarios	  in	  which	  the	  design	  is	  reliably	  safe.	  	  	  	  	  In	  summary,	   it	  should	  now	  be	  apparent	  why	  regulations/procedures	  are	  generally	  not	   represented	   explicitly	   in	   a	   Brahms	   model.	   Regulations/procedures	   are	  
normative	   descriptions	   of	   interactions	   among	   people,	   systems,	   and	   environment,	  that	   is,	  abstractions	   of	  what	   is	   supposed	   to	  happen.	   	  Therefore,	   they	  would	  not	   in	  general	   be	   contained	   in	   the	  model.	   Like	   the	   relation	  between	   specifications	   and	   a	  program,	  regulations/procedures	  are	  at	  a	  different	  level	  from	  the	  work	  system.	  The	  proper	  way	  to	  relate	  regulations	  and	  a	  work	  practice	  simulation	  is	  to	  use	  models	  of	  regulations	   outside	   the	   simulation	   to	   evaluate	   the	   system’s	   behavior	   in	   different	  scenarios.	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12.3 The	  Importance	  of	  Verifying	  the	  Total	  Work	  System	  Recall	   that	   the	   technical	   approach	   being	   used	   in	   the	   broader	   research	   project	   is	  adapting	   an	   existing	   agent-­‐based	   modeling	   system	   (Brahms)	   and	   using	  sophisticated	  software	  modeling	  tools	  to	  provide	  useful	  analyses	  early	  in	  the	  work	  system	   design	   process	   (Chapter	   1).	   	   The	   analysis	   of	   work	   systems	   composed	   of	  people	   and	   automated	   subsystems	   whose	   interactions	   may	   become	   complex	  requires	  methods	  for	  verifying	  that	  safety	  properties	  are	  not	  violated.	  	  	  	  As	  illustrated	  by	  the	  Überlingen	  accident,	  verification	  of	  automated	  systems	  should	  take	   into	   account	   interactions	   with	   other	   systems,	   people,	   and	   the	   environment.	  Understanding	  how	  the	  work	  system	  behaves	  entails	  considering	  communications,	  protocols,	  regulations	  and	  procedures,	  organizational	  roles	  and	  policies,	  geographic	  locations	   and	   facility/vehicle	   layout,	   controls/displays,	   automated	   controls	   and	  alerting	  systems,	  weather,	  and	  so	  on.	  	  The	  people	  and	  this	  context	  of	  resources	  and	  operational	  constraints	  constitute	  the	  “total	  work	  system,”	  also	  referred	  to	  a	  socio-­‐
technical	  system.	  	  The	   verification	   of	   TCAS	   (Kochenderfer	   et	   al.	   2012a,b)	   has	   not	   heretofore	   been	  placed	  in	  a	  total	  system	  perspective,	  and	  instead	  considers	  mainly	  the	  mathematics	  of	  aircraft	  in	  flight.	  The	  analysis	  of	  Überlingen	  by	  Kuchar	  and	  Drumm	  (2007)	  states	  the	  pilots	  did	  not	  obey	  TCAS,	  without	  considering	  the	  ordering	  and	  timing	  of	  ATCO’s	  intervention:	   “The	   Russians’	   choice	   to	  maneuver	   opposite	   to	   the	   RA	   defeated	   the	  coordination	   logic	   in	   TCAS.	   An	   advisory	   system	   like	   TCAS	   cannot	   prevent	   an	  accident	  if	  the	  pilots	  don’t	  follow	  the	  system’s	  advice”	  (p.	  284).	  	  Viewed	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  automated	  system	  alone,	  they	  then	  ask,	  “Why	  didn’t	  TCAS	  reverse	  the	  sense	  of	  the	  RAs	  when	   the	   situation	  continued	   to	  degrade?”	   rather	   than	   “Why	  didn’t	  ATCO	  know	   that	   TCAS	   intervention	   was	   underway	   and	   his	   authority	   was	   usurped?”	   or	  “How	   difficult	   is	   it	   for	   pilots	   to	   reverse	   course	   under	   direction	   of	   a	   computer	  seconds	  after	  a	  person	  of	  authority	  has	  fervently	  told	  them	  what	  to	  do?”	  	  	  	  A	  component	   like	  TCAS	  cannot	  be	  properly	  designed	  or	  validated	  in	   isolation:	  One	  must	   remain	   committed	   to	   the	   integrity	   of	   the	   work	   system,	   which	   includes	   the	  capabilities	   and	   socio-­‐cognitive	   strategies	   of	   the	   people	   and	   the	   causal	   effects	   of	  their	  sequential	  and	  simultaneous	   interactions	  with	  technology.	  As	  an	  example,	  de	  Carvalho	  et	  al.	  (2009)	  provide	  a	  systemic	  analysis	  of	  how,	  even	  when	  all	  component	  systems	  are	  functioning	  normally,	  an	  accident	  can	  occur.	  Verifying	  and	  validating	  in	  terms	   of	   possible	   failures	   and	   errors	   alone	   is	   not	   sufficient—only	   a	   total	   system	  perspective	  will	  reveal	  “coincidences,	  unexpected	  links,	  and	  resonance”	  (p.	  339)	  by	  which	  the	  operating	  conditions	  drift	  into	  unsafe	  states	  (p.	  326).	  	  Kuchar	  and	  Drumm	  (2007)	  acknowledge	  and	  provide	  data	  about	  pilot	  response	  (p.	  287)	  and	  incorporate	  some	  aspect	  of	  pilot	  response	  in	  their	  model	  (p.	  290),	  but	  the	  emphasis	   is	   on	   improving	   TCAS	   rather	   than	   improving	   the	   overall	   concept	   of	  operations	  from	  the	  pilot’s	  perspective.	  A	  system	  with	   limited	  situation	  awareness	  may	  be	  made	  yet	  more	  complicated	   in	  order	   that	   it	  will	  know	  when	  to	  reverse	   its	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previous	   command.	   As	   for	   the	   pilots,	   “this	   specific	   problem	   [what	   occurred	   at	  Überlingen]	   is	   being	   solved	   by	   improving	   pilot	   training	   to	   comply	   with	   RAs”	   (p.	  294).	   	   But	   the	   same	   analysis	   concludes:	   “Pilot	   non-­‐compliance	   to	   an	   RA	  may	   not	  necessarily	   compromise	   safety	   in	   a	   particular	   encounter,”	   such	   as	   when	   visual-­‐separation	  procedures	   are	  permitted	   (p.	   287).	   	  The	   inherent	   contradictions	   in	   the	  system	  remain.	  	  Verifying	   TCAS	   requires	   viewing	   its	   function	   from	   perspective	   of	   the	   total	   work	  system,	  this	  includes	  convincing	  pilots	  to	  manipulate	  the	  aircraft	  controls	  to	  effect	  a	  change	   of	   course.	   So	   even	   before	   the	   Überlingen	   accident,	   it	   would	   have	   been	  obvious	   from	  a	   total	   system	  perspective	   that	   the	   function	  of	   the	  TCAS	   system	  has	  two	  aspects,	  operating	   in	  different	  domains	  (Figure	  12-­‐1):	  1)	  detecting	  planes	  and	  giving	  alerts	  with	  safe	  advice	  (the	  logical-­‐functional	  	  domain),	  and	  2)	  convincing	  the	  pilots	   to	   control	   the	   aircraft	   in	   a	   certain	   way	   (socio-­‐technical	   domain).	   But	   this	  leaves	   out	   the	   ATCO,	   whose	   actions	   may	   change	   the	   context	   in	   which	   a	   pilot	  interprets	   TCAS.	   Consequently,	   the	   total	   system	   must	   include	   at	   least	   the	   ATCO	  responsible	  for	  the	  aircraft	  and	  his/her	  operational	  context.	   	  (See	  the	  discussion	  in	  Sections	   11.2	   and	   11.3	   concerning	   why	   we	   describe	   TCAS’s	   role	   as	   inherently	  
convincing	  pilots	  rather	  than	  ordering	  them	  to	  change	  course.)	  	  Traditional	  human	  factors	  analyses	  of	  TCAS	  might	   focus	  on	  the	  display	  design,	   the	  loudness	  of	  the	  alert,	  the	  choice	  of	  voice,	  the	  phrasing	  of	  the	  instruction,	  and	  so	  on.	  	  These	  are	  relevant	  and	  important	  considerations.	  However,	  socio-­‐technical	  systems	  analysis	  starts	  with	  the	  total	  system—what	  are	  people	  trying	  to	  accomplish?	  	  What	  are	  the	  functions	  of	  tools	  relative	  to	  the	  stakeholders’	  objectives	  and	  values?	  Who	  or	  what	   interacts	   in	   space	   and	   time	   to	   produce	   the	   behavior	   of	   the	   overall	   system?	  	  Specifically,	  what	   information	  about	   the	  air	   space	  might	  enable	  pilots	   to	   judge	   the	  right	  course	  of	  action	  so	  they	  might	  better	  weigh	  the	  advice	  from	  TCAS?	  	  Similar	  observations	  have	  been	  made	  by	  Rushby	  (2011)	  that	  certification	  should	  be	  based	   on	   an	   “argument	   that	   certain	   claims	   about	   safety	   are	   justified	   by	   evidence	  about	   the	  system….	  The	  argument	  must	  consider	  all	  possible	  circumstances	  of	   the	  system’s	  operation,	   including	   those	  where	   faults	  afflict	   its	  own	  components,	  or	   its	  environment	   behaves	   in	   undesirable	   ways”	   (p.	   211).	   Rushby	   explains	   that	   the	  compositional	   approach	   tends	   to	   be	   favored	   by	   computer	   scientists,	   but	   is	   not	  appropriate	  for	  flight	  certification:	  Computer	   scientists	  might	  wish	   for	   a	  more	   compositional	   (i.e.,	   component-­‐based)	  approach,	   but	   this	   is	   antithetical	   to	   current	   certification	   practices.	   Experience	  teaches	   that	   many	   hazardous	   situations	   arise	   through	   unanticipated	   interactions,	  often	  precipitated	  by	  faults,	  among	  supposedly	  separate	  systems.	  (p.	  216)	  	  All	  of	  this	  is	  another	  way	  of	  justifying	  the	  use	  of	  a	  work	  practice	  simulation—it	  is	  of	  value	  not	  only	  as	  a	  design	  tool	  for	  grasping	  complicated	  interactions	  in	  which	  many	  variables	   (including	   capabilities	   of	   automated	   systems	   and	   roles	   of	   people	   and	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systems),	  but	  also	  as	  a	  means	  for	  verifying	  a	  work	  system	  design,	  exactly	  because	  it	  includes	  the	  relevant	  people	  and	  systems.	  	  
	  
Figure	  12-­‐1:	  Total	  System	  perspective	  for	  verifying	  TCAS	  functionality	  	  
12.4 Relating	  Requirements,	  Design,	  Model,	  and	  Simulation	  Outcomes	  Running	   simulation	   scenarios	   provides	   a	   way	   of	   verifying	   a	   design,	   such	   as	   by	  indicating	   gaps	   and	   unacceptable	   situations.	   However,	   this	   is	   a	   conceptually	  complex	   process,	   because	   the	   simulation	   has	   several	   aspects	   including	   the	   work	  system	  design	  and	  rationale	  and	  how	  these	  are	  represented,	  the	  model	  of	  the	  design,	  the	  program	  that	  runs	  the	  model	  (simulation	  engine),	  and	  the	  simulation	  outcomes	  (the	  behaviors	  of	  agents	  and	  objects).	  	  	  Table	   12-­‐1	   provides	   one	   way	   to	   grasp	   this	   complexity	   by	   analogy	   with	   software	  verification.	  	  In	  software	  engineering,	  formalized	  requirements	  guide	  and	  constrain	  the	  program’s	  design	  and	  behaviors;	  verification	  by	  one	  approach	  involves	  creating	  a	  model	  of	  the	  program	  and	  relating	  it	  to	  requirements.	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Table	  12-­‐1:	  Relation	  of	  program	  to	  work	  system	  simulation	  model	  	   Requirements	  
(Success	  Criteria/	  
Constraints)	  
Design	   Implementation/Code	  
Computer	  
Program	  




Goals	  and	  Regulations	   Work	  system	  design	  (WSD)	   Simulation	  model	  	  In	   the	   context	   of	  work	   practice	   simulation,	   the	   system	   to	   be	   verified	   is	   already	   a	  model.	   In	  some	  respects	   the	  specifications,	   the	  design	   is	   represented	   in	   the	  model	  explicitly	   (e.g.,	   groups,	   agents,	   geography,	   tools);	   in	   other	   respects	   the	   design	   is	  represented	  implicitly	  (e.g.,	  regulations,	  as	  discussed	  in	  Section	  12.2).	  	  	  Table	   12-­‐2	   elaborates	   the	   scientific	   perspective	   introduced	   in	   Section	   12.1:	   the	  “system”	  is	  some	  part	  of	  the	  air	  transportation	  system	  in	  the	  world;	  the	  model	  to	  be	  verified	   comprises	   the	   model	   components,	   scenarios,	   and	   outcomes;	   	   and	   the	  specifications	  are	   the	  mix	  of	  ATS	  goals,	  policies,	   regulations,	   etc.	   that	   the	   system’s	  states	  and	  behaviors	  are	  supposed	  to	  obey.	  	  
Table	  12-­‐2:	  Relation	  of	  System,	  Model,	  and	  Specification	  in	  Brahms-­‐GÜM	  
Conceptual	  Level	   Brahms-­‐GÜM	  Aspect	  SYSTEM	   ATS	  work	  system	  	  MODEL	  OF	  SYSTEM	   ATS	  work	  system	  design	  formulated	  as	  Brahms	  model	  (static	  definitions	  of	  properties	  and	  behaviors	  of	  objects	  and	  agents	  and	  geographic/facility	  models)	  ATS	  scenarios	  (initial	  configurations	  of	  model	  components)	  	  Work	  system	  behaviors	  (simulated	  states/actions)	  	  SPECIFICATION	   Regulations,	  protocols,	  related	  ATS	  goals	  (e.g.,	  safety	  requirements;	  critical	  states/thresholds)	  
	  The	  value	  of	  verifying	  the	  simulation	  model	  will	  depend	  on	  its	  validity.	  A	  model	  that	  omits	  key	  aspects	  of	  the	  real	  world	  system	  or	  improperly	  represents	  how	  people	  or	  objects	   behave	   may	   be	   verified	   with	   respect	   to	   ATS	   regulations	   and	   operational	  procedures,	   but	   be	   insufficient	   for	   certifying	   the	   design.	   	   Therefore	   using	   a	   work	  system	  simulation	  as	  a	  design	  tool	  requires	  at	  least	  the	  following	  distinctions:	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• Verifying	  and	  validating	  the	  simulation	  model	  (including	  “model	  checking”)	  
• Verifying	   the	   work	   system	   design	   (WSD)	   with	   respect	   to	   regulations,	  procedures,	   etc.	   by	   simulating	   the	   design	   to	   evaluate	   the	   system’s	  performance	  (e.g.,	  does	  this	  design	  satisfy	  safety	  properties)	  
• Verifying	  a	  proposed	  or	  revised	  regulation54	  in	  a	  simulation	  model	  driven	  by	  reality-­‐based	  scenarios	  (e.g.,	  actual	  input	  events	  and/or	  load	  statistics)—will	  a	  regulation	  be	  satisfied	  in	  practice	  if	  we	  design	  air	  traffic	  systems	  in	  certain	  ways	  (class	  of	  WSDs).	  	  The	   regulations,	   work	   system	   design,	   and	   work	   system	   simulation	   have	   a	   triadic	  relation	   (Figure	   12-­‐2).	   All	   three	   are	   in	   some	   sense	  models:	   regulations	   prescribe	  properties	   of	   the	   work	   system;	   the	   design	   describes	   components	   and	   behaviors	  intended	  to	  satisfy	  the	  regulations;	  and	  the	  simulation	  model	  represents	  the	  design.	  	  	  
	  
Figure	  12-­‐2:	  Triad	  of	  abstractions:	  Simulation	  Model,	  Work	  System	  Design,	  
and	  Regulations	  	  	  The	   triad	   shows	   possible	   flexibility	   in	   what	   is	   taken	   as	   given	   and	   what	   is	   being	  verified.	   Insofar	   as	   the	  work	   system	   includes	  new	  or	   revised	   components	   such	   as	  new	   automation,	   some	   of	   the	   regulations	   will	   be	   proposals	   about	   how	   these	  components	  are	  to	  interact	  with	  others.	  	  One	  might	  view	  the	  future	  work	  system	  as	  given	  and	  view	  the	  simulation	  as	  a	  means	  of	  determining	  whether	   the	  regulations	  are	  consistent	  and	  sufficient.	   	  The	  regulations	   themselves	  are	  being	  designed	  with	  respect	  to	  more	  abstract	  goals,	  which	  in	  ATS	  involve	  safety	  and	  efficiency:	  	  
Efficiency	  &	  Safety	  Goals	  	  ó 	  Regulations	  ó 	  Work	  System	  Design(s)	  	  Consequently,	   in	  using	  a	  work	  system	  simulation	   for	  “verification”	  early	   in	  an	  ATS	  work	  system	  design	  process	  we	  might	  focus	  on	  different	  aspects:	  	   1. Check	  a	  WSD:	  Given	  a	  candidate	  work	  system	  design,	  does	  this	  WSD	  
satisfy	  the	  regulations?	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  54	  Hereafter	  in	  this	  chapter	  the	  term	  “regulations”	  refers	  to	  all	  formal	  and	  semiformal	  requirements	  imposed	   by	   organizations	   about	  work	   products	   and	   how	   the	  work	   is	   to	   be	   done	   such	   as	   policies,	  procedures,	  protocols,	  etc.	  that	  affect	  staffing,	  facilities,	  tools,	  behaviors	  of	  people	  and	  systems,	  etc.	  
REGULATIONS	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2. Check	  a	  regulation:	  Does	  this	  regulation	  produce	  the	  desired	  system	  performance,	  with	  respect	  to	  efficiency	  &	  safety?	  	  3. Redesign	  a	  work	  system:	  Can	  we	  “debug”	  a	  WSD	  to	  fix	  it	  relative	  to	  the	  regulations?	  4. Generalize	  WSD:	  What	  range	  of	  WSDs	  satisfy	  a	  regulation?	  i.e.,	  what	  variations	  are	  allowable?	  5. Revise	  regulations:	  Can	  we	  modify	  a	  given	  regulation	  so	  it	  is	  satisfied	  by	  a	  class	  of	  WSDs?	  (e.g.,	  relax	  a	  requirement)	  	  In	  practice	   the	  work	  system	  design	  and	  regulations	  might	  be	   formulated	   together.	  	  We	   might	   then	   think	   of	   the	   requirements	   for	   the	   work	   system	   as	   consisting	   of	  
performance	   constraints	   on	   work	   system	   behavior	   (e.g.,	   aircraft	   separation	  distances)	  and	  operations	  constraints	  on	  work	  system	  design	  (e.g.,	  requiring	  at	  least	  two	  ATCOs	   on	  duty),	   corresponding	   respectively	   to	  what	  we	  have	   called	   here	   the	  regulations	  and	  design.	  	  
	  
Figure	  12-­‐3:	  Double-­‐Loop	  Investigation:	  Behaviors	  of	  verified	  work	  simulation	  
model	  provide	  evidence	  for	  verification	  of	  work	  system	  design	  	  In	   summary,	   we	   are	   interested	   in	   understanding	   how	   a	  WSD	  will	   behave,	   how	   it	  relates	   to	   requirements,	  and	   finally	  whether	  a	  proposed	  change	   to	   the	  regulations	  will	   function	   as	   desired.	   Because	   the	  work	   system	   design	   and	   requirements	   both	  serve	  to	  define	  the	  simulation,	  “verifying	  a	  simulation	  model”	  involves	  at	  least	  two	  levels	   of	   analysis.	   Figure	   12-­‐3	   shows	   how	   these	   two	   aspects	   of	   the	   work	   system	  design	   process	   can	   be	   related	   from	   a	   verification	   perspective	   in	   what	   has	   been	  called	  “double-­‐loop	  learning”	  (Argyris	  and	  Schön	  1978).	  	  	  Referring	   to	   the	   inner	   feedback	   loop,	   we	   can	   investigate	   whether	   the	   simulation	  model	   implements	   the	   work	   system	   design.	   	   And	   then	   given	   the	   simulation	  behaviors,	   we	   can	   investigate	   whether	   the	   work	   system’s	   behaviors	   satisfy	   the	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requirements	  (e.g.,	  regulations,	  cost,	  efficiency,	  and	  other	  practical	  human-­‐centered	  concerns)	   and	   hence	   the	   design	   is	   satisfactory.	   Put	   another	   way,	   behaviors	   of	   a	  verified	   work	   simulation	   model	   provide	   evidence	   for	   verifying	   the	   work	   system	  design.	  	  	  	  A	  strict	  analogy	  to	  software	  engineering	  verification	  will	  be	  misleading	  because	  the	  requirements	   of	   a	   WSD	   are	   not	   necessarily	   fixed,	   but	   might	   need	   to	   be	   changed	  because	  they	  are	   impossible	   to	  satisfy	   for	  a	  given	  design,	  aspects	  of	  which	  may	  be	  fixed	   (e.g.,	   legacy	   systems).	  This	  highlights	  why	  work	  practice	   simulation	   is	  useful	  for	  designing	  future	  work	  systems	  in	  which	  automation,	  people’s	  practices,	  and	  even	  regulations	   might	   be	   as	   yet	   undetermined	   or	   modifiable.	   This	   is	   the	   valuable	  	  “double-­‐loop”	  aspect	  of	   the	  project	   in	  which	  goal	  and	  values	  might	  be	  reframed	  or	  reordered.	  
12.5 Developing	  and	  Applying	  Work	  System	  Simulations	  Scientifically	  So	  far	  we	  have	  considered	  verification	  from	  the	  perspective	  of	  software	  engineering	  that	   relates	   two	   formal	   systems	   (e.g.,	   a	   set	   of	   requirements	   and	   a	   program	   or	   a	  model).	   	   Because	   it	  models	  work	   practices,	   a	  work	   system	   simulation	  model	  may	  also	  be	  viewed	  as	  being	  a	  scientific	  model	  of	  the	  activities,	  objects,	  beliefs	  etc.	  of	  that	  work	  system.	  	  In	  this	  section	  we	  consider	  in	  more	  detail	  how	  developing	  and	  using	  a	  work	  system	  simulation	  may	  be	  approached	  from	  a	  scientific	  perspective.	  	  Work	   practice	   simulations	   may	   be	   considered	   as	   either	   descriptive	   or	   predictive	  models.	  We	  create	  and	  use	  them	  in	  ways	  analogous	  to	  scientific	  modeling	  in	  general,	  but	   the	   emphasis	   is	   on	   formulating	   and	   evaluating	   a	   work	   system	   design.	  Considerations	  for	  validating	  the	  simulation	  include	  both	  the	  model	  of	  current	  work	  practices	  as	  well	  as	   the	  more	  general	   theory	  of	  human	  behavior	   that	   is	   implicit	   in	  both	   agent	   models	   (e.g.,	   how	   people	   act	   in	   certain	   situations)	   and	   in	   the	  framework/engine	   itself	   (e.g.,	   how	   attention	  may	   be	   interrupted	   and	   resumed	   on	  the	  basis	  of	  felt	  priorities).	  	  	  	  	  Practically	  speaking,	  the	  value	  of	  a	  work	  system	  simulation	  is	  not	  in	  predicting	  the	  future,	   because	   it	   is	   unlikely	   that	   a	   specific	   initial	   configuration	   (e.g.,	   aircraft	  locations	  and	  flight	  paths)	  	  will	  occur	  or	  that	  the	  set	  of	  simulated,	  interacting	  agents	  would	  match	   the	  specific	  knowledge	  and	  habits	  of	  actual	  people.	   Instead,	  we	  view	  the	  work	  system	  simulation	  as	  a	  form	  of	  test	  bench,	  a	  virtual	  environment	  used	  to	  verify	  the	  completeness	  and	  consistency	  of	  the	  work	  system	  design	  and	  regulations	  (broadly	  defined).	  	  	  The	  modeling	  process	  can	  be	  expanded	  to	  make	  clearer	  the	  iterations	  involved	  and	  role	  of	  analysts	  in	  evaluating	  the	  simulation	  results	  (Figure	  12-­‐4):	  	  
	  	  




Figure	  12-­‐4:	  Workflow	  in	  creating	  and	  analyzing	  work	  system	  simulations	  as	  a	  
scientific	  process.	  	  1. Design:	   Formulating	   design	   of	   future	   operations,	   often	   by	   reference	   to	  current	  or	  historical	  operations	  2. Model:	   Representing	   people,	   facilities,	   tools,	   operations,	   etc.	   as	   a	   work	  system	  simulation	  3. Simulate:	   Running	   the	   simulation	   against	   scenarios	   (i.e.,	   model	  configurations,	  including	  absent	  or	  “faulty”	  subsystems,	  as	  well	  as	  “work”	  or	  “jobs”	  that	  flow	  through	  the	  system,	  e.g.,	  flights	  in	  the	  ATS,	  customer	  orders	  in	  an	  office	  setting)	  4. Visualize:	  Creating	  visual	  representations	  for	  reflecting	  on	  patterns	  in	  work	  system	  behaviors	  over	  time	  (logged	  in	  a	  file	  as	  a	  “history”	  or	  “trace”	  of	  time-­‐stamped	  events)	  5. Conceptualize:	   Describing	   patterns	   (e.g.,	   trends)	   of	   interest,	   indicating	  surprises,	  evidence	  for	  and	  against	  hypotheses,	  etc.	  	  6. Theorize:	  Articulating	   implications	   for	   future	  operations,	   including	   revised	  design	  and	  regulations.	  	  This	   workflow	   is	   based	   on	   our	   experience	   with	   the	   OCA	   mirroring	   simulation	  (Figure	   12-­‐5;	   Clancey	   et	   al.	   2008),	   but	   incorporates	   general	   methods	   of	  experimental	  data	  analysis	  (for	  another	  example,	  see	  Clancey	  and	  Lowry	  2012).	  	  The	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process	   of	   creating	   charts	   and	   conceiving	   new	   relations	   (“findings”)	   is	   of	   course	  illustrated	  by	  the	  refinement	  of	  Brahms-­‐GÜM	  described	  in	  Chapter	  10.	  	  As	  the	  charts	  from	  the	  Brahms-­‐OCAMS	  simulation	  illustrate	  (Figure	  12-­‐5),	  multiple	  simulations	  and/or	  scenarios	  may	  be	  compared	  quantitatively	  in	  the	  analytic	  phase.	  Here	  metrics	  generated	  from	  a	  simulation	  model	  of	  future	  operations	  are	  compared	  to	   the	   metrics—running	   over	   the	   same	   scenarios—produced	   by	   the	   current	  operations	  model.	  	  The	  future	  OCA	  operations	  model	  was	  created	  by	  extracting	  part	  of	   an	   agent	   model	   of	   a	   Mission	   Control	   Center	   backroom	   flight	   officer	   and	  identifying	  those	  same	  activities	  as	  being	  executed	  by	  a	  software	  agent.55	  	  If	  funding	  and	  time	  had	  permitted,	  we	  would	  have	  validated	  the	  current	  operations	  metrics	  by	  observational	  data	  from	  Johnson	  Space	  Center	  Mission	  Control,	  lending	  credence	  to	  the	  predicted	  metrics	  generated	  by	  the	  future	  operations	  simulation.	  	  
	  
Figure	   12-­‐5:	   Visualization	   of	   statistics	   generated	   from	   “current	   ops”	  
simulation	   compared	   to	   “future	   ops”	   simulation,	   showing	   the	   activities	   and	  
percentage	   time	   devoted	   to	   the	   “mirroring”	   task.	   Automation	  would	   reduce	  
the	  effort	  required	  for	  the	  “mirroring”	  task	  from	  5%	  to	  .5%	  of	  total	  shift	  time	  
(8	  hours).	  	  This	  part	  of	  the	  analysis	  must	  be	  performed	  by	  human	  analysts.	  Analytic	  tools	  such	  as	  Excel	  are	  useful	  for	  collecting	  and	  graphing	  simulation	  statistics.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  the	  OCAMS	  example,	  the	  “conceptualization	  phase”	  noted	  in	  Figure	  12-­‐4	  appraised	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  55	  Workframes	  were	   edited	   to	   allow	   for	   the	   task	   being	   automated.	   Thus	   the	   software	   agent	   in	   the	  future	   operations	   simulation	   was	   a	   prototype	   of	   the	   agent	   that	   was	   later	   incorporated	   in	   the	  deployed	  OCAMS	  system.	  	  This	  illustrates	  the	  simulation-­‐to-­‐implementation	  methodology	  (Clancey	  et	  al.	  2008).	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difference	  between	   the	  current	  and	   future	  operations	  simulations.	  People	  must	  be	  involved	   because	   interpretations	   of	   the	   simulation	   outcomes	   involve	   value	  judgments,	   such	   as	   how	   large	   a	   quantitative	   improvement	   is	   sufficient	   to	   justify	  implementation	  of	  the	  future	  operations	  design.	  This	  appraisal	  requires	  background	  knowledge	   about	   the	   organizational	   objectives	   and	   values	   (e.g.,	   what	   kinds	   of	  investments	   are	   acceptable?).	   	   A	   business-­‐economic	   analysis	   is	   usually	   required,	  such	  as	  a	  payback	  analysis	  (time	  to	  recoup	  costs)	  with	  a	  cost/benefit	  tradeoff	  (e.g.,	  effect	   of	   denying	   other	   investment	   opportunities).	   Such	   analysis	   may	   justify	  improving	   the	   simulation	   in	   certain	   areas,	   such	   as	   increasing	   fidelity,	   in	   order	   to	  increase	  confidence	  in	  the	  data	  that	  it	  generates.	  	  In	   summary,	   verifying	   and	   validating	   a	  work	   system	   simulation	   is	   not	   an	   entirely	  automatic	  or	  automatable	  process.	   	  Rather,	  people	  must	  play	  a	  role	  in	  determining	  whether	   a	   work	   system	   simulation	   output	   is	   valid	   and	   useful.	   This	   appraisal	  operates	  on	  several	  levels	  including	  verification	  of	  the	  model	  (inner	  feedback	  loop,	  Figure	   12-­‐3),	   reformulating	   regulations	   (including	   policies,	   procedures,	   etc.;	   the	  outer	  feedback	  loop),	  and	  also	  revisiting	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  the	  simulation	  model,	  including	   the	   kinds	   of	   metrics,	   visualization,	   and	   analysis	   with	   respect	   to	   the	  purpose	   of	   the	   modeling	   enterprise	   (e.g.,	   increasing	   acceptance	   of	   proposed	  automation).	  	  	  	  The	   first	   phase	   of	  modeling	   and	   analysis	   (top	   of	   Figure	   12-­‐4)	  may	   involve	   formal	  verification	   methods.	   The	   second	   phase	   can	   be	   aided	   by	   analytic	   software,	   but	  people	   will	   do	   the	   work	   of	   reflecting	   on	   the	   simulation	   results	   and	   generating	  further	   experiments.	   In	   the	   broader	   research	   project	   of	   which	   Brahms-­‐GÜM	   is	   a	  part,	  examines	  how	  formal	  methods	  can	  be	  used	  to	  facilitate	  this	  analytic	  process	  as	  well.	  	  	   	  The	   entire	   work	   system	   design	   modeling	   and	   simulation	   process	   is	   a	   form	   of	  inquiry,	  which	  means	  that	  most	  aspects	  are	  tentative	  and	  subject	  to	  revisions:	  	  
	  
• Proposed	  requirements	  (regulations)	  
• Proposed	  work	  system	  design	  
• Scenarios	  of	  work	  system	  configurations	  (what	  might	  occur)	  	  
• Predicted	  work	  system	  behaviors	  
• Causal	  analysis	  of	  work	  system	  and	  regulation	  incompatibilities	  
• Recommendations	  for	  redesign	  and/or	  regulation	  revision	  	  The	   investigation	   is	   experimental,	   involving	   modeling	   with	   repeated	  reinterpretation	   of	   observations	   and	   documents,	   variation	   and	   analysis	   of	  alternative	  models,	   and	   experimentation	  with	   alternative	   designs	   and	   regulations.	  	  As	   illustrated	   by	   the	   Brahms-­‐GÜM	   effort	   (Section	   6.8,	   Chapters	   8,	   9,	   10),	   the	  modeling	   process	   involves	   discovering	   new	   events	   and	   relations	   of	   importance,	  realizing	  aspects	  of	   the	  model	   that	   require	  more	  detail,	   and	   throughout	   reframing	  how	  the	  model	  can	  be	  formulated	  in	  a	  useful	  way,	  where	  even	  the	  potential	  value	  of	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the	  model	  will	  be	  affected	  by	  the	  kind	  of	  simulation	  that	  is	  practical	  and	  the	  results	  that	  emerge.	  	  To	   this	   point	   we	   have	   emphasized	   the	   steps	   involved	   in	   analyzing	   simulation	  behaviors	   from	  a	   given	   simulation	   run.	   The	   other	   side	   of	   this	   process	   is	   the	  well-­‐known	   problem	   of	   managing—generating	   and	   exploring—a	   large	   space	   of	  simulation	  runs.	  	  With	  respect	  to	  a	  given	  Brahms	  model,	  this	  space	  is	  defined	  by	  the	  initial	  model	  configurations	  (scenarios,)	  and	  the	  probabilistic	  elements	  in	  the	  model	  (Appendix	  27).	  As	  can	  be	  expected,	  there	  are	  too	  many	  scenarios	  to	  run	  as	  dozens	  of	  variables	   are	   introduced.	   Model	   checking	   methods	   adopted	   from	   software	  engineering	   (e.g.,	   Hunter	   et	   al.	   in	   preparation),	   could	   provide	   a	   means	   of	  systematically	  exploring	  this	  space.	  Accordingly	  the	  Brahms	  engine	  was	  modified	  to	  enable	   logging	   “branch	   points”	   (events	   affected	   by	   a	   probabilistic	   element)	   and	  tracking	  whether	  a	  belief	  or	  fact	  was	  created	  from	  an	  initial	  belief/fact	  (i.e.,	  part	  of	  the	   scenario	   definition).	   Further	   consideration	   of	   this	   approach	   lies	   outside	   the	  scope	  of	  the	  presently	  defined	  Brahms-­‐GÜM	  project	  and	  report.	  Because	   a	   work	   practice	   model	   represents	   both	   “normal”	   and	   non-­‐optimal	  behaviors,	  it	  is	  important	  that	  the	  modelers	  be	  aware	  of	  what	  variations	  are	  possible	  within	  regulations	  and	  what	  variations	  might	  occur	  because	  of	  workload,	  fatigue,	  or	  complex	   situations.	   As	   we	   have	   shown,	   in	   some	   respects	   important	   non-­‐optimal	  behaviors	   (e.g.,	   ATCO	  not	  monitoring	   the	  overall	   airspace)	  will	   emerge	   in	  Brahms	  simulations	   from	   the	  workframe	  priorities	   and	   circumstantial	   interactions.	   	   Other	  undesirable	  behaviors	  may	  occur	  in	  practice	  that	  the	  model	  fails	  to	  capture	  because	  of	   assumptions	   about	   agent	   capabilities	   (e.g.,	   duration	   of	   an	   activity)	   or	  methods	  (e.g.,	   how	   ATCO	   handles	   a	   dysfunctional	   phone	   system).	   In	   general,	   we	   are	   less	  concerned	  about	  how	  people	  might	  be	  more	  creative	  and	  capability	  in	  reality,	  than	  where	  the	  model	  makes	  socio-­‐psychological	  claims	  that	  are	  not	  always	  true.	  	  	  One	  way	  to	  anticipate	  such	  shortcomings,	  to	  help	  us	  critically	  analyze	  a	  model,	  is	  to	  refer	  to	  how	  simulations	  have	  failed	  in	  the	  past,	  such	  as	  in	  the	  example	  of	  the	  Crater	  simulation	  program	  that	  was	  misused	  for	  predicting	  damage	  to	  the	  Columbia	  shuttle	  tiles:	   Crater	  was	  validated	  using	  small	  pieces	  of	  foam	  and	  ice	  on	  single	  tiles.	  During	  the	  process	  of	  turning	  empirical	  data	  into	  a	  predictive	  equation,	  the	  limitations	  and	  contingencies	  of	  these	  initial	   data	  sets	  were	   lost.	   Furthermore,	   the	   process	   of	   computerization	   of	   Crater	  rendered	  the	  uncertainties	  inherent	  in	  the	  tool	  even	  more	  invisible,	  and	  the	  specific	  mode	  of	  computerization,	   a	   plug-­‐in-­‐the-­‐numbers	  spreadsheet,	   gave	   a	   false	   sense	  of	   clarity	   and	  certainty	  to	  the	  results."	  (Brown	  2006,	  p.	  396)	  	  We	   need	   tools	   for	   tracking	   limitations	   and	   contingencies	   in	   a	   complex	   simulation	  like	  Brahms-­‐GÜM.	  	  For	  example	  primitive	  activity	  durations	  need	  to	  be	  documented	  indicating	   how	   they	   were	   determined,	   why	   and	   when	   they	   were	   modified	   from	  analysis	  of	  simulation	  runs,	  and	  represent	   in	  some	  way	  under	  what	  circumstances	  the	  assumed	  upper	  and/or	  lower	  duration	  bounds	  might	  be	  different	  in	  practice.	  We	  need	  to	  determine	  critical	  variables	  (e.g.,	  when	  ATCO	  monitors	  the	  larger	  airspace)	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and	  what	  affects	  them	  (e.g.,	  prioritization	  given	  to	  aircraft	  in	  landing	  approach),	  how	  and	   when	   these	   determining	   events	   might	   occur	   (e.g.,	   a	   Sunday	   evening),	   what	  complications	   might	   make	   the	   work	   difficult	   (e.g.,	   other	   ATCO	   off	   duty),	   what	  automation	  could	  mitigate	  these	  complications	  (e.g.,	  STCA	  Optical	  alert),	  what	  other	  complications	  might	  disable	  or	  defeat	  the	  automation	  (e.g.,	  maintenance),	  and	  so	  on.	  The	   modeling	   and	   simulation	   process	   enables	   us	   to	   get	   a	   handle	   on	   such	   causal	  relations,	   and	   particularly	   how	   their	   ordering	   might	   change	   and	   influence	   the	  overall	  system.	  Model	  checking	  might	  enable	  then	  discovering	  combinations	  that	  are	  not	   expected	   and	  have	  not	   yet	   been	  discovered	   through	   scenarios	   that	   have	   been	  deliberately	  tested.	  	  Finally,	  in	  our	  consideration	  of	  verification	  and	  validation	  of	  Brahms-­‐GÜM,	  we	  might	  step	  out	  from	  the	  language	  of	  requirements,	  design,	  and	  so	  on,	  and	  broadly	  view	  the	  modeling	  and	  verification	  process	  from	  the	  perspective	  of	  the	  person	  or	  agency	  that	  is	  sponsoring	  and/or	  benefiting	  from	  the	  simulation.	  In	  the	  broader	  concept	  of	  this	  research,	  the	  “customers”	  for	  Brahms-­‐GÜM	  are	  the	  airlines	  (“vendors”)	  who	  will	  be	  investing	  and	  using	  proposed	  NextGen	  technology.	   	  In	  this	  respect,	  the	  goals	  of	  the	  work	   system	   design,	   simulation,	   and	   analytic	   process	   are	   to	   increase	   safety	   in	  operations;	  while	   in	   the	  context	  of	   the	   invention	  of	  new	   technologies,	   the	  goals	  of	  the	  entire	  work	  system	  simulation	  enterprise	  is	  to	  provide	  useful	  analyses	  early	  in	  the	  design	  process,	  and	  thus	  to	  increase	  confidence	  among	  stakeholders	  so	  they	  will	  adopt	  standards	  that	  implement	  the	  NextGen	  plan:	  
 
NextGen	  Confidence/Adoption	  Goals	  	  ó 	  Work	  System	  Simulation	  
 That	   is,	   the	  use	  of	  work	   system	  simulation	   could	  be	  adopted	  as	  part	  of	   an	  overall	  methodology	   for	   NextGen	   design,	   evaluation	   and	   adoption.	   	   Increased	   confidence	  could	  result	   from	  a	  combination	  of	   factors	   including	   formalization	  of	  work	  system	  design	   as	   a	   simulation	   model;	   verification	   of	   the	   regulations,	   design,	   and	   model	  through	   a	   combination	   of	   scenario	   experiments,	   model	   checking,	   and	   analysis	   of	  performance	  metrics.	  	  Put	  another	  way,	  confidence	  rests	  on	  believing	  the	  simulation	  
output	   (involving	   verification	   and	   validation),	   which	   can	   be	   enhanced	   by	  participating	  in	  the	  model-­‐building	  and	  evaluation	  process.	  	  Consequently,	  the	  tools	  in	   the	   model-­‐building	   environment,	   such	   as	   the	   Brahms	   AgentViewer,	   could	   be	  essential	   for	  making	  the	  model	  accessible	  and	  the	  output	  understandable	  to	  pilots,	  ATCOs,	   air	   traffic	   control	   center	  managers,	   airline	  managers,	   and	   so	   on.	   	   Thus,	   in	  considering	  methods	  for	  verifying	  and	  validating	  a	  work	  system	  simulation,	  we	  need	  to	   take	   into	   the	   people	   and	   activities	   that	   will	   provide	   a	   context	   for	   creating,	  analyzing,	  and	  interpreting	  a	  simulation	  with	  respect	  to	  NextGen	  ATS.	  	  In	   summary,	   so	   far	   in	   this	   chapter	   we	   have	   discussed	   a	   broad	   range	   of	   issues	  involved	  in	  “verifying”	  Brahms-­‐GÜM.	  The	  simulation	  effort	  is	  one	  means	  of	  verifying	  a	   work	   system	   design,	   which	   may	   be	   accomplished	   by	   a	   combination	   of	  experimentation	   with	   scenarios	   and	   formal	   methods	   that	   relate	   the	   space	   of	  alternative	  simulated	  behaviors	  to	  regulations	  (e.g.,	  safety	  properties).	  	  The	  Brahms	  language	   and	   engine	   itself	   implicitly	   embodies	   a	   socio-­‐psychological	   theory	   of	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human	  activity,	  including	  aspects	  of	  perception,	  reasoning,	  and	  physical	  interactions	  with	  objects	  in	  the	  world.	  	  The	  methodology	  for	  creating	  and	  using	  such	  a	  simulation	  might	  occur	  within	  the	  context	  of	  activities	  involving	  a	  variety	  of	  stakeholders	  (e.g.,	  pilots,	  airlines,	  FAA)	  to	  facilitate	  NextGen	  technology	  development	  and	  certification,	  along	  with	  new	  regulations	  and	  work	  processes.	  
12.6 Use	  of	  Ethnography	  in	  Modeling	  The	  scientific	  modeling	  perspective	  shows	  that	  verification	  and	  validation	  of	  a	  work	  practice	   simulation	   are	   both	   essential.	   	   In	   this	   section	   we	   discuss	   an	   empirical	  method	  for	  model	  development	  and	  validation	  using	  ethnography.	  	  	  Ethnography	  is	  a	  method	  of	  observation	  and	  analysis	  of	  social	  groups	  and	  activities.	  	  Ethnographic	  methods	  were	   developed	  within	   the	   discipline	   of	   anthropology,	   but	  are	  now	  used	  in	  a	  variety	  of	  academic	  and	  applied	  fields,	  including	  sociology,	  social	  psychology,	   industrial	   design,	   user	   interface	   design,	   and	   human	   factors	   research.	  Ethnographic	   methods	   are	   combined	   and	   related	   to	   describe	   and	   analyze	  participants’	   activities	   at	   a	   variety	   of	   time	   scales,	   including	   the	   methods	   of	  participant	  observation;	  video,	  audio	  and	  still	  photography	  recording	  and	  analysis;	  self-­‐diaries;	  informal	  on-­‐the-­‐spot	  interviews;	  formal	  oral	  histories;	  and	  collection	  of	  workplace	  artifacts,	  especially	  documents	  and	  drawings.	  	  Ethnographic	  observation	  is	  a	  necessary	  part	  of	  understanding	  work	  practice,	  that	  is	  to	   learn	   and	   understand	   how	  work	   actually	   gets	   done.	   	   Ethnographic	   observation	  typically	  forms	  a	  part	  of	  the	  Brahms	  modeling	  method,	  including	  learning	  about	  the	  actors,	   their	   formal	   and	   informal	   relationships,	   activities,	   communications,	  documents,	  procedures,	  tools	  of	  the	  trade,	  the	  work	  setting,	  and	  so	  on.	  Ethnography	  has	   been	   applied	   previously	   in	   ethnographic	   contexts	   to	   “reveal	   patterns,	   raise	  questions,	  and	  enhance	  our	  understanding	  of	   systems	   in	  ways	  not	  easily	  available	  with	  other	  methods”	  (Mindell	  and	  Mirmalek	  2011;	  Hutchins,	  1995,	  2000).	  	  	  Validating	   some	   aspects	   of	   the	   Brahms-­‐GÜM	   simulation	   model	   requires	  ethnographic	   observation	   (or	   some	   automated	   means	   of	   recording	   data).	   This	  includes	  questions	  such	  as	  when	  and	  for	  what	  period	  ATCOs	  monitor	  radar	  displays,	  at	   what	   distance	   ATCOs	   typically	   detect	   potential	   separation	   violations,	   and	   the	  effect	  of	   alerts	   such	  as	   the	  STCA	  Optical	   system	  on	  ATCO	  behavior.	   	  As	   illustrated	  throughout	  this	  report,	  documents	  alone	  are	  not	  sufficient	  for	  constructing	  a	  work	  practice	  model,	   particularly	   in	   matters	   related	   to	   aviation	   safety	   where	   it	   is	   well	  known	  that	  pilot	  and	  ATCO	  mishaps	  are	  not	  uniformly	  recorded.	  	  	  
12.6.1 People’s	  descriptions	  of	  their	  jobs	  	  It	   might	   appear	   that	   the	   best	   way	   to	   discover	   how	   work	   is	   done	   is	   to	   ask	   the	  workers.	  	  The	  problem	  with	  interviews	  is	  that	  people	  are	  not	  able	  to	  describe	  their	  work	  accurately	  and	   in	  detail.	   	  What	   they	  often	  provide	  an	  abstract	  description	  of	  how	   things	   are	   supposed	   to	   work	   under	   “normal”	   circumstances,	   perhaps	   a	  textbook	  or	  classroom	  procedure	  they	  were	  taught.	  	  These	  are	  idealized	  statements	  that	  bear	  an	  unknown	  relation	  to	  the	  real	  work.	  	  For	  example,	  one	  commonly	  hears	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the	  complaint,	  “I’ve	  had	  so	  much	  busywork	  this	  week	  that	  I	  haven't	  been	  able	  to	  get	  any	   real	   work	   done.”	   This	   statement	   implies	   a	   categorization	   of	   activities	   into	  “busywork”	   and	   “real	   work,”	   raising	   questions	   about	   what	   is	   actually	   getting	  accomplished	   and	   why	   other	   activities	   are	   not	   occurring.	   Some	   of	   the	   busywork	  might	  be	  making	  the	  real	  work	  possible,	  such	  as	  gathering	  information,	  assembling	  and	  preparing	  tools,	  getting	  feedback,	  etc.	  Thus	  one	  must	  understand	  the	  objectives	  and	   functions	   of	   the	  workplace	   and	   relate	   these	   idealizations	   to	  what	   occurs	   and	  why	  on	  any	  given	  day.	  
12.6.2 Formal	  representations	  of	  a	  work	  system	  A	  work	  system	  	  may	  be	  represented	  by	  a	  wide	  range	  of	   formal	  methods,	   including	  legal	  regulations,	  organizational	  policies	  and	  procedures,	  flow	  charts,	  task	  analyses,	  project	   timelines,	   work	   breakdown	   structure	   charts,	   org	   charts,	   and	   so	   on.	   	   Such	  representations	  are	  useful	   in	  practice	   for	  managing	  schedules,	  budgets,	  personnel,	  etc..	  However,	  such	  artifacts	  represent	  activities	  at	  a	  level	  of	  abstraction	  that	  is	  too	  general	   and	   idealized	   to	   be	   sufficient	   in	   modeling	   work	   practice.	   Instead,	   an	  ethnographer	  may	  begin	  by	  gathering	  such	  descriptions	  and	  use	  them	  as	  a	  starting	  place	   for	   observing	   workplace	   interactions	   and	   interviewing	   participants.	   Most	  obviously,	   if	   the	   BFU	   Report	   on	   relied	   only	   on	   skyguide’s	   written	   regulations,	  analysts	  would	  not	  have	  known	  about	  the	  practice	  of	  reduced	  the	  number	  of	  ATCOs	  managing	  the	  Zurich	  sector	  on	  Sunday	  evenings.	  	  
12.6.3 Use	  of	  ethnography	  in	  prior	  Brahms	  models	  Ethnography	  has	  played	  a	  central	  role	  for	  developing	  almost	  all	  Brahms	  models	  over	  the	  past	  two	  decades:	  
• Initial	   formulation	   of	   the	   Brahms	   language	   by	   simulating	   NYNEX	   work	  practices	   in	   telecommunications	   provisioning	   (order	   processing	   and	  installing	   point-­‐to-­‐point	   circuits	   for	   corporate	   customers	   in	   Manhattan;	  Clancey	  et	  al.	  1998)	  
• Patient-­‐caregiver	   interactions	   in	   a	   medical	   clinic	   at	   Kaiser-­‐Permanente	   in	  Pasadena,	  CA	  (Clancey	  et	  al.	  1998a;	  exists	  only	  as	  a	  sketch)	  
• A	   day-­‐in-­‐the-­‐life	   of	   six	   people	   living	   in	   the	   Flashline	  Mars	   Arctic	   Research	  Station	  on	  Devon	  Island,	  Canada	  (FMARS,	  Clancey	  et	  al.	  2005)	  
• Science	   operations	   in	   preparing	   programs	   for	   the	   Mars	   Exploration	   Rover	  (Seah	  et	  al.	  2005)	  
• Space	   Shuttle	   ascent	   operations	   at	   JSC	   Mission	   Control	   Center	   (called	  MODATA,	  Sierhuis	  et	  al.	  2007)	  	  
• File	  management	  operations	  between	   JSC	  MCC	  ground	   support	   and	   the	   ISS	  (OCAMS,	  Clancey	  et	  al.	  2008).	  	  In	  most	   cases	   the	   ethnographic	   study	   including	   on-­‐site	   observations	   over	   several	  weeks	   and	   interviews.	   For	   Brahms-­‐GÜM	   we	   visited	   an	   ATCC	   for	   one	   day	   and	  arranged	   several	  meetings	  with	   a	   few	   local	   air	   traffic	   controllers	   to	  provide	   some	  feedback	  about	  our	  analysis	  of	  	  Überlingen	  events.	  Ideally,	  we	  would	  have	  engaged	  in	   extensive	   observation	   and	   delayed	  modeling.	   However,	   the	   project	   timing	   and	  resources	   (one	  modeler),	   the	   lack	  of	  access	   to	   the	  people	  and	  places	   involved	  and	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the	   time	   that	   has	   passed	   since	   the	   Überlingen	   accident,	   and	   the	   changes	   in	  equipment,	  plus	  the	  many	  reports	  about	  the	  accident	  suggested	  as	  a	  whole	  that	  we	  develop	  a	  model	  from	  the	  extensive	  material	  available	  online.	  Although	  not	  ideal,	  we	  believe	   this	   “ethnography	   at	   a	   distance”	   approach	   has	   been	   successful	   for	   our	  purposes.	  
12.6.4 	  “Ethnography	  at	  a	  distance”	  Modeling	  the	  Überlingen	  accident	  in	  Brahms	  requires	  the	  kind	  of	  information	  about	  participants	  and	  their	  activities,	  locations,	  equipment,	  communications,	  timings,	  etc.	  that	   would	   in	   normal	   circumstances	   be	   obtained	   from	   sustained	   and	   careful	  personal	   	   observation	   of	   ongoing	   work	   activities,	   the	   standard	   ethnographic	  methods.	  However,	  in	  the	  case	  of	  an	  aviation	  accident,	  we	  obviously	  do	  not,	  and	  can	  not,	  have	  direct	  access	   to	  all	  of	   this	   information.	   	  Rather	  we	  must	  use	  what	  Diane	  Vaughan	  (1996),	  in	  her	  discussion	  of	  the	  research	  process	  on	  the	  Challenger	  launch	  decision,	   describes	   as	   “historical	   ethnography”:	   the	   use	   of	   official	   documents,	  reports,	   interviews,	   and	   artifacts.	   	   Note	   that	   these	   are	   the	   central	   methods	   for	  historical	  analysis	  of	  recent	  events.	  	  	  	  Within	  anthropology	  this	  kind	  of	  research,	  also	  called	  ethnography	  at	  a	  distance,	  is	  a	  known	  practice,	  exactly	   in	  conditions	  where	  direct	  observation	   is	   impossible.	   	  The	  classic	   study	   is	   Ruth	   Benedict’s	   The	   Chrysanthemum	   and	   the	   Sword:	   Patterns	   of	  
Japanese	   Culture	   (Benedict	   1946).	   	   This	   book	   is	   based	   on	   research	   conducted	   on	  Japanese	  culture	  during	  the	  Second	  World	  War,	  commissioned	  by	  the	  Office	  of	  War	  Information	   and	   the	   Office	   of	   Strategic	   Studies.	   	   Benedict	   had	   never	   traveled	   to	  Japan,	  and	  of	  course	  was	  unable	  to	  do	  so	  during	  the	  war.	  She	  used	  written	  materials,	  movies,	   Japanese	   government	   documents,	   and	   interviews	  with	   Japanese	   nationals	  living	   in	   the	  United	   States:	   a	   data	   set	   very	   similar	   the	   one	  we	  have	  used	   to	   study	  aviation	  accidents.	  	  	  	  Both	  these	  cases	  argue	  that	  ethnography	  at	  a	  distance	  can	  produce	  valuable	  results.	  	  However,	  the	  usefulness	  of	  ethnography	  at	  a	  distance	  depends	  on	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  probable	  cause	  of	  the	  accident	  as	  related	  to	  the	  available	  data.	   	  For	  example,	   if	  we	  had	  an	  accident	   that	  was	  affected	  by	  what	   readings	  were	  visible	   in	   a	   smoke	   filled	  cabin,	  we	  would	  need	  video	  data	  of	   the	  actual	  accident	   to	  be	  absolutely	   sure.	   	  We	  could	  use	  a	  similar	  cabin	  to	  set	  up	  an	  experiment,	  but	  if	  we	  did	  not	  know	  the	  density	  of	  the	  smoke	  and	  the	  physical	  efforts	  the	  crew	  made	  to	  get	  readings,	  we	  could	  only	  speculate	  about	  events.	  	  	  
12.6.5 Available	  data	  for	  Überlingen	  accident	  Here	  we	   review	   the	   data	   that	   has	   been	   available	   for	   the	   study	   of	   the	   Überlingen	  accident,	  and	  indeed	  most	  aviation	  accidents.	  	  	  
Direct	  information	  about	  the	  situation	  Direct	   information	   about	   the	   events.	   	   These	   are	   available	   as	   part	   of	   the	   accident	  investigation,	   in	   this	   case	   by	   the	   German	   Federal	   Bureau	   of	   Aircraft	   Accidents	  
	  	  
WORK	  PRACTICE	  SIMULATION	  OF	  COMPLEX	  HUMAN-­‐AUTOMATION	  SYSTEMS	  IN	  SAFETY-­‐CRITICAL	  SITUATIONS	   1
9
6 	  
Investigation:	  Bundesstelle	   für	  Flugunfalluntersuchung,	   or	  BFU.	   	  Direct	   information	  includes:	  
• Transcripts	  (and	  translations)	  of	  conversations	  within	  cockpits,	  and	  between	  pilots	  and	  Air	  Traffic	  Controllers,	  from	  cockpit	  recorders	  (black	  boxes)	  and	  audio	  recording	  of	  Air	  Traffic	  Control	  interactions.	  
• Recordings	  of	  aircraft	  instruments,	  depending	  on	  what	  recorders	  survive	  and	  are	  recovered.	  	  	  
• Reports	  on	  the	  remains	  of	  the	  aircraft,	  depending	  on	  what	  remains	  survive	  and	  are	  recovered.	  	  	  
• Information	  about	  the	  equipment	  and	  capacities	  of	  the	  aircraft	  involved	  in	  the	  accident	  
• Filed	  information	  about	  the	  flight	  plans	  of	  the	  aircraft.	  
• Information	  about	  training	  and	  history	  of	  specific	  flight	  crew	  members	  and	  air	  traffic	  controllers.	  
• Training	  manuals	  and	  regulations	  of	  the	  airlines	  and	  air	  traffic	  control	  facilities	  involved	  in	  the	  accident.	  	  
Indirect	  information	  about	  the	  situation	  
• The	  analysis	  and	  conclusion	  sections	  of	  the	  official	  accident	  report.	  
• Interviews	  with	  surviving	  participants	  (not	  available	  in	  the	  case	  of	  Überlingen,	  except	  for	  employees	  of	  the	  Air	  Traffic	  Control	  Center	  in	  Zurich	  managed,	  who	  could	  describe	  general	  conditions,	  though	  not	  the	  specific	  circumstances).	  
• Interviews	  with	  pilots	  and	  air	  traffic	  controllers,	  who	  can	  assist	  with	  domain	  knowledge,	  and	  describe	  what	  would	  be	  normal	  procedures	  and	  responses	  in	  the	  circumstances	  of	  the	  accident.	  	  In	  our	  investigation	  of	  the	  Überlingen	  accident,	  we	  have	  had	  available	  to	  us	  NASA	  subject	  matter	  experts	  in	  piloting	  and	  air	  traffic	  control,	  whose	  guidance	  has	  been	  extremely	  important	  in	  helping	  us	  understand	  aviation	  language,	  procedures,	  what	  responses	  are	  normal,	  what	  responses	  are	  unusual,	  etc..	  
• Observation	  of	  other	  Air	  Traffic	  Control	  Centers,	  and	  Air	  Traffic	  Control	  Simulators	  at	  NASA.	  	  We	  have	  had	  the	  opportunity	  to	  visit	  the	  Oakland	  Air	  Traffic	  Control	  Center,	  as	  well	  as	  air	  traffic	  control	  simulations	  at	  NASA	  Ames	  Research	  Center.	  	  These	  observations	  allow	  us	  to	  understand	  better	  the	  work	  of	  air	  traffic	  control	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  physical	  plant,	  the	  equipment,	  the	  pace	  of	  work,	  and	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  controllers	  communicate.	  
• Analyses,	  including:	  the	  conclusions	  of	  official	  accident	  reports,	  dissenting	  opinions	  to	  accident	  reports,	  academic	  and	  professional	  analyses	  of	  accident	  data	  and	  reports.	  	  It	  must	  be	  remembered	  that	  each	  of	  these	  forms	  of	  analysis	  has	  its	  own	  bias.	  	  Most	  particularly,	  official	  investigation	  reports	  attempt	  to	  analyze	  the	  data	  to	  determine	  who	  is	  to	  blame.	  	  While	  these	  reports	  can	  be	  quite	  wide	  ranging,	  their	  primary	  purpose	  is	  to	  provide	  testimony	  for	  the	  legal	  process	  that	  follows	  an	  accident.	  	  In	  practical	  terms,	  this	  means	  that	  many	  details	  that	  would	  be	  important	  for	  a	  work	  practice	  model	  are	  not	  included,	  since	  they	  have	  no	  legal	  consequences.	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  As	  well	  as	  these	  fairly	  standards	  forms	  of	  data	  for	  historical	  ethnography,	  in	  the	  case	  of	  Überlingen	  (and	  a	  number	  of	  other	  aviation	  accidents)	  TV	  dramatizations	  provide	  additional	  valuable	  though	  somewhat	  problematic	  source	  of	  information.	  	  There	  are	  several	  dramatizations	  of	   the	  Überlingen	  accident:	  one	  produced	  by	   the	  BBC	   and	   one	   by	   the	   Canadian	   Broadcasting	   Company.	   	   These	   dramatizations	   are	  extremely	  useful	  in	  helping	  one	  to	  visualize	  what	  was	  happening.	  	  But	  they	  must	  be	  used	  carefully,	  because	  the	  details	  of	  speech,	  physical	  locations,	  and	  equipment	  are	  not	   necessarily	   accurate	   to	   the	   level	   required	   by	   a	   BRAHMS	   model.	   	   Also	   they	  necessarily	   contain	   interpretations	   of	   the	   data	   that	   must	   be	   understood	   as	  someone’s	  interpretations,	  as	  opposed	  to	  fact.	  	  For	  example,	  the	  CBC	  dramatization	  edits	   out	   other	   flights	   being	   handled	   by	   the	   air	   traffic	   controller,	   in	   order	   to	  concentrate	   on	   the	   story	   of	   the	   two	   soon-­‐to-­‐collide	   planes	   and	   the	   late	   arriving	  plane	   coming	   in	   for	   a	   landing.	   	   At	   the	   same	   time,	   the	   narration	   and	  music	   of	   the	  dramatization	   suggests	   that	   the	   controller’s	   workload	   is	   extremely	   high,	   an	  interpretation	  that	  our	  subject	  matter	  experts	  in	  air	  traffic	  control	  dispute.	  	  	  	  The	  point	  is	  that	  these	  dramatizations	  are	  extremely	  valuable,	  providing	  a	  rapid	  way	  for	   the	   investigator	   to	   get	  up	   to	   speed	  on	  what	  happened,	   and	  making	   the	  official	  transcript	   much	   more	   comprehensible.	   At	   the	   same	   time,	   it	   is	   necessary	   to	  remember	  that	  these	  dramatizations	  are	  an	  interpretation	  leaning	  in	  the	  direction	  of	  a	   story	  deliberately	  dramatized	   to	  be	  entertaining	  or	  at	   least	   to	  keep	   the	  viewer’s	  interest.	  They	  must	  always	  be	  checked	  against	  official	  transcripts	  and	  other	  sources.	  	  	  
12.6.6 Missing	  information	  important	  for	  refining	  and	  validating	  Brahms-­‐GÜM	  	  Clearly	  there	  is	  a	  great	  deal	  of	  information,	  interpretation,	  analysis	  and	  speculation	  available	  about	  the	  Überlingen	  accident.	  Nevertheless,	  further	  information	  would	  be	  valuable	   to	   increase	   the	   precision	   of	   the	   model	   that	   might	   be	   determined	   with	  ethnographic	   observation,	   on	   the	   spot	   interviews	   with	   personnel,	   and	   perhaps	  records	  that	  are	  not	  publicly	  available.	  	  The	  following	  are	  some	  illustrative	  examples	  of	  missing	   information	   that	  would	   improve	   the	   simulation	  model	   and/or	   validate	  our	  assumptions.	  	  
Information	  about	  the	  Zurich	  ATCC	  
• Exact	   dimensions	   of	   the	   distance	   between	   the	   two	   workstations	   being	  operated	  by	  ATCO	  and	   the	  minimum	   time	   it	  would	   take	   for	  ATCO	   to	  move	  between	   one	   station	   and	   another.	   When	   ATCO	   notices	   the	   impending	  collision	   is	   affected	   by	   the	   cumulative	   time	   for	   his	   many	   moves	   back	   and	  forth.	  
• Typical	  radar	  monitoring	  sequence	  of	   looking	  and	  manipulating	  used	  at	   the	  time	   in	  Zurich,	  providing	  an	   information	  flow	  analysis	  (Hutchins	  2000)	  and	  data	  about	  when	  separation	  issues	  were	  typically	  detected	  and	  handled.	  
• Information	  about	  the	  shift	  handover	  practice.	  	  For	  example,	  was	  there	  a	  shift	  change	   binder	   (“read-­‐and-­‐initial”	   binder)	   containing	   information	   about	  activities	   on	   the	   upcoming	   shift,	   as	   is	   standard	   in	   US	   control	   rooms?	   	   We	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would	  like	  to	  know	  what	  ATCO	  and	  other	  ATCC	  staff	  actually	  knew	  about	  the	  upcoming	  maintenance	  activities.	  	  	  
• Relation	  of	  SYMA	  to	  ATCO’s	  activities.	  	  Observation	  would	  tell	  us	  more	  about	  the	   role	   of	   the	   SYMA	   (Systems	  Manager)	   and	   how	   this	   position	   interacted	  with	  ATCOs.	   	  One	  of	  our	  questions	  has	  been	  why	  the	  ATCO	  on	  duty	  did	  not	  call	  SYMA	  in	  to	  help	  as	  he	  discovered	  that	  his	  equipment	  was	  degraded	  and	  his	   workload	   was	   rising	   or	   why	   the	   SYMA,	   if	   responsible	   for	   systems	  administration,	  was	  not	  proactive	   in	  ensuring	   that	   the	  maintenance	  did	  not	  disrupt	  operations.	  The	  	  essence	  of	  a	  “generalized	  model”	  is	  to	  represent	  best	  practices	  and	  not	  just	  absences,	  omission,	  and	  malfunctions	  (Section	  8.1);	  our	  understanding	  what	  other	  people	  might	  have	  done	  in	  similar	  circumstances	  is	  limited	  to	  what	  is	  available	  in	  published	  information.	  
• Past	   history	   of	  maintenance	   operations	   including	   frequency,	   effects,	   issues.	  	  For	   example,	   had	   the	   phone	   system	   ever	   been	   disabled	   in	   previous	  maintenance	  efforts?	  	  
Information	  about	  the	  flights	  
• Details	  about	  the	  AEF	  flight	  that	  distracted	  the	  ATCO.	  	  The	  BFU	  Report	  refers	  to	   this	   flight	   only	   as	   “a	   late-­‐arriving	   Airbus	   320”	   whose	   schedule	   was	   not	  known	   to	   the	   two	   ATCOs.	   The	   ANSA	   transcript	   identifies	   the	   flight	   as	  “AEF1135	   Aero	   Lloyd	   (Aero	   Lloyd	   Flugreisen)”	   (p.	   57).	  Whether	   the	   plane	  was	  arriving	   from	   the	  north	  or	   south	  could	  affect	  ATCO’s	  perception	  of	   the	  other	  aircraft	  on	  the	  radar	  display.	  We	  do	  not	  know	  whether	  there	  was	  some	  reason	  for	  urgency	  for	  the	  ATCO	  to	  handle	  this	  flight	  personally,	  rather	  than	  deciding	   sooner	   to	   instruct	   the	   pilot	   to	   contact	   the	   Friedrichshafen	   tower	  directly.	  
• Frequency	   of	   charter	   and	   late-­‐arriving	   flights	   like	   the	   BTC	   and	   AEF	   on	   a	  Sunday	  evening.	  
• Transcript	   of	   the	   BTC	   cockpit,	   full	   30	   minutes	   if	   possible,	   to	   better	  understand	  the	  crew	  dynamics.	  	  	  
12.7 Case	  Study:	  Brahms	  MER	  Validity	  Failure	  None	   of	   the	   sponsors	   of	   projects	   in	   which	   Brahms	   has	   been	   used	   to	   date	   have	  provided	   funding	   or	   resources	   to	   enable	   validating	   the	   model.	   Instead,	   project	  managers	   supporting	   the	   efforts	   deemed	   that	   the	   insights	   gained	   from	   the	  experience	   in	  developing	   the	  model	   to	  be	   sufficient	   for	   the	  purposes	   at	  hand	   (the	  NYNEX	  and	  MODAT	  models)	  or	  the	  models	  were	  themselves	  experimental	  efforts	  to	  evaluate	   the	   capability	   of	   the	  modeling	   framework,	   as	   in	   the	   case	   of	   FMARS	   and	  Brahms-­‐GÜM.	  	  	  	  The	  OCA	   “Current	  Operations”	   simulation	   (Section	  12.5)	  was	   essentially	   validated	  by	   the	   work	   group’s	   judgment	   that	   the	   metrics	   (e.g.,	   time	   devoted	   to	   particular	  tasks)	  were	  plausible.	  However,	  no	  effort	  was	  devoted	  to	  analyzing	  and	  quantifying	  video	   data	   that	   could	   have	   validated	   the	   durations	   for	   primitive	   activities	   in	   the	  model.	   The	   “Future	  Operations”	   simulation	   itself	  was	   used	   to	   validate	   the	  OCAMS	  
	  	  
WORK	  PRACTICE	  SIMULATION	  OF	  COMPLEX	  HUMAN-­‐AUTOMATION	  SYSTEMS	  IN	  SAFETY-­‐CRITICAL	  SITUATIONS	   1
9
9 	  
software	  agent	  design,	  however	  after	   the	  OCAMS	  system	  was	  deployed,	   there	  was	  no	  effort	  to	  compare	  what	  actually	  occurred	  (e.g.,	  the	  time	  required	  to	  interact	  with	  OCAMS)	  to	  the	  predictions	  made	  by	  the	  simulation.	  	  	  	  In	  the	  deploying	  OCAMS	  by	  converting	  the	  simulation	  agents	  to	  runtime	  agents,	  we	  did	  encounter	  difficulties	  because	  of	  simplifying	  assumptions	  about	  how	  computer	  systems	  were	  used.	  A	  related	  issue	  had	  arisen	  in	  developing	  Brahms-­‐MER	  (Seah	  et	  al.	  2005)	  in	  which	  a	  difficulty	  arose	  during	  operations	  training	  sessions	  that	  we	  had	  failed	  to	  discover	  when	  simulating	  the	  same	  operations.	  	  We	  drew	  two	  conclusions	  from	   the	   experience:	   1)	   a	   simulation	   should	   explicitly	   model	   and	   validate	   how	  people	  provide	  input	  to	  software	  tools,	  what	  output	  they	  specifically	  “read”	  from	  the	  program,	   and	  what	   they	   do	  with	   this	   information;	   2)	   the	   purpose	   of	   a	   simulation	  should	   be	  well	   defined,	   preferably	   to	   answer	   design	   questions	   and/or	   evaluate	   a	  particular	  tool	  or	  process	  (rather	  than	  being	  an	  unfocused	  “model	  of	  work	  practices”	  in	  some	  setting).	  	  In	  particular,	  the	  Brahms-­‐MER	  simulation	  failed	  to	  represent	  that	  some	   data	   was	   being	   transformed	   manually	   (between	   the	   SAP	   and	   MAPGEN	  programs)	   and	   the	   time	   required.	   During	   the	  MER	   training	   the	  manual	  work	  was	  found	   to	   take	   so	   long	   that	   it	   justified	   developing	   an	   intermediate	   tool	   (the	  “Constraint	   Editor”).	   	   The	   Brahms-­‐MER	   model	   represented	   the	   SAP	   output	   and	  MAPGEN	   input,	   but	   the	  model	   of	   MAPGEN	  was	   incorrect,	   assuming	   it	   was	   in	   the	  form	  provided	  by	  SAP.	  	  Relating	  prior	  experience	  to	  Brahms-­‐GÜM,	  we	  recognize	  in	  particular	  that	  the	  work	  required	  to	  use	  a	  radar	  display	  and	  interpret	  the	  data	  has	  been	  greatly	  abstracted—only	   the	   final	   practical	   beliefs	   about	   flight	   information	   are	  modeled	   and	   they	   are	  directly	   accessible	   without	   requiring	   intermediate	   steps	   of	   instrument	  manipulation,	  data	   lookup,	  correlation,	   calculation,	   logical	   inference,	  etc.	   	   In	  effect,	  the	  workload	   is	  not	  simulated	  at	   the	  grainsize	   that	  could	  properly	  account	   for	   the	  physical	  and	  perceptual	  work	  required	  (and	  this	  is	  common	  to	  most	  task/functional	  models	   as	  well).	   In	   this	   respect,	   one	  must	   be	   cautious	   in	   concluding	  what	   should	  have	  been	  “obvious”	  to	  the	  ATCO	  at	  certain	  points	  in	  time.	  	  It	  is	  precisely	  here	  that	  ethnographic	  observation	  to	  validate	  the	  model	  would	  be	  important.	  	  In	   conclusion,	   validating	   Brahms-­‐GÜM	   and	   similar	  models	  would	   be	   important	   in	  using	   the	   simulation	   results	   for	   work	   system	   design	   or	   forensic	   analyses.	   This	  project	   has	   focused	   on	   demonstrating	   the	   value	   of	   the	   Brahms	   framework	   for	  modeling	   and	   simulating	   complex	   interactions	   of	   people	   and	   automated	   systems	  relevant	   to	   aviation	   safety.	   Carrying	   the	   work	   further	   to	   use	   Brahms-­‐GÜM	   in	  improving	   TCAS	   or	   similar	   systems	   for	   example	   would	   necessitate	   validating	   the	  simulated	   objects	   (e.g.,	   radar	   display)	   and	   how	   they	   are	   used,	   as	   well	   as	   the	  protocols	   and	   all	   of	   the	   conditional	   sensitivities	   (e.g.,	   aircraft	   separation	   at	  which	  ATCO	  notices	  and	   intervenes)	  and	  timings	  (e.g.,	  how	  often	  and	  for	  how	  long	  ATCO	  monitors	   flights)	   related	   to	   work	   practices.	   	   Related	   validation	   is	   required	   that	  would	  observe	  how	  pilots	  notice,	  interpret,	  and	  respond	  to	  TCAS,	  stressing	  their	  use	  of	  other	  information	  and	  their	  communications	  in	  the	  cockpit.	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12.8 Research	  Issues	  in	  Specifying	  and	  Verifying	  TCAS	  Itself	  To	  this	  point,	  we	  have	   focused	  on	   the	  broad	  problem	  of	  verifying	  and	  validating	  a	  work	  practice	  simulation.	  	  However,	  our	  discussion	  would	  not	  be	  complete	  without	  commenting	  on	  the	  subproblem	  of	  verifying	  and	  validating	  the	  automated	  systems	  contained	   within	   the	   work	   system.	   	   In	   particular,	   the	   difficulty	   of	   specifying	   the	  TCAS	   algorithm	   and	   verifying	   the	   program	   highlights	   why	   a	   work	   practice	  simulation	  is	  essential.	  	  Simply	  put,	  if	  TCAS	  were	  infallible,	  then	  pilots	  would	  know	  to	  always	  do	  what	  TCAS	  advises	  and	  to	  always	  ignore	  other	  sources	  of	  information,	  including	  the	  ATCO.	  The	  issue	   of	   authority	   would	   be	   trivial:	   TCAS	   would	   always	   overrule	   ATCO	   and	   the	  pilots’	  own	  judgment.	  One	  would	  simply	  need	  to	  do	  what	  TCAS	  says	  and	  making	  the	  air	  transportation	  system	  safe	  would	  reduce	  to	  installing	  TCAS	  and	  proper	  training.	  	  	  	  The	  fundamental	  problem	  with	  TCAS	  is	  not	  just	  that	  it	  is	  demonstrably	  fallible	  (e.g.,	  Kuchar	  and	  Drumm	  2007;	  EUROCONTROL	  2009),	  but	  the	  program	  itself	  has	  become	  difficult	  to	  understand	  and	  modify.	  A	  Lincoln	  Labs	  report	  (Kochenderfer	  et	  al.	  2012b	  p.	  28)	  states:	  	   The	  evolutionary	  development	  process	  of	  the	  collision	  avoidance	  logic	  has	  resulted	  in	   complex	   pseudocode	   with	   many	   heuristic	   rules	   and	   parameter	   settings	   whose	  justification	  has	  been	  lost	  over	  the	  years.	  Unfortunately,	  due	  to	  the	  complexity	  of	  the	  system,	   correcting	   issues	   without	   introducing	   new	   vulnerabilities	   is	   very	   difficult	  and	   costly.	   Next-­‐generation	   procedures	   and	   new	   sensor	   systems	   will	   require	  reengineering	  much	  of	  the	  logic	  and	  tuning	  many	  parameters.	  	  	  Kochenderfer	   et	   al.	   	   (2012b)	   advocate	   a	   principled,	   model-­‐based	   approach	   to	  generating	  the	  TCAS	  logic:	  	  	   Recent	  work…has	  pursued	  a	  new	  model-­‐based	  optimization	  approach	  to	  developing	  logic	   that	   has	   the	   potential	   to	   shorten	   the	   development	   cycle,	   improve	  maintainability,	  and	  enhance	  safety	  with	  fewer	  nuisance	  alerts.	  This	  new	  approach	  involves	  using	  computers	  to	  directly	  optimize	  the	  logic	  based	  on	  encounter	  models	  of	  traffic	  and	  performance	  metrics...	  	  The	  computer-­‐generated	  logic	  will	  still	  have	  to	  undergo	  rigorous	  safety	  analysis	  that	  may	   result	   in	   modifications	   to	   the	   model	   or	   metrics.	   However,	   the	   development	  cycle	  will	  be	  shortened	  because	  the	  logic	  does	  not	  require	  manual	  revision	  (p.29).	  	  This	  report	  shows	  that,	  even	  without	  considering	  interactions	  among	  pilots,	  ATCOs,	  and	   TCAS	   as	   we	   have	   done	   in	   Brahms-­‐GÜM,	   specifying	   and	   verifying	   the	   TCAS	  algorithm	  itself	  is	  still	  a	  difficult	  research	  problem.	  	  	  	  This	   critical	   evaluation	   of	   TCAS—that	   parts	   of	   the	   program’s	   operation	   cannot	   be	  validated	   because	   justifications	   have	   been	   lost—strongly	   supports	   the	   view	   that	  TCAS	  advisories	  today	  should	  be	  interpreted	  by	  pilots	  as	  relevant	  information,	  but	  not	   indisputable	   commands.	   	   Furthermore,	   the	   fallibility	   of	   TCAS	   itself	   strongly	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justifies	   a	   work	   system	   simulation	   that	   incorporates	   the	   judgment	   of	   pilots	   and	  ATCOs	  because	  in	  practice	  they	  must	  relate	  multiple	  sources	  of	  information	  to	  TCAS	  to	  decide	  what	  to	  do	  when	  an	  RA	  occurs.	  This	  fact	  provides	  another	  perspective	  on	  the	   argument	   articulated	   above	   that	   certifying	   TCAS	   requires	   a	   work	   practice	  simulation—TCAS	  not	  only	  has	  the	  function	  of	  affecting	  what	  people	  do,	  what	  they	  do	  must	  involve	  relating	  multiple	  sources	  of	  information	  because	  they	  know	  that	  the	  RA	   could	   be	   unnecessary	   or	   wrong.	   	   Hence	   understanding	   the	   effect	   of	   TCAS	   on	  safety	  requires	  understanding	  the	  total	  work	  system.	  	  TCAS’s	  limitations	  also	  suggests	  that	  one	  way	  of	  improving	  safety	  of	  the	  total	  work	  system	   is	   to	   expose	   the	   program’s	   vulnerabilities	   to	   pilots.	   In	   particular	   the	  probability	   of	   advice	   being	   incorrect	   in	   a	   particular	   situation	   (e.g.,	   using	   the	  probabilistic	   estimates	   Kochenderfer	   et	   al.	   derive	   from	   historical	   data)	   could	   be	  presented	   to	   the	   pilot.	   This	   approach	   would	   be	   in	   line	   with	   the	   1970s	   expert	  systems	  explanation	  perspective	  that	  a	  fallible	  system	  should	  provide	  some	  means	  for	  people	  to	  evaluate	  its	  advice,	  that	  is,	  for	  its	  logic	  to	  be	  transparent.	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13 Conclusions	  and	  Future	  Research	  Recommendations	  	  This	  chapter	  considers	  what	  we	  have	  learned	  of	  relevance	  to	  NextGen	  in	  developing	  Brahms-­‐GUM	   and	   provides	   recommendations	   for	   future	   research.	   We	   begin	   by	  reviewing	   the	   objectives	   and	   method	   for	   using	   Brahms	   to	   simulate	   a	   complex	  human-­‐automation	  work	  system,	  emphasizing	  the	  generality	  of	  Brahms-­‐GUM.	  	  	  We	  then	  relate	  and	  evaluate	  Brahms	  with	  respect	   to	   the	  questions	  and	  topics	   that	  have	  framed	  research	  in	  the	  “Authority	  and	  Autonomy”	  task	  within	  NASA’s	  Aviation	  Safety	   Program.	   We	   critically	   review	   how	   Brahms-­‐GÜM	   could	   be	   improved	   to	  simulate	   1)	   how	   different	   agent	   “ontologies”	   or	   ways	   of	   categorizing	   the	   world	  interact,	  2)	  mental	  models,	  and	  3)	  emotional-­‐physiological	  modes	  influencing	  work	  behavior.	  We	  present	  methodological	  lessons	  learned	  in	  developing	  a	  work	  system	  simulation	  for	  air	  transportation	  systems	  using	  frameworks	  like	  Brahms.	  	  	  	  Turning	  finally	  to	  aviation	  safety	  lessons	  learned	  and	  recommendations,	  we	  review	  TCAS	   training	   issues	   raised	   by	   the	   BFU	  Report	   and	   comment	   on	   the	   relevance	   of	  Brahms-­‐GÜM	  to	  the	  recommendations	  by	  the	  Panel	  on	  Human	  Factors	  in	  Air	  Traffic	  Control	   Automation	   (Wickens,	   et	   al.	   1998)	   concerning	   the	   effect	   and	   role	   of	  automated	  systems	  in	  the	  airspace	  system.	  
13.1 Summary	  of	  Objectives	  and	  Method	  In	  this	  project	  we	  have	  investigated	  a	  “benchmark”	  scenario	  drawn	  from	  current	  air	  transportation	  systems,	  in	  which	  pilots	  and	  controllers	  interact	  with	  TCAS	  and	  other	  automation	  systems.	  The	  Überlingen	  accident	  was	  specifically	  chosen	  to	  understand	  interactions	  when	   authority	   changes	   in	   controlling	   flight	   paths.	   The	   accident	   also	  has	   many	   anomalies	   contributing	   to	   the	   collision,	   which	   can	   be	   simulated	   in	  different	  combinations	  to	  cover	  a	  wide	  variety	  of	   	  pilot-­‐automation	  and	  controller-­‐automation	  interactions.	  	  	  	  We	   have	   developed	   a	   general	   ATS	   model	   (not	   just	   a	   simulation	   of	   Überlingen	  events),	  called	  the	  Brahms	  Generalized	  Überlingen	  Model	  (Brahms-­‐GÜM).	  Brahms-­‐GÜM	   can	   be	   configured	   in	   different	   ways	   such	   that	   anomalous	   events	   that	  contributed	  to	  the	  Überlingen	  accident	  can	  be	  modeled	  as	  functioning	  according	  to	  requirements	  (or	  following	  operating	  procedures)	  or	  in	  an	  anomalous	  condition,	  as	  occurred	  during	  the	  accident.	  For	  example,	  telephones	  in	  the	  ATCC	  can	  be	  simulated	  in	  Brahms-­‐GÜM	  as	  operating	  normally	  or	  disabled	  as	  they	  were	  during	  the	  accident.	  	  	  The	   configurable	   events	   in	   Brahms-­‐GÜM	   include	   causative	   factors	   such	   as	  human	  
actions	   (e.g.,	   an	   ATCO	   absent	   from	   the	   ATCC)	   and	  preferences	   (e.g.,	   at	  what	   point	  lateral	   separation	   requires	   action),	  otherwise	  everyday	  occurrences	   (e.g.,	   a	   delayed	  flight	   departure	   time),	   and	   automation	   parameters	   (e.g.,	   the	   refresh	   delay	   on	   the	  ATCC	  radar	  display).	  	  	  	  The	   simulation	   model	   is	   designed	   such	   that	   these	   factors	   are	   specified	   as	   initial	  conditions	   when	   the	   model	   is	   simulated	   (see	   Appendix	   24	   for	   configuration	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examples).	   Every	   configuration	   of	   factors,	   together	   with	   fixed	   components	   and	  behaviors	  in	  the	  model,	  constitutes	  a	  scenario.	  	  	  To	  be	  clear,	  Brahms-­‐GÜM	  provides	  several	  kinds	  of	  generality:	  
• Initial	  model	  conditions	  can	  be	  configured:	  
o to	   include	   other	   flights	   on	   different	   flight	   paths	   and	   their	   scheduled	  departure	  times	  
o to	  specify	  whether	  and	  when	  the	  second	  ATCO	  goes	  on	  break	  
o to	  specify	  whether	  pilots	  obey	  the	  TCAS	  RA	  
o to	  specify	  sensitivity	  of	  ATCO	  to	  separation	  infringement	  
• Agents	  can	  be	  cloned	  using	  copy	  and	  paste	  methods	  to	  add	  more	  ATCOs,	  for	  example,	  with	  other	  workstations,	  telephones,	  etc.;	  or	  to	  add	  more	  pilots	  on	  other	  flights.	  
• Geographic	  areas	  can	  be	  cloned	  using	  copy	  and	  paste	  methods	  to	  add	  more	  sectors,	  ATCCs,	  planes	  with	  cockpits,	  etc.	  
• Models	  of	  people	  and	  automation	  can	  be	   independently	  modified	  to	  change	  conditions	   for	   behaviors,	   durations	   for	   primitive	   actions,	   probability	   of	  detectables	   and	   inferences;	   methods	   (WFs)	   of	   activities	   can	   be	  added/deleted	  or	  reprioritized	  independently.	  	  
• New	   models	   of	   automation	   can	   be	   added	   independently;	   e.g.,	   one	   could	  change	   what	   appears	   on	   a	   radar	   display	   by	   adding	   a	   new	   kind	   of	   alert,	  without	   necessarily	  modifying	  when	   agents	  monitor	   or	   how	   they	   interpret	  the	  “beliefs”	  represented	  by	  the	  radar.	  	  Brahms-­‐GÜM	  is	  designed	  in	  a	  general	  way	  to	  enable	  “what	  if”	  experimentation	  over	  a	   wide	   range	   of	   scenarios,	   as	   well	   as	   subsequent	   adaption	   (reusing	   simulation	  components)	   for	  modeling	  and	  simulating	  NextGen	  scenarios.	   	  We	  emphasize	   that	  the	  Brahms-­‐GÜM	  is	  not	  per	  se	  a	  specific	  model	  of	  the	  Überlingen	  accident,	  but	  rather	  
a	  kind	  of	  “superset”	  model	  that	  implicitly	  defines	  a	  class	  of	  scenarios,	  which	  include	  as	  an	  instance	  what	  occurred	  at	  Überlingen.	  	  	  	  One	   can	   create	   variations	   of	   Überlingen	   directly	   by	   modifying	   the	   other	   flights	  handled	  by	  the	  Zurich	  ATCO	  in	  frequency	  and	  duration	  of	  work	  required	  (when	  AEF	  1135	   arrives	   in	   the	   airspace),	   setting	   any	   of	   the	   anomalous	   conditions,	   etc.	   But	  Brahms-­‐GÜM	   provides	   a	   yet	  more	   general	   test	   bench	  with	   reusable	   components:	  One	  could	  simulate	  any	  other	  air	  sectors,	   flights,	  and	  extend	   it	   to	  experiment	  with	  new	   forms	  of	  NextGen	  onboard	  or	  ground	  automation.	   In	  effect,	  Brahms-­‐GÜM	   is	  a	  framework	   for	   modeling	   and	   simulating	   human-­‐automation	   interactions	   among	  aircraft,	  flight	  systems,	  crews,	  ATCOs,	  and	  systems	  in	  ATCCs.	  	  This	  report	  has	  illustrated	  the	  analytic	  method	  for	  creating	  this	  general	  framework	  by	   generalizing	   the	  work	   system	   configuration	   and	   events	   that	   occurred	   during	   a	  specific	  incident.	  Our	  success	  in	  simulating	  a	  variety	  of	  related	  scenarios	  (e.g.,	  Table	  8-­‐1)	   demonstrates	   the	   extent	   to	   which	   Brahms,	   a	   multiagent	   work	   practice	  modeling	   framework,	   facilitates	   this	   generalization.	   In	   particular,	   the	   complex	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space-­‐time	  interactions	  of	  people	  and	  systems—which	  provide	  an	  environment	  for	  each	   other—motivates	   a	   behavior-­‐based	   “total	   systems”	   perspective	   for	  understanding	  the	  variety	  and	  effects	  of	  interactions	  among	  people	  and	  automation.	  We	   contrasted	   this	   approach	   with	   a	   functional-­‐allocation	   model	   that	   might	   be	  employed	  synergistically	  in	  a	  formal	  verification	  process.	  	  The	   process	   of	   creating	   Brahms-­‐GÜM	  has	   clarified:	   1)	   the	  nature	  of	   complex	  work	  
systems,	  particularly	  cognitive	  complexity	  in	  operations	  (e.g.,	  how	  a	  complicated	  but	  routine	  situation	  becomes	  complex	  and	  out	  of	  control)	  and	  2)	  emergent	  effects	  in	  a	  
complex	  system,	  particularly	  temporal	  relations,	  and	  why	  these	  relations	  are	  difficult	  to	   predict	   or	   even	   comprehend	   (and	   what	   statistics	   and	   visualizations	   facilitate	  understanding	   and	   perhaps	   predicting	   them).	   The	   process	   of	   creating	   a	   model	  focusing	   on	   human-­‐systems	   interactions—and	   particularly	   understanding	   the	  emergent	  effects—guided	  our	  search	  for	  and	  interpretation	  of	  historical	  data,	  with	  many	  experiences	  of	  re-­‐looking	  and	  seeing	  new	  "facts"	  in	  the	  transcripts	  and	  charts	  that	  we	  had	  been	  studying	  for	  months.	  
13.2 Conclusions	  about	  Using	  Brahms	  for	  Aviation	  Safety	  Simulations	  In	   this	   section	  we	   relate	   and	   evaluate	  Brahms-­‐GÜM	  with	   respect	   to	   the	   questions	  and	  topics	  that	  have	  framed	  research	  in	  the	  “Authority	  and	  Autonomy”	  task	  within	  NASA’s	   Aviation	   Safety	   Program.	   These	   comments	  may	   be	   viewed	   as	   a	   high-­‐level	  comprehensive	   appraisal	   of	   what	   the	   Brahms-­‐GÜM	   effort—a	   work	   practice	  simulation	  of	  complex	  human-­‐automation	  systems	  in	  safety	  critical	  situations—has	  accomplished	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  approach	  and	  goals	  of	  this	  research	  program.	  	  
• How	  and	   to	  what	   extent	   can	   complex	   scenario	   simulations	   be	  used	   to	   verify	   and	  
validate	  new	  work	  system	  designs	  to	  a	  sufficient	  confidence	  level	  that	  we	  can	  begin	  
to	  introduce	  them	  (e.g.,	  they	  adequately	  represent	  the	  actual	  environment)?	  	  Brahms-­‐GÜM	  demonstrates	  that	  we	  have	  the	  capability	  to	  develop	  complex	  scenario	  simulations	   that	   can	   be	   used	   to	   verify	   and	   validate	   new	   work	   system	   designs.	  	  Demonstrating	  that	  such	  simulations	  are	  sufficiently	  accurate	  and	  valid	  to	  use	  them	  with	   confidence	   for	   introducing	   new	   automation	   systems	   requires	   a	   great	   deal	   of	  further	  research,	  including	  simulation	  of	  crew	  interactions,	  more	  and	  higher-­‐fidelity	  models	   of	   onboard	   and	   ground	   ATCC	   systems,	   and	   extensive	   validation	   from	  ethnographic	  and	  human-­‐in-­‐the-­‐loop	  performance	  studies.	  	  	  	  
• Does	   this	   simulation	   approach	  provide	   appropriate	  metrics	   for	   evaluating	   safety	  
and	  performance	  properties	  relevant	  to	  regulatory	  processes	  and	  policies?	  	  	  Brahms-­‐GÜM	   can	   be	   used	   to	   generate	   a	   variety	   of	   relevant	  metrics.	   	   A	  multi-­‐year	  research	   effort	   is	   merited	   to	   develop	   methods	   for	   instrumenting	   the	   Brahms	  framework	  itself	  to	  generate	  and	  assist	  analyzing	  metrics	  and	  to	  relate	  such	  metrics	  to	  regulatory	  processes	  and	  policies.	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• Consequently,	  how	  can	  current	  V&V	  processes	  and	  tools	  be	  revised	  or	  extended	  to	  
refine	  and	  amplify	  simulations	  of	  complex	  scenarios?	  	  	  The	  application	  of	  V&V	  research	   to	  Brahms-­‐GÜM	  is	  a	  related	  but	  separate	  project.	  However,	  our	  results	  and	  analysis	  suggest	  that	  V&V	  processes	  and	  tools	  might	  focus	  on	  methods	  for	  efficiently	  defining	  and	  focusing	  the	  space	  of	  modeled	  variables	  (e.g.,	  simulating	   flights	   entering	   ATCO’s	   sector).	   Another	   research	   project	   might	  specifically	  characterize	  tools	  that	  would	  assist	   the	  refinement	  steps	   in	  developing	  Brahms-­‐GÜM	  (Chapter	  10).	  	  	  
• What	   is	   the	   efficacy	  and	   feasibility	   of	   the	  work	  practice	   simulation	  approach	   for	  
designing	  and	  evaluating	  the	  effects	  of	  display,	  alerting,	  and	  procedures	  on	  safety?	  	  Because	  of	  the	  total	  systems	  approach	  allowing	  variable	  model	  fidelity	  of	  any	  human	  role	  or	  subsystem,	  Brahms-­‐GÜM	  shows	  that	  developing	  work	  practice	  simulations	  is	  feasible	   and	   usefully	   informative	   for	   designing	   and	   evaluating	   automation.	   In	  particular,	   the	   Überlingen	   scenario	   illustrates	   that	   a	   work	   practice	   simulation	   is	  particular	  appropriate	  because	  unlike	  many	  human	  factors	  models	  in	  aeronautics,	  it	  includes	  and	  relates	  the	  behaviors	  of	  the	  ATCC	  and	  the	  cockpit,	  as	  well	  as	  automated	  systems	  they	  rely	  on	  for	  safety.	  TCAS	  exemplifies	  how	  a	  system	  can	  usurp	  a	  person’s	  authority,	  and	   the	  simulation	  shows	  how	   failure	   for	   this	  change	   in	  authority	   to	  be	  communicated	  immediately	  to	  ATCO	  may	  result	  in	  a	  disruption	  of	  TCAS’	  actions	  and	  the	  designers’	  assumptions.	  	  	  In	   short,	   Brahms-­‐GÜM	   research	   suggests	   that	   a	   work	   practice	   simulation	   is	  especially	  well	  suited	  to	  designing	  and	  evaluating	  the	  effects	  of	  display,	  alerting,	  and	  procedures	   on	   safety.	   The	   framework	   is	   compatible	   with	   future	   efforts	   to	   model	  	  formally-­‐checkable	   strategies	   for	   task	   performance,	   management	   of	  communications,	  and	  maintenance	  of	  situation	  awareness	  under	  conditions	  where	  authority	   is	   re-­‐assigned	   (or	   managed)	   across	   human	   and	   automated	   agents	   in	   a	  variety	   of	   ways,	   including	   dynamic	   changes.	   Therefore,	   such	   total	   system	  simulations	  could	  be	  of	  considerable	  value	  within	  a	  comprehensive	  V&V	  process	  for	  NextGen	  A&A	  problems.	  	  
• Can	  we	  measure	   the	   time	   to	   deal	   with	   perturbations	   and	   the	   risk	   of	   a	   problem	  
occurring?	  	  	  We	  have	  shown	  in	  some	  detail	   (Section	  10.5)	  how	  Brahms-­‐GÜM	  enables	  modeling	  how	   distractions	   (e.g.,	   late-­‐arriving	   flight,	   dysfunctional	   telephone	   system)	   can	  perturb	   the	   routine	  process	  of	  monitoring	   flights	  and	   lead	   to	   separation	  violation.	  Further,	  the	  intervention	  of	  ATCO	  before	  and	  after	  a	  TCAS	  TA	  influences	  whether	  an	  RA	  is	  required	  and	  if	  so	  the	  particular	  advisories	  generated	  for	  each	  aircraft.	  Varying	  the	   model	   of	   any	   aspect	   (e.g.,	   time	   devoted	   to	   handling	   phone	   problem;	  prioritization	  of	  activities	   such	  as	   flight	  handoff	  and	  routine	  scanning	  of	   the	   radar	  display),	   enables	   generating	   metrics	   on	   sensitivity	   of	   effects	   and	   frequency	   of	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different	   sequential	   behaviors	   that	   result	   (e.g.,	   how	   soon	   before	   TCAS	   RA	  intervention	  can	  be	  effective	  rather	  than	  being	  disruptive).	  	  	  
• Could	   such	   a	   simulation	   help	   design	   methods	   for	   quantifiably	   detecting	   that	   a	  
system	  is	  starting	  to	  fail	  during	  operations?	  	  A	  simulation	  like	  Brahms-­‐GÜM	  can	  generate	  metrics	  like	  those	  mentioned	  above	  to	  detect	   “intolerable”	  configurations,	   such	  as	  determining	   that	   the	  current	  workload	  exceeds	  what	  ATCO	  can	  manage,	  requiring	  a	  change	  in	  strategy	  (e.g.,	  instructing	  AEF	  to	  contact	  the	  tower	  directly	  immediately)	  and/or	  reconfiguration	  of	  the	  flight	  paths	  (e.g.,	   detecting	   that	   BTC	   has	   arrived	   in	   the	   sector	   at	   the	   same	   altitude	   as	   was	  provided	  to	  the	  crossing	  DHL	  flight).	  	  In	  effect,	  one	  way	  of	  characterizing	  “starting	  to	  fail”	   is	   in	   terms	  of	   accumulating	   conflicts	   that	  need	   to	  be	   resolved	  and/or	   routine	  operations	   that	   are	   consuming	  more	   time	   than	   usual	   and	   thus	   delaying	   required	  actions.	  	  	  Much	  of	  the	  research	  direction	  in	  A&A	  focuses	  on	  law-­‐like	  properties,	  such	  as	  official	  regulations,	   including	   separation	   violation.	   	  Focusing	   as	   well	   on	   cognitive	  complexity,	  we	  could	  for	  example	  define	  properties	  such	  as	  “ATCO	  should	  spend	  X%	  of	   time	  monitoring	   larger	   air	   space”	   and	   	  “ATCO	   should	   not	   have	  more	   than	   two	  pending	   tasks.”	   Such	   thresholds	   might	   provide	   advance	   warning	   of	   undesirable	  behaviors:	  
o failures	   to	   carry	   out	   certain	   activities	   according	   to	   expected	  schedule/intensity	   etc.	   in	   normal	   practice,	   e.g.,	   not	   monitoring	   larger	  airspace;	  
o becoming	  reactive,	  flitting	  about,	  juggling	  several	  things	  at	  once,	  allowing	  quality	   of	   work	   to	   degrade,	   e.g.,	   ATCO	   allowing	   AEF	   to	   dominate	   his	  attention;	  not	  monitoring	  DHL	  and	  BTC	  after	  the	  intervention;	  
o not	  realizing	  that	  certain	  events	  or	  information	  could	  have	  or	  would	  have	  consequences	  downstream;	  more	  generally,	  not	  thinking	  ahead,	  a	  kind	  of	  tunnel	  vision	  and	  action,	  e.g.,	  clearing	  DHL	  to	  FL360	  and	  then	  not	  thinking	  through	  the	  implications	  of	  BTC's	  reported	  altitude.	  	  Such	   properties	   could	   be	   interpreted	   as	   indicating	   that	   the	   work	   system	   is	  transitioning	   from	   being	   complicated	   to	   being	   complex.	   In	   effect	   we	   could	  instrument	   the	   Brahms	   engine	   to	   provide	   a	   form	   of	   prognostic	   indication	   of	  increased	  risk	  of	  system	  failure.	  	  
• What	   are	   the	   advantages	   of	   a	   unified	   agent	   architecture	   like	   Brahms	   versus	  
simulations	  that	  allow	  a	  variety	  of	  representations?	  	  The	  Brahms	  framework	  enables	  flexibly	  integrating	  the	  simulated	  world	  of	  Brahms	  agents	  and	  objects	  with	  other	  simulations	  as	  well	  as	  operational	  software	  (through	  an	   API).	   This	   enables	   adapting	   and	   refining	   simulations	   efficiently	   and	  pragmatically,	   promoting	   reuse	   of	   model	   components,	   with	   all	   of	   the	   forms	   of	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generality	   outlined	   above.	   The	   inherent	   modularity	   of	   the	   agent-­‐oriented	   and	  object-­‐oriented	   architecture	   facilitates	   creating	   simulations	   incrementally	   and	  making	  local	  modifications	  experimentally	  (e.g.,	  Table	  10-­‐2).	  	  The	   key	   concepts	   provided	   by	   Brahms	   that	  make	   it	   a	   unified	   architecture	   are:	   1)	  parallel	   simulation	   of	   processes	   that	  may	   interact	   at	   different	   levels	   (e.g.,	   ATCO’s	  intervention	   interacts	   with	   TCAS	   through	   simulation	   of	   verbal	   commands),	   2)	  uniform	   use	   of	   message	   passing	   for	   communications	   among	   people	   and	   systems	  (with	   domain-­‐specific	   message	   structures	   as	   required),	   3)	   simulation	   of	   located,	  chronological	   behaviors	   of	   people	   and	   systems	   (i.e.,	  modeling	   activities	  within	   an	  abstracted	   geographic	  model	   of	   facilities,	   vehicles,	   landscapes,	   etc.),	   4)	   simulating	  human	   perception	   through	   “detectables”	   (Clancey	   et	   al.	   1998b),	   5)	   simulating	  “broadcast”	  (verbal	  out-­‐louds)	  and	  movement	  as	  behaviors	  that	  are	  conditional	  on	  agent	   beliefs	   (model	   of	   world),	   6)	   simulating	   inference	   as	   occurring	   within	   an	  activity.	  	  
• How	   does	   “scenario-­‐based	   thinking”	   relate	   to	   analytic/verbal	   arguments,	   e.g.,	  
establishing	  a	  different	  kind	  of	  evidence	  that	  a	  system	  is	  safe?	  	  With	  respect	  to	  scenario-­‐based	  thinking,	  Brahms	  enables	  simulating	  a	  work	  system	  in	   a	   general	   way,	   such	   that	   the	   simulation	   can	   be	   configured	   to	   model	   a	   large	  number	   of	   scenarios.	   Simulating	   scenarios	   promotes	   systems	   thinking	   in	   both	  analysis	  and	  in	  modeling.	  A	  Brahms	  simulation	  of	  pilot	  activities	  in	  extended	  flight	  (over	  multiple	   sectors)	   requires	  modeling	   air	   traffic	   controllers,	   and	   this	   requires	  modeling	   the	   tools	   both	   parties	   are	   using	   to	   inform	   and	   carry	   out	   their	  communications	   and	   to	   execute	   the	   requests	   they	  might	  make	   of	   each	   other	   (e.g.,	  pilot	   request	   to	   change	   altitude).	   	   A	   Brahms	   simulation	   is	   to	   an	   analytic/verbal	  argument	  as	  a	  play	   is	   to	  reviewer’s	  synopsis	  and	  critique.	   	  As	  representations,	   the	  play	  and	  the	  review	  are	  of	  course	  complementary.	  With	  respect	   to	  aviation	  safety,	  the	  Brahms	  simulation	  provides	  a	  test	  bench	  for	  generating	  metrics,	  for	  doing	  what-­‐if	   experiments,	   for	   studying	   causal-­‐temporal	   relations	   in	   a	   systematic	  manner.	   	   In	  effect,	   the	   value	   of	   a	   scenario-­‐based	   simulation	   relative	   to	   analytic/verbal	  arguments	   is	   similar	   to	   the	  value	  of	  having	   a	  model	   for	   scientific	   and	  engineering	  over	  having	  just	  lists	  of	  facts,	  assumptions,	  and	  inferences.	  	  The	  model	  can	  be	  used	  to	  suggest	  hypotheses	  that	  leads	  to	  more	  data	  collection,	  refined	  theories,	  and	  new	  experiments.	  	  Scenario-­‐based	  thinking	  in	  Brahms	  has	  the	  potential	  of	  making	  work	  system	  design	  a	  scientific	  enterprise.	  	  
• What	  shortcomings	  were	  uncovered	  by	  unexpected	  research	  results,	  suggesting	  
requirements	  for	  further	  research?	  	  	  	  Appendix	   28	   discusses	   some	   limitations	   in	   the	   Brahms	   language;	   the	   following	  sections	  describe	  how	  models	  might	  be	   improved	   and	   the	  methodological	   lessons	  learned.	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13.3 How	  Brahms-­‐GÜM	  Could	  be	  Improved	  for	  Simulating	  	  Complex	  Human-­‐
Automation	  Systems	  	  The	  timing	  sensitivity	  and	  variety	  of	  behavioral	  sequences	  (Table	  10-­‐3)	  that	  result	  from	  running	  a	  single	  scenario	  (Überlingen,	  1F	  in	  Table	  10-­‐1)	  demonstrates	  that	  the	  Brahms	  framework	  enables	  modeling	  the	  variability	  and	  dynamic	  implications	  of	  a	  work	  system	  that	  combines	  simultaneous	  agent	  activities	  and	  subsystem	  processes.	  Further,	  the	  model	  is	  general	  to	  the	  extent	  that	  it	  can	  run	  in	  different	  configurations	  (scenarios)	  in	  which	  the	  simulated	  actions	  of	  people	  and	  automated	  system	  interact	  and	  influence	  each	  other	  in	  unexpected	  ways.	  	  In	  the	  following	  sections	  we	  elaborate	  on	  the	  advantages	  of	  Brahms	  for	  simulating	  complex	  human-­‐automation	  systems,	  and	  correspondingly	  how	  Brahms-­‐GÜM	  might	  be	  enhanced	  to	  exploit	  the	  Brahms	  framework.	  
13.3.1 Modeling	  different	  agent	  and	  object	  ontologies	  Pilots	  and	  ATCOs	  have	  different	  ways	  of	  modeling	  flight	  activity.	  That	  is,	  they	  have	  different	   ways	   of	   characterizing	   (categorizing)	   the	   objects,	   their	   properties,	   and	  processes	   of	   the	   world,	   which	   constitutes	   an	   ontology.	   For	   example,	   they	   track	  progress	   of	   flights	   relative	   to	   different	   “progress	   landmarks.”	   Generally,	   speaking	  pilots	   think	   and	   talk	   in	   terms	   of	   distance—“where	   am	   I	   within	   my	   arrival	   and	  approach	   path?”;	   ATCOs	   think	   and	   talk	   in	   terms	   of	   time—“When	  will	   X	   occur?	   Is	  there	  time	  for	  Y	  to	  do	  X?”	  	  Put	  another	  way,	  the	  mental	  models	  of	  ATCOs,	  pilots,	  and	  automation	  will	  differ	  in	  describing	  “the	  same”	  events,	  tasks,	  goals,	  etc.	  	  	  Brahms	  enables	  variation	  of	  mental	  models	  because	  the	  entities	  and	  attributes	  that	  make	  up	  each	  group	  or	  agent’s	  beliefs	  can	  be	  modeled	  independently.	   In	  principle,	  all	   of	   the	   agents	   and	   objects	   can	   “think	   in	   different	   languages.”	   Of	   course,	   any	  communications	  will	   be	   in	   terms	  of	   a	   shared	  ontology,	   and	  any	  belief	   gained	  by	  a	  Brahms	   detectable	   in	   terms	   of	   the	   ontology	   of	   the	   world	   model,	   the	   so-­‐called	  objective	   “facts.”	   An	   agent	   or	   object	   can	   translate	   from	   one	   frame	   of	   reference	   to	  another	  in	  inferences	  (TFs).	  
	  Effectively	  the	  ATCOs	  are	  managing	  a	  large	  airspace	  with	  many	  planes	  as	  well	  as	  the	  runways.	  	  They	  are	  locating	  planes	  in	  space,	  focusing	  on	  separation	  and	  allocation	  of	  places.	  The	  pilot	  is	  on	  a	  trajectory	  and	  is	  instructed	  by	  ATCO	  about	  when	  to	  arrive	  at	  the	   waypoints.	   The	   pilot	   flies	   with	   a	   single-­‐minded,	   one-­‐directional	   orientation,	  geodetically	  aligned	  for	  efficiency—the	  shortest	  path	  from	  A	  to	  B	  is	  preferred.	  The	  ATCO	  is	  managing	   flows,	  streams	  of	  planes	  passing	  through	  the	  same	  airspace	  and	  airport	  regions.	  	  	  	  The	   pilot	   locates	   a	   single	   point	   (the	   plane)	   in	   3-­‐d	   space,	   constrained	   by	   altitude,	  pitch,	  roll,	  and	  speed.	  The	  ATCO	  locates	  an	  entire	  population	  of	  planes	  in	  3-­‐d	  space	  (e.g.,	  the	  ARFA	  Sector,	  Figure	  9-­‐2),	  all	  in	  motion,	  but	  attempts	  to	  sustain	  a	  dynamic	  equilibrium:	  planes	  arriving	  and	  landing	  at	  a	  certain	  pace	  and	  so	  many	  planes	  in	  a	  given	  flight	  path,	  separated	  by	  fixed	  amounts.	  	  So	  despite	  the	  entire	  system	  being	  in	  constant	  motion,	  the	  dynamic	  properties	  are	  bounded	  and	  routine.	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  We	  can	  experience	  the	  ATCOs	  perspective	  by	  observing	  the	  stream	  of	  planes	  at	  night	  coming	   into	   an	   airport.	  We	   can	   routinely	   see	   several	   planes,	   maybe	   even	   five	   or	  more,	   progressively	   distant	   on	   the	   same	   flight	   path,	   descending	   to	   the	   airport,	  spaced	  more	  or	  less	  equally	  apart.	  	  Knowing	  the	  ATCO’s	  ontology	  enables	  us	  to	  better	  understand	  and	  model	  his	  work.	  For	  example,	  how	  much	  time	  does	  the	  ATCO	  have	  available	  for	  advance	  notice,	  given	  the	   frequency	   and	   duration	   of	   interactions,	   etc.?	   	  What	   does	   the	   incoming	   stream	  look	   like?	   	  How	   do	   events	   bunch	   or	   backlog?	   	  How	   are	   these	   influenced	   by	   the	  circumstantial	   additions	   and	   subtractions	   of	   speed	   on	   route	   from	   wind	   and	  rerouting?	   	   In	  particular,	   future	   research	  using	  Brahms	  models	   could	  examine	   the	  practicality	   of	   viewing	   the	  modern	   airline	   pilot	   as	   a	   “manager”	   (as	   prescribed	   by	  Casner	  2007)—what	  ontology	  characterizes	  the	  activities	  of	  monitoring,	  controlling,	  and	  communicating?	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interpretation	   and	   action	   implications	  may	   be	   adaptable,	   but	   only	  within	   another	  fixed	  ontology	  of	  permissible	  variation.	  	  	  These	  are	  crucial	  issues	  to	  model,	  not	  least	  because	  they	  fit	  very	  well	  how	  Brahms	  work	  system	  simulations	  make	  social-­‐psychological	  processes	  visible.	  In	  particular,	  the	   different	   attentional	   foci	   of	   pilots	   and	   controllers	   are	   not	   visible	   to	   a	   casual	  observer.	   This	   critical	   aspect	   of	   current	   operations	   could	   well	   be	   ignored	   or	  minimized	  in	  designing	  NextGen	  automation	  systems.	  Brahms	  simulations	  provide	  a	  way	  for	  engineers	  to	  talk	  about	  and	  model	  how	  expertise,	  attention,	  and	  knowledge	  interact	  in	  operations.	  	  	  	  Brahms-­‐GÜM	   can	   be	   augmented	   to	   represent	   agent	   and	   object	   ontologies,	   thus	  better	  modeling	  the	  work	  required	  to	  adapt	  a	  work	  practice	  to	  the	  data	  or	  services	  provided	   by	   a	   tool.	   Such	   a	   model	   would	   also	   reveal	   the	   differing	   interpretations	  pilots,	  ATCOs,	  and	  automated	  systems	  infer	  from	  their	  interactions	  with	  each	  other.	  With	  respect	  to	  the	  social	  character	  of	  work	  practices,	  research	  could	  focus	  on	  how	  human-­‐systems	   relations	   parallel	   or	   different	   from	   teamwork	   among	   people,	   and	  how	  these	  relations	  make	  interaction	  easier	  or	  more	  problematic.	  	  	  In	  particular,	  models	  of	  mental	  models	  must	  include	  people’s	  understanding	  of	  the	  goals	   and	   methods	  of	   automation,	   as	   well	   as	   perhaps	   the	   assumptions	   design	   of	  automated	  systems	  makes	  about	  the	  goals	  and	  methods	  of	  people	  who	  are	  affected	  by	   it.	   	  Model	   checking	   could	   then	   include	  detecting	  discrepancies	  between	  mental	  models	  of	  agents	  and	  object	  and	  their	  actual	  states.	  	  	  One	   could	   also	  model	   how	  people	   and	   systems	   reflectively	  model	   their	   own	   goals	  and	   methods	   as	   part	   of	   their	   practice	   to	   develop	   coherent	   models	   of	   progress	  
appraisal	  (Feltovich	  et	  al.	  2008).	  Such	  models	  would	  relate	  to	  roles,	  responsibilities,	  and	  ongoing	   status	   to	   characterize	   “What	   I	   am	  doing	  now.”	   “How	  well	   is	   this	   task	  proceeding?”	   “What	   are	   the	  wider,	   long-­‐term	   implications	   of	   this	   decision?”	   If	   the	  Zurich	  ATCO	  during	  the	  Überlingen	  accident	  were	  constructing	  such	  a	  mental	  model	  of	  progress,	  he	  might	  have	  noticed	  that	  fussing	  over	  the	  telephones	  was	  distracting	  from	   his	   primary	   role	   in	   ensuring	   safety	   of	   all	   the	   flights	   in	   his	   sector.	   Mental	  progress	  appraisal	  models	  of	  other	  agents/objects,	  could	  include	  for	  example,	  “is	  X	  functioning	  well	  doing	  his/its	  task	  now?”	   	  With	  such	  a	  mental	  model,	  representing	  an	   aspect	   of	   situation	   awareness,	   the	   Zurich	   ATCO	   might	   have	   cared	   to	   ask	   and	  verify	  what	  effects	  the	  maintenance	  work	  was	  having	  on	  the	  tools	  he	  relied	  upon	  for	  carrying	  out	  his	  responsibilities.	  
13.3.3 Modeling	  emotional-­‐physiological	  modes	  	  Creating	   a	   model	   of	   interactive	   human-­‐automation	   behavior	   raises	   psychological	  questions	  about	  emotion	  and	  fatigue,	  exemplified	  by	  our	  analysis	  of	  why	  the	  Zurich	  ATCO	   shifted	   from	  handling	   the	  BTC/DHL	   separation	   to	   responding	   to	  AEF’s	   final	  call,	  rather	  than	  confirming	  that	  the	  potential	  collision	  was	  resolved	  (Section	  6.8.6).	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Emotional	   aspects	  may	   be	   relevant,	   such	   as	   the	   relief	   of	   closure:	   ATCO	  may	   have	  conceived	   the	  problem	  as	   communicating	  with	  BTC,	   so	   their	  descent	   confirmation	  gave	  an	  experience	  of	  closure	  and	  ability	   to	  respond	  to	  AEF’s	  call	  at	   that	  moment.	  The	  effect	  of	   fatigue	  on	  multitasking	   is	  also	  of	  course	  well	  known:	  ATCO’s	  ongoing	  focus	   and	   frustration	   in	   getting	   closure	   in	   the	   AEF	   landing	   handoff	   was	   perhaps	  pulling	  him	  back	  towards	  the	  other	  radar	  scope,	  the	  activity	  in	  which	  had	  he	  become	  fixated	  over	  five	  minutes.	  	  The	   Brahms	   framework	   does	   not	   have	   direct,	   built-­‐in	   methods	   for	   simulating	  emotional-­‐physiological	  modes	  of	  feeling/attitude,	  fatigue,	  stress,	  attention	  fixation,	  etc.,	   which	   may	   be	   cumulative	   effects	   of	   workload.	   An	   approach	   for	   simulating	  physical	  properties	  of	  a	  person,	  which	  was	  used	   in	   the	  Brahms	  model	  of	   “a	  day	   in	  the	   life”	  of	  a	  Mars	  research	  station	  (Clancey	  et	  al.	  2005),	   is	   to	  model	  the	  body	  of	  a	  person	   as	   an	   associated	   object	  with	   physiological	   attributes	   (e.g.,	   need	   for	   eating,	  sleep,	  using	  a	  toilet)	  whose	  values	  are	  a	  function	  of	  time.	  These	  attributes	  could	  also	  be	   set	   by	  workframes	   that	  model	   emotional	   or	   fatigue	   effects	   of	   doing	   an	   activity	  (e.g.,	  a	   function	  of	   the	  time	  required	  to	  accomplish	  a	   task).	   	  This	  object	  could	  then	  “communicate”	  beliefs	  to	  the	  agent	  that	  model	  feeling	  tired,	  focused	  on	  a	  task,	  etc.,	  which	   would	   be	   included	   in	   WF	   conditions	   and	   hence	   influence	   what	   and	   how	  activities	  are	  carried	  out.	  	  	  Another	  way	   to	   proceed	  might	   be	   to	   use	   a	  Brahms	   simulation	   to	   characterize	   the	  work	   and	   context	   in	  which	   an	   agent	   is	   operating,	   and	   represent	   these	   states	   and	  situations	   in	   other	   suitable	   modeling	   frameworks.	   Such	   a	   model	   could	   then	   be	  coupled	   to	   the	   Brahms	   simulation	   through	   the	   “body	   as	   object”	   approach.	   The	  Brahms	   language	   could	   also	   be	   extended;	   for	   example	   detectables	   might	   be	  dynamically	   modified	   by	   an	   associated	   model	   of	   fatigue	   (e.g.,	   decrease	   the	  probability	  of	  noticing	  a	  fact	  in	  the	  world).	  	  	  	  The	  Brahms	  engine	  could	  also	  make	  accessible	  to	  the	  “body	  model”	  data	  about	  the	  ongoing	   number	   of	   interrupted	   WFs,	   the	   frequency	   of	   interruption	   by	   higher-­‐priority	   activities,	   the	   duration	   for	   carrying	   out	   an	   activity	   compared	   to	   a	  normal/expected	   duration,	   etc.	   These	   factors	   would	   represent	   workload	   that	   the	  body	  model	  could	  incorporate	  into	  the	  model	  of	  fatigue/stress,	  excitement/interest,	  displeasure/anxiety,	  etc.	  
13.4 Methodological	  Lessons	  Learned	  in	  Simulating	  Work	  Systems	  and	  
Scenarios	  As	   mentioned,	   Brahms-­‐GÜM	   has	   been	   the	   most	   complex	   Brahms	  model	   we	   have	  constructed	   to	   date,	   in	   terms	   of	   the	   number	   of	   independently	   operating	   kinds	   of	  objects	  (e.g.,	  aircraft,	  FMS,	  TCAS,	  radar)	  and	  agent	  roles	  (pilot,	  ATCO,	  CA).	  We	  sought	  to	   develop	   a	   system	   useful	   for	   model	   checking	   research	   within	   one	   year,	   which	  could	  not	  have	  been	  done	  without	  the	  single	  modeler’s	  extensive	  experience	  using	  Brahms	   over	   a	   decade.	   The	   models	   of	   people	   and	   subsystems	   were	   necessarily	  scoped	   in	   detail	   and	   fidelity,	   as	   summarized	   at	   the	   beginning	   of	   Chapter	   9.	   In	  particular,	  we	  had	  originally	  intended	  to	  model	  intra-­‐crew	  roles	  and	  interactions	  to	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simulate	  the	  BTC	  interactions	  regarding	  following	  TCAS	  versus	  the	  ATCO.	  	  It	  would	  be	  worthwhile	  to	  model	  also	  what	  the	  “DL	  identity”	  of	  ATCO	  would	  entail	  (BFU,	  p.	  83)	   and	   how	   the	   ATCC	  might	  more	   properly	   adjusting	   roles	   to	   accommodate	   the	  maintenance	  situation	  (BFU,	  p.	  84).	  	  Developing	  the	  model	  incrementally	  resulted	  in	  being	  continuously	  surprised	  about	  timing	  effects	  especially,	  requiring	  improved	  fidelity	  in	  models	  of	  both	  subsystems	  (e.g.,	   radar	   display	   sweep),	   aircraft	   flight	   paths	   (e.g.,	   response	   to	   TCAS),	   the	   air	  sector	   (e.g.,	   bounds	   of	   ARFA),	   pilots	   (e.g.,	   acknowledging	  ATCO/TCAS	   after	   taking	  action),	  and	  ATCO	  (e.g.,	  handling	  dysfunctional	  phones).	  	  	  In	  managing	   such	   a	   technical	   project	   one	  would	   generally	   prefer	   to	   know	   and	   to	  have	  documented	  what	  needs	  to	  be	  in	  the	  model	  early	  on.	  Of	  course,	  the	  amount	  of	  detail	  would	  have	  appeared	  daunting,	  and	  in	  practice	  appreciating	  what	  needed	  to	  be	  included	  required	  many	  months	  of	  experience	  in	  critiquing	  the	  simulation	  output	  and	   research	   reading	   to	   grasp	   such	   detail.	   	   Nevertheless,	   in	   approaching	   such	   a	  model	   in	   the	   future,	   we	   will	   develop	   a	   technical	   design	   in	   the	   same	   manner	   we	  document	   realtime	   Brahms	   agent	   software	   systems.	   In	   particular,	   knowing	   that	   a	  one-­‐second	   clock	   tick	   is	   required,	   we	   are	   now	   better	   able	   to	   anticipate	   the	  corresponding	  degree	  of	  fidelity	  required	  for	  agent	  and	  object	  behaviors.	  This	  said,	  the	  project	  schedule	  must	  allow	  for	   late	  discoveries	  and	  significant	  changes	   to	   the	  model,	   as	   we	   have	   documented	   in	   Chapter	   10—nearly	   a	   third	   of	   the	   year	   was	  devoted	   to	   “refining”	   the	   model	   to	   produce	   sufficiently	   complete	   and	   coherent	  simulations.	  	  Our	   prior	   experience	   suggested	   Brahms-­‐GÜM	   would	   benefit	   from	   having	   three	  modelers	   at	   least,	   focusing	   on	   ATCC,	   aircraft/flights,	   and	   the	   cockpit.	   Research,	  design	   documentation,	   review,	   testing	   could	   have	   proceeded	  more	   systematically	  and	  efficiently	  with	  more	  personnel.	  	  In	  particular,	  the	  modeling	  process	  would	  have	  benefited	   greatly—as	   well	   as	   future	   research	   using	   Brahms-­‐GÜM—by	   disciplined	  documentation	   of	   the	   source	   of	   every	  WF,	   what	   assumptions	   and	   simplifications	  were	   made,	   and	   the	   history	   of	   modifications	   with	   justifications	   (e.g.,	   interaction	  effects).	   Such	   records	  were	  not	  necessary	  when	  developing	  other	  Brahms	  models,	  but	   the	   complexity	  of	   this	   simulation	  made	   it	  difficult	   at	   times	   to	   remember	  or	   to	  reflect	  on	  how	   the	  model	  was	  being	  designed	   (e.g.,	  modeling	   reading	   the	   radar	  as	  analogous	  to	  communicating	  with	  a	  radio	  was	  inadequate	  to	  model	  ATCO’s	  decision	  of	  which	  aircraft	  to	  advise	  to	  descend).	  	  In	  using	  or	  adapting	  Brahms-­‐GÜM	  for	   	  developing	  new	  automation	  or	  significantly	  changed	   work	   practices,	   our	   experience	   from	   Brahms-­‐MER	   (Section	   12.7)	   shows	  that	  detailed	  data-­‐flow	  and	  use-­‐case	  diagrams	  are	  essential	   for	  verifying	  workflow	  connectivity	  early	  in	  design	  of	  the	  simulation.	  	  	  In	  short,	  a	  lesson	  learned	  from	  our	  experience	  is	  that,	  when	  shifting	  from	  a	  research	  project	   like	   that	   reported	   here	   to	   a	   development	   context,	  modeling	   complex	   real-­‐world	  systems	  should	  follow	  standard	  software	  engineering	  practices;	  consequently	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more	   personnel	   and	   time	   will	   be	   required	   than	   might	   be	   apparent	   from	   the	  accomplishments	  of	  the	  Brahms-­‐GÜM	  project.	  This	  entails	  writing	  and	  maintaining	  model	   requirements	   specification	   and	   technical	   design	   documents,	   such	   as	  describing	   in	  detail	  how	  automated	  components	   like	  TCAS	  are	  modeled,	   including	  significant	  simplifications/workarounds	  and	  omissions.	  Such	  a	  model	  is	  too	  complex	  for	  a	  research	  manager	  to	  review	  in	  detail	  or	  sufficiently	  frequently.	  	  	  It	   is	   particularly	   important	   that	   modelers	   not	   arbitrarily	   decide	   how	   to	   model	  processes	  without	  discussing	  the	  design.	  Such	  consideration	  and	  coordination	  takes	  time	   that	  must	  be	   factored	   into	   the	  project	   schedule.	  At	   least	   semi-­‐formal	  designs	  created	   and	   improved	   during	   a	   relatively	   long	   analysis	   period	   is	   required.	   Issues	  	  discovered	   by	   later	   research	   reading	   (e.g.,	   why	   ATCO	   believed	   DHL	   was	   at	   the	  proper	   altitude	   [FL360];	   why	   ATCO	   repeated	   the	   intervention	   call	   to	   BTC)	  might	  have	  arisen	  during	  the	  model	  specification	  phase.	  	  Similarly,	  the	  failure	  to	  detect	  in	  Brahms-­‐MER	   the	  workflow	  gap	   in	  MER	  operations	  workflow	   (Section	  12.7)	  might	  have	   been	   transparent	   if	   model	   components	   and	   communications	   had	   been	  carefully	   specified	   prior	   to	   coding	   the	   model.	   	   Such	   analysis	   and	   documentation	  requires	  continuously	  updated,	  easily	  indexed	  descriptions	  of	  every	  modeled	  entity	  in	  terms	  of	  properties,	  behaviors,	  caveats,	  etc.	  	  Speaking	   for	   the	   other	   point	   of	   view,	   one	   could	   also	   argue	   that	   the	  modularity	   of	  Brahms	  and	  a	  modeler’s	   facility	  with	  the	  language	  enable	  frequent	  and	  sufficiently	  rapid	  modifications	  that	  one	  can	  use	  the	  model	  itself	  as	  a	  sketch	  pad.	  This	  approach	  has	  the	  well-­‐known	  advantage	  of	  establishing	  a	  broad	  framework	  and	  “painting	  in”	  details	   as	   required.	   The	   team	   might	   experience	   might	   ongoing	   surprise	   and	   be	  repeatedly	  revising	  the	  same	  sections	  of	  the	  model,	  particularly	  of	  human	  behavior	  in	   complicated	   situations	   (e.g.,	   ATCOs	   handling	   of	   AEF,	   other	   flights,	   monitoring,	  equipment	   dysfunctions).	   	   This	   is	   not	   surprising	   or	   a	   problem	   if	   the	   overall	  configuration	  is	  stable,	  as	  was	  the	  case	  in	  generalizing	  from	  the	  Überlingen	  events.	  Furthermore,	   insofar	  as	  Brahms-­‐GÜM	  now	  serves	  as	  an	  adaptable	  framework	  with	  reusable	   components,	   future	   research	   efforts	   using	   the	   simulation	   for	   NextGen	  design	   and	   certification	   might	   be	   proceed	   in	   a	   more	   conventional,	   planned,	   and	  predictable	  way.	  
13.5 TCAS	  Training	  Issues	  and	  Cognitive	  Complexity	  In	   this	   section	  we	  provide	   a	   brief	   summary	   of	   how	   training	   relates	   to	  Überlingen	  accident	   and	   how	   training	   is	   discussed	   in	   BFU	   Report.	   We	   consider	   how	   the	  perspective	  of	  cognitive	  complexity	  informs	  training	  methods	  relevant	  to	  automated	  systems	  like	  TCAS.	  	  
13.5.1 Training	  for	  pilots	  The	  most	  obvious	  training	  issue	  raised	  by	  the	  Überlingen	  accident	  is	  the	  question	  of	  pilots’	   TCAS	   training,	   specifically	   the	   difference	   between	   the	   training	   of	   the	   DHL	  crew	  and	  the	  BTC	  crew.	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The	  BTC	  crew,	  who	  violated	  the	  rule	  to	  obey	  TCAS	  rather	  than	  the	  controller	  in	  case	  of	   a	   conflict,	   had	   not	   had	   simulator	   training	   on	   TCAS.	   Their	   training	   was	   solely	  classroom	  based.	  The	  DHL	  crew	  had	  had	  simulator	  training.	   	  This	  makes	  it	  easy	  to	  conclude	  that	  presence	  or	  absence	  of	  simulator	  training	  was	  the	  deciding	  factor	   in	  the	  correctness	  of	  the	  crews’	  actions.	  	  However,	  the	  DHL	  crew	  did	  not	  face	  a	  decision	  about	  whom	   to	   obey;	   they	   had	   only	   the	   command	   from	  TCAS.	   	   Consequently,	  we	  cannot	   conclude	  what	   they	  would	   have	   done	   if	   like	   the	   BTC	   crew	   they	   had	   been	  advised	  by	  ATCO	  first.	  	  In	   2002,	   the	   Russian	   Federation	   did	   not	   require	   TCAS	   to	   be	   installed	   for	   flights	  within	  the	  Federation’s	  airspace.	  	  Only	  planes	  and	  crews	  flying	  in	  airspace	  requiring	  TCAS,	   such	   as	   the	   European	  Union,	   needed	   to	   be	   TCAS	   capable.	   This	   explains	   the	  relative	  scarcity	  or	  absence	  of	  TCAS	  simulators,	  and	  hence	  simulator	  training	  within	  the	  Russian	  Federation.	  Data	  from	  simulator	  training	  on	  a	  variety	  of	  permutations	  of	  the	   Überlingen	   scenario	   would	   be	   useful	   to	   determine	   whether	   the	   order	   of	  commands	   received	   has	   an	   effect	   on	   whether	   crew	   members	   can	   make	   a	   rapid	  reversal	   in	   an	   emergency	   situation.	   In	   particular,	   Brahms-­‐GÜM	   might	   be	  incorporated	  in	  a	  human-­‐in-­‐the-­‐loop	  simulation,	  in	  which	  people	  serve	  as	  ATCOs	  at	  workstations	  with	  simulated	  Brahms	  pilots	  (or	  vice	  versa).	  
13.5.2 Training	  for	  ATCO	  and	  ATCC	  management	  The	   BFU	   Report	   makes	   the	   observation	   that	   the	   ATCO	   on	   duty	   had	   not	   received	  training	   as	   a	  DL	   (supervisor)	   and	   thus	   lacked	  higher	   level	   skills	   of	   human	   factors	  and	  Team	  Resource	  Management:	  	   When	  the	  ATCO	  released	  his	  colleague	  to	   take	  an	  extended	  rest	  break	  he	  assumed	  responsibility	  for	  the	  duties	  of	  both	  the	  RE	  and	  RP,	  and	  some	  of	  the	  duties	  of	  the	  DL.	  He	  was	  assisted	  by	  one	  CA.	  He	  was	  neither	  aware	  of	  the	  potential	  support	  available	  from	   the	   ATCO	   and	   SYMA	   assigned	   to	   the	   team	   of	   technicians,	   nor	   the	   technical	  expert	  assigned	  to	  him.	  
 Although	  the	  ATCO	  had	  not	  received	  a	  training	  as	  a	  DL	  he	  was	  aware	  of	  these	  duties.	  However,	   he	  was	  more	   familiar	  with	   his	   role	   at	   the	   heart	   of	   the	   operational	   ATM	  team	  and	  was	  not	  so	  familiar	  with	  the	  subtle	  differences	  of	  supervising	  the	  overall	  CIR	  ATM	  system;	  an	  advanced	  sociotechnical	  system.	  Normally	  when	  the	  ATCO	  had	  a	  situation	  requiring	  support	  he	  could	  call	  on	  the	  DL	  to	  assist.	  Efficient	  supervision	  of	   the	   system	   by	   the	   DL	   would	   ensure	   the	   ATCO	   was	   afforded	   the	   appropriate	  resources	  at	  the	  “sharp	  end”	  to	  best	  manage	  the	  air	  traffic	  situation.	  	  (BFU	  Report,	  p	  83)	  
 Lack	  of	  DL	  training	  is	  mentioned	  here	  as	  only	  one	  of	  many	  problems	  associated	  with	  SMOP	   for	   the	  night	   shift.	  The	  BFU	  report	  also	  notes	   that	  due	   to	   staffing	   shortages	  standard	  refresher	  training	  was	  not	  available	  as	  often	  as	  required,	  and	  that	   in	  any	  case,	  supervisory	  training	  was	  not	  provided	  for	  ATCOs:	  	  
• Several	   controllers	   at	   ACC	   Zurich	   were	   only	   insufficiently	   informed	   about	  operating	  the	  radar	  system	  in	  the	  fallback	  mode.	  Operation	  in	  this	  degraded	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mode	  was	   not	   regularly	   trained,	   nor	   had	   suitable	   guidance	   documentation	  been	   developed.	  Although	   operating	   in	   the	   fallback	   mode	   is	   not	   overly	  problematic	   or	   inherently	   unsafe	   it	  must	   be	   understood	   how	   the	   system’s	  defences	  are	  affected.	  	  
• The	  night	  shift	  ATCOs	  were	  expected	  to	  assume	  some	  functions	  of	  the	  DL	  but	  were	  not	  trained	  to	  handle	  the	  role.	  	  
• Refresher	   courses	   were	   scheduled	   every	   six	   months.	   Due	   to	   the	   tight	  personnel	  situation	  they	  were	  run	  on	  an	  annual	  basis	  only.	  	  
• There	  was	  no	  comprehensive	  training	  in	  emergency	  or	  unusual	  procedures	  in	  a	  suitable	  simulation	  device	   included	   in	   these	  courses.	  The	  company	  did	  not	   provide	   specific	   and	   suitably	   detailed	   material	   to	   the	   ATCOs	   for	   the	  handling	  of	  emergency	  or	  unusual	  situations.	  (BFU	  Report,	  pp.	  91	  –	  92)	  	  Given	  that	  the	  accident	  analysis	  reveals	  systemic	  flaws	  in	  the	  Zurich	  ATCC,	  training	  for	   both	  middle	   and	   upper	  management	   is	   essential,	   too.	   In	   trial	   of	   skyguide,	   the	  defendants	   were	   four	   middle	   managers,	   three	   technicians,	   and	   the	   air	   traffic	  controller;	   but	   upper	   management	   at	   skyguide	   was	   not	   indicted.	   Were	   the	   staff	  shortages	   at	   the	   Zurich	   ATCC	   also	   partly	   caused	   by	   business	   decisions	   by	   upper	  management?	  	  
13.5.3 Training	  cannot	  guarantee	  safety	  for	  cognitively	  complex	  systems	  It	   is	   easy	   and	   common	   to	   assign	   to	   training	   the	   requirement	   of	   mitigating	  vulnerabilities	   in	  a	  work	  system	  design:	  make	  sure	   that	  people	  do	   the	   right	   thing.	  Insofar,	  as	  Perrow	  argues,	  it	  is	  impossible	  to	  give	  prescriptions	  that	  will	  insure	  that	  accidents	  will	  not	  happen	  for	  a	  system	  that	  may	  become	  cognitively	  complex	  during	  operation,	   this	   approach	   provides	   no	   guarantee	   of	   safety	   and	   may	   obscure	   or	  prevent	  taking	  seriously	  the	  flaws	  in	  the	  work	  system	  design.	  	  	  	  Johnson	  (2004b,	  p.	  32)	  makes	   this	  argument	   in	  his	  analysis	   for	  Eurocontrol	  of	   the	  BFU	  Report:	  	   There	  is	  a	  paradox	  in	  the	  BFU	  report.	  Not	  only	  does	  it	  criticise	  the	  risk	  assessment	  practices	  of	  the	  Air	  Traffic	  Service	  provider.	  It	  also	  uses	  a	  form	  of	  “20-­‐20”	  hindsight	  to	  criticise	   the	   training	  of	  Air	  Traffic	  Control	  Officers	  on	   the	  basis	  of	   the	  problems	  that	  emerged	  during	  the	  Überlingen	  accident.	  There	  seems	  to	  be	  an	  assumption	  that	  because	  errors	  were	  made	  then	  training	  must	  have	  been	  to	  blame.	  	  Johnson	   insists	   that	   the	   analysis	  must	   recognize	   that	   the	  ATC	   system	  had	  become	  cognitively	  complex	  and	  hence	  not	  resolvable	  by	  training:	  	   The	  focus	  of	  the	  first	  report	  in	  this	  contract	  has,	  however,	  been	  to	  focus	  more	  on	  the	  problems	  of	  risk	  assessment.	  Even	  if	  the	  relevant	  personnel	  had	  been	  better	  trained	  there	  is	   little	  evidence	  and	  few	  guarantees	  that	  they	  would	  have	  been	  able	  to	  cope	  with	   the	   demands	   that	   their	   operating	   environment	   placed	   on	   them	   during	   this	  accident.	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In	  particular,	  Johnson	  suggests	  that	  the	  Überlingen	  collision	  provides	  evidence	  that	  the	  work	  system	  at	  the	  time	  of	  the	  accident	  was	  not	  safe	  because	  the	  configuration	  had	  changed	  (and	  continued	  changing)	  in	  ways	  unknown	  to	  the	  ATCO:	  	   The	  BFU	  argued	  that	  “although	  operating	  in	  fallback	  mode	  is	  not	  overly	  problematic	  or	   inherently	   unsafe	   it	   must	   be	   understood	   how	   the	   system’s	   defences	   are	  understood”	   (BFU	   page	   91).	   This	   statement	   is	   contentious.	   Certainly	   by	   the	  standards	  in	  other	  industries,	  such	  as	  nuclear	  power	  or	  military	  operations,	  it	  would	  be	   difficult	   to	   argue	   that	   the	   fallback	  mode	   is	   inherently	   ‘safe’	   even	   if	   controllers	  have	   a	   complete	   understanding	   of	   the	   available	   defences.	   Recall	   also	   that	   these	  defences	   changed	  over	   time	   as	   the	   SWI-­‐02	   communications	   system	  was	   gradually	  brought	  back	  into	  service	  without	  the	  controller	  being	  informed.	  	  People	  holding	  complex	  responsibilities	  might	  also	  be	  trained	  to	  recognize,	  as	  Don	  Norman	   notes,	   that	   a	   piece	   of	   technology,	   whether	   a	   computer	   screen	   or	   a	   soda	  machine,	  covered	  with	  sticky	  notes	  explaining	  how	  to	  use	  it	  can	  be	  assumed	  to	  be	  a	  bad	   piece	   of	   design.	   For	   a	   complicated	   task	   such	   as	   ATC,	   the	   very	   need	   for	   such	  intense	  training	  may	  be	  revealing	  the	  degree	  of	  risk	  involved	  in	  working	  with	  such	  tools.	  	  	  	  Kathy	   Abbott’s	   FAA	   study	   on	   operational	   use	   of	   flight	   path	  management	   systems	  illustrates	  how	  training	  for	  existing	  automation	  systems	  may	  be	  missing	  because	  not	  all	  emergency	  situations	  can	  be	  anticipated	  by	  the	  designers:	  	   …	  pilots	  have	  to	  deal	  with	  many	   failures	   for	  which	  there	  are	  no	  checklists,	  and	   for	  which	   there	   is	  no	   training	  of	  any	  kind,	   such	  as	   failures	  or	  malfunctions	  of	  air-­‐data	  computers;	   computer	   or	   software	   failures;	   electrical	   failures;	   and	   uncommanded	  autopilot	  disconnects	  or	  pitch-­‐up	  incidents	  for	  which	  the	  reason	  is	  unknown.	  Failure	  assessment	   is	  difficult,	   failure	  recovery	   is	  difficult,	  and	   the	   failure	  modes	  were	  not	  anticipated	  by	  the	  designers.	  (Learmont	  2011)	  	  Although	   the	   Überlingen	   accident	   provides	   an	   easy	   argument	   that	   crews	   should	  obey	   TCAS	   over	   ATCO	   instructions,	   the	   possibility	   of	   unanticipated	   situations	  suggests	   that	   TCAS’s	   role	  must	  more	   generally	   be	   advisory.	   Rather	   than	   being	   an	  agent	  dictating	  action	  that	  must	  always	  be	  obeyed,	  TCAS	  is	  just	  an	  important	  source	  of	  information—implying	  extremely	  urgent	  need	  for	  attention—that	  the	  pilot	  must	  relate	  to	  the	  broader	  context	  and	  information.	  	  The	   bottom	   line	   is	   that	   a	   judgment	  was	   and	   always	   is	   required	   in	   responding	   to	  TCAS—as	   the	   huge	   number	   of	   false	   positives	   attest:	   “false	   alarms	   may	   cause	  pilots	  to	   lose	   trust	   in	   the	   system	   and	   ignore	   alerts”	   (Kuchar	   and	  Drumm	  2007,	   p.	  277).	  Interpreting	  and	  responding	  to	  TCAS	  does	  not	  involve	  following	  a	  simple	  rule	  of	  doing	  what	  it	  says.	  	  Indeed,	  a	  2005	  study	  of	  1725	  TCAS	  	  RA	  “climb”	  events,	  cited	  by	  Kuchar	  and	  Drumm,	  showed	  astounding	  lack	  of	  compliance:	  	   Only	   13%	   of	   pilot	   responses	   met	   the	   assumption	   used	   by	   TCAS:	   pilot	   responses	  within	  5	  seconds	  and	  achieving	  a	  1500	  ft/min	  vertical	  rate.	  In	  63%	  of	  the	  cases,	  the	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pilots	  maneuvered	  in	  the	  proper	  direction	  but	  were	  not	  as	  aggressive	  or	  prompt	  as	  TCAS	  assumed.	  Pilots	  maneuvered	  in	  the	  opposite	  direction	  to	  the	  RA	  in	  24%	  of	  the	  cases.	  	  	  That	  so	  many	  pilots	  so	  frequently	  choose	  an	  opposite	  course	  of	  action	  suggests	  that	  in	   practice	   pilots	   have	   learned	   to	   use	   TCAS	   as	   an	   information	   source	   and	   have	  experience	   about	  when	   to	   ignore	   it.	   	   Accordingly,	   the	   BFU	  Report’s	   lead	   systemic	  cause	  of	  the	  accident	  appears	  to	  be	  pointing	  in	  the	  right	  direction:	  	   The	   integration	  of	  ACAS/TCAS	   II	   into	   the	   system	  aviation	  was	   insufficient	  and	  did	  not	  correspond	  in	  all	  points	  with	  the	  system	  philosophy.	  The	  regulations	  concerning	  ACAS/TCAS	  published	  by	   ICAO	  and	  as	  a	   result	   the	   regulations	  of	  national	  aviation	  authorities,	   operations	   and	  procedural	   instructions	  of	   the	  TCAS	  manufacturer	   and	  the	  operators	  were	  not	  standardised,	  incomplete	  and	  partially	  contradictory.	   	  What	  remains	  to	  be	  determined	  is	  how	  TCAS	  should	  be	  integrated	  into	  the	  aviation	  system	   and	   what	   regulations	   can	   be	   stated	   that	   are	   not	   incomplete	   and	  contradictory	  with	  respect	  to	  responding	  to	  TCAS.	  
13.6 Relation	  of	  Brahms-­‐GÜM	  Methods	  and	  Results	  to	  Study	  
Recommendations	  To	   conclude	   this	   report,	   we	   comment	   on	   the	   relevance	   of	   Brahms-­‐GÜM	   to	   the	  recommendations	  by	  the	  Panel	  on	  Human	  Factors	  in	  Air	  Traffic	  Control	  Automation	  (Wickens,	   et	   al.	   1998,	   pp.	   1-­‐8).	   This	   National	   Academy	   of	   Sciences	   panel	   report	  focuses	   on	   the	   interaction	   of	   pilots	   and	   air	   traffic	   controllers,	   concerning	  particularly	  the	  design,	  effect,	  and	  role	  of	  automated	  systems	  in	  the	  airspace	  system.	  	  This	  report	  is	  particularly	  germane	  to	  the	  use	  of	  work	  practice	  modeling	  for	  design	  and	   as	   a	   component	   of	   verification	   of	   work	   system	   designs	   including	   automated	  systems.	  In	  analyzing	  and	  simulating	  the	  Überlingen	  accident	  we	  have	  been	  looking	  back	   to	   the	   past,	   whereas	   in	   NextGen	   design	   we	   require	   methods	   for	   looking	  forward,	   that	   is	   a	   prognostic	   mode	   of	   analysis.	   The	   report	   specifically	   advocates	  modeling	   and	   simulating	   systems	   and	   interactions	   like	   those	   represented	   in	  Brahms–GÜM,	  such	  as	  “situations	  in	  which	  two	  or	  more	  coordinating	  agents	  receive	  information	  inputs	  that	  are	  incongruous	  or	  contradictory”	  and	  the	  effect	  on	  loss	  of	  situation	   awareness	   leading	   to	   separation	   violation	   from	   the	   use	   of	   higher-­‐level	  decision	   and	   action	   selection	   systems.	   	   These	   and	   other	   factors	   that	   argue	   for	  Brahms’	   value	   for	   creating	   and	   evaluating	  work	   system	  designs	   are	   elaborated	   in	  each	  excerpted	  section	  that	   follows	  (titles	  of	  excerpts	  are	  from	  the	  report,	  pp.	  1-­‐8;	  emphasis	  added;	  comments	  follow	  each	  of	  the	  recommendations).	  	  
Levels	  of	  Automation	  
• The	  panel	  recommends	  that	  automation	  efforts	  focus	  on	  reliable,	  high-­‐level	  automation	  applications	   for	   information	   acquisition,	   integration,	   and	   presentation	   and	   for	   aiding	  controller	  decision	  making	  in	  order	  to	  support	  all	  system	  functions.	  Especially	  important	  
in	   the	   near	   future	   is	   the	   development	   of	   decision	   aids	   for	   conflict	   resolution	   and	  
maintaining	   separation.	   These	   aids	   should	   be	   directed	   primarily	   toward	   ensuring	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proper	   spacing	   between	   aircraft	   in	   preparation	   for	   the	   final	   stages	   of	   approach	   to	  landing	  and	  toward	  en	  route	  flight	  path	  efficiency	  improvement.	  	  Our	   analysis	   of	   Überlingen	   events	   and	   results	   of	   the	   scenario	   simulation	   suggests	  that	   decision	   aids	   and	   alerting	   systems	   for	   maintaining	   separation	   and	   resolving	  conflicts	  are	  among	  the	  most	  important	  use	  of	  automation	  for	  air	  traffic	  controllers	  and	  pilots.	  	  	  
• The	   panel	   recommends	   implementation	   of	   high	   levels	   of	   automation	   of	   decision	   and	  action	   selection	   for	   system	   tasks	   involving	   relatively	   little	   uncertainty	   and	   risk.	  However,	   for	   system	   tasks	   associated	  with	   greater	   uncertainty	   and	   risk,	   automation	   of	  
decision	  and	  action	  selection	  should	  not	  proceed	  beyond	  the	  level	  of	  suggesting	  a	  preferred	  
decision/action	  alternative.	  Any	  consideration	  for	  automation	  at	  or	  above	  this	  level	  must	  be	   designed	   to	   prevent:	   loss	   of	   vigilance,	   loss	   of	   situation	   awareness,	   degradation	   of	  operational	   skills,	   and	   degradation	   of	   teamwork	   and	   communication.	   Such	   designs	  should	   also	   ensure	   the	   capabilities	   to	   overcome	   or	   counteract	   complacency,	   recover	  from	  failure,	  and	  provide	  a	  means	  of	  conflict	  resolution	  if	  loss	  of	  separation	  occurs.	  	  This	  recommendation	  is	  consistent	  with	  viewing	  TCAS	  and	  corresponding	  alerts	  for	  ATCO	   as	   handling	   degraded	   monitoring	   and	   hence	   awareness	   of	   the	   current	  situation.	  TCAS	  7.1’s	  reversal	  mode	  could	  compensate	  for	  the	  kind	  of	  intervention	  at	  Überlingen	  that	  affected	  pilot	  response.	  	  
Recovery	  
• The	  panel	  recommends	   investing	  sufficient	  resources	   in	  studies	  of	  human	  response	   to	  low-­‐probability	   emergencies;	   actively	   pursuing	   failure	   modes/fault	   tree	   analysis,	  particularly	   to	   identify	   situations	   in	   which	   two	   or	   more	   coordinating	   agents	   receive	  
information	   inputs	   that	  are	   incongruous	  or	  contradictory;	   and	   involving	   human	   factors	  specialists	  in	  the	  development	  and	  testing	  of	  system	  recovery	  procedures.	  
• The	  panel	  recommends	  the	  development	  of	  models,	   for	  given	  designs	  and	  procedures,	  to	  examine	  the	  implications	  of	  recovery	  in	  a	  high-­‐density,	  unstructured	  airspace	  created	  by	  increased	  capabilities	  of	  ground-­‐based	  automation	  or	  free	  flight.	  
• The	   panel	   recommends	   the	   development	   of	   airspace	   safety	  models	   that	   can	   predict	   the	  
likelihood	  of	  midair	  collisions,	  as	  a	  function	  of	  frequency	  and	  parameters	  of	  near-­‐midair	  collisions	  and	  losses	  of	  separation,	  for	  varying	  standards	  of	  traffic	  separation.	  To	  do	  this,	  models	   should	   be	   developed	   that	   are	   sensitive	   to	   loss	   of	   situation	   awareness	   and	   the	  
possible	   degradation	   of	   skills	   that	   may	   result	   from	   moving	   controllers	   to	   progressively	  
higher	  levels	  of	  automation	  of	  decision	  and	  action	  selection.	  	  Brahms-­‐GÜM	   demonstrates	   how	   to	   model	   and	   simulate	   multiple	   coordinating	  agents	  with	  different,	   incongruous	  or	   contradictory	   information;	   it	   can	  be	  used	   to	  predict	   the	   likelihood	  of	  midair	  collisions	  as	  a	   function	  of	  many	  variables	  affecting	  situation	  awareness	  and	  causing	  loss	  of	  separation	  	  
• The	  panel	   recommends	   that	  air	   traffic	   control	   subject-­‐matter	  experts	   collaborate	  with	  specialists	   in	   the	   behavioral	   sciences	   to	   model	   individual	   and	   team	   responses	   to	  
emergency	   situations	   and	   to	   populate	   the	  models	  with	   data	   to	   be	   collected	   in	   studies	   of	  
human	   response	   time	   to	   low-­‐probability	   emergencies.	   Policy	   makers	   should	   be	   made	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aware	   that	   choosing	  median	   response	   times	   to	  model	   these	   situations	   can	   have	   very	  different	   implications	   from	  those	  based	  on	  worst-­‐case	   (longest)	   response	   times;	   these	  kinds	  of	  modeling	  choices	  must	  be	  carefully	  made	  and	  justified.	  
• The	   panel	   recommends	   that	   system	   functionality	   should	   be	   designed	   so	   that	   failure	  recovery	  will	  not	  depend	  on	  skills	  that	  are	  likely	  to	  degrade.	  	  Brahms-­‐GÜM	   could	   be	   used	   without	   further	   modification	   as	   a	   tool	   for	   focusing	  multidisciplinary	  modeling,	  data	  collection,	  and	  analysis	  of	   response	   times	   to	   low-­‐probability	  emergencies.	  	  
Locus	  of	  Authority	  
• A	  ground-­‐based	   scenario	   consistent	  with	   formulated	  plans	  of	   the	  Federal	  Aviation	  Administration	   can	   increase	   efficiency	   without	   radical	   changes	   in	   authority	  structure	  from	  the	  current	  system	  (e.g.,	  the	  expanded	  national	  route	  program).	  The	  panel	   therefore	   recommends	   the	  development	  and	   fielding	  of	  current	  and	  proposed	  
automation	   tools	   for	   ground-­‐based	   air	   traffic	   control,	   following	   the	   guidelines	  specified	   in	   this	   report	   regarding	   the	   selection	   of	   levels	   of	   automation.	   We	   also	  recommend	   the	   vigorous	   pursuit	   of	   projections	   of	   how	   various	   tools	  will	   operate	   in	  
concert.	  	  The	  components	  of	  Brahms-­‐GÜM	  could	  be	  directly	  used,	  adapted,	  and	  extended	  to	  simulate	  the	  operational	  processes	  and	  challenges	  of	  using	  a	  suite	  of	  ground-­‐based	  ATC	  systems	  that	  operate	  in	  concert.	  	  	  	  
• Because	   free	   flight	  design	   concepts	   that	   assume	  a	  high	   level	   of	   airborne	   authority	  over	   control	   of	   aircraft	   flight	   paths	   have	   more	   uncertainties	   than	   design	   options	  involving	   ground-­‐based	   authority	   with	   increased	   automation,	   the	   panel	  recommends	   extreme	   caution	   before	   existing	   levels	   of	   free	   flight	   are	   further	  expanded	   to	   greater	   levels	   of	   pilot	   authority	   for	   separation.	   Furthermore,	   we	  
recommend	   the	   conduct	   of	   extensive	   human-­‐in-­‐the-­‐loop	   simulation	   studies	   and	  
validation	   of	   human	   performance	   models	   before	   decisions	   are	   made	   regarding	   the	  
further	   implementation	  of	   free	  flight;	   this	   is	  needed	   to	  obtain	   reliable	  prediction	  of	  the	  safety	  implications	  of	  worst-­‐case	  scenarios.	  We	  also	  recommend	  heavy	  reliance	  on	  scenario	  walk-­‐throughs	  and	  focus	  group	  sessions	  with	  controllers,	  pilots,	   traffic	  managers,	  and	  airline	  dispatchers.	  	  Brahms-­‐GÜM	  could	  be	   coupled	   to	  other	  airspace	   simulation	   systems	   in	  human-­‐in-­‐the-­‐loop	  simulation	  studies,	  using	  the	  methods	  developed	  for	  the	  realtime	  Brahms	  agent	  systems	  (Clancey	  et	  al.	  2012).	  In	  particular,	  prototype	  automated	  systems	  or	  simulated	   systems	   (as	   Brahms-­‐GÜM	   simulates	   TCAS)	   could	   be	   combined	   to	  understand	  the	  effects	  of	  increased	  pilot	  authority,	  as	  well	  as	  decreased	  authority	  by	  onboard	  flight	  advisory	  systems	  like	  TCAS	  that	  affect	  or	  impose	  the	  free-­‐flight	  mode.	  	  
Introducing	  Automation	  
• The	   panel	   recommends	   that	   senior	   Federal	   Aviation	   Administration	   management	  should	  reexamine	   the	  results	  of	   the	  study	  by	   the	  Human	  Factors	  Subcommittee	  of	   the	  FAA’s	   Research,	   Engineering,	   and	  Development	  Advisory	   Council,	  with	   a	   view	   toward	  implementing	   those	  recommendations	   that	  appear	  most	   likely	   to	  achieve	  more	  active,	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continued,	   and	   effective	   involvement	   of	   both	   users	   and	   trained	   human	   factors	  practitioners	   in	   the	   development	   and	   implementation	   of	   advanced	   air	   traffic	   control	  systems.	  All	  aspects	  of	  human-­‐centered	  automation	  should	  be	  considered	  in	  fielding	  new	  
automated	  systems.	  	  From	  the	  perspective	  of	  computational	  methods	  relevant	  to	  fielding	  new	  automated	  systems,	   Brahms-­‐GÜM	   is	   a	   prime	   example	   of	   a	   human-­‐centered	   computing	  technology	   that	   can	   facilitate	   and	   promote	   a	   holistic	   design	   and	   certification	  methodology.	  	  
• The	   Federal	   Aviation	   Administration	   should	   continue	   to	   support	   integrated	   product	  teams	  with	  well-­‐trained	  human	  factors	  specialists	  assigned	  to	  the	  teams.	  Both	  users	  and	  
human	   factors	   specialists	   should	   be	   involved	   at	   the	   early	   stages	   to	   help	   define	   the	  
functionality	  of	  the	  proposed	  automation	  system.	  These	  specialists	  should	  be	  responsible	  to	  report	  to	  human	  factors	  management	  within	  the	  Federal	  Aviation	  Administration	  as	  well	  as	  to	  project	  managers.	  
• The	  Federal	  Aviation	  Administration	  should	  continue	  to	  work	  toward	  an	  infrastructure	  in	  which	  some	  human	  factors	  training	  is	  provided	  to	  personnel	  and	  program	  managers	  at	  all	  levels	  of	  the	  organization	  (and	  contract	  teams).	  
• The	  Federal	  Aviation	  Administration	  should	  ensure	  that	  adequate	  funding	  is	  provided	  for	  
needed	  human	  factors	  work	  at	  all	  stages	  of	  system	  development	  and	  field	  evaluations	  both	  
before	  and	  after	  systems	  acquisition.	  	  Both	   air	   traffic	   controllers	   and	   pilots	   participated	   as	   time	   and	   funding	   allowed	   in	  developing	   Brahms-­‐GÜM.	   With	   additional	   funding,	   much	   more	   could	   have	   been	  accomplished	  by	  collaborative	  design	  and	  evaluation,	  including	  using	  ethnographic	  methods	  for	  data	  collection	  and	  model	  validation	  (Section	  12.6).	  	  
• During	   the	  development	  of	  each	  automation	   function,	   system	  developers	   should	  consider	  
possible	   interactions	   with	   other	   automation	   functions	   (under	   development	   or	   already	  
existing),	   tools,	   and	   task	   requirements	   that	   form	   (or	   will	   form)	   the	   operational	   context	  
into	  which	  the	  specific	  automation	  feature	  will	  be	  introduced.	  
	  The	   Brahms-­‐GÜM	   project	   has	   demonstrated	   that	   a	   multi-­‐agent,	   activity-­‐based	  modeling	   framework	   can	   simulate	   non-­‐deterministic	   interactions	   of	   people	   and	  systems.	   	   In	  particular,	   the	  Brahms	  framework	  enables	  simulating	  how	  the	  actions	  of	   people	   and	   systems	   form	   the	   operational	   context	   for	   each	   other.	   Such	   a	   work	  system	  simulation	  can	  be	  useful	  at	  every	  stage	  in	  developing	  automation	  functions,	  but	  especially	  early	  in	  design.	  	  	  Our	   experience	   analyzing	   and	  modeling	   the	  Überlingen	   accident	   underscores	   that	  verification	   and	   validation	   must	   be	   about	   the	   entire	   work	   system	   —and	   the	  properties	  of	  interest	  are	  that	  checks	  and	  balances	  are	  in	  place	  to	  handle	  failures	  of	  communication/alerting	   subsystems	   and/or	   failures	   of	   people	   	   to	   notice,	  comprehend,	  and/or	  communicate	  problematic	  (unsafe)	  situations.	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Simulating	   how	   independently	   operating	   people,	   tools,	   and	   automated	   systems	  interact	  reveals	  how	  simple	  behaviors	  can	  combine	  to	  produce	  a	  complex	  system—an	   air	   transportation	   system	   in	  which	   the	   dynamic	   configurations	   of	   aircraft	   and	  computerized	  systems	  has	  become	  too	  difficult	   for	  pilots	  and	  air	  traffic	  controllers	  to	  perceive,	  understand,	  and	  safely	  control.	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15 Glossary	  	  A&A	   Authority	  and	  Autonomy	  Activity	   In	  Brahms,	  a	  located	  behavior	  of	  agent	  or	  object,	  which	  takes	  time.	  A	  Composite	  Activity	  consists	  of	  a	  prioritized	  set	  of	  workframes,	  such	  that	  the	  activity	  may	  involve	  a	  combination	  of	  perceiving	  and	  changing	  the	  state	  of	  objects,	  inferring	  new	  beliefs,	  communicating	  (asking	  or	  telling	  beliefs),	  and	  moving.	  	  AFCS	   Assurance	  for	  Flight-­‐Critical	  Systems,	  task	  within	  the	  Aviation	  Safety	  Program	  (AvSP)	  	  of	  the	  System-­‐Wide	  Safety	  and	  Assurance	  Technologies	  (SSAT)	  Project	  	  of	  NASA’s	  Aeronautics	  Research	  Mission	  Directorate	  (ARMD)	  Agent	   In	  Brahms,	  a	  proactive,	  located	  process	  that	  models	  the	  world	  and	  carries	  out	  activities;	  may	  represent	  a	  person,	  a	  goal-­‐oriented	  robotic	  system,	  or	  an	  “intelligent”	  software	  program	  AirRadio	   Aeronautical	  Radio	  &	  Air	  Traffic	  Control	  Advisors	  ANSA	   International	  Advisory	  Group	  Air	  Navigation	  Services	  AP	   Autopilot	  ARMD	   Aeronautics	  Research	  Mission	  Directorate	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ATC	   Air	  Traffic	  Control	  ATCC	   Air	  Traffic	  Control	  Center	  ATCO	   Air	  Traffic	  Controller.	  	  Acronym	  used	  in	  the	  European	  Union.	  	  In	  the	  United	  States,	  the	  FAA	  uses	  the	  term	  “controller”.	  ATS	   Air	  Traffic	  System	  Authority	  	   having	  the	  right,	  or	  power,	  to	  exercise	  controls	  or	  issue	  air	  traffic	  commands	  that	  impact	  the	  position,	  velocity,	  and/or	  attitude	  of	  aircraft	  during	  operations.	  Autonomy	  (or	  automation)	  	   a	  function	  or	  system	  that	  can	  operate	  independently	  of	  pilot	  or	  air	  traffic	  controller	  intervention.	  AvSP	   Aviation	  Safety	  Program	  Belief	   In	  Brahms,	  a	  proposition	  about	  the	  world,	  constituting	  part	  of	  an	  agent’s	  or	  object’s	  model	  of	  the	  world	  BFU	   Bundesstelle	  für	  Flugunfalluntersuchung:	  German	  Federal	  Bureau	  of	  Aircraft	  Accident	  Investigation	  Brahms	   Multiagent	  representational	  framework	  for	  modeling	  and	  simulating	  work	  practices	  of	  people	  in	  modeled	  distributed	  geographic	  settings,	  interacting	  with	  other	  people	  and	  objects	  over	  time.	  	  Brahms-­‐GÜM	   Generalized	  Überlingen	  Model	  represented	  in	  Brahms	  language	  CA	   Controller	  Assistant	  for	  the	  ATCO	  CDU	   Control	  Display	  Unit	  CPA	   Closest	  Point	  to	  Approach	  Detectable	   In	  BRAHMS,	  perceived	  fact	  in	  the	  world	  DL	   Supervisor	  at	  ACC	  Zurich	  	  (German:	  Dienstleiter)	  Eurocontrol	   European	  Organisation	  for	  the	  Safety	  of	  Air	  Navigation:	  Counterpart	  of	  the	  United	  States	  Federal	  Aviation	  Administration	  (FAA)	  Fact	   In	  Brahms,	  a	  proposition	  about	  an	  agent,	  object,	  or	  geography	  that	  from	  modeler’s	  perspective	  is	  objectively	  true	  (contrast	  with	  belief)	  Flight-­‐critical	  System	   Any	  system	  required	  to	  ensure	  the	  safe	  conduct	  of	  an	  aircraft	  flight.	  Includes	  air,	  ground,	  and	  space	  systems;	  and	  recognizes	  that	  human	  performance	  is	  central	  to	  flight-­‐critical	  system	  performance.	  FSM	   Formal	  Semantic	  Methods	  Geography	   In	  Brahms,	  a	  model	  of	  the	  places	  (areas	  and	  subareas)	  of	  the	  simulated	  world	  (e.g.,	  buildings,	  workstation	  area,	  cockpit)	  and	  paths	  for	  moving	  from	  place	  to	  place	  Group	   In	  Brahms,	  a	  class	  consisting	  of	  agents,	  representing	  any	  common	  set	  of	  activities	  and	  initial	  facts	  and	  beliefs	  (i.e.,	  true	  when	  simulation	  run	  begins)	  GÜM	   Generalized	  Überlingen	  Model	  HFACS	   Human	  Factors	  Analysis	  and	  Classification	  System	  IAC	   Interstate	  Aviation	  Committee:	  executive	  body	  overseeing	  the	  use	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and	  management	  of	  civil	  aviation	  in	  the	  Russian	  Federation	  ICAO	   International	  Civil	  Aviation	  Organization	  Life	  cycle	   The	  series	  of	  phases	  of	  a	  system	  including	  conceptualization,	  design,	  development,	  maintenance,	  upgrading,	  and	  retirement	  	  Multiagent	  System	   Computer	  program	  of	  parallel	  processes	  consisting	  of	  agents	  and	  objects,	  generally	  distributed	  in	  a	  simulated	  or	  real	  world	  environment	  NAT	   Normal	  Accident	  Theory	  ND	   Navigation	  Display	  NextGen	  ATS	   Next	  Generation	  Air	  Transportation	  System	  	  Object	   In	  Brahms,	  any	  located	  entity	  having	  factual	  properties	  (e.g.,	  size)	  and	  optionally	  behaviors	  and	  changing	  states	  (e.g.,	  an	  aircraft)	  PDF	   Primary	  Flight	  Display	  PSR	   Primary	  Surveillance	  Radar	  RA	   Resolution	  Advisory:	  TCAS	  command	  to	  pilot	  Sectorisation	   Virtual	  division	  of	  airspace	  skyguide	   Private	  air	  traffic	  control	  service	  for	  Swiss	  airspace	  and	  adjoining	  airspace	  areas	  in	  Germany,	  Austria,	  France	  and	  Italy	  that	  have	  been	  delegated	  to	  its	  control.	  (Officially	  written	  in	  lower	  case.)	  SMOP	   Single	  Man	  Operations	  Plan	  SSAT	   System-­‐Wide	  Safety	  and	  Assurance	  Technologies	  Program	  STAR	   Standard	  Terminal	  Arrival	  Route.	  STARs	  are	  procedures	  listing	  arrival	  waypoints,	  altitudes,	  speeds,	  etc.	  for	  each	  airport	  runway	  STCA	   Short-­‐Term	  Collision	  Avoidance	  system	  (provides	  optical	  and	  audible	  alerts	  for	  ATCO)	  SYCO	   Flight	  Plan	  Processing	  System	  SYMA	   Systems	  Manager	  TA	   Traffic	  Advisory:	  TCAS	  warning	  to	  pilot	  TAU	   Time	  to	  Collision	  	  Tau	  value	   Number	  of	  seconds	  until	  lateral	  or	  vertical	  collision	  TCAS	   Traffic	  Collision	  Avoidance	  System	  (includes	  display	  and	  voice	  commands	  to	  pilots)	  Thoughtframe	  (TF)	   An	  inference	  rule	  that	  concludes	  new	  beliefs	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  existing	  beliefs	  TSAFE	   Terminal	  Tactical	  Separation	  Assured	  Flight	  Environment	  UTC	   Coordinated	  Universal	  Time.	  	  Equivalent	  to	  GMC:	  Greenwich	  Mean	  Time	  V&V	   Verification	  and	  Validation	  Validation	   Confirmation	  that	  proposed	  system	  requirements,	  and/	  or	  operational	  systems,	  meet	  the	  expectations	  of	  the	  customer	  and	  other	  stakeholders,	  accomplishing	  the	  intended	  purpose	  in	  the	  intended	  environment(s),	  throughout	  the	  system’s	  life	  cycle	  Verification	  	   Confirmation	  that	  proposed	  or	  operational	  systems	  comply	  with	  requirements	  throughout	  the	  system’s	  life	  cycle	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VOR	   Very	  High	  Frequency	  Omni	  directional	  Radio	  Range:	  ground	  radio	  beacon	  VSI	   Vertical	  Speed	  Indicator	  Waypoint	   Set	  of	  coordinates	  for	  navigation,	  identifying	  a	  point	  in	  physical	  space,	  including	  latitude,	  longitude	  and	  altitude	  WMC	   Work	  Model	  that	  Computes	  Work	  system	   An	  interacting	  configuration	  of	  hardware,	  software,	  people,	  facilities,	  and	  procedures	  organized	  for	  some	  purpose,	  which	  is	  accomplished	  in	  its	  operations	  Workframe	  (WF)	   A	  situation-­‐action	  rule	  that	  causes	  an	  agent	  to	  carry	  out	  activities	  when	  certain	  conditions	  based	  on	  agent	  beliefs	  are	  true;	  either	  “top-­‐level”	  or	  part	  of	  a	  Composite	  Activity	  of	  the	  agent.	  (For	  objects	  these	  are	  called	  Factframes.)	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16 Appendix:	  Key	  Events	  in	  Überlingen	  Collision	  This	   is	   an	   excerpt	   from	   the	   BFU	  Report	   (pp.	   108-­‐109)	   listing	   the	   key	   events	   that	  contributed	  to	  the	  collision.	  	  
Air	  traffic	  control	  (ATC)	  
§ Sectorisation	  work	  was	  carried	  out	  within	  ACC	  Zurich	  in	  order	  to	  re-­‐arrange	  the	  control	  sectors	  in	  the	  night	  from	  1	  to	  2	  July	  2002.	  During	  this	  time	  the	  radar	  system	  was	  operated	  in	  the	  “fallback	  mode“	  and	  the	  separation	  minimum	  had	  been	  increased	  from	  5	  to	  7	  NM.	  In	  doing	  so	  the	  MV9800	  radar	  computer	  was	  not	  available	  to	  the	  controllers,	  therefore	  
o no	  automatic	  correlation	  of	  the	  flight	  targets	  was	  possible	  and	  	  
o the	  optical	  STCA	  was	  not	  displayed	  anymore.	  	  
§ The	  direct	  phone	  connections	  with	  the	  adjacent	  ATCO	  units	  were	  not	  available	  to	  the	  controller	  of	  ACC	  Zurich	  during	  the	  time	  from	  21:23	  hrs	  until	  21:34:37	  hrs.	  An	  automatic	  change-­‐over	  of	  incoming	  calls	  to	  the	  bypass	  system	  was	  not	  in	  existence.	  At	  21:34:44	  hrs	  the	  first	  of	  a	  total	  of	  four	  calls,	  three	  calls	  from	  UAC	  Karlsruhe	  and	  one	  call	  from	  Friedrichshafen,	  was	  registered.	  These	  calls	  had	  not	  been	  answered.	  	  
§ There	  were	  written	  directives	  concerning	  the	  accomplishment	  of	  the	  work,	  however,	  they	  did	  not	  include	  explanations	  about	  the	  effects	  the	  work	  would	  have	  on	  the	  availability	  of	  technical	  equipment.	  	  
§ The	  CoC	  did	  not	  know	  about	  the	  sectorisation	  work.	  An	  assessment	  to	  minimise	  risks	  did	  not	  take	  place.	  	  
§ Besides	  the	  technicians	  three	  additional	  colleagues	  were	  present	  in	  the	  CIR.	  
o One	  of	  the	  managers	  to	  support	  the	  ATCO	  	  
o One	  SYMA	  	  
o One	  controller	  to	  support	  the	  technicians	  	  The	  ATCO	  did	  not	  know	  about	  the	  tasks	  of	  these	  colleagues.	  	  
§ The	  sectorisation	  work	  had	  not	  been	  coordinated	  with	  the	  adjacent	  ATCO	  units.	  	  
§ According	  to	  the	  duty	  schedule,	  two	  controllers	  were	  responsible	  for	  the	  control	  of	  the	  en-­‐	  tire	  airspace	  of	  ACC	  Zurich	  during	  the	  night	  shift.	  They	  had	  to	  assume	  the	  tasks	  of	  radar	  planning	  (RP),	  radar	  executive	  (RE)	  and	  to	  a	  limited	  extent	  also	  the	  functions	  of	  the	  super-­‐	  visor	  (DL)	  and	  the	  system	  manager.	  Therefore,	  a	  continuous	  management	  of	  the	  different	  tasks	  was	  not	  ensured.	  An	  assessment	  to	  minimise	  risks	  during	  the	  night	  shift	  did	  not	  take	  place.	  	  
§ The	  controllers	  were	  obliged	  to	  read	  the	  directives	  concerning	  the	  accomplishment	  of	  the	  system	  work.	  But	  they	  did	  not	  read	  them.	  The	  supervisor	  (DL)	  had	  merely	  given	  them	  general	  information	  about	  the	  work.	  	  
§ Two	  assistants	  were	  at	  the	  disposal	  of	  the	  controllers	  to	  support	  them	  with	  routine	  and	  co-­‐	  ordination	  tasks,	  however,	  they	  had	  no	  authorization	  to	  assume	  any	  traffic	  control	  functions.	  	  
§ After	  the	  air	  traffic	  flow	  had	  decreased	  one	  controller	  retired	  to	  rest	  at	  about	  21:15	  hrs	  and	  approximately	  10	  minutes	  later	  one	  assistant	  retired	  to	  rest.	  Normally	  they	  would	  not	  return	  to	  the	  control	  room	  until	  early	  in	  the	  morning.	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§ It	  had	  been	  known	  to	  and	  tolerated	  by	  the	  management	  and	  the	  quality	  assurance	  of	  the	  air	  navigation	  service	  company	  for	  years	  that	  during	  the	  night	  at	  periods	  of	  low	  traffic	  flow	  only	  one	  controller	  performed	  all	  traffic	  control	  tasks	  whereas	  the	  other	  controller	  had	  a	  rest.	  	  
§ Both	  controllers	  were	  qualified	  and	  licensed	  in	  accordance	  with	  the	  regulations	  in	  force.	  	  
§ The	  controller	  remaining	  in	  the	  control	  room	  was	  examined	  after	  the	  accident	  for	  medicine,	  drugs	  and	  alcohol	  which	  produced	  negative	  result.	  	  
§ At	  the	  time	  of	  the	  accident	  the	  controller	  had	  to	  control	  three	  airplanes:	  	  
o the	  B757-­‐200	  in	  direct	  approach	  to	  Tango	  VOR	  at	  FL	  360	  	  
o the	  TU154M	  in	  direct	  approach	  to	  Trasadingen	  VOR	  at	  FL	  360	  and	  	  
o a	  delayed	  Airbus	  A320	  approaching	  Friedrichshafen.	  	  The	  Airbus	  was	  controlled	  on	  119.920	  MHz	  and	  the	  two	  other	  airplanes	  on	  128.050	  MHz.	  Therefore	  they	  could	  not	  hear	  each	  other	  which	  resulted	  in	  simultaneous	  transmissions.	  For	  all	  flights	  the	  control	  strips	  were	  available	  to	  the	  controller	  in	  time.	  From	  the	  control	  strips	  the	  impending	  conflict	  situation	  (B757-­‐200	  and	  TU154M)	  was	  only	  recognisable	  in	  combination	  with	  the	  radar	  display.	  	  
§ The	  controller	  was	  solely	  responsible	  for	  the	  entire	  ATCO	  within	  ACC	  Zurich.	  For	  this	  he	  had	  to	  fill	  two	  adjacent	  workstations	  with	  different	  frequencies	  and	  worked	  with	  two	  radar	  monitors.	  In	  order	  to	  control	  flights	  in	  the	  upper	  airspace	  and	  the	  approach	  in	  the	  lower	  airspace	  to	  Friedrichshafen.	  Radar	  charts	  with	  different	  ranges	  were	  displayed	  on	  the	  monitors.	  	  
§ The	  controller	  was	  not	  aware	  that	  in	  the	  fallback	  mode	  the	  optical	  STCA	  was	  not	  available.	  The	  system	  did	  not	  provide	  an	  automatic	  indication	  that	  the	  optical	  STCA	  was	  not	  available.	  	  
§ During	  the	  last	  five	  minutes	  prior	  to	  the	  collision,	  the	  controller	  paid	  more	  attention	  to	  the	  Airbus	  A320	  in	  approach	  to	  Friedrichshafen.	  
§ The	  bypass	  telephone	  system	  had	  temporarily	  a	  technical	  defect	  so	  that	  the	  necessary	  co-­‐	  ordination	  with	  Friedrichshafen	  could	  not	  take	  place	  by	  phone.	  	  
§ At	  21:33:24	  hrs	  the	  radar	  controller	  of	  UAC	  Karlsruhe	  was	  alerted	  by	  his	  STCA	  of	  the	  conflict	  situation.	  His	  attempts	  to	  warn	  the	  controller	  of	  ACC	  Zurich	  by	  phone	  were	  not	  successful	  as	  a	  telephone	  connection	  could	  not	  be	  established.	  
§ The	  controller	  did	  not	  notice	  the	  imminent	  separation	  infringement	  in	  time.	  He	  instructed	  the	  TU154M	  crew	  at	  21:34:49	  hrs	  (43	  seconds	  prior	  to	  the	  collision)	  to	  descend	  to	  FL	  350	  which	  was	  too	  late	  to	  ensure	  the	  required	  separation	  to	  the	  B757-­‐200.	  The	  phraseology	  used	  did	  not	  correspond	  with	  the	  urgency	  of	  the	  situation.	  
§ At	  21:34:56	  hrs	  the	  prescribed	  separation	  of	  7	  NM	  was	  infringed.	  	  
ACAS/TCAS	  
§ The	  TU154M	  crew	  followed	  the	  ATCO	  instruction	  immediately	  and	  initiated	  the	  descent.	  	  
§ At	  21:34:56	  hrs	  (35	  seconds	  prior	  to	  the	  collision)	  TCAS	  generated	  RAs	  in	  both	  aircraft	  simultaneously.	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o The	  B757-­‐200	  crew	  received	  an	  RA	  to	  descend.	  The	  copilot	  was	  not	  in	  his	  seat	  at	  the	  	  time.	  The	  PIC	  followed	  the	  RA	  and	  initiated	  the	  descent.	  	  
o The	  TU154M	  crew	  had	  already	  initiated	  the	  descent	  when	  they	  received	  the	  RA	  to	  	  climb.	  The	  RA	  did	  not	  change	  the	  decision	  and	  the	  descent	  was	  continued.	  This	  decision	  did	  not	  take	  into	  account	  that	  very	  likely	  simultaneously	  with	  this	  RA	  the	  other	  air-­‐	  plane	  involved	  would	  receive	  a	  complementary	  RA.	  	  
§ The	  copilot	  of	  the	  TU154M	  questioned	  the	  continuation	  of	  the	  descent	  twice.	  But	  he	  could	  not	  gain	  anybodies	  [sic]	  ear.	  A	  comment	  that	  TCAS	  has	  priority	  over	  ATCO	  did	  not	  come	  from	  any	  of	  the	  crew	  members.	  	  
§ The	  B757-­‐200	  crew	  reported	  23	  seconds	  after	  the	  RA	  the	  “TCAS	  descent”	  to	  ACC	  Zurich.	  The	  copilot	  hat	  taken	  his	  seat	  again	  at	  that	  time	  and	  the	  frequency	  was	  free.	  	  
§ According	  to	  his	  statement	  the	  controller	  did	  not	  notice	  the	  message	  of	  the	  B757-­‐200	  crew.	  The	  first	  part	  of	  the	  message	  was	  incomprehensible	  due	  to	  the	  simultaneous	  transmission	  of	  both	  crewmembers.	  The	  second	  part	  coincided	  with	  a	  message	  at	  the	  adjacent	  work-­‐	  station	  (RE)	  transmitted	  by	  the	  A320.	  	  
§ At	  21:35:00	  hrs	  the	  MV9800	  computer	  of	  ACC	  Zurich	  released	  an	  aural	  STCA	  warning	  to	  the	  workstation	  of	  the	  controller.	  This	  warning	  had	  not	  been	  noticed	  in	  the	  control	  room.	  	  
§ Once	  the	  controller	  noticed	  that	  the	  TU154M	  had	  initiated	  the	  descent	  he	  again	  turned	  to	  	  the	  A320	  whose	  crew	  had	  already	  called	  him	  twice.	  He	  did	  not	  continue	  to	  observe	  the	  developing	  situation.	  	  
§ An	  automatic	  downlink,	  integrated	  in	  the	  TCAS	  equipment,	  carrying	  information	  about	  issued	  RA’s	  to	  the	  respective	  ATCO	  units	  has	  not	  been	  introduced	  worldwide	  yet.	  It	  was	  determined	  that	  with	  the	  prescribed	  reports	  via	  radio	  delays	  and	  loss	  of	  information	  may	  occur.	  	  
§ The	  ACAS/TCAS	  related	  international	  regulations	  and	  national	  procedures	  valid	  on	  the	  day	  of	  the	  accident	  were	  not	  sufficiently	  clear	  or	  incomplete	  and	  misleading	  and	  did	  not	  fully	  correspond	  to	  the	  system	  philosophy.	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17 Appendix:	  Überlingen	  Timeline	  One	  analysis	  of	  BFU	   Investigation	  Report	  commented	  about	   the	   inadequacy	  of	   the	  timeline	  (Johnson	  2004b).	  	  Most	  obviously,	  there	  is	  no	  common	  scale	  for	  time—the	  width	  of	  columns,	  which	  represent	  1	  second	  each,	  varies	  according	   to	   the	   text	   the	  designer	  wanted	  to	  fit	  in	  each	  column’s	  cells	  (Figure	  17-­‐1).	  	  	  	  
	  
Figure	  17-­‐1:	  BFU	  Report	  Appendix	  3	  excerpt	  from	  “View	  of	  the	  Events”	  
timeline.	  Each	  column	  represents	  1	  second	  but	  the	  columns	  have	  different	  
widths.	  Furthermore,	  the	  diagram	  is	  titled	  “the	  last	  minute”	  and	  represents	  the	  last	  1	  minute	  and	  15	  seconds,	  yet	  many	  important	  events	  leading	  to	  the	  accident	  occurred	  at	  least	  five	  minutes	  earlier	   (such	  as	   the	  attempts	   to	   call	  Friedrichshafen).	  The	  diagram	   is	  extremely	   helpful	   and	   represents	   a	   great	   deal	   of	   information,	   but	   omits	   ATCO’s	  movements,	  so	  we	  must	  reconstruct	  what	  he	  saw	  and	  heard,	  an	  essential	  part	  of	  a	  work	  practice	  simulation.	  	  Figure	   17-­‐2	   represents	   our	   reconstruction	   of	   the	   seven	   minutes	   prior	   to	   the	  collision,	  emphasizing	  ATCO	  location	  when	  interacting	  with	  each	  of	  the	  flights.	  	  The	  chart	   is	   segmented	   into	   three	  sequential	  parts	   from	   top	   to	  bottom.	   	  Each	  segment	  indicates	  when	  ATCO	  was	  at	  right	  (top	  of	  segment)	  and	  left	  (bottom)	  workstations	  and	   when	   he	   interacted	   with	   certain	   flights	   there	   workstation.	   “Friedrichshafen”	  represents	   ATCO’s	   attempts	   to	   call	   the	   tower	   on	   the	   telephone.	   Shading	   and	  numbers	  in	  cells	  indicate	  possible	  prioritization	  of	  simultaneous	  activities	  to	  explain	  what	  he	  was	  doing	  at	  each	  time.	  (1	  is	  the	  active	  communication;	  2,	  what	  will	  do	  next;	  3,	  further	  delayed;	  0,	  the	  communication	  will	  be	  handled	  immediately	  but	  caller	  told	  to	  wait.)	  Question	  mark	  indicates	  his	  location	  is	  uncertain.	  Gray	  shading	  designates	  two	   events	   that	   ATCO	   apparently	   did	   not	   perceive	   because	   he	   was	   at	   right	  workstation:	  1)	  21:32:38	  DHL	  611	  appears	  on	  ARFA	  sector	  radar,	  2)	  23:35:20	  DHL	  calls	  in	  “600	  TCAS	  descent.”	  
View of the events (last minute) Appendix 3AZ: AX001-1-2/02
21:34 Hr 21 21 21
Min 34 34 35







Altitude (feet) 36000 ft
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B-T-C 2-9-3-7, ah.. descend flight level ah.. 3-5-0, 












































B-T-C 2-9-3-7, ah.. descend flight level ah.. 3-5-0, 
expedite, I have crossing traffic.
CLIMB! 
CLIMB!
B-T-C 2-9-3-7, ah ..descend flight level ah .. 3-5-0, 























Figure	  17-­‐2:	  Timeline	  representing	  ATCO	  location	  when	  interacting	  with	  
different	  flights	  during	  last	  seven	  minutes	  (see	  text).	  	  This	   analysis	  would	  enable	   refining	   the	  ATCO	  model	   to	  development	  a	  prioritized	  “mental	  model”	  of	  active	  tasks	  (specifically	  here,	  handling	  flights	  in	  his	  sector).	  	  The	  current	  model	  uses	  WF	  priorities	  to	  effectively	  sort	  actions,	  such	  that	  handoff	  for	  an	  arriving	  flight	  has	  priority	  over	  monitoring	  the	  radar	  display,	  etc.	  (see	  Table	  23-­‐1	  in	  Appendix	   23).	   	   An	   alternative	   approach	   when	   an	   activity	   involves	   simultaneous	  equal-­‐priority	  possible	  actions	  is	   for	  the	  agent	  to	  have	  an	  belief	  about	  “what	   is	  my	  top	  priority	  to	  do	  now,”	  “what	  I	  need	  to	  do	  next”	  and	  “what	  will	  be	  handled	  as	  soon	  as	  practical,”	  corresponding	  to	  the	  ranking	  1-­‐3	  in	  the	  chart.	  
UTC$hour$ 21 21 21
minute 29 30 31
0 15 30 45 0 15 30 45 0 15 30
ATCO$RE$(Right) ? ? ? ? R R ? ? ? ?
Friedrichshafen 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2
Aero6Lloyd 1 1 1 2 2 2 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 3
ATCO$RP$(Left) L L L







45 0 15 30 45 0 15 30 45
ATCO$RE$(Right) ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? R ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?
Friedrichshafen 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1




UTC$hour$ 21 21 21
minute 34 35 36
0 15 30 45 0 15 30 45 0
ATCO$RE$(Right) R R
Friedrichshafen
Aero6Lloyd 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
ATCO$RP$(Left) L L
BTC62937 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
DHL6611 Collision
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18 Appendix:	  Überlingen	  Unexplained	  Events	  and	  Behaviors	  This	  appendix	  examines	  two	  key	  aspects	  of	  the	  accident	  that	  are	  mentioned	  in	  the	  BFU	  Report	  and	  Mayday	  video,	  but	  are	  not	  adequately	  documented	  or	  explained	  in	  reports,	  namely	  how	  the	  TCAS	  display	  influenced	  the	  BTC	  crew	  and	  why	  the	  Zurich	  ATCO	  did	  not	  notice	  that	  the	  DHL	  aircraft	  was	  descending.	  	  
• Russian	  crew	  interaction	  prior	  and	  during	  TCAS	  TA/RA	  is	  complex	  and	  not	  
correctly	  or	  completely	  presented	  by	  BFU	  timeline	  or	  the	  Mayday	  video	  
(BFU	  Report,	  p.	  8).	  	  	  
o BFU	  Investigation	  Report	  description	  and	  diagrams	  are	  not	  complete	  or	  consistent:	  	  	  
§ 	  “At	  21:34:42	  hrs,	  TCAS	  generated	  a	  TA	  (“traffic,	  traffic“).	  The	  CVR	  recorded	  that	  both	  the	  PIC	  and	  the	  copilot	  called	  out	  “traffic,	  traffic“	  (p.	  8)	  
§ 	  “View	  of	  the	  Events”	  Appendix	  3:	  shows	  Copilot	  calling	  out	  “traffic,	  traffic”	  at	  21:34:48,	  but	  does	  not	  show	  PIC	  saying	  this.	  	  
o BTC	  Crew	  is	  pre-­‐occupied	  by	  discussing	  TCAS;	  they	  are	  not	  disregarding	  it;	  during	  this	  1	  min	  41	  sec	  (just	  prior	  to	  TA)	  they	  do	  not	  call	  into	  ATCO	  to	  inquire	  about	  the	  intruder;	  is	  this	  a	  common	  occurrence?	  	  For	   the	   time	   between	   about	   21:33:00	   hrs	   and	   21:34:41	   hrs	   the	   CVR	   recorded	  crew	  discussions	   concerning	   an	   airplane	   approaching	   from	   the	   left	  which	  was	  displayed	  on	   the	  vertical	  speed	   indicator	   (VSI/TRA)	  which	   is	  part	  of	   the	  TCAS.	  All	  flight	  crew	  members	  with	  the	  exception	  of	  the	  flight	  engineer	  were	  involved	  in	  these	  discussions.”	  (BFU	  Report,	  p.	  8)	  	  
o Mayday	  video	  and	  BFU	  report	  imply	  that	  Russians	  received	  Blue	  TCAS	  but	  DHL	  did	  not	  
§ Russian	  situation:	  The	   TU154M	   crew	   noticed	   at	   21:33:18	   hrs	   for	   the	   first	   time	   on	   the	   TCAS	  display	   (VSI/TRA)	  another	  airplane	  approaching	   from	   the	   left.	  At	   this	   time	  the	  distance	  between	  the	  two	  airplanes	  was	  still	  approximately	  27	  NM.	  It	  is	  to	  be	  assumed	  that	  the	  display	  had	  been	  set	  to	  a	  range	  of	  40	  NM,	  as	  provided	  by	  the	  flight	  operations	  manual.	  There	  is	  no	  doubt	  that	  it	  was	  the	  B757-­‐200	  with	  which	  the	  TU154M	  later	  collided	  because	  there	  was	  no	  other	  airplane	  in	  this	  airspace	  at	  the	  time.	  (BFU	  Report,	  p.	  70)	  	  
• But	  the	  video	  shows	  the	  range	  is	  set	  at	  16	  NM	  when	  it	  is	  first	  depicted.	  
• The	  copilot	  asked	  at	  21:34:30	  whether	  he	  should	  decrease	  the	  scale	  and	  the	  PIC	  replied	  “No.”	  At	  21:34:36	  hrs	  -­‐	  six	  seconds	  prior	  to	  the	  TA	  -­‐	  the	  commander	  said	  that	  he	  had	  recognized	  the	  airplane	  at	  the	  same	  flight	  level.	  This	  finding	  is	  based	  on	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the	  commander's	  statements:	  "Here	  visually"	  and	  two	  seconds	   later:	  "Here,	  it	   is	   showing	   us	   zero".	   This	   statement	   referred	   to	   the	   altitude	   difference	  indicated	   on	   the	   VSI/TRA	   display	   (“00“	   indication	   near	   the	   blue	   solid	  diamond).	  (BFU	  Report,	  p.	  70)	  	  
§ DHL	  situation:	  When	  Russian	  TCAS	  shows	  Blue	  TCAS	  (prior	  to	  TA),	  the	  video	  then	  says,	  “On	  the	  DHL	  plane,	  the	  crew	  is	  relaxed,	  they	  don’t	  know	  they	  are	  on	  a	  collision	  course.	  TCAS	  hasn’t	  sounded	  a	  warning	  yet….	  The	  first	  officer	  goes	  to	  the	  washroom.”	  	  At	  21:34:30	  hrs	  the	  copilot	  handed	  over	  the	  control	  of	  the	  airplane	  to	  the	  PIC	  in	  order	  to	  go	  to	  the	  lavatory	  installed	  in	  a	  cubicle	  at	  the	  rear	  of	  the	  cockpit.	  At	  21:34:31	  hrs	  the	  PIC	  confirmed	  that	  he	  had	  taken	  over.	  (BFU	  Report,	  p.	  7)	  	  When	   the	  copilot	  as	   the	  PF	  at	  21:34:30	  hrs	  handed	  over	   the	  control	  of	   the	  airplane	  to	  the	  PIC	  in	  order	  to	  go	  to	  the	  lavatory,	  the	  distance	  between	  both	  airplanes	  was	  still	  13.6	  NM.	  The	  crew	  would	  have	  been	  able	  to	  recognise	  the	  other	   airplane	   on	   the	   VSI/TRA	   if	   a	   range	   of	   16	   NM	   was	   set.	   The	   setting,	  however,	   could	   not	   be	   determined.	   It	   is	   probable	   that	   the	   crew	   had	   not	  
noticed	   the	  other	  airplane	  at	   that	   time	  otherwise	   the	  copilot	  would	  not	  have	  
left	  his	  seat.	  (BFU	  Report,	  p.	  68,	  emphasis	  added)	  	  
o The	  report	  justifies	  the	  DHL	  pilots	  not	  noticing	  the	  TCAS	  display:	  	  It	   is	   not	   part	   of	   the	   prescribed	   and	   practised	   procedures	   to	   constantly	  observe	   the	   TCAS	   display	   on	   the	   respective	   instruments.	   According	   to	   the	  system	  philosophy,	  the	  attention	  of	  the	  crew	  is	  drawn	  to	  a	  potential	  conflict	  by	  the	  acoustical	  annunciation	  of	  a	  TA	  or	  an	  RA.	  (p.	  68)	  	  
§ Further	  the	  BFU	  report	  states	  that	  the	  Russians	  were	  wrong	  to	  be	  attending	  to	  the	  TCAS	  display	  prior	  to	  the	  TA:	  	  	  	  Note:	   	   The	   BFU	   is	   of	   the	   opinion	   that	   the	   use	   of	   the	   TCAS	   display	   for	   the	  development	   of	   an	   own	   assessment	   of	   the	   air	   traffic	   situation	   and/or	   of	   a	  situation	  awareness	   is	  not	  compatible	  with	  the	  TCAS	  system	  philosophy	  or	  the	   system	  ATC.	  There	  are	  also	  no	  procedures	   in	  existence	   in	  order	   to	  use	  the	  system	  in	  such	  a	  way.	  (p.	  99-­‐100)	  	  
§ The	  report	  implies	  that	  despite	  the	  TCAS	  “philosophy”	  and	  lack	  of	  procedures,	  the	  fact	  the	  TCAS	  display	  was	  visible	  and	  influenced	  the	  BTC	  crew’s	  interpretation	  of	  ATCO’s	  intervention:	  	  	  The	   crew	   did	   recognise	   the	   other	   airplane	   on	   the	   VSI/TRA	   early	   and	  was	  able	   to	   identify	   it	   visually	   before	   the	   accident.	   That	  way	   they	   had	   become	  aware	   of	   a	   possible	   conflict	   which	   then	   seemed	   to	   be	   solved	   through	   the	  instruction	  of	  ACC	  Zurich.	  (p.	  99)	  	  
• Why	  doesn’t	  the	  Zurich	  ATCO	  see	  that	  the	  DHL	  is	  also	  descending?	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o Why	  didn’t	  he	  see	  that	  DHL	  was	  descending	  very	  close	  to	  BTC,	  if	  he	  was	  looking	  at	  the	  BTC	  datablock	  at	  21:35:12	  (BFU	  p.	  89).	  	  Why	  doesn’t	  he	  inform	  DHL	  about	  traffic?	  	  What	  was	  Zurich	  ATCO	  doing	  between	  21:35:17	  and	  21:35:25?	  	  	  	  
o Zurich	  ATCO	  obviously	  he	  sees	  the	  DHL	  	  on	  his	  radar	  by	  21:34:49	  or	  he	  wouldn't	  have	  issued	  the	  urgent	  descend	  instruction	  to	  the	  Russians.	  	  
o The	  DHL	  had	  been	  descending	  since	  21:34:57,	  two	  seconds	  after	  the	  Russians.	  
o It	  is	  claimed	  (BFU	  Report,	  p.	  89)	  that	  “He	  would	  not	  have	  been	  able	  to	  recognise	  the	  B757-­‐200	  was	  descending	  until	  the	  screen	  update	  at	  21:35:12	  hrs.”	  	  	  
o He	  was	  at	  the	  left	  workstation,	  just	  finishing	  his	  remark	  to	  the	  Russians	  to	  expedite,	  and	  then	  listening	  to	  them	  respond	  from	  21:35:13-­‐17.	  	  So	  he	  was	  presumably	  staring	  at	  the	  screen	  exactly	  when	  the	  DHL	  (B757)	  update	  occurred	  at	  21:35:12.	  	  	  
o He	  repeated	  his	  command	  to	  the	  Russians,	  “expedite	  descent”	  at	  21:35:07,	  so	  presumably	  he	  is	  still	  seeing	  both	  planes	  on	  a	  collision	  course;	  that	  is,	  he	  was	  seeing	  DHL	  on	  the	  radar	  display.	  
o He	  confirmed	  the	  TU154M	  was	  descending	  based	  on	  his	  testimony	  (p.	  85).	  This	  confirmation	  had	  to	  be	  at	  21:35:12	  because	  1)	  he	  issued	  the	  expedite	  just	  prior,	  and	  	  the	  previous	  screen	  update	  occurred	  at	  21:35:00	  only	  4	  seconds	  after	  the	  AP	  disengage,	  too	  soon	  to	  show	  the	  descent.	  
o If	  he	  is	  able	  to	  confirm	  that	  the	  BTC	  is	  descending	  based	  on	  its	  data	  label	  
(p.	  85)	  why	  doesn’t	  he	  also	  see	  that	  the	  DHL	  is	  descending,	  given	  that	  he	  
sees	  both	  planes	  and	  they	  are	  near	  each	  other	  on	  the	  screen?	  	  	  
o As	  Figure	  18-­‐1	  shows,	  when	  ATCO	  was	  talking	  to	  BTC	  at	  left	  workstation,	  AEF	  calls	  in	  (heard	  on	  right);	  it	  is	  possible	  he	  detected	  this	  and	  wanted	  to	  respond	  to	  them;	  how	  could	  this	  be	  more	  important	  than	  confirming	  that	  collision	  was	  resolved	  (or	  did	  he	  surmise	  it	  was	  out	  of	  his	  control)?	  	  
	  	  




Figure	  18-­‐1:	  Excerpt	  of	  last	  minute	  timeline	  (BFU	  Report,	  Appendix	  3).	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19 Appendix:	  TCAS	  II	  Version	  7.1	  CP112E	  Reversal	  Logic	  The	  DHL	   and	   BTC	   planes	  were	   both	   equipped	  with	   TCAS	   II	   7.0	  which	   included	   a	  form	  of	  “reversal	  logic”	  (BFU,	  p.	  49).	  	  
TCAS	   II,	   Version	   7	   is	   capable	   of	   generating	   a	   Reversal	   RA,	   i.e.	   a	   coordinated	   RA	   into	   a	   direction	  
contrary	  to	  the	  initial	  RA.	  The	  Reversal	  is	  a	  way	  out,	  if	  during	  the	  avoidance	  manoeuvre	  an	  inversion	  
of	  the	  original	  geometrical	  situation	  of	  the	  flight	  paths	  occurred.	  This	  situation	  will	  arise	  in	  particular	  
if	  the	  crews	  respond	  contrary	  to	  the	  initial	  RA.	  	  A	  Reversal	  RA	  can	  be	  issued	  if	  the	  following	  conditions	  
are	  fulfilled:	  	  
▪ The	   calculated	   distance	   at	   the	   CPA	  must	   be	   greater	   in	   the	   new	   direction	   than	   in	   the	  
initial	  direction	  and	  must	  be	  greater	  than	  100	  ft.	  	  
▪ The	  altitude	  difference	  between	  the	  airplanes	  must	  have	  already	  exceeded	  100	  ft	  in	  the	  
new	  direction.	  	  
▪ A	  reversal	  may	  be	  generated	  not	  earlier	  than	  9	  s	  after	  the	  initial	  RA.	  	  
▪ Up	  to	  the	  calculated	  moment	  of	  collision	  a	  period	  of	  at	  least	  4	  s	  must	  be	  left.	  
These	   conditions	  within	   the	   algorithm	   for	   the	   calculation	   of	   the	   Reversal	   have	   been	   introduced	   in	  
order	   to	   preclude	   frequent	   reversals	   of	   TCAS	   avoidance	  manoeuvres.	   This	   is	   necessary	   in	   order	   to	  
maintain	  the	  trustworthiness	  of	  TCAS.	  	  
During	   the	   descent	   of	   the	   B757-­‐200	   and	   the	   TU154M	   a	   Reversal	   RA	   was	   not	   generated,	   because	  
conditions	  for	  an	  RA	  were	  not	  given.	  	  
	  The	  BFU	  Report	  does	  not	  specify	  which	  conditions	  for	  a	  reversal	  RA	  did	  not	  hold.	  	  	  Kuchar	  and	  Drumm	  (2007,	  p.	  284)	  provide	  a	  more	  complete	  explanation.	  They	  begin	  by	  citing	  a	  condition	  omitted	  from	  the	  BFU	  Report:	  	   First,	   a	   reversal	   will	   be	   triggered	   only	   by	   the	   aircraft	   with	   priority—that	   is,	   the	  aircraft	  with	  the	  lower	  Mode	  S	  address.	  If	  the	  aircraft	  has	  a	  higher	  Mode	  S	  address	  than	  the	  intruder,	  the	  RA	  sense	  will	  be	  reversed	  only	  when	  directed	  to	  do	  so	  by	  the	  priority	  aircraft	  through	  the	  data	  link.	  	  In	  the	  configuration	  at	  Überlingen	  (Figure	  ),	  the	  Russian	  aircraft	  had	  a	  lower	  Mode	  S	  address	  (effectively	  a	  serial	  number	  that	  distinguishes	  each	  aircraft	  with	  TCAS),	  so	  it	  was	  responsible	  for	  triggering	  a	  reversal.	  A	  climb-­‐RA	  was	  in	  process	  and	  the	  internal	  TCAS	   “template	   predicted	   adequate	   separation	   between	   aircraft,	   at	   least	   until	   the	  final	  few	  seconds;	  therefore,	  TCAS	  did	  not	  issue	  an	  RA	  reversal.”	  The	  TCAS	  algorithm	  did	  not	  take	  into	  account	  that	  the	  TU154M	  was	  not	  actually	  climbing.	  	  Yet	  even	  if	  the	  DHL	   aircraft	   had	   priority	   to	   generate	   the	   reversal,	   TCAS	   II	   7.0	   would	   not	   have	  generated	  a	  reversal	  because	  “both	  aircraft	  remained	  within	  100	  ft	  vertically	  of	  each	  other	  throughout	  the	  encounter”	  (p.	  285).	  	  	  The	   revised	  TCAS	   II	   7.1	   reversal	   algorithm	   (Change	  Proposal	   112E)	   is	   specifically	  designed	   to	   detect	   one	   plane	   disregarding	   TCAS,	   in	   which	   case	   it	   instructs	   the	  complying	  pilot	  to	  reverse	  (and	  says	  nothing	  to	  the	  non-­‐complying	  pilot;	  see	  figures	  below).	  
	  	  




Figure	  19-­‐1.	  Why	  TCAS	  did	  not	  generate	  reversal	  at	  Überlingen	  (Suchy	  2007,	  p.	  
11)	  	  Apparently	   following	  Überlingen,	   there	  were	   a	   series	   of	  meetings,	  with	   a	  working	  committee	  report	  in	  2008,	  and	  review	  process	  that	  completed	  in	  2010	  (to	  deal	  with	  what	  was	  understood	  to	  be	  an	  “urgent”	  design	  problem).57	  	  
Following a number of comments from airlines, EASA has proposed the following dates 
for the TCAS II version 7.1 mandate in European airspace: forward fit (new aircraft) 1 
March 2012, retrofit (existing aircraft) 1 December 2015. These dates are proposed 
dates, subject to further regulatory processes and are not final until the Implementing 
Rule has been published. 
 
Although TCAS II is an aircraft system, it has been implemented to improve ATM safety. 
Studies conducted for EUROCONTROL, using recently recorded operational data, 
indicate that currently the probability of a mid-air collision in European airspace is 
2.7 x 10-8 which equates to one in every 3 years. When TCAS II version 7.1 is 
implemented that probability will reduce by a factor of 4. (emphasis added) 
…. 
The	   issues	  with	   the	   reversal	   logic	  were	   resolved	   through	   a	   significant	   code	   change	   for	   TCAS	   II	  
logic	  version	  7.0.	  This	  change	  is	  known	  as	  Change	  Proposal	  112E	  (CP112E).	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  57	  This	  information	  and	  following	  excerpts	  are	  from	  http://www.eurocontrol.int/msa/public/standard_page/ACAS_Upcoming_Changes.html	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CP112E	   brings	   improvements	   to	   the	   reversal	   logic	   of	   TCAS	   II	   logic	   version	   7.0	   by	   detecting	  
geometries	  close	  to	  that	  of	  the	  2002	  Überlingen	  mid-­‐air	  collision,	  and	  by	  easing	  the	  triggering	  
thresholds	  of	   reversal	  RAs	   in	  encounters	   in	  which	  the	  aircraft	   remain	  vertically	  within	  100	  ft	  of	  
each	   other.	   The	   basic	   principle	   is	   to	   detect	   that	   two	   aircraft	   are	   climbing,	   or	   descending	  
simultaneously.	   Two	   mechanisms	   are	   used	   to	   ensure	   that	   reversal	   RAs	   are	   triggered	   when	  
necessary.	  
	  
CP112E	   first	  adds	  a	   feature	  which	  monitors	  RA	  compliance.	  When	   it	   is	  detected	  after	  a	  certain	  
period	  of	   time	   that	   an	  aircraft	   is	   not	   responding	   correctly	   to	   an	  RA,	   it	   circumvents	   the	   "100	   ft	  
box"	  rule,	  allowing	  reversal	  RAs	  for	  aircraft	  closer	  than	  100	  ft	  vertically.	  
	  
CP112E	  also	  adds	  a	  prediction	  of	  the	  vertical	  separation	  at	  the	  closest	  point	  of	  approach,	  based	  
on	   current	   vertical	   speeds,	   to	   detect	   the	   need	   for	   a	   reversal	   RA.	   Indeed,	  when	   this	   prediction	  
shows	  that	  the	  aircraft	  are	  probably	  going	  to	  be	  closer	  than	  a	  predefined	  threshold,	  reversal	  RAs	  
are	  considered	  as	  a	  valid	  option	  for	  aircraft	  closer	  than	  100	  ft	  vertically.	  
	  
Reversal	  RAs	  are	  not	  triggered	  too	  early	   in	  an	  encounter,	  to	   leave	  time	  for	  the	  initial	  RAs	  to	  be	  
efficient	  before	  reversing.	   In	  addition,	  reversal	  RAs	  are	  not	  triggered	  too	  close	  to	  the	  predicted	  
closest	  point	  of	  approach,	  to	  avoid	  useless	  reversal	  RAs.	  
	  
CP112E	   has	   been	   extensively	   validated	   in	   Europe	   by	   the	   EUROCONTROL-­‐sponsored	   team	  
composed	  of	  DSNA	  and	  Egis	  Avia	  experts,	  and	  by	  several	  organizations	   in	  the	  USA	  (MIT	  Lincoln	  
Lab,	  MITRE,	  FAA,	  and	  Johns	  Hopkins	  University).	  This	  validation	  shows	  that	  CP112E	  significantly	  
improves	  the	  safety	  brought	  by	  TCAS.	  It	  triggers	  reversal	  RAs	  in	  time	  in	  the	  geometries	  in	  which	  
the	   issue	   with	   reversal	   RAs	   was	   identified.	   In	   addition,	   side	   effects	   and	   performance	  
deteriorations	  are	  minimal	  for	  CP112E	  and	  are	  considered	  acceptable	  compared	  to	  the	  collision	  
risk	  with	  current	  versions	  of	  TCAS.	  
	  A	  more	  precise	  characterization	  might	  be:	  compared	  to	  the	  collision	  risk	  given	  how	  
people	  might	   interact	  with	  current	  versions	  of	  TCAS.	  	  The	   topic	   and	   analysis	   clearly	  focus	  on	   the	  automated	  system,	  rather	   than	  viewing	   the	  entire	  human-­‐automation	  system	  as	  flying	  the	  plane	  and	  accounting	  for	  accidents.	  	  Ladkin	  (2004)	  provides	  a	  helpful	  summary:	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The	  technical	  components	  of	  the	  ACAS	  system	  are	  purely	  advisory.	  They	  paint	  pretty	  pictures	  on	  a	  display	  and	  generate	  spoken	  sentences.	  They	  do	  not	  control	  the	  aircraft.	  The	  ACAS	  system	  depends	  for	  any	  effectiveness	  it	  may	  have	  exclusively	  on	  actions	  of	  the	  aircraft	  crew.	  The	  aircraft	  crew	  are	  thus	  an	  integral	  part	  of	  the	  ACAS	  system	  as	  system	  (not	  just	  the	  kit).	  	  An	   apparently	   final	   or	   public	   version	   of	   the	   “Secondary	   Surveillance	   Radar	  Mode	  Select	  (SSR	  MODE	  S)	  and	  Airborne	  Collision	  Avoidance	  System	  (ACAS)	  Programme”	  (MAS)	   report	   has	   been	   posted	   online.58	  	   It	   does	   not	   mention	   Überlingen	   and	  provides	  a	  simpler	  diagram	  indicating	  the	  actual	  advisory	  text:	  
	  
	  
	  	  We	  note	  also	  these	  remarks	  from	  Eurocontrol’s	  FAQs	  online	  page	  about	  ACAS:59	  	  	   TCAS	  (Traffic	  Alert	  and	  Collision	  Avoidance	  System)	  is	  a	  specific	  implementation	  of	  the	  ACAS	  (Airborne	  Collision	  voidance	  System)	  concept.	  TCAS	  II	  version	  7.0	  and	  7.1	  are	  currently	  the	  only	  available	  equipment	  that	   is	   fully	  compliant	  with	  the	  ACAS	  II	  Standards	  and	  Recommended	  Practices	  (SARPs).	  	  ACAS	   II	   provides	   "Resolution	   Advisories"	   (RA's)	   in	   the	   vertical	   sense	   (direction)	  telling	  the	  pilot	  how	  to	  regulate	  or	  adjust	  his	  vertical	  speed	  so	  as	  to	  avoid	  a	  collision.	  
 and	  also	  this	  remark	  about	  the	  certification	  process:	  	   	  The	   change	   to	   the	   reversal	   logic	   has	   been	   evaluated	   using	   mathematical	  modelling…..	  John	  Lygeros,	  Carolos	  Livadas	  and	  Nancy	  Lynch	  have	  formally	  proved	  the	  correctness	  of	  the	  two-­‐airplane	  TCAS	  avoidance	  algorithms	  [7].	  (Ladkin	  2004)	  	  The	  history	  and	  development	  of	  TCAS	  suggest	  the	  following	  simulation	  and	  formal	  modeling	  challenges	  relevant	  to	  future	  research	  using	  Brahms-­‐GÜM:	  1. Using	   the	   Brahms	   simulation	   with	   the	   existing	   reversal	   algorithm	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  58	  http://www.eurocontrol.int/msa/public/standard_page/TCAS71.html	  59	  http://www.eurocontrol.int/msa/public/faq/ACAS_FAQ.html	  -­‐	  qa10	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implemented,	  under	  what	  simple	  variations	  would	  it	  be	  enabled	  after	  all?	  2. Using	   a	   Brahms	   simulation	   revised	   to	   incorporate	   this	   new	   algorithm,	  does	   the	   reversal	   algorithm	   now	   prevent	   collision?	   Note	   that	  Mitre/Honeywell	   testing	   could	   not	   have	   taken	   all	   of	   the	   factors	   of	  Überlingen	  into	  account.	  3. Under	  what	  conditions	  will	  the	  new	  TCAS	  reversal	  algorithm	  fail?	  
20 Appendix:	  Proposed	  TCAS	  Resolution	  Advisory	  Downlink	  Although	   it	  might	   appear	   from	   the	  Überlingen	   accident	   that	   it	   is	   essential	   for	   the	  sector	   ATCO	   to	   be	   automatically	   notified	   that	   TCAS	   has	   issued	   an	   RA	   (called	   “RA	  Downlink”),	   the	   issue	   is	   controversial	   and	   the	  FAA	  has	  no	  plans	   for	   implementing	  this.	  	  A	  workshop	  was	  held	  in	  Berlin	  in	  October	  2009	  (EUROCONTROL	  2009)	  60	  	  to	  review	  the	  pros	  and	  cons	  of	  the	  RA	  Downlink:	  	   Notification	  of	  ACAS	   II	  Resolution	  Advisories	  (RA)	   to	  controllers	  as	   they	  occur	  has	  been	  contemplated	  for	  many	  years.	  In	  Europe	  the	  Überlingen	  mid-­‐air	  collision	  gave	  additional	   impetus	   for	   a	   number	   of	   organisations	   to	   implement	   what	   usually	   is	  referred	  to	  as	  RA	  Downlink.	  With	  the	  increasing	  operational	  use	  of	  Mode	  S,	  at	  least	  one	   enabling	   technology	   is	   readily	   available	   in	   a	   number	   of	   States.	   To	   avoid	  proliferation	  of	  concepts	  of	  use,	   it	   is	  now	  urgently	  needed	  to	   find	  common	  ground	  for	  use	  of	  RA	  Downlink	  in	  Europe.	  	  A	  latency	  study	  predicted	  that	  in	  95%	  of	  the	  cases,	  the	  ATCO	  would	  be	  informed	  of	  the	  RA	  using	  Mode	  S	  within	  10	  seconds,	  taking	  all	  technical	  and	  human	  factors	  into	  account.	  	  A	  previous	  study	  (PASS)	  by	  EUROCONTROL	  reported:	  	   An	   analysis	   of	   pilots’	   TCAS	   RA	   reports	   to	   ATC	   was	   performed.	   About	   50%	   of	  “Climb/Descend”	   RAs	   are	   reported,	   whilst	   reporting	   of	   other	   RAs	   is	   about	   20%.	  Preliminary	   findings	   also	   show	   that	   the	   lack	   of	   report	   by	   crews	   receiving	   a	  coordinated	  “Climb/Descend”	  RA	  is	  often	  associated	  to	  a	  pilot	  report	  by	  the	  threat	  aircraft.	  	  	  Finally	   lack	  of	  report	   is	  sometimes	  associated	  to	  pilots	  not	   following	  the	  RA,	  while	  short	  duration	  RAs	  in	  general	  are	  often	  not	  reported.	  	  The	  MIT	  Lincoln	  Laboratory	  analysis	  (EUROCONTROL	  2009)	  cites	  the	  following:	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  60	  Presentations	  are	  posted:	  http://www.eurocontrol.int/ra-­‐downlink/public/standard_page/berlin_workshop_oct_09.html	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▪ The	  frequency	  of	  RA	  encounters	  is	  significantly	  higher	  in	  the	  USA.	  This	  is	  in	  part	  explained	  by	  the	  higher	  traffic	  density	  and	  in	  part	  by	  the	  following	  points.	  	  
▪ The	  vast	  majority	  of	  RA	  encounters	  occur	  in	  uncontrolled	  airspace	  and	  reflect	  interactions	  between	  TCAS-­‐equipped	  aircraft	  and	  VFR	  traffic	  or	  non-­‐equipped	  business	  jets.	  	  
▪ Many	  of	  such	  interactions	  are	  caused	  by	  VFR	  traffic	  legally	  flying	  at	  500	  feet	  between	  IFR	  flight	  levels.	  	  	  	  The	  FAA	  currently	  has	  no	  plans	  for	  RA	  Downlink	  display	  because	  many	  RAs	  do	  not	  require	  changes	  in	  flight	  path;	  pilot	  non-­‐compliance	  with	  climb/descent	  RAs	  has	  the	  potential	   to	   cause	  confusion;	  and	  because	   the	   role	  of	  ATC	   in	   interactions	  between	  IFR	  and	  VFR	  traffic	  is	  unclear.	  	  Fewer	  than	  10%	  of	  RAs	  in	  the	  US	  are	  coordinated	  TCAS-­‐TCAS	  between	  two	  aircraft;	  the	  rest	  are	  single	  aircraft	  advisories.	  	  Pilots	  do	  not	  comply	  with	  38%	  of	  RA	  “climb”	  advisories.	   	  Most	  RAs	  involve	  only	  adjusting	  vertical	  speed	  and	  half	   involve	  VFR	  of	  general	  aviation	  “intruder.”	  	  	  	  The	   International	   Federation	   of	   Air	   Traffic	   Controllers	   Associations	   (IFATCA)	   is	  opposed	   to	   RA	   downlink.61	  	   They	   argue	   that	   any	   consideration	   of	   this	   capability	  must	  take	  into	  account:	  	  
▪ Clear	  and	  unambiguous	  legal	  responsibilities	  for	  controllers.	  	  
▪ No	  delay	  in	  downlink	  (e.g.	  due	  to	  antenna	  rotation).	  	  
▪ Displayed	  at	  the	  appropriate	  controller	  position(s).	  	  
▪ Must	  be	  fully	  compatible	  with	  ground	  safety	  nets	  (STCA,	  APW,	  etc.)	  	  
▪ Nuisance	  and	  false	  alerts	  must	  be	  kept	  to	  an	  absolute	  minimum.	  	  	  Other	  presentations	   in	  2009	  similarly	   indicated	   that	  nuisance	  RAs	  would	  not	  help	  the	  ATCO	  and	  were	  a	  reason	  for	  not	  providing	  RA	  downlink	  and	  would	  add	  “another	  visual	  element”	  to	  screens	  that	  were	  already	  full	  of	  data.	   	  They	  are	  concerned	  that	  the	   RA	   downlink	  would	   be	   broadcast,	   rather	   than	   sent	   to	   the	   appropriate	   sector.	  Dehn	  et	  al.62	  provide	  a	  useful	  academic	  report	  that	  assesses	  “the	  operational	  affect	  of	  RA	  downlink.”	  	  In	  conclusion,	  key	  stakeholders	  believe	  that	  RA	  downlink	  could	  substantially	  disrupt	  ATCO	  work	  practices.	  Studies	  are	  required	  to:	  
• Design	  what	  is	  presented	  and	  how	  it	  is	  shown	  on	  the	  display	  (some	  say	  only	  “RA”	  not	  direction;	  others	  favor	  maximum	  info)	  
• Understand	  how	  the	  RA	  might	  interact	  with	  existing	  “safety	  nets”	  (e.g.,	  STCA)	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  61	  Posted	  presentation:	  http://www.eurocontrol.int/ra-­‐downlink/gallery/content/public/library/berlin/2-­‐4	  Philippe	  Domogala.pps	  62	  http://reports.nlr.nl:8080/xmlui/bitstream/handle/10921/478/TP-­‐2012-­‐309.pdf?sequence=1	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• Develop	  “global	  guidelines	  and	  procedures”	  for	  ATCOs	  regarding	  RA	  downlink	  
• Demonstrate	  that	  the	  RA	  downlink	  provides	  beneficial	  information,	  even	  with	  nuisance/false	  alerts.	  
21 Appendix:	  TCAS	  Protocol	  for	  ATCO	  and	  Pilot	  Decision	  Making	  The	   material	   in	   this	   appendix	   is	   provided	   as	   background,	   excerpted	   from	  http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/TCAS	  (accessed	  23	  July	  2012),	  bold	  emphasis	  added.	  TCAS	  II	  issues	  the	  following	  types	  of	  aural	  annunciations:	  
• Traffic	  advisory	  (TA)	  
• Resolution	  advisory	  (RA)	  
• Clear	  of	  conflict	  When	  a	  TA	   is	   issued,	  pilots	   are	   instructed	   to	   initiate	  a	  visual	   search	   for	   the	   traffic	  causing	   the	  TA.	   If	   the	   traffic	   is	   visually	   acquired,	   pilots	   are	   instructed	   to	  maintain	  visual	  separation	  from	  the	  traffic.	  The	  pilot	  training	  programs	  also	  indicate	  that	  no	  horizontal	   maneuvers	   are	   to	   be	   made	   based	   solely	   on	   information	   shown	   on	   the	  traffic	  display.	  Slight	  adjustments	  in	  vertical	  speed	  while	  climbing	  or	  descending,	  or	  slight	   adjustments	   in	   airspeed	  while	   still	   complying	  with	   the	   ATCO	   clearance	   are	  acceptable.[4]	  	  
When	  an	  RA	   is	   issued,	  pilots	  are	  expected	   to	  respond	   immediately	   to	   the	  RA	  
unless	  doing	  so	  would	  jeopardize	  the	  safe	  operation	  of	  the	  flight.	  This	  means	  
that	  aircraft	  will	  at	  times	  have	  to	  manoeuver	  contrary	  to	  ATCO	  instructions	  or	  
disregard	   ATCO	   instructions.	   In	   these	   cases,	   the	   controller	   is	   no	   longer	  
responsible	  for	  separation	  of	  the	  aircraft	  involved	  in	  the	  RA	  until	  the	  conflict	  
is	  terminated.	  
	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  ATCO	  can	  potentially	  interfere	  with	  the	  pilot’s	  response	  to	  RAs.	  If	  
a	  conflicting	  ATCO	  instruction	  coincides	  with	  an	  RA,	  the	  pilot	  may	  assume	  that	  
ATCO	  is	  fully	  aware	  of	  the	  situation	  and	  is	  providing	  the	  better	  resolution.	  But	  
in	   reality	  ATCO	   is	   not	   aware	   of	   the	  RA	  until	   the	  RA	   is	   reported	  by	   the	   pilot.	  Once	  the	  RA	  is	  reported	  by	  the	  pilot,	  ATCO	  is	  required	  not	  to	  attempt	  to	  modify	  the	  flight	  path	  of	   the	  aircraft	   involved	  in	  the	  encounter.	  Hence,	   the	  pilot	   is	  expected	  to	  “follow	  the	  RA”	  but	  in	  practice	  this	  does	  not	  yet	  always	  happen.	  	  Some	  States	  have	  implemented	  “RA	  downlink”	  which	  provides	  air	  traffic	  controllers	  with	   information	   about	   RAs	   posted	   in	   the	   cockpit	   obtained	   via	   Mode	   S	   radars.	  Currently,	   there	  are	  no	   ICAO	  provisions	  concerning	   the	  use	  of	  RA	  downlink	  by	  air	  traffic	  controllers.	  	  The	  following	  points	  receive	  emphasis	  during	  pilot	  training:	  
• Do	   not	   manoeuver	   in	   a	   direction	   opposite	   to	   that	   indicated	   by	   the	   RA	  because	  this	  may	  result	  in	  a	  collision.	  
• Inform	  the	  controller	  of	  the	  RA	  as	  soon	  as	  permitted	  by	  flight	  crew	  workload	  after	  responding	  to	  the	  RA.	  There	  is	  no	  requirement	  to	  make	  this	  notification	  prior	  to	  initiating	  the	  RA	  response.	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• Be	  alert	   for	  the	  removal	  of	  RAs	  or	  the	  weakening	  of	  RAs	  so	  that	  deviations	  from	  a	  cleared	  altitude	  are	  minimized.	  
• If	  possible,	   comply	  with	   the	   controller’s	   clearance,	   e.g.	   turn	   to	   intercept	  an	  airway	  or	  localizer,	  at	  the	  same	  time	  as	  responding	  to	  an	  RA.	  
• When	   the	   RA	   event	   is	   completed,	   promptly	   return	   to	   the	   previous	   ATCO	  clearance	   or	   instruction	   or	   comply	   with	   a	   revised	   ATCO	   clearance	   or	  instruction.	  
	   	  
TCAS	  II	  After	   the	   Überlingen	   mid-­‐air	   collision	   (July	   1,	   2002),	   studies	   have	   been	   made	   to	  improve	  TCAS	  II	  capabilities.	  Following	  extensive	  Eurocontrol	  input	  and	  pressure,	  a	  revised	   TCAS	   II	   Minimum	   Operational	   Performance	   Standards	   (MOPS)	   document	  has	  been	  jointly	  developed	  by	  RTCA	  (Special	  Committee	  SC-­‐147)	  and	  EUROCAE….	  TCAS	  II	  Version	  7.1	  will	  be	  able	  to	  issue	  RA	  reversals	  in	  coordinated	  encounters,	  in	  case	  one	  of	  the	  aircraft	  doesn't	  follow	  the	  original	  RA	  instructions	  (Change	  proposal	  CP112E).	   Other	   changes	   in	   this	   version	   are	   the	   replacement	   of	   the	   ambiguous	  
"Adjust	   Vertical	   Speed,	   Adjust"	   RA	   with	   the	   "Level	   off,	   Level	   off"	   RA,	   to	   prevent	  improper	   response	   by	   the	   pilots	   (Change	   proposal	   CP115).;	   and	   the	   improved	  handling	   of	   corrective/preventive	   annunciation	   and	   removal	   of	   green	   arc	   display	  when	  a	  positive	  RA	  weakens	  solely	  due	  to	  an	  extreme	  low	  or	  high	  altitude	  condition	  (1000	   feet	  AGL	  or	  below,	  or	  near	   the	  aircraft	   top	  ceiling)	   to	  prevent	   incorrect	  and	  possibly	  dangerous	  guidance	  to	  the	  pilot	  (Change	  proposal	  CP116).	  	  Studies	   conducted	   for	   Eurocontrol,	   using	   recently	   recorded	   operational	   data,	  indicate	  that	  currently	  the	  probability	  of	  a	  mid-­‐air	  collision	  in	  European	  airspace	  is	  2.7	   x	   10−8	  which	   equates	   to	   one	   in	   every	   3	   years.	   When	   TCAS	   II	   Version	   7.1	   is	  implemented,	  that	  probability	  will	  be	  reduced	  by	  a	  factor	  of	  4.	  	  The	   above	   article	   suggests	   that	   there	   is	   currently	   no	   solution	   to	   the	   problem	   of	  	  contrary	  ATCO	  and	  RA	  instructions	  occurring	  “simultaneously.”	  	  “If	  a	  conflicting	  ATCO	  instruction	  coincides	  with	  an	  RA,	  the	  pilot	  may	  assume	  
that	  ATCO	  is	  fully	  aware	  of	  the	  situation	  and	  is	  providing	  the	  better	  resolution.	  
But	   in	   reality	   ATCO	   is	   not	   aware	   of	   the	   RA	   until	   the	   RA	   is	   reported	   by	   the	  
pilot.”	  	  	  The	   first	   sentence	   implies	   that	   in	   the	   case	   of	   coincidental	   instructions,	   as	   for	  Überlingen,	   then	   the	   ATCO	   should	   be	   followed.	   	   But	   the	   second	   sentence	   implies	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that,	  as	   for	  Überlingen,	  the	  ATCO	  could	  not	  be	  fully	  aware	  of	  the	  situation	  until	  after	  
the	  pilot	  reports	  the	  RA—with	  no	  probably	  time	  for	  negotiation	  of	  the	  inconsistency.	  	  So	  the	  first	  sentence	  is	  logically	  incoherent—if	  the	  pilot	  hasn’t	  reported	  the	  RA,	  the	  pilot	  can	  not	  assume	  that	  the	  ATCO	  is	  fully	  aware,	  and	  hence	  the	  pilot	  should	  obey	  the	  RA	  instead.	  With	  the	  introduction	  of	  TCAS	  7.1	  new	  reversal	  logic,	  it	  is	  hoped	  that	  this	  issue	  will	  be	  resolved	  –	  it	  won’t	  matter	  what	  this	  crew	  does;	  if	  they	  violate	  TCAS	  RA,	  then	  the	  other	  plane	  will	  be	  instructed	  to	  reverse.	  
22 Appendix:	  Brahms	  Reformulation	  of	  WMC	  model	  	  This	  appendix	  describes	  the	  BRAHMS	  model	  and	  simulation	  created	  based	  on	  Kim’s	  (2011)	  dissertation.	  	  Following	  Young	  and	  Pritchett’s	  nomenclature,	  we	  refer	  to	  this	  as	  the	  WMC	  (“work	  model	  that	  computes”)	  model.	  	  	  	  The	   purpose	   of	   this	   Brahms	   modeling	   effort	   in	   the	   fall	   of	   2011	   was	   to	   develop	  fundamental	   constructs	   that	  would	   be	   useful	   in	   any	   Brahms	   air	   traffic	   simulation	  model,	  while	  learning	  how	  the	  representation	  of	  work	  practice	  in	  the	  “work	  model	  that	  computes”	  relates	  to	  the	  work	  practice	  formulation	  in	  Brahms.	  The	  WMC	  model	  was	   extremely	   helpful	   for	   providing	   an	   initial	   framework	   on	   which	   to	   develop	   a	  Brahms	  model	  of	  pilot-­‐flight	  system	  interactions.	  The	  WMC	  model	  was	  created	  for	  a	  to	   illustrate	   a	   functional-­‐allocation	   simulation	   based	   on	   cognitive	   task	   analysis,	  which	   is	   complementary	   to	   a	   work	   systems	   simulation.	   The	   comparisons	   that	  appear	  here	  are	  relative	  to	  the	  analytic	  perspective	  of	  work	  practice	  modeling	  and	  the	  purposes	  of	  the	  Brahms-­‐GÜM	  project,	  and	  are	  not	  intended	  to	  be	  a	  critique	  of	  the	  WMC	  methods	  or	  results.	  	  	  The	  WMC	  model	  emphasizes	  the	  interaction	  of	  the	  pilot	  and	  automation	  under	  three	  control	   regimes;	   the	   air	   traffic	   controller’s	   work	   is	   only	   included	   to	   the	   extent	  required	  by	  the	  crew’s	  actions.	  	  After	  creating	  the	  “manual	  only”	  model,	  our	  project	  efforts	  were	  redirected	  in	  December	  2011	  to	  the	  Überlingen	  scenario.	  Consequently,	  we	  did	  not	  simulate	  the	  hybrid	  and	  fully	  automated	  modes	  in	  Brahms.	  However,	  the	  model	  does	  include	  the	  pilot’s	  interaction	  with	  automated	  flight	  control	  systems	  to	  both	   get	   information	   and	   control	   the	   aircraft,	   as	   described	   subsequently	   in	   the	  descent	  scenario	  narrative.	  	  The	  greatest	  part	  of	  the	  effort	  in	  creating	  this	  Brahms	  model	  lies	  in	  the	  simulation	  of	  the	  aircraft	  flight	  representing	  the	  position	  and	  velocity	  vector	  in	  three	  dimensions	  at	  three	  second	  intervals.	  These	  calculations	  occur	  in	  a	  Java	  function,	   invoked	  by	  a	  Brahms	  workframe	  that	  updates	  the	  aircraft’s	  status	  parameters	  (see	  figures).	  This	  appendix	   provides	   details	   about	   this	   part	   of	   the	   model	   because	   it	   was	   directly	  reused	  creating	  the	  Brahms	  generalized	  Überlingen	  model.	  	  	  	  As	  background,	  the	  following	  is	  an	  outline	  of	  the	  WMC	  agent	  modeling	  framework:	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Agent:	  	   entity	  that	  performs	  an	  action	  Action:	  	   work	  performed	  by	  an	  agent	  at	  one	  instance	  in	  time	  Resource:	  	   a	  specific	  state	  of	  the	  environment	  Environment:	  	   collection	  of	  resources	  available	  for	  interaction	  with	  the	  agent	  Decision	  actions:	  	   process	  of	  selecting	  a	  course	  of	  action	  based	  on	  the	  environmental	  context	  Temporal	  actions:	  	   actions	  initiated	  by	  the	  agent.	  It	  obtains	  a	  specific	  resource	  from	  the	  environment	  and	  changes	  its	  value	  Functions:	  	   describes	  how	  something	  may	  be	  achieved	  (in	  the	  coding	  sense).	  It	  can	  call	  upon	  other	  functions	  or	  temporal	  actions.	  
	  Thus	  activity	  is	  modeled	  in	  terms	  of	  abstract	  functions	  and	  primitive	  (temporal)	  actions.	  The	  abstract	  functions	  of	  WMC	  are	  organized	  hierarchically	  in	  four	  levels	  (from	  most	  to	  least	  abstract):	  
	  Functional	  purpose:	  Purposes	  for	  which	  the	  system	  was	  designed	  as	  well	  as	  the	  external	  constraints	  on	  its	  operation.	  Abstract	  functions:	  	  The	  criteria	  that	  the	  work	  system	  uses	  for	  measuring	  its	  progress	  towards	  the	  functional	  purposes.	  General	  functions:	  	   Basic	  functions	  that	  the	  system	  is	  designed	  to	  achieve	  in	  order	  to	  accomplish	  the	  higher	  functional	  purposes.	  Temporal	  functions:	  Collections	  of	  temporal	  actions	  	  These	   abstraction	   levels	   were	   originally	   replicated	   in	   Brahms	   but	   have	   been	  subsequently	   reformulated	   to	   better	   conform	   to	   Brahms	   constructs	   so	   we	   could	  simulate	  multitasking	  of	  the	  ATCOs	  and	  pilots;	  see	  Appendix	  22.6.	  
22.1 Descent	  Scenario	  Narrative	  Here	  we	  describe	  the	  particular	  flight	  simulated	  in	  the	  WMC	  model;	  font	  formatting	  indicates	  aircraft,	  locations,	  and	  agents	  that	  are	  components	  of	  the	  Brahms	  model.	  	  The	  scenario	  begins	  with	  a	  United	  Airlines	  plane,	   flight	  UA	  888,	   traveling	   from	  San	  Francisco	  (SFO)	  to	  Los	  Angeles	  (LAX).	  At	  400	  nautical	  miles	  from	  “Top	  of	  Descent”	  (TOD)	  coordinates,	  which	  is	  the	  starting	  point	  for	  landing	  into	  Los	  Angeles	  airport,	  the	  Captain	  starts	  to	  review	  the	  “LAX	  RIIVR	  TWO	  Arrival”	  STAR	  (Standard	  Terminal	  Arrival	   Route)	   procedure	   for	   landing	   onto	   runway	   25L	   of	   LAX	   using	   the	   CDU	  (Control	  Display	  Unit)	  in	  the	  cockpit.	  	  	  Meanwhile,	  an	  ATCO	   (Air	  Traffic	  Controller)	  at	  LAX	  notices	   flight	  UA	  888	  entering	  controlled	  airspace	  being	  monitored	  on	  ATC’s	  workstation.	  ATCO	   radios	   the	  plane	  to	   request	   for	   handoff	   from	   the	   regional	   air	   traffic	   control	   center.	   The	   Captain	  receives	   and	   acknowledges	   handoff	   from	   LAX	   ATCC.	   The	   Captain	   then	   requests	  clearance	  from	  LAX	  ATCO	  to	  start	  descent	  from	  cruise	  and	  fly	  to	  each	  waypoint	  as	  specified	  in	  the	  STAR	  procedure.	  LAX	  ATCO	  responds	  to	  give	  clearance	  to	  land.	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The	   Captain	   starts	   the	   plane’s	   approach	   to	   TOD	   and	   continuously	   monitors	  progress	  of	  plane	  to	  each	  waypoint	  using	  the	  PFD	  (Primary	  Flight	  Display)	  and	  ND	  (Navigation	  Display).	  Just	  before	  arriving	  at	  each	  waypoint,	  the	  Captain	  reviews	  and	  inputs	   the	   next	   waypoint’s	   heading,	   airspeed	   and	   vertical	   speed	   into	   FMS	   (Flight	  Management	  System)	  using	  the	  MCP	  (Mode	  Control	  Panel).	  The	  plane	  tracks	  its	  GPS	  coordinates,	   as	   it	   changes	   speed	   and	  heading,	   and	   reports	   back	   its	   information	   to	  the	  CDU,	  PFD	  and	  ND.	  	  	  As	  plane	  approaches	  the	  last	  waypoint	  before	  touching	  down	  onto	  the	  runway,	  the	  Captain	  quickly	  deploys	  and	  confirms	  the	  plane’s	  landing	  gears	  are	  deployed.	  As	  the	  plane	   touch	   down	  onto	   the	   runway,	   the	   Captain	   deploys	   flaps	   and	   applies	   plane’s	  
airbrakes	  to	  slow	  down	  the	  plane	  on	  the	  runway.	  	  
	  
Figure	  22-­‐1:	  Data	  Flow	  Among	  Brahms	  WMC	  Model	  Components	  
22.2 Brahms	  WMC	  Model	  Components	  The	  following	  sections	  describe	  geography/locations,	  agents	  and	  objects	  modeled	  in	  BRAHMS	  to	  simulate	  the	  descent	  scenario.	  	  Refer	  also	  to	  Appendix	  23	  for	  complete	  list	   of	   Brahms-­‐GÜM	   components	   to	   understand	   how	   model	   definitions	   of	  groups/classes	  and	  instances	  are	  stored	  and	  organized.	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22.2.1 Geography	  models	  An	   area	   in	   BRAHMS	   represents	   a	   geographical	   location	   and	   is	   used	   to	   create	   a	  geographical	  representation	  for	  use	  in	  the	  model.	  Areas,	  such	  as	  “LAX,”	  are	  instances	  of	  Brahms	  Area	  Definitions,	  which	  are	  classes	  in	  this	  domain	  (e.g.,	  cities,	  airports).	  	  	  	  
Table	  22-­‐1:	  Brahms	  WMC	  Los	  Angeles	  Airport	  &	  Airspace	  
Area	   Description	   Area	  Definition	  LAX	   Los	  Angeles	  Airport	   Instance	  of	  an	  Airport	  within	  City	  LAX_ARTCC	   LAX	  Air	  Traffic	  Control	  Center	   Instance	  of	  a	  Air	  Route	  Traffic	  Control	  Center	  building	  and	  located	  in	  LAX	  LAX_RWY_25L	   Runway	  25L	  in	  LAX	   Instance	  of	  Runway	  within	  Airport	  LAX_ATC_Workstation	   LAX	  ATCO	  workstation	  area	   Instance	  of	  Workstation	  Area	  and	  located	  in	  LAX_ARTCC	  LAX_ControlledAirSpace	   Controlled	  air	  space	  above	  LAX	   Instance	  of	  Controlled	  Air	  Space	  within	  World	  TOD_Waypoint,	  GRAMM_Waypoint,	  RUSTT_Waypoint,	  HABSO_Waypoint,	  RIIVR_Waypoint,	  DECEL_Waypoint,	  LUVYN_Waypoint,	  KRAIN_Waypoint,	  FUELR_Waypoint,	  GAATE_Waypoint,	  HUNDA_Waypoint,	  LIMMA_Waypoint,	  	  RWY_25L_Waypoint	  
Waypoints	  in	  air	  space	  with	  associated	  GPS	  Data	  and	  Runway	  (if	  any).	   Instance	  of	  Controlled	  Air	  Space	  within	  World	  	  
	  	  
Table	  22-­‐2:	  Brahms	  WMC	  Plane	  Areas	  
Area	   Description	   Relationship	  to	  other	  Areas	  UALPlaneArea	   United	  Airlines	  Plane	  areas	   Instance	  of	  Aircraft	  Areas	  UALPlaneCockpitArea	   Cockpit	  area	  within	  plane	   Instance	  of	  UALPlaneArea	  UALPlaneCabinArea	   Passenger	  cabin	  area	  within	  plane	   Instance	  of	  UALPlaneArea	  	  
22.2.2 Agent	  models	  Agents	   have	   behaviors	   and	   beliefs	   which	   they	   can	   inherit	   from	   multiple	   groups.	  Thus	   the	   UA888_Captain	   is	   an	   agent	   belonging	   to	   the	   UALPilots	   group,	   which	  belongs	   to	   the	   Pilots	   group,	   etc.	   The	   UA888_Captain	   therefore	   inherits	   all	   of	   the	  behaviors	  of	  the	  UAPilots,	  Pilots,	  FlightCrew	  and	  RadioCommunicator	  groups.	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Table	  22-­‐3:	  Brahms	  WMC	  Agents	  
Agent	   Group	  
Membership	  
Description	   Location	  UA888_Captain	   UALPilots	  <	  Pilots	  <	  RadioCommunicator,	  FlightCrew	   Captain	  of	  United	  Flight	  888	   UALPlaneCockpitArea	  ATC_LAX	   AirTrafficControllers	  <	  RadioCommunicator	   LAX’s	  Air	  Traffic	  Controller	   LAX_ARTCC	  
22.2.3 Object	  models	  
Table	  22-­‐4:	  Brahms	  WMC	  Plane	  and	  Instrument	  Objects	  
Object	   Class	   Description	   Location	  UA888_Plane	   Boeing747-­‐400	  	   United	  Flight	  888	  plane	   LAX_ControlledAirSpace	  UA888_Plane_Control_	  Stick	   Aircraft	  Control	  Column	   Control	  yoke	  or	  stick	  of	  UA	  888	  plane	   UALPlaneCockpitArea	  UA888_Plane_Speed_	  Brake_Control	   Aircraft	  Speed	  Brake	  Control	   Control	  to	  decrease	  speed	  of	  plane	   UALPlaneCockpitArea	  UA888_Plane_Landing_	  Controls	   Aircraft	  Landing	  Control	   Control	  to	  deploy	  landing	  gear	   UALPlaneCockpitArea	  UA888_Plane_Radio	   Aircraft	  Radio	   Radio	  installed	  in	  aircraft	   UALPlaneCockpitArea	  	  
Table	  22-­‐5:	  Brahms	  WMC	  Flight	  Management	  Systems	  (Objects)	  
Object	   Class	   Description	   Location	  UA888_Plane_PFD	   Boeing	  Primary	  Flight	  Display	   Displays	  the	  flight	  mode	  annunicator	  modes,	  altitude,	  air	  speed	  and	  heading	  of	  plane.	   UALPlaneCockpitArea	  UA888_Plane_ND	   Boeing	  Navigation	  Display	   Displays	  horizontal	  view	  of	  the	  area	  ahead	  of	  aircraft,	  its	  heading,	  and	  the	  waypoints	  defining	  the	  flight	  route.	  
UALPlaneCockpitArea	  
UA888_Plane_CDU	   Control	  Display	  Unit	   Displays	  that	  shows	  Flight	  Plans	  and	  to	  program	  waypoints	  and	  their	  restrictions.	   UALPlaneCockpitArea	  UA888_Plane_MCP	   Mode	  Control	  Panel	   A	  long	  narrow	  panel	  located	  centrally	  in	  front	  of	  the	  pilot,	  may	  be	  used	  to	  control	  Heading(HDG),	  Speed(SPD),	  Altitude(ALT),	  Vertical	  Speed(V/S),	  Vertical	  Navigation(VNAV)	  and	  Lateral	  Navigation(LNAV).	  
UALPlaneCockpitArea	  
	  
Table	  22-­‐6:	  Brahms	  WMC	  Air	  Traffic	  Control	  Systems	  (Objects)	  
Object	   Class	   Description	   Location	  LAX_ATC_System	   Air	  Traffic	  Control	  System	   Computer	  used	  by	  Air	  Traffic	  Controller	   LAX_ATC_Workstation	  LAX_PSR	   Primary	  Surveillance	  Radar	   Radar	  monitoring	  planes	  in	  its	  air	  space.	   LAX_ARTCC	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Table	  22-­‐7:	  Brahms	  WMC	  Flight	  Procedures	  &	  Data	  (Objects)	  
Object	   Class	   Description	   Location	  STAR_RIIVR_TWO_Arrival	   Standard	  Terminal	  Arrival	  Route	   Published	  Flight	  Segments/routes	  (typically	  via	  VOR's	  and	  intersections)	  from	  each	  of	  these	  transitions	  to	  a	  point	  near	  a	  destination	  airport.	  
	  
LAX_DescentChecklist	   Descent	  Checklist	   Procedure	  composed	  of	  multiple	  steps	  	  ensuring	  the	  flight	  deck	  systems	  are	  configured	  properly,	  and	  the	  pilot	  and	  cabin	  crews	  are	  “briefed”	  for	  upcoming	  phases.	  
UALPlaneCockpitArea	  
TOD_FlightSegment,	  GRAMM_FlightSegment,	  RUSTT_FlightSegment,	  HABSO_FlightSegment,	  RIIVR_FlightSegment,	  DECEL_FlightSegment,	  LUVYN_FlightSegment,	  KRAIN_FlightSegment,	  FUELR_FlightSegment,	  GAATE_FlightSegment,	  HUNDA_FlightSegment,	  LIMMA_FlightSegment,	  RWY_25L_FlightSegment	  
Flight	  Segments	   Published	  procedure	  for	  a	  flight	  segment	  that	  specifies	  waypoint,	  airspeed	  and	  altitude	  restriction,	  etc.	  
	  
TOD_gps,	  	  GRAMM_gps,	  RUSTT_gps,	  HABSO_gps,	  RIIVR_gps,	  DECEL_gps,	  LUVYN_gps,	  KRAIN_gps,	  FUELR_gps,	  GAATE_gps,	  HUNDA_gps,	  LIMMA_gps,	  RWY_25L_gps	  
GPS	  Data	   Global	  positioning	  system	  coordinates	  –	  longitude,	  latitude	  &	  altitude.	   	  
22.3 Conceptual	  Objects	  Model	  A	  conceptual	  object	  in	  BRAHMS	  is	  used	  to	  model	  and	  track	  in	  the	  simulation	  entities	  that	   have	   properties	   that	   are	   conceptual.	   A	   flight	   is	   a	   conceptual	   object;	   its	  properties	  include	  scheduled	  departure	  and	  arrival	  times.	  Conceptual	  objects	  do	  not	  exist	   as	   discrete	   things,	   but	   are	   realized	   by	   a	   combination	   of	   people,	   objects,	   and	  events,	   such	   as	   an	   aircraft,	   who	   is	   actually	   onboard,	   and	   actual	   departure	   time,	  route,	  etc.	  	  Similarly,	  an	  airline’s	  flight	  schedule	  is	  a	  conceptual	  object,	  representing	  a	   combination	   of	   flights,	   each	   of	   which	   is	   a	   conceptual	   object.	   	   By	   incorporating	  conceptual	  objects	   in	   the	  model,	   statistics	  can	  be	  generated	  during	   the	  simulation,	  such	  as	  “touch	  time”	  and	  “cycle	  time”;	  also	  object	  flows	  can	  be	  generated	  to	  depict	  a	  work	  process.	  
	  	  




Table	  22-­‐8:	  Brahms	  WMC	  Conceptual	  Objects	  
Object	   Class	   Description	  Manage_Aircraft_Energy,	  Manage_Aircraft_Systems,	  Manage_Communication,	  Manage_Lateral_Route,	  Manage_Stability_Of_Work_Environment,	  Manage_Trajectory	  
Generalized	  Function	   Temporal	  functions	  that	  are	  grouped	  into	  generalized	  functions.	  	  
	  The	  following	  section	  describes	  the	  notion	  of	  “Generalized	  Functions”	  in	  the	  WMC	  model	  and	  how	  they	  relate	  to	  pilot	  actions	  and	  aircraft	  states.	  
22.4 Structure	  of	  Pilot’s	  Activities,	  Workframes,	  Thoughtframes	  	  For	  simplicity,	  we	   	  examine	  a	  single	  “function	  allocation”	  in	  the	  WMC	  model	  of	  the	  descent	  phase	  in	  “mostly	  manual”	  mode.	  	  
Table	  22-­‐9:	  “Mostly-­‐manual”	  function	  allocation	  (FA4,	  teamwork	  actions	  red-­‐
coded;	  excerpt	  from	  Kim	  2011,	  p.	  86).	  
Temporal	  Function	   Pilot	   Automation	  
Control	  Vertical	  Speed	  
Dial	  Altitude	  Selector	  Dial	  VS	  Selector	  Push	  Alt	  Hold	  Switch	  Push	  FLCH	  Switch	  Push	  Vertical	  NAV	  Switch	  Push	  Vertical	  Speed	  Switch	  Monitor	  Green	  Arc	  
Update	  Pitch	  Control	  Evaluate	  Vertical	  Mode	  Evaluate	  Alt	  Restriction	  Mode	  Altitude	  Reminder	  
	  A	  temporal	  function	  “aggregates	  (temporal)	  actions	  according	  to	  inherently-­‐coupled	  dynamics	  and	  purposes.”	  In	  the	  Brahms	  model	  the	  temporal	  functions	  are	  activated	  by	   top-­‐level	   workframes	   of	   the	   Pilot	   and	   the	   actual	   functional	   allocation	   (Pilot	  column	  above)	  correspond	  to	  Workframes	  in	  an	  associated	  composite	  activity	  (see	  excerpt	  Table	  22-­‐10).	  
	  
	  	  




Figure	  22-­‐2:	  WMC	  “Arrival-­‐Approach	  work	  model”	  hierarchy	  (adapted	  from	  
Kim	  2011,	  p.	  81)	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Table	  22-­‐10:	  Representation	  of	  WMC	  Structure	  in	  Brahms	  Thoughtframes,	  
Workframes,	  and	  Activities	  









object],	  belief	  of	  
Pilot	  set	  by	  pTF	  	  
III.	  Pilot	  Top	  Level	  
Workframes	  	  	  
(with	  Composite	  
Activity,	  CA)	  
IV.	  Workframes	  in	  
CA	  
	  	  
Priorities	  and	  Values	   Generalized	  Functions	   Temporal	  Functions	   Functions	  Allocated	  
to	  Pilot	  
	  Change_Vertical_Speed	  	   Manage_Aircraft_Energy	   Control	  Vertical	  Speed	  (controlVerticalSpeed)	  
Dial	  Altitude	  Selector	  Dial	  VS	  Selector	  Push	  Alt	  Hold	  Switch	  Push	  FLCH	  Switch	  Push	  Vertical	  NAV	  Switch	  Push	  Vertical	  Speed	  Switch	  Monitor	  Green	  Arc	  	  These	   relations	   are	   visible	   in	   the	   WMC	   “Arrival-­‐approach	   work	   model”	   (Figure	  22-­‐2).	   As	   noted	   above,	   this	   level	   of	   abstraction	   is	   represented	   by	   the	   top-­‐level	  thoughtframes	  of	  the	  Pilot.	  	  A	  key	  notion	  in	  the	  WMC	  model	  is	  that	  the	  actual	  actions	  are	   determined	   by	   the	   Opportunistic,	   Tactical,	   and	   Strategic	   “cognitive	   control	  modes.”	   These	   affect	   for	   example	   the	   degree	   of	   monitoring	   possible.	   	   We	   do	   not	  currently	  model	  these	  modes	  in	  the	  Brahms	  formulation	  because	  of	  the	  initial	  focus	  interactive	   behaviors—what	   people	   do	   in	   particular	   situations—rather	   than	  describing	   abstract	   states	   of	   mind	   corresponding	   to	   these	   kinds	   of	   behaviors.	   In	  effect	   cognitive	   control	   modes	   could	   be	   viewed	   a	   way	   of	   grouping	   and	   labeling	  workframes	  that	  represent	  different	  ways	  of	  behaving.	  	  This	   outline	   summarizes	   how	   the	   model	   is	   structured	   (examples	   in	   parentheses),	  referring	  again	  to	  the	  table	  above:	  	  
• Pilot’s	   top-­‐level	   TFs	   (Change_Vertical_Speed)	   set	   generalizedFunction	   belief	  (Manage_Aircraft_Energy).	  
• Pilot’s	   top-­‐level	   WFs	   (Control	   Vertical	   Speed)	   model	   how	   Pilot	   specializes	  (focuses)	   the	   generalizedFunction	   depending	   on	   what	   flight	   parameters	  require	   attention,	   causing	   a	   composite	   activity	   to	   begin	  (controlVerticalSpeed).	  
• Composite	   Activity	   WFs	   (Dial	   Altitude	   Selector,	   …)	   determine	   what	  selector/switch	   needs	   to	   be	   adjusted,	   and	   do	   a	   primitive	   activity	  (dialingSelector	  or	  pushingSwitch).	  	  The	   top-­‐level	   TFs	   and	   associated	   generalized	   functions	   are	   provided	   by	   the	   next	  table.	  
	  	  










Workframes	  Review_Operating_Procedures	   Manage_Aircraft_Systems	   Control_Operating_Procedures	  Configure_Flight_Deck	   Manage_Aircraft_Systems	   Control_Flight_Deck_Components	  	  Configure_Aircraft_Before_Touchdown	   Manage_Aircraft_Systems	   Control_Aircraft_Configuration	  	  Configure_Aircraft_Touchdown	   Manage_Aircraft_Systems	   Control_Aircraft_Configuration	  Respond_To_ATC	   Manage_Communication	   Control_Communication_With_ATC	  Response_From_ATC	   Manage_Communication	   Control_Communication_With_ATC	  Request_Waypoint_Clearance	   Manage_Communication	   Control_Communication_With_ATC	  Verify_Aircraft_Information	   Manage_Stability_Of_Work_Environment	   Control_Aircraft_Information	  Monitor_Plane_To_Waypoint	   Manage_Trajectory	   Control_Waypoints	  Monitor_Plane_Vertical_Profile	   Manage_Trajectory	   Control_Vertical_Profile	  Change_Airspeed	   Manage_Aircraft_Energy	   Control_Airspeed	  Change_Vertical_Speed	   Manage_Aircraft_Energy	   Control_Vertical_Speed	  Change_Heading	   Manage_Lateral_Route	   Control_Heading	  Plane_Taxi_On_Runway	   unknown	   	  	  The	  priorities	  assigned	  to	  Pilot’s	  WFs	  are	  based	  on	  generalized	  functions:	  	   100	  =	  Manage	  Communications	  (with	  ATCO	  or	  pilots)	  40	  =	  Manage	  Stability	  Of	  Work	  Environment	  (e.g.	  verify	  route	  &	  waypoint	  info,	  etc.)	  30	  =	  Manage	  Lateral	  Route	  (e.g.	  change	  heading)	  20	  =	  Manage	  Aircraft	  Energy	  (e.g.	  change	  airspeed,	  vertical	  speed,	  deploy/retract	  flaps	  or	  gears,	  brakes,	  etc.)	  10	  =	  Manage	  Aircraft	  Systems	  (e.g.	  turn	  on/off	  auto-­‐pilot,	  altitude	  alert,	  etc.)	  	  0	  =	  Manage	  Trajectory	  (e.g.	  monitoring	  travel	  to	  waypoint,	  rate	  of	  descent,	  etc.)	  	  	  Communications	  interrupt	  all	  non-­‐communication	  related	  workframes	  because	  they	  are	  given	  the	  highest	  priority	  in	  the	  model.	  	  As	   described	   below	   (Section	   22.6),	   this	   framework	   did	   not	   provide	   the	   flexibility	  required	   for	  modeling	   interruptions	   and	   shifts	   of	   attention	   as	   new	   information	   is	  broadcast	   or	   visible	   to	   the	   ATCOs	   and	   pilots.	   	   Details	   about	   this	   difficulty	   are	  explained	   after	   first	   describing	   how	   So	   Young	   and	   Pritchett	   et	   al.’s	   functional	  allocation	  framework	  is	  reformulated	  in	  terms	  of	  Brahms’	  behavioral,	  activity-­‐based	  framework.	  
22.4.1 Example	  of	  pilot’s	  behavior	  logic/flow	  	  In	  the	  original	  Brahms	  WMC	  model,	  which	  is	  being	  documented	  in	  this	  appendix,	  the	  pilot’s	  behaviors	  are	  determined	  by	  beliefs	  about	  his/her	  “generalizedFunction,”	  an	  attribute	  of	  the	  Pilots	  group.	  	  For	  example,	  	  	  	   Current.generalizedFunction	  =	  Manage_Aircraft_Energy	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  Here	   generalizedFunction	   is	   a	   conceptual	   class	   and	  Manage_Aircraft_Energy	   is	   an	  instance	   of	   this	   class	   (i.e.,	   a	   conceptual	   object).	   	   By	   convention	   in	   Brahms,	   an	  attribute	  of	  a	  group/agent	  having	  a	  value	  that	  is	  an	  instance	  of	  a	  conceptual	  class	  is	  interpreted	  as	  being	  something	  the	  agent	  conceives	  about	  him/herself.	  	  In	   this	   formulation,	   the	   pilot’s	   top-­‐level	   (always	   active)	   thoughtframes	   set	   the	  GeneralizedFunction	  (instance	  of	  Generalized	  Functions),	   thus	  modeling	  the	  pilot’s	  conceiving	  what	  he	   should	  be	  doing	  now.	  These	  TFs	  are	   conditional	  on	   the	  Pilot’s	  route	   (FlightSegment	   instances)	   and	   plane’s	   airspeed,	   vertical	   speed,	  bearing/heading,	   etc.	   	   They	   roughly	   correspond	   to	   phases	   of	   activity	   during	   the	  flight.	   Initial	   and	   final	   stages	   occur	   only	   once	   (e.g.,	   Configure	   Flight	   Deck);	   others	  represent	  repeating	  activities	  (e.g.,	  Respond	  to	  ATC).	  	  	  	  For	   example,	   the	   GeneralizedFunction	   Manage_Aircraft_Energy	   is	   set	   by	   the	   top-­‐level	  Pilots	  group	  TF	  Change_Vertical_Speed.	  	  
/*	   	   	  
*	  Generalized	  Function	  -­‐	  Manage	  Aircraft	  Energy	  
*/	  
thoughtframe	  Change_Vertical_Speed	  {	  
	   display:	  "Change	  Vertical	  Speed";	  
	   priority:	  10;	  //	  higher	  priority	  
	   variables:	  
foreach(FlightSegment)	  route;	  
	   	   forone(Aircraft)	  plane;	  
	   when(	   knownval(current.generalizedFunction	  =	  unknown)	  and	  
	   	   knownval(current.route	  =	  route)	  and	  
	   	   knownval(route.cleared	  =	  true)	  and	  
	   	   knownval(route.verified	  =	  true)	  and	  
	   	   knownval(current.inPlane	  =	  plane)	  	  and	  
	   	   knownval(plane.touchdown	  =	  false)	  and	  
knownval(plane.verticalSpeed	  !=	  route.verticalSpeed))	   	  
do	  {	  
	   	   conclude((current.generalizedFunction	  =	  Manage_Aircraft_Energy),	  fc:0);	  
	   }	  
}//tf	  Change_Airspeed	  
	  The	  TF	  precondition	  above	   indicates	   if	   the	  pilot	   is	  not	  currently	  engaged	   	   in	  some	  flight	  management	   activity	   (generalizedFunction	  =	  unknown),	   the	   route	   is	   cleared	  (with	  ATC)	  and	  verified	  (see	  below),	  the	  plane	  is	  not	  already	  on	  the	  ground,	  and	  the	  plane's	   vertical	   speed	   is	   not	   the	   prescribed	   speed	   of	   the	   route,	   then	  Manage_Aircraft_Energy	  (i.e.,	  control	  the	  vertical	  speed)."	  	  	  
workframe	  Control_Vertical_Speed	  {	  
	   display:	  "Control	  Vertical	  Speed";	  
	   variables:	  
	   	   forone(Aircraft)	  plane;	  
	   	   forone(FlightManagementSystem)	  fms;	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   foreach(FlightSegment)	  route;	  
	   detectables:	  	  <<	  SEE	  FOOTNOTE63	  >>	  
	   	   detectable	  Respond_To_ATCO	  {	  
	   	   	   detect((current.generalizedFunction	  =	  Manage_Communication))	  
	   	   	   then	  impasse;	  
	   	   }	  
	   	   detectable	  Configure_Aircraft	  {	  
	   	   	   detect((current.generalizedFunction	  =	  Manage_Aircraft_Systems),	  dc:0)	  
	   	   	   then	  impasse;	  
	   	   	   }	  
	   when(	   knownval(current.generalizedFunction	  =	  Manage_Aircraft_Energy)	  and	  
	   	   knownval(plane	  =	  current.inPlane)	  	  and	  
	   	   knownval(current.location	  =	  fms.location)	  and	  
	   	   knownval(route	  =	  current.route)	  and	  
	   	   knownval(plane.verticalSpeed	  !=	  route.verticalSpeed))	  
	   do	  {	  
	   	   controlVerticalSpeed	  (route);	  
	   	   	   }	  
}//wf	  Control_Vertical_Speed	  
	  	  Controlling	   the	  vertical	   speed	   is	   a	   composite	   activity,	  having	  multiple	  workframes	  that	   represent	   different	   operations	   that	  might	   be	   required.	   	   In	   the	  manual	  model	  there	  are	  seven	  workframes:	  
	  
Dial_Altitude_Selector	  
	   Dial_VS_Selector	  	  
	   Push_Alt_Hold_Switch	  	  
	   Push_FLCH_Switch	  	  
	   Push_Vertical_NAV_Switch	  	  
	   Push_Vertical_Speed_Switch	  	  
	   Monitor_Green_Arc	  	  	  These	  are	  applied	  in	  sequence;	  the	  first	  two	  dial	  selectors	  and	  the	  second	  two	  push	  switches.	  	  These	  are	  primitive	  activities	  that	  only	  take	  time.	  	  
	  
primitive_activity	  dialingSelector()	  {	  	  
display:	  "Dialing	  Selector";	  	  
random:	  true;	  	  
min_duration:	  1;	  	  
max_duration:	  5;	  }	  
//pac	  dialingSelector	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  63	  From	  the	  perspective	  of	  the	  Brahms	  framework,	  this	  WF	  is	  somewhat	  nonsensical—it	  should	  not	  be	   necessary	   for	   agents	   to	   detect	   their	   own	   beliefs.	   	   In	   this	   direct	  mapping	   of	  WMC	   into	   Brahms,	  problems	   were	   encountered	   in	   modeling	   how	   an	   agent	   returns	   from	   a	   prior	   activity	   after	   an	  interruption	   (which	   is	   normally	   handled	   by	   how	   the	   Brahms	   engine	   handles	   subsumption,	  interruption,	  and	  resumption	  of	  WFs).	  	  These	  detectables	  are	  a	  workaround	  so	  that	  after	  dealing	  with	  communications,	  the	  agent	  returns	  to	  the	  previous	  activity	  that	  had	  been	  “impassed”	  –	  otherwise	  the	  belief	   about	   the	   previous	   generalizedFunction	   would	   be	   lost.	   	   This	   awkwardness	   was	   resolved	   in	  Brahms–GÜM	  (Section	  22.6).	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  The	   5th	   and	   6th	   WFs	   actually	   make	   the	   change	   that	   affects	   the	   aircraft.	   The	  workframe	   Push_Vertical_Speed_Switch	   communicates	   altitude	   change	   to	   Mode	  Control	   Panel	   (MCP)	   which	   communicates	   to	   plane	   which	   communicates	   to	   the	  Control	  Display	  Unit	  (CDU	  –	  treated	  here	  as	  being	  the	  automation	  system	  itself)	  that	  performs	  calculations	   for	   rate	  of	  descent/ascent	   (vertical	   speed)	  based	  on	  current	  airspeed;	   this	   is	   communicated	   back	   to	   Primary	   Flight	  Display	   (PFD),	   from	  which	  the	  pilot	  read	  the	  vertical	  speed	  originally.	  	  	  Notice	   the	   ordering	   of	   the	   conclude	   and	   communication	   activity	  
pushVerticalSpeedSwitch	   (where	   the	   pilot	   sets	   the	  MCP,	  which	   appears	   here	   as	  with:	  mcp).	   	  The	  conclude	  changes	  the	  pilot’s	  belief	  about	  the	  vertical	  speed	  to	  the	  correct	   setting.	   The	   “send”	   action	   gives	   the	   mcp	   the	   pilot’s	   belief	   about	   the	  route.verticalSpeed.64	  	  
workframe	  Push_Vertical_Speed_Switch	  {	  
	   display:	  "Push	  Vertical	  NAV	  Switch";	  
priority:	  20;	  
	   variables:	  
	   	   forone(ModeControlPanel)	  mcp;	  
	   	   forone(Aircraft)	  plane;	  
when(	   knownval(current.location	  =	  mcp.location)	  and	  
	   	   knownval(current.inPlane	  =	  plane)	  and	  
	   	   knownval(route.verticalSpeed	  !=	  plane.verticalSpeed))	  
	   do	  {	  
	   	   conclude((route.verticalSpeed	  =	  plane.verticalSpeed),	  fc:0);	  
	   	   pushVerticalSpeedSwitch	  (mcp,	  route);	   	  
	   }	  
}//wf	  Push_Vertical_Speed_Switch	  	  
communicate	  pushVerticalSpeedSwitch(ModeControlPanel	  mcp,	  FlightSegment	  route)	  {	  
	   display:	  "Pushing	  Vertical	  Speed	  Switch"	  
random:	  true;	  
	   min_duration:	  1;	  
	   max_duration:	  4;	  
	   with:	  mcp;	  
	   about:	  send(route.verticalSpeed	  =	  unknown);	  
}//com	  pushVerticalSpeedSwitch	  
22.4.2 Pilot’s	  communication	  with	  air	  traffic	  control	  	  In	  the	  Brahms	  WMC	  model,	  all	  communications	  occur	  through	  the	  model	  constructs	  shown	  in	  the	  table.	  	  
Table	  22-­‐12:	  Pilot’s	  thoughtframes,	  belief,	  and	  workframe	  related	  to	  
communications	  
Pilot	  Top-­‐level	   generalizedFunction	   Pilot	  Top-­‐level	  Workframes	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  64	  The	   “unknown”	   in	   the	  Send	   is	  a	  Brahms	  convention/shorthand—the	  syntax	  requires	  some	  value	  here;	  whatever	  the	  Pilot	  believes	  will	  be	  conveyed.	  
	  	  
WORK	  PRACTICE	  SIMULATION	  OF	  COMPLEX	  HUMAN-­‐AUTOMATION	  SYSTEMS	  IN	  SAFETY-­‐CRITICAL	  SITUATIONS	   2
6
2 	  
Thoughtframes	   belief	  Respond_To_ATC	   Manage_Communication	   Control_Communication_With_ATC	  Response_From_ATC	   Manage_Communication	   Control_Communication_With_ATC	  Request_Departure_Clearance	   Manage_Communication	   Control_Communication_With_ATC	  Request_Waypoint_Clearance	   Manage_Communication	   Control_Communication_With_ATC	  	  The	  WMC	  Generalized	  Function	  “Manage	  Communication”	  is	  here	  modeled	  by	  four	  TFs,	  as	  listed	  in	  the	  first	  column	  of	  the	  table	  above.	  	  Each	  of	  these	  TFs	  gives	  the	  pilot	  the	   belief	   that	   his	   generalizedFunction	   is	  Manage_Communication.	   	   Each	  TF	   has	   a	  screen	   to	  assure	   that	   the	  pilot	   is	  not	  already	  engaged	   in	   this	  generalized	   function,	  “current.generalizedFunction	  !=	  Manage_Communication.”	  	  	  The	  use	  of	  the	  “foreach”	  construct	   in	   the	   example	   below	   implies	   that	   this	   TF	   is	   applicable	   (i.e.,	   to	   be	  potentially	  fired)	  for	  every	  ATCO	  and	  every	  topic.	  
	   	   	  
thoughtframe	  Respond_To_ATCO	  {	  
	   display:	  "Respond	  To	  ATC";	  
	   variables:	  
	   	   foreach(AirTrafficControllers)	  atc;	  
	   	   foreach(string)	  topic;	  
	   when(	   knownval(current.generalizedFunction	  !=	  Manage_Communication)	  and	  
	   	   knownval(atc.flightCallSign	  =	  current.flightCallSign)	  and	   	   	   	  
	   	   knownval(atc.performative	  =	  "REQUEST")	  and	   	   	   	   	  
	   	   knownval(atc.subject	  =	  topic))	  
	   do	  {	  
	   	   conclude((current.generalizedFunction	  =	  Manage_Communication),	  fc:0);	   	  
	   	   conclude((current.subject	  =	  topic),	  fc:0);	  
	   }	  
}//tf	  Respond_To_ATC	  
	   	   	  
thoughtframe	  Response_From_ATCO	  {	  
	   -­‐-­‐	  same	  as	  Respond_To_ATCO	  except	  	   	   	   	  
knownval(atc.performative	  =	  "AGREE")	  	  
	   	   	  
thoughtframe	  Request_Departure_Clearance	  {	  
	   variables:	  
	   	   foreach(StandardInstrumentDeparture)	  sid;	  
	   	   foreach(Aircraft)	  plane;	  
	   	   foreach(FlightSegment)	  route;	  
when(	   knownval(current.generalizedFunction	  !=	  Manage_Communication)	  and	  
	   	   knownval(sid	  =	  current.airportSID)	  and	  
	   	   knownval(current.inPlane	  =	  plane)	  and	  
	   	   knownval(plane.location	  =	  sid.departureAirport)	  and	  
	   	   knownval(current.route	  =	  sid.mapFlightSegments(1))	  and	  
	   	   knownval(route.cleared	  =	  false))	  
	   do	  {	  
	   	   conclude((current.generalizedFunction	  =	  Manage_Communication),	  fc:0);	  
	   	   conclude((current.subject	  =	  "departure"),	  fc:0);	  
	   }	  
}//tf	  Request_Departure_Clearance	  
	   	   	  
thoughtframe	  Request_Waypoint_Clearance	  {	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   display:	  "Request	  Waypoint	  Clearance";	  
	   variables:	  
	   	   foreach(AirTrafficControllers)	  atc;	  
	   	   forone(Flight)	  flight;	  
	   	   forone(FlightSegment)	  route;	  
	   when(	   knownval(current.generalizedFunction	  !=	  Manage_Communication)	  and	  
	   	   knownval(atc.flightCallSign	  =	  current.flightCallSign)	  and	  
	   	   knownval(flight	  =	  current.flight)	  and	  
	   	   knownval(flight.handoff	  =	  true)	  and	  
	   	   knownval(route	  =	  current.route)	  and	  
	   	   knownval(route.cleared	  =	  false))	  
	   do	  {	  
	   	   conclude((current.generalizedFunction	  =	  Manage_Communication),	  fc:0);	  
	   	   conclude((current.subject	  =	  "clearance"),	  fc:0);	  
	   }	  
}//tf	  Request_Waypoint_Clearance	  
	   	   	  
thoughtframe	  Waypoints_Cleared	  {	  
	   display:	  "Waypoints	  Cleared";	  
	   variables:	  
	   	   forone(StandardTerminalArrivalRoute)	  arrivalRoute;	  
	   	   forone(Flight)	  flight;	  
	   	   forone(AirTrafficControllers)	  atc;	  
	   	   collectall(FlightSegment)	  routes;	  
	   when(	   knownval(flight	  =	  current.flight)	  and	  
	   	   knownval(flight.cleared	  =	  true)	  and	  
	   	   knownval(flight.clearedByATCO	  =	  atc)	  and	  
	   	   knownval(routes.cleared	  =	  false))	  
	   do	  {	  
	   	   conclude((routes.cleared	  =	  true),	  fc:0);	  
	   	   conclude((routes.clearanceByATCO	  =	  atc),	  fc:0);	  
	   }	  
}//tf	  Waypoints_Cleared	  
	   	   	  	  When	   “current.generalizedFunction	   =	   Manage_Communication,”	   (i.e.,	   the	   pilot	  believes	  he	   is	   engaged	   in	   a	   communication—therefore	  he	  needs	   to	   say	   and/or	  do	  something),	  the	  following	  top-­‐level	  WF	  of	  the	  pilot	  becomes	  available	  for	  application	  (corresponding	  to	  the	  agent	  conceiving	  “what	  I	  can	  be	  doing	  now”).	  This	  WF	  simply	  invokes	   a	   composite	   activity,	   controlCommunicationWithATC,	   to	   carry	   out	   the	  communication.	  	  
workframe	  Control_Communication_With_ATCO	  {	  
	   variables:	  
	   	   forone(Aircraft)	  plane;	  
	   	   forone(AircraftRadio)	  radio;	  
	   	   foreach(AirTrafficControllers)	  atc;	  
	   	   foreach(string)	  topic;	  
	   	   foreach(string)	  speechAct;	  
	   when(	   knownval(current.generalizedFunction	  =	  Manage_Communication)	  and	  
	   	   knownval(plane	  =	  current.inPlane)	  	  and	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   knownval(radio.location	  =	  current.location)	  and	  
	   	   knownval(atc.flightCallSign	  =	  current.flightCallSign)	  and	  
	   	   knownval(topic	  =	  current.subject)	  and	  
	   	   knownval(speechAct	  =	  current.performative))	  
	   do	  {	  
	   	   controlCommunicationWithATC(atc,	  radio);	  
	   }	  
}//wf	  Control_Communication_With_ATC	  








	  These	   WFs	   were	   not	   completely	   modeled	   in	   Brahms	   WMC	   because	   project	  objectives	   suggested	   shifting	   to	   developing	   Brahms-­‐GÜM	   rather	   than	   perfecting	  Brahms	  WMC;	  see	  the	  footnote.	  	  	  	  The	   WFs	   set	   two	   primitive	   activities,	   “listen”	   (which	   takes	   a	   certain	   time)	   and	  “sendMessageViaRadio.”	   	   The	   latter	   is	   a	   communication	   activity	   of	  AirTrafficCommunicators,	  a	  group	  to	  which	  pilots	  belong;	  it	  simply	  sends	  (“tells”)	  a	  set	  of	  beliefs	   to	   the	   control	   center	   (“unknown”	  here	  allows	   transmitting	  whatever	  the	   pilot	   believes	   about	   the	   indicated	   attributes,	  which	   are	   concluded	   in	   the	  WFs	  that	  invoke	  sendMessageViaRadio—see	  below):	  	  
	  
communicate	  sendMessageViaRadio(AircraftRadio	  radio,	  int	  minDuration,	  int	  maxDuration)	  {	  
	   display:	  "Send	  Message	  Via	  Radio";	  
	   random:	  true;	  
	   min_duration:	  minDuration;	  
	   max_duration:	  maxDuration;	  
	   with:	  radio;	  
	   about:	  	   send(current.controlCenter	  =	  unknown),	  	  
	   	   send(current.reciever	  =	  unknown),	  	  
	   	   send(current.flightCallSign	  =	  unknown),	  	  
	   	   send(current.subject	  =	  unknown),	  	  
	   	   send(current.performative	  =	  unknown),	  
	   	   send(current.route	  =	  unknown);	  
}//com	  sendMessageToPlane	  
	  There	  are	  also	  two	  TFs,	  Departure_Cleared	  &	  Flight_Plan_Routes_Cleared,	  that	  make	  corresponding	  assertions	  in	  response	  to	  information	  received	  (listed	  after	  the	  composite	  activity’s	  WFs).	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composite_activity	  controlCommunicationWithATC(AirTrafficControllers	  atc,	  AircraftRadio	  radio)	  {	  
	   display:	  "Control	  Communication	  with	  ATC";	  
activities:	  
	   primitive_activity	  listen(int	  minDuration,	  int	  maxDuration)	  {	  
	   	   display:	  "Listening";	  
	   	   random:	  true;	  
	   	   min_duration:	  minDuration;	  
	   	   max_duration:	  maxDuration;	  
	   }	  
workframes:	  
workframe	  Receive_Altitude_Clearance	  {	  	  	  SEE	  NOTE65	  
	   display:	  "Receive	  Altitude	  Clearance";	  
	   variables:	  
	   	   forone(FlightSegment)	  route;	  
	   when(	   knownval(atc.performative	  =	  "AGREE")	  and	  
	   	   knownval(atc.subject	  =	  "altitude_clearance")	  and	  
	   	   knownval(atc.flightCallSign	  =	  current.flightCallSign)	  and	  
	   	   knownval(route	  =	  current.route))	  
	   do	  {	  
	   	   listen(2,	  3);	  
	   	   retractBelief(atc,	  "performative");	  
	   	   //controlVerticalSpeed(route);	  
	   	   conclude((current.generalizedFunction	  =	  unknown),	  fc:0);	  
	   }	  
}//wf	  Receive_Altitude_Clearance	  
	   	   	   	   	  
workframe	  Receive_ILS_Clearance	  {	  
	   same	  as	  Receive_Altitude_Clearance,	  except:	  	  knownval(atc.subject	  =	  "ils_clearance")	  
	   and	  has	  actions:	  
conclude((flight.cleared	  =	  true),	  fc:0);	  
	   	   conclude((flight.clearedByATCO	  =	  atc),	  fc:0);	  
	   	   	   	   	  
workframe	  Receive_Waypoint_Clearance	  {	  
	   same	  as	  Receive_ILS_Clearance,	  except:	  	  knownval(atc.subject	  =	  "waypoint_clearance")	  	  
	  
workframe	  Receive_Departure_Clearance	  {	  
	   same	  as	  Receive_ILS_Clearance,	  except:	  	  knownval(atc.subject	  =	  "departure")	  	  
	  
workframe	  Respond_Handoff	  {	  
	   display:	  "Respond	  Handoff";	  
	   variables:	  
	   	   forone(Flight)	  flight;	  
	   when(	   knownval(atc.performative	  =	  "REQUEST")	  and	  
	   	   knownval(atc.subject	  =	  "handoff")	  and	  
	   	   knownval(atc.flightCallSign	  =	  current.flightCallSign)	  and	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  65	  Receive_Altitude_Clearance	  &	   ILS_clearance	  not	   fully	  modeled	  and	  doesn’t	  do	  anything.	  The	  pilot	  never	  requests	  altitude	  clearance	  and	  ATCO	  is	  not	  modeled	  to	  give	  clearance.	  The	  WF	  as	  written	   is	  clearance	   for	   particular	   flight	   segment/route	   rather	   than	   clearance	   for	   entire	   flight.	  	  Receive_Departure_Clearance	   in	   the	   Brahms	   model	   is	   not	   in	   Pritchett	   et	   al.	   WMC;	   it	   is	   also	  incomplete.	  Receive_Waypoint_Clearance	  comes	  from	  Pritchett	  WMC;	  the	  Brahms	  WMC	  model	  clears	  all	  waypoints	  for	  entire	  flight.	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   knownval(flight	  =	  current.flight))	  
	   do	  {	  
	   	   conclude((current.controlCenter	  =	  atc.controlCenter),	  fc:0);	  
	   	   conclude((current.subject	  =	  "handoff"),	  fc:0);	  
	   	   conclude((current.performative	  =	  "AGREE"),	  fc:0);	  
	   	   conclude((current.reciever	  =	  atc),	  fc:0);	  
	   	   sendMessageViaRadio(radio,	  1,	  5);	  	  //	  move	  on	  to	  request	  for	  clearance	  
	   	   retractBelief(atc,	  "performative");	  
	   	   listen(2,	  3);	  
	   	   conclude((flight.handoff	  =	  true),	  fc:0);	  
	   	   conclude((current.generalizedFunction	  =	  unknown),	  fc:0);	  
	   }	  
}//wf	  Respond_Handoff	  
	   	   	   	   	  
workframe	  Request_Clearance66	  {	  
	   display:	  "Request	  Clearance";	  
	   variables:	  
	   	   forone(FlightSegment)	  route;	  
	   	   forone(Aircraft)	  plane;	  
	   when(	   knownval(plane	  =	  current.inPlane)	  	  and	  
	   	   knownval(route	  =	  current.route)	  and	  
	   	   knownval(route.cleared	  =	  false)	  and	  
	   	   knownval(atc.flightCallSign	  =	  current.flightCallSign)	  and	  
	   	   knownval(current.subject	  =	  "clearance"))	  
	   do	  {	  
	   	   conclude((current.controlCenter	  =	  atc.controlCenter),	  fc:0);	  
	   	   conclude((current.performative	  =	  "REQUEST"),	  fc:0);	  
	   	   conclude((current.reciever	  =	  atc),	  fc:0);	  
	   	   conclude((radio.inAircraft	  =	  plane),	  fc:0);	  
	   	   sendMessageViaRadio(radio,	  1,	  5);	  //	  move	  on	  to	  request	  for	  clearance	  
	   	   listen(1,	  3);	  
	   	   conclude((current.generalizedFunction	  =	  unknown),	  fc:0);	  
	   }	  
}//wf	  Request_Clearance	  
	  
workframe	  Request_Departure	  {	  
	   same	  as	  Request_Clearance,	  except:	  	  knownval(current.subject	  =	  "departure”)	  
	  
Thoughtframes:	  
thoughtframe	  Departure_Cleared	  {	  
	   variables:	  
	   	   foreach(StandardInstrumentDeparture)	  sid;	  
	   	   foreach(int)	  order;	  
	   	   foreach(FlightSegment)	  route;	  
	   when(	   knownval(current.airportSID	  =	  sid)	  and	  
	   	   knownval(route	  =	  sid.mapFlightSegments(order))	  and	  
	   	   knownval(atc.performative	  =	  "AGREE")	  and	  
	   	   knownval(atc.subject	  =	  "departure"))	  
	   do	  {	  
	   	   conclude((route.cleared	  =	  true));	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  66	  Reference	  to	  “flight”	  variable	  and	  precondition	  removed	  here	  because	  it	  was	  unnecessary.	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   }	  
}//tf	  Departure_Cleared	  
	  
thoughtframe	  Flight_Plan_Routes_Cleared	  {	  
	   variables:	  
	   	   foreach(FlightPlan)	  plan;	  
	   	   foreach(FlightSegment)	  route;	  
	   	   foreach(int)	  order;	  
	   when(	   knownval(plan	  =	  current.flightPlan)	  and	  
	   	   knownval(route	  =	  plan.mapFlightSegments(order))	  and	  
	   	   knownval(atc.performative	  =	  "AGREE")	  and	  
	   	   knownval(atc.subject	  =	  "departure"))	  
	   do	  {	  
	   	   conclude((route.cleared	  =	  true));	  
	   }	  
}//tf	  Flight_Plan_Routes_Cleared	  
}	  //cac	  controlCommunicationWithATC	  
	   	   	  
22.5 Simulation	  of	  Aircraft	  Flight	  The	   following	   graphics	   show	   the	   flight	   path	   coordinates	   (longitude,	   latitude	   &	  altitude)	  as	  the	  plane	  travels	  from	  one	  waypoint	  to	  another.	  Figure	  22-­‐3	  shows	  the	  path	   in	  Google	  Earth.	   	  Figure	  22-­‐4	   is	   from	  the	  Brahms	  AgentViewer,	  configured	   to	  display	  the	  aircraft’s	  and	  CDU’s	  behaviors.	  The	  calculation	  of	  each	  waypoint	  (Figure	  22-­‐5)	  triggers	  the	  pilot	  model	  to	  set	  the	  correct	  values	  into	  cockpit	  computer	  CDU.	  	  Here	   are	   the	   details:	   	   At	   the	   start	   of	   the	   timeline	   (Figure	   22-­‐4),	   UA	   888	   is	   in	  Workframe	   (wf)	   “Fly	   To	  Waypoint,”	  which	   performs	   a	  Move	   activity	   (mv)	   to	   new	  waypoint,	   RIIVR_Waypoint.	   Simultaneously,	   Control	   Display	   Unit	   (CDU)	   is	   in	  Workframe	   “Track	  GPS	   to	  Waypoint,”	  which	   executes	   a	   Java	  Activity	   that	   updates	  GPS	   coordinates	   beliefs	   in	  UA888_Plane_CDU_Tracking_GPS_5	   every	   three	   seconds	  (set	  by	  an	  initial	  belief	  “current.gpsUpdateRate	  =	  3”)	  until	  UA	  888	  communicates	  it	  has	   reached	   that	   waypoint.	   When	   the	   Java	   Activity	   updates	  UA888_Plane_CDU_Tracking_GPS_5	  coordinate	  beliefs,	  a	  Workframe	  in	  this	  object	  is	  triggered	   to	   communicate	   them	   to	   CDU.	   (This	   is	   being	   updated	   to	   assert	   facts	  instead,	  which	  will	  make	  the	  communication	  unnecessary.)	  	  	  When	  UA	  888	  reaches	  the	  waypoint,	  CDU	  calculates	  distance	  to	  the	  next	  waypoint	  using	   updated	   GPS	   coordinate	   data.	   UA	   888	   then	   starts	   Workframe	   “Cruise	   at	  Waypoint”	   and	   CDU	   continues	   tracking	   changes	   in	  UA888_Plane_CDU_Tracking_GPS_5	   coordinate	   beliefs	   in	   Workframe	  “Track_GPS_At_Waypoint.”	  	  This	  serves	  as	  an	  intermediate	  state	  to	  represent	  arrival	  at	   the	   waypoint	   without	   further	   instructions	   being	   dialed	   in.	   	   The	   pilot	  communicates	   the	   new	   waypoint,	   airspeed,	   vertical	   speed,	   etc.	   to	   UA	   888,	   which	  communicates	   these	   values	   to	   CDU.	   CDU	   then	   calculates	   travel	   time	   to	   new	  waypoint	  and	  communicates	  time	  to	  UA	  888.	  Once	  UA	  888	  gets	  travel	  time	  to	  new	  waypoint,	   it	  starts	  Workframe	  “Fly	  To	  Waypoint”	   to	  move	  to	  new	  waypoint.	  Again	  CDU	   starts	   “Track	   GPS	   to	   Waypoint,”	   which	   updates	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UA888_Plane_CDU_Tracking_GPS_5	  coordinate	  beliefs.	  
	  
Figure	  22-­‐3:	  Graph	  of	  UA888	  Flight	  Path	  from	  coordinates	  generated	  by	  WMC	  










Figure	  22-­‐4:	  AgentViewer	  Display	  of	  Aircraft	  “Fly	  to	  Waypoint”	  Behavior	  	  (see	  
text	  for	  details)	  
	  	  





Figure	  22-­‐5:	  Model	  Propositions	  Indicating	  Aircraft	  Position,	  Updated	  at	  3	  sec	  
Intervals	  Also	  visible	  in	  Figure	  22-­‐4	  are	  blue	  and	  yellow	  squares	  designating	  workframes	  and	  actions	  whose	  names	  have	  been	  omitted.	  	  The	  Track_GPS_At_Waypoint	  repeats	  with	  shorter	   durations	   as	   the	   plane	   cruises	   along	   at	   the	   waypoint.	   The	   unlabeled	  workframe	   invoked	   by	   the	   “GPS	   Progress	   To	   Waypoint”	   composite	   activity	   is	  Update_Next_Waypoint,	  which	  performs	  another	  composite	  activity,	  which	  includes	  the	  workframe	  Calculate_Distance_To_Next_Waypoint.	  	  	  	  	  In	   Figure	   22-­‐4	   the	   numbers	   at	   the	   end	   of	   the	   blue	   lines	   indicate	   the	   number	   of	  beliefs	   communicated.	   For	   example,	  UA888_Plane_CDU_Tracking_GPS_5	   repeatedly	  communicates	  three	  beliefs,	  its	  longitude,	  latitude	  and	  altitude.	  One	  can	  click	  on	  the	  blue	   square	   at	   beginning	   of	   communication	   lines	   to	   see	   what	   beliefs	   are	  communicated.	  	  Here	   are	   yet	   more	   details:	   	   The	   object	   UA888_Plane_CDU_Tracking_GPS_5	   	   is	  dynamically	   created	   during	   the	   simulation	   run	   using	   the	   Brahms	   built-­‐in	   create	  object	  activity	  (which	  is	  why	  the	  object	  has	  a	  strange	  name).	  
	  
create_object	  createGPSData(GPSData	  gps)	  {	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  max_duration:	  1;	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  action:	  new;	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  source:	  GPSData;	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  destination:	  gps;	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The	  CDU	  receives	  a	  belief	  about	  the	  existence	  of	  this	  object,	  enabling	  the	  CDU	  to	  pass	  the	  object	  as	  an	  input	  parameter	  to	  the	  Java	  Activity	  that	  computes	  the	  next	  location	  of	  the	  aircraft.	  	  	  As	  can	  be	  seen	  in	  the	  create-­‐object	  activity,	  UA888_Plane_CDU_Tracking_GPS_5	  	  is	  an	  instantiation	   of	   the	   GPSData	   class,	   which	   stores	   longitude,	   latitude	   and	   altitude	  values.	   	  This	  object	  and	  class	  are	  examples	  of	  software	  (computational)	  objects,	   to	  be	   contrasted	  with	   physical	   objects	   (e.g.,	   the	   CDU)	   and	   conceptual	   objects	   (e.g.,	   a	  scheduled	  flight).	  	  The	  “Flight	  Procedures	  and	  Data”	  table	  above	  list	  other	  objects	  in	  this	  class.	  	  The	  GPS	  update	  rate	  is	  an	  initial	  belief	  because	  most	  of	  the	  CDU	  workframes	  are	  of	  type	   dataframe,	   which	   process	   data/beliefs	   of	   objects.	   As	   a	   general	   rule,	  propositions	  about	  computational	  objects	  are	  modeled	  as	  beliefs	  in	  Brahms	  because	  they	  represent	  world	  states	   (where	  world	  states	  are	   facts);	   	  database	  records	  and	  written	   expressions	   on	   a	   display	   or	   a	   paper	   form	   are	   treated	   similarly	   as	   being	  beliefs,	   meaning	   that	   they	   are	   assertions	   that	   are	   not	   necessarily	   true	   about	   the	  world.	  	  In	  reality,	  a	  plane’s	  Control	  Display	  Unit	  doesn’t	  perform	  the	  computation	  to	   track	  the	  GPS.	  Our	  implementation	  is	  a	  workaround	  to	  handle	  the	  limitation	  that	  Brahms	  agents	   and	   objects	   cannot	   be	   engaged	   in	   more	   than	   one	   activity	   at	   a	   time.	   In	  particular,	  while	   the	  plane	   is	  performing	  a	  Move	  activity,	   it	   cannot	  simultaneously	  perform	  a	  Java	  Activity.	  Therefore	  some	  object	  within	  the	  plane	  must	  compute	  the	  location;	  for	  simplicity	  the	  CDU	  was	  used	  for	  this	  purpose.	  	  	  The	  following	  are	  the	  workframes	  that	  appear	  in	  Figure	  22-­‐4.	  	  	  
In	  Aircraft	  class:	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  workframe	  Fly_To_Waypoint	  {	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  display:	  "Fly	  To	  Waypoint";	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  type:	  dataframe;	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  variables:	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  foreach(Waypoint)	  wayPoint;	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  foreach(int)	  travelTime;	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  detectables:	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  detectable	  Altitude	  {	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  detect((current.altitude	  =	  unknown));	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  }	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  detectable	  Latitude	  {	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  detect((current.latitude	  =	  unknown));	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  }	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  detectable	  Longitude	  {	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  detect((current.longitude	  =	  unknown));	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  }	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  when(knownval(current.waypoint	  =	  wayPoint)	  and	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  knownval(current.location	  !=	  wayPoint)	  and	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  knownval(current.timeToWaypoint	  >	  0)	  and	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  knownval(travelTime	  =	  current.timeToWaypoint))	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  do	  {	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  flyToWaypoint(wayPoint,	  travelTime);	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  conclude((current.timeToWaypoint	  =	  0),	  fc:0);	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  }	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  }//wf	  Fly_To_Waypoint	  
	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  workframe	  Cruise_At_Waypoint	  {	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  type:	  dataframe;	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  variables:	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  foreach(Waypoint)	  waypoint;	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  detectables:	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  detectable	  Stop_Cruising	  {	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  detect((current.waypoint	  !=	  waypoint))	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  then	  abort;	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  }	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  detectable	  Touchdown	  {	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  detect((current.touchdown	  =	  true))	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  then	  abort;	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  }	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  detectable	  Altitude	  {	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  detect((current.altitude	  =	  unknown));	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  }	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  detectable	  Latitude	  {	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  detect((current.latitude	  =	  unknown));	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  }	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  detectable	  Longitude	  {	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  detect((current.longitude	  =	  unknown));	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  }	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  when(knownval(current.waypoint	  =	  waypoint)	  and	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  knownval(current.location	  =	  waypoint))	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  do	  {	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  cruising();	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  }	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  }//wf	  Cruise_At_Waypoint	  
	  	  
In	  ControlDisplayUnit	  class:	  
	  	  
workframe	  Track_GPS_To_Waypoint	  {	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  type:	  dataframe;	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  variables:	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  forone(Aircraft)	  plane;	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  foreach(FlightSegment)	  route;	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  foreach(Waypoint)	  waypoint;	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  when(knownval(current.inAircraft	  =	  plane)	  and	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  knownval(plane.waypoint	  =	  waypoint)	  and	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  knownval(route.toWaypoint	  =	  waypoint))	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  do	  {	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  conclude((plane.timeToWaypoint	  =	  route.timeToWaypoint),	  fc:0);	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  timeToWaypoint(plane);	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  gpsProgressToWaypoint(route);	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  }	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  }//wf	  Track_GPS_To_Waypoint	  
	  	  




	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  workframe	  Track_GPS_At_Waypoint	  {	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  type:	  dataframe;	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  repeat:	  true;	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  variables:	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  forone(Aircraft)	  plane;	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  foreach(int)	  lateralSpeed;	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  foreach(int)	  verticalRate;	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  foreach(double)	  heading;	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  forone(int)	  interval;	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  forone(GPSData)	  coordinate;	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  detectables:	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  detectable	  Not_At_Waypoint	  {	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  detect((plane.location	  !=	  plane.waypoint))	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  then	  abort;	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  }	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  when(knownval(current.inAircraft	  =	  plane)	  and	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  knownval(plane.location	  =	  plane.waypoint)	  and	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  knownval(lateralSpeed	  =	  plane.airSpeed)	  and	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  knownval(verticalRate	  =	  plane.verticalSpeed)	  and	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  knownval(heading	  =	  plane.bearing)	  and	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  knownval(interval	  =	  current.gpsUpdateRate)	  and	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  knownval(coordinate	  =	  current.gps)	  and	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  knownval(coordinate.altitude	  >	  0))	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  do	  {	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  getPosition(lateralSpeed,	  heading,	  verticalRate,	  interval,	  coordinate);	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  getGPSCoordinates(coordinate);	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  conclude((plane.altitude	  =	  coordinate.altitude));	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  conclude((plane.latitude	  =	  coordinate.latitude));	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  conclude((plane.longitude	  =	  coordinate.longitude));	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  }	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  }//wf	  Track_GPS_At_Waypoint	  
22.6 Reformulation	  of	  Brahms	  WMC	  Model	  for	  Multitasking	  	  In	   extending	   the	   pilot	   model	   of	   Brahms	   WMC	   we	   found	   that	   the	   structuring	   by	  “generalized	   function”	   copied	   from	  WMC,	   which	   posits	   that	   conscious	   inferences	  about	   goals	   drive	   behavior	   was	   inconsistent	   with	   Brahms	   framework,	   which	  emphasizes	  reactive,	  interactive	  behavior	  driven	  by	  ongoing	  conception	  of	  activities	  in	  context.	  	  Rooting	   all	   behaviors	   in	   the	   pilot’s	   thoughtframes	   (pTFs)	   conflicted	   with	   the	  essential	   structure	   of	   Brahms’	   framework,	   namely	   that	   behaviors	   of	   agents	   are	  driven	  by	  WFs	  that	  select	  Activities,	  which	  enables	  simulating	  multitasking.	  	  If	  WFs	  were	   controlled	   by	   TFs,	   then	   the	   TFs	   themselves	   had	   to	   be	   controlled—and	   this	  leads	  a	  goal-­‐oriented,	  inference-­‐based	  model.	   	  But	  if	  behavior	  is	  driven	  by	  decision	  making	  (inference	  by	  applying	  TFS),	  then	  the	  agent	  must	  always	  be	  reasoning	  about	  what	  he/she	  should	  be	  doing	  and	  juggling	  priorities	  and	  plans.	  	  	  In	  Brahms,	  these	  “decisions”	  about	  what	  to	  do	  next	  are	  modeled	  by	  the	  conditions	  and	  priorities	  of	  the	  agents	  WFs.	  Most	  importantly	  the	  subsumption	  organization	  of	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activities	  provides	  an	  implicit	  contextual	  structure	  (modeling	  a	  conceptualization	  of	  “what	  I’m	  doing	  now”)	  by	  which	  the	  agent	  is	  always	  simultaneously	  doing	  multiple	  activities	   (within	   the	   subsumption	   path	   of	   WF-­‐Activity-­‐WF-­‐…).	   	   (A	   process	  subsumption	  architecture	  is	  to	  be	  contrasted	  with	  a	  function	  invocation	  hierarchy	  in	  which	   only	   one	   function/procedure	   is	   “running”	   or	   “active”	   at	   one	   time.)	   The	  Brahms	  engine	  simulates	  how	  people	  shift	  their	  attention	  within	  an	  activity	  (or	  at	  a	  top-­‐level	   for	   reactive	  behaviors	   such	  as	   responding	   to	   a	  nearby	  alarming	  event	   in	  the	   world)	   and	   thus	   replicates	   an	   ability	   for	   multitasking	   with	   an	   “interrupt	   and	  resume”	  mechanism.	  	  (For	  detailed	  explanations	  of	  this	  mechanism	  see	  Clancey	  et	  al.	  1998b;	  Sierhuis	  et	  al.	  2009).	  The	  important	  distinction	  between	  an	  agent’s	  model	  of	  his/her	  goals	  and	  conceptual,	  often	  tacit	  motives	  is	  explained	  in	  Clancey	  (2002).	  	  The	   activity-­‐based	   subsumption	   architecture	   effectively	   turns	   the	   goal-­‐oriented	  perspective	   inside	  out.	   	   Inferences	  are	  not	   viewed	  as	  driving	  all	   behavior	   in	   some	  timeless,	  isolated	  space	  independent	  of	  activity.	  	  Rather	  in	  the	  Brahms	  work	  practice	  framework,	   inferences	  occur	  within	  ongoing	  activities	   that	  provide	   the	  conceptual	  context	   for	   constraining	  what	   is	   of	   interest	   (what	   you	   are	   observing	   and	   thinking	  about),	  what	   tools	  are	  used	   (e.g.,	  pen	  and	  paper,	   spreadsheets,	   computer	  models),	  and	  how	  judgments	  are	  made,	  represented	  in	  the	  world,	  and	  communicated.	  	  In	  creating	  Brahms-­‐GÜM	  model	  we	  needed	  to	  model	  multitasking	  of	  both	  the	  ATCOs	  and	   the	   pilots.	   	   To	   return	   “control”	   to	   the	   agent’s	   ongoing	   activities,	   the	   pTFs	  asserting	   GeneralizedFunction	   pilot	   beliefs	   in	   Brahms	   WMC	   were	   eliminated.	   In	  Brahms-­‐GÜM	   these	   beliefs	   are	   instead	   concluded	   by	   WFs	   with	   preconditions	  resembling	   the	   original	   pTFs.	   	   This	   enables	   Brahms	   interruption-­‐and-­‐resume	  mechanism,	  which	  operates	  on	  WFs,	  to	  enable	  the	  pilot	  agent	  to	  shift	  attention	  and	  activity	  focus	  as	  the	  dynamic	  context	  requires.	  	  In	   summary,	   in	   Brahms-­‐WMC	   a	   pilot	   agent’s	   top-­‐level	   TFs	   assert	   a	  GeneralizedFunction	  (GF)	  belief	   that	   trigger	   (are	  preconditions	  of)	   specific	  actions	  in	  WFs,	  that	  include	  Composite	  Activities.	  	  In	  the	  reformulation,	  rather	  than	  viewing	  GFs	  as	  beliefs	  about	  goals,	  they	  are	  beliefs	  about	  activities,	  and	  the	  GFs	  are	  modeled	  as	  activities	  (what	  the	  pilot	  does).	  Table	  22-­‐13	  outlines	  this	  reformulation.	  	  
Table	  22-­‐13:	  Reformulation	  of	  GeneralizedFunction	  in	  Brahms-­‐GÜM	  
Brahms-­‐WMC	  CONSTRUCT	   Brahms–GÜM	  CONSTRUCT(S)	  Pilot	  Top-­‐level	  Thoughtframes	  asserts:	   Pilot	  Top-­‐level	  Workframes	  that	  assert	  GF	  belief	  and	  invoke:	  
generalizedFunction	  belief	  (goal)	  that	  triggers:	   GF	  Activities,	  which	  contain:	  Pilot	  Top-­‐level	  Workframes,	  which	  invoke:	   GF	  Workframes,	  which	  invoke:	  Pilot	  CompositeActivities	   Pilot	  CompositeActivities	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As	  can	  be	  seen,	  the	  analytic	  shift	  in	  the	  Brahms	  framework	  is	  to	  model	  behavior	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  agent’s	  conception	  of	  “what	  I’m	  doing	  now”	  (WFs	  and	  Activities),	  which	  may	   include	   beliefs	   about	  what	   the	   agent	   is	   doing	   (GF	   belief).	   	   In	   a	   goal-­‐oriented	  model	  by	  contrast,	  inference	  rules	  that	  assert	  goals	  are	  at	  the	  top	  and	  these	  beliefs	  control	   actions.	   	   This	   fits	   the	   theory	   that	   conceptualization	   organizing	   human	  attention	   and	   behavior	   is	   largely	   tacit,	   with	   conscious	   “talk”	   to	   oneself	   or	   others	  about	   goals	   and	   actions	   (aka	   “planning”)	   being	   itself	   an	   activity.	   In	   this	   respect,	  planning	   doesn’t	   sit	   apart	   from	   activity,	   invoking	   it,	   but	   is	   rather	   an	   interactive	  behavior	  of	  its	  own	  right	  (Clancey	  2002).	  	  	  In	   Brahms-­‐GÜM	   the	   pilot	   agent	   still	   has	   a	   belief	   about	   the	   GF	   (“what	   I’m	   doing	  now”),	   but	  WFs	   control	   attention	   directly.	   A	   GF	   precondition	   for	   the	  workframes	  within	  the	  GF	  Activities	  is	  not	  necessary.	   	  The	  logic	  of	  the	  top-­‐level	  TFs	  in	  Brahms-­‐WMC	  (which	  was	  a	  direct	  mapping	  implied	  by	  the	  So	  Young	  &	  Pritchett	  et	  al.	  WMC	  model)	  is	  moved	  to	  WFs	  that	  directly	  control	  activities,	  fitting	  the	  “reactive”	  nature	  of	  a	  Brahms	  agent	  model.	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23 Appendix:	  Brahms	  AFCS	  Überlingen	  Model	  Components	  Brahms	   model	   constructs	   are	   organized	   into	   text	   files,	   which	   are	   written	   by	   the	  Brahms	  Composer,	  which	  provides	   a	   project	   explorer	   and	   smart	   editing	   interface.	  File	  names	  are	  arbitrary,	  but	  conventionally	   reflect	   the	  names	  of	  agents,	   concepts,	  areas,	  and	  objects	  in	  the	  Brahms	  model.	  	  The	  following	  listings	  are	  created	  from	  the	  model	   files,	   indicating	   the	   groups/agents,	   classes/objects,	   and	   geographic	  areas/subareas.	   	  The	  communications	  among	  agents	  and	  objects	  are	  diagramed	   in	  Figure	  22-­‐1	  and	  Figure	  9-­‐1.	  	  Brahms-­‐GÜM	  consists	  of	  two	  parts,	  the	  generic	  model	  components	  (e.g.,	  defining	  an	  airport)	   that	   are	   useful	   for	   any	   ATS	   simulation	   and	   the	   more	   specific	   model	  components	  that	  enable	  defining	  the	  space	  of	  scenarios	  that	  are	  variations	  of	  what	  occurred	  at	  Überlingen	  (e.g.,	  the	  specific	  airports	  involved).	  	  	  	  In	  the	  lists	  that	  follow,	  the	  itemized	  elements	  are	  file	  names	  that	  usually	  correspond	  to	   names	   in	   Brahms-­‐GÜM.	   	   For	   example,	   “Airport”	   represents	   the	   file	   name	  “Airport.b,”	  which	  contains	  the	  Airport	  area	  definition,	  specifying	  it	  as	  a	  subclass	  of	  the	  Country_City	  area	  and	  having	  two	  properties,	  a	  name	  and	  airport	  code:	  	   areadef	  Airport	  extends	  Country_City	  {	  	   attributes:	  	   	  	  	  public	  string	  fullName;	  	   	  	  	  public	  string	  airportCode;	  }	  //	  Airport	  
23.1 Generic	  Air	  Transportation	  System	  Model	  Components	  	  These	   are	   Brahms	   component	   definitions	   useful	   for	   creating	   Brahms	   models	   for	  many	  purposes	  related	  to	  air	  transportation	  systems.	   	  These	  include	  agent	  groups,	  object	  classes,	  and	  general	  areas,	  as	  well	  as	  ATS	  objects	   that	  would	  be	  common	  to	  most	   ATS	   models	   (e.g.,	   radar,	   radio).	   However,	   there	   is	   nothing	   dictated	   by	   the	  Brahms	  language	  that	  dictates	  what	  is	  in	  the	  “generic”	  model	  versus	  the	  “Überlingen	  scenarios”	  part;	  it	  is	  just	  a	  way	  of	  organizing	  the	  definitions	  and	  files.	  	  	  The	  Aircraft	  definitions	   (e.g.,	   AircraftTupolev)	   might	   just	   have	   well	   been	   placed	   with	   the	  definitions	  defining	  airports	  involved	  in	  the	  Überlingen	  scenarios,	  but	  were	  deemed	  as	   more	   globally	   useful	   for	   creating	   future	   NextGen	   Brahms	   models	   than	   for	  example	  the	  definition	  of	  staffing	  in	  the	  Zurich	  ATCC.	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23.2 Model	  Components	  Required	  for	  GUM	  Scenarios	  	  These	   are	  Brahms	   component	  definitions	   required	   for	  modeling	  what	   occurred	   in	  the	  Zurich	  ATCC	  airspace	  during	  the	  late	  evening	  of	  July	  1,	  2002.	  	  Such	  components	  would	   of	   course	   be	   useful	   for	   modeling	   and	   simulating	   an	   infinite	   variety	   of	  scenarios	  involving	  any	  of	  these	  countries,	  airports,	  airlines,	  controllers,	  etc.	  
23.2.1 Agent	  groups	  
• AirTrafficControllers	  Austria	  
• AirTrafficControllers	  Belarus	  
• AirTrafficControllers	  Belgium	  
• AirTrafficControllers	  France	  
• AirTrafficControllers	  Germany	  
• AirTrafficControllers	  Italy	  
• AirTrafficControllers	  Poland	  
• AirTrafficControllers	  Russia	  
• AirTrafficControllers	  Spain	  
• AirTrafficControllers	  Switzerland	  
• FlightCrew	  AEF1135	  
• FlightCrew	  BTC2937	  
• FlightCrew	  DHX611	  
• FlightCrew	  OTHER	  
23.2.2 Conceptual	  objects	  
• Airline	  AEF	  
• Airline	  BTC	  
• Airline	  DHL	  
• Airline	  Other	  
• Flight	  AEF1135	  
• Flight	  BTC2937	  
• Flight	  DHX611	  
• Flight	  OTHER	  
23.2.3 Geography	  areas	  
• Airport	  Austria	  
• Airport	  Belarus	  
• Airport	  Belgium	  
• Airport	  France	  
• Airport	  Germany	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• Airport	  Italy	  
• Airport	  Moscow	  
• Airport	  Poland	  
• Airport	  Spain	  
• AirSpace	  Austria	  
• AirSpace	  Belarus	  
• AirSpace	  Belgium	  
• AirSpace	  Czech	  Republic	  
• AirSpace	  Europe	  
• AirSpace	  France	  
• AirSpace	  Germany	  
• AirSpace	  Italy	  
• AirSpace	  Poland	  
• AirSpace	  Russia	  
• AirSpace	  Spain	  
• AirSpace	  Switzerland	  
• ARTCC	  Barcelona	  
• ARTCC	  Karlsruhe	  
• ARTCC	  Marseille	  
• ARTCC	  Minsk	  
• ARTCC	  Moscow	  
• ARTCC	  Munich	  
• ARTCC	  Vienna	  
• ARTCC	  Warsaw	  




• Czech	  Republic	  









• Airbus320	  AEF1135	  
• ATC	  Systems	  Austria	  
• ATC	  Systems	  Belarus	  
• ATC	  Systems	  Belgium	  
• ATC	  Systems	  Cologne	  
• ATC	  Systems	  France	  
• ATC	  Systems	  Germany	  Frankfurt	  
• ATC	  Systems	  Germany	  Friedrichshafen	  
• ATC	  Systems	  Germany	  Karlsruhe	  
• ATC	  Systems	  Germany	  Munich	  
• ATC	  Systems	  Italy	  
• ATC	  Systems	  Poland	  
• ATC	  Systems	  Russia	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• ATC	  Systems	  Spain	  
• ATC	  Systems	  Swiss	  Zurich	  
• Boeing747	  Other	  
• Boeing757	  DHX611	  
• DHX611	  Checklist	  
• Eurocontrol	  AFSS	  Computer	  
• FlightPlan	  AEF1135	  
• FlightPlan	  BTC2937	  
• FlightPlan	  DHX611	  
• FlightPlan	  EDDF	  EDNY	  
• FlightPlan	  LIME	  EBBR	  
• FlightPlan	  UUDD	  LEBL	  
• StandardOperatingProcedures	  EBBR	  
• StandardOperatingProcedures	  EDDF	  
• StandardOperatingProcedures	  EDNY	  
• StandardOperatingProcedures	  LEBL	  
• StandardOperatingProcedures	  LIME	  
• StandardOperatingProcedures	  UUDD	  
• Tupolev154	  BTC2937	  
23.2.5 Workframes	  and	  thoughtframes	  The	   following	   tables	   are	   the	   workframes	   and	   thoughtframes	   of	   the	   Air	   Traffic	  Controllers	  group	  in	  Brahms-­‐GÜM.	  	  
Table	  23-­‐1	  Air	  Traffic	  Controller	  Agents	  Workframes	  Priorities	  	  
Workframe	   Priority	   Agents	  
Get	  ATC	  Display	  Info	  (like	  air	  sectors,	  etc.)	   100	   RP,	  ARFA	  RE,	  CA	  
Monitor	  Crossing	  Planes	  Closing	  In	  (like	  closest	  flight,	  separations,	  
etc.)	  
80	   RP,	  ARFA	  RE,	  CA	  
Get	  Plane	  Info	  (like	  latitude,	  longitude,	  heading,	  etc.)	   70	   RP,	  ARFA	  RE,	  CA	  
Read	  Flight	  Progress	  Strip	   50	   RP,	  ARFA	  RE,	  CA	  
Monitor	  Plane	  Latitude	   5	   RP,	  ARFA	  RE,	  CA	  
Monitor	  Plane	  Longitude	   5	   RP,	  ARFA	  RE,	  CA	  
Monitor	  Plane	  Altitude	   5	   RP,	  ARFA	  RE,	  CA	  
Monitor	  Flight	  In	  Sector	   0	   RP,	  ARFA	  RE,	  CA	  
Start	  My	  Break	   0	   RP,	  ARFA	  RE,	  CA	  
Check	  Flights	  Loss	  Of	  Separation	  (check	  closest	  flight,	  etc.)	   100	   RP,	  ARFA	  RE	  
Confirm	  Flight	  In	  Sector	   60	   RP,	  ARFA	  RE	  
Hold	  Off	  Flight	  Unknown	  Sector	  (pilot	  radio-­‐in	  but	  not	  seen	  flight	  in	  
display	  yet)	  
60	   RP,	  ARFA	  RE	  
Search	  Flight	  In	  Display	   60	   RP,	  ARFA	  RE	  
Agree	  Flight	  Level	  (pilot	  request	  for	  flight	  level	  change)	   60	   RP,	  ARFA	  RE	  
Resolve	  Flight	  Conflict	  (radio	  flight	  to	  climb/descend)	   60	   RP,	  ARFA	  RE	  
Informed	  Flight	  TCAS	  Climb	  (monitor	  flight	  in	  display)	   50	   RP,	  ARFA	  RE	  
Informed	  Flight	  TCAS	  Descent	  (monitor	  flight	  in	  display)	   50	   RP,	  ARFA	  RE	  
Acknowledge	  Flight	  Conflict	  Resolved	  (pilot	  inform	  TCAS	  alert	  off)	   50	   RP,	  ARFA	  RE	  
Check	  Flight	  Before	  Request	  Handoff	   20	   RP,	  ARFA	  RE	  
Request	  Handoff	  (ask	  pilot	  to	  tune	  radio	  to	  another	  ATC)	   10	   RP,	  ARFA	  RE	  
Get	  Flight	  Level	  Confirmation	  (pilot	  confirm	  climbing/descending)	   10	   RP,	  ARFA	  RE	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Workframe	   Priority	   Agents	  
Request	  ATCO	  Take	  Over	  (in	  order	  to	  take	  a	  break)	   10	   RP,	  ARFA	  RE	  
Take	  Over	  From	  ATCO	  (so	  other	  ATCO	  can	  go	  on	  a	  break)	   10	   RP,	  ARFA	  RE	  
Handover	  Briefing	  (between	  ATCOs)	   10	   RP,	  ARFA	  RE	  
Track	  Flight	  In	  Conflict	   8	   RP,	  ARFA	  RE	  
Handling	  Other	  Flights	   10	   RP	  
Refuse	  Flight	  Descent	  Not	  Cleared	  (after	  pilot	  radio	  in	  request)	   50	   ARFA	  RE	  
Request	  Alternate	  Phone	  Number	  (after	  failed	  3rd	  call	  attempt)	   45	   ARFA	  RE	  
Coordinate	  Flight	  Approach	  Airport	   40	   ARFA	  RE	  
Coordinate	  Flight	  Approach	  Alternate	   40	   ARFA	  RE	  
Discuss	  Sector	  Contact	  Alternatives	  (with	  CA	  after	  call	  failures)	   40	   ARFA	  RE	  
Report	  Alternate	  Phone	  Status	  (to	  CA	  success/fail	  about	  phone	  call)	   30	   ARFA	  RE	  
Flight	  Approach	  Cleared	  For	  Handoff	  (after	  contact	  on	  phone)	   30	   ARFA	  RE	  
Monitor	  Flight	  Descent	  Altitude	   5	   ARFA	  RE	  
Monitor	  Flight	  Descent	  Latitude	   5	   ARFA	  RE	  
Understand	  SID	  (Standard	  Instrument	  Descent	  Procedure)	   0	   ARFA	  RE	  
Understand	  STAR	  (Standard	  Terminal	  Arrival	  Procedure)	   0	   ARFA	  RE	  
Check	  Departure	  Runway	  Status	   50	   EDNY	  ATC	  
Check	  Arrival	  Runway	  Status	   50	   EDNY	  ATC	  
Transmit	  Flight	  Plan	   50	   EDNY	  ATC	  
Give	  Flight	  Departure	  Clearance	   20	   EDNY	  ATC	  
Give	  Flight	  Arrival	  Clearance	   20	   EDNY	  ATC	  
Coordinate	  Flight	  Approach	  Airport	  (over	  the	  phone	  with	  ARFA	  RE)	   10	   EDNY	  ATC	  
Handover	  Flight	  Progress	  Strip	   50	   CA	  
Search	  Flight	  In	  Display	   20	   CA	  
Alternate	  Phone	  Contact	  Request	  (go	  get	  phone	  number,	  etc.)	   10	   CA	  
Alternate	  Phone	  Contact	  Succeeded	   10	   CA	  
Alternate	  Phone	  Contact	  Failure	  (go	  discuss	  alternatives,	  etc.)	   10	   CA	  	  	  
Table	  23-­‐2	  Air	  Traffic	  Controller	  Agents	  Thoughtframes	  	  
Agents	   Thoughtframes	  
EDNY	  ATC	   Flight	  En	  Route	  After	  Takeoff,	  Flight	  Descent	  To	  Airport,	  Flight	  Approach	  Runway	  No	  
Handoff,	  Flight	  Landing	  On	  Runway,	  Flight	  Landing	  No	  Handoff	  
ARFA	  RE	   Alternate	  Airport	  Phone	  Contact,	  Flight	  Descent	  To	  Airport,	  Flight	  Approaching	  Runway,	  
Flight	  Pass	  TOD	  to	  Runway,	  Handoff	  Flight	  Approaching	  Runway	  
RP,	  ARFA	  RE	   Informed	  Flight	  Conflict	  Resolved,	  Handoff	  Flight	  Exit	  Air	  Sector,	  Handoff	  Flight	  Leaving	  
Max	  Latitude,	  Handoff	  Flight	  Leaving	  Min	  Latitude,	  Handoff	  Flight	  Leaving	  Max	  Longitude,	  
Handoff	  Flight	  Leaving	  Min	  Longitude,	  Handoff	  Flight	  Below	  Min	  Altitude,	  Handoff	  Flight	  
Above	  Max	  Altitude,	  Interrupt	  Phone	  Call	  TCAS	  Climb,	  Interrupt	  Phone	  Call	  TCAS	  Descent,	  
Receive	  Pilot	  Greeting	  In	  Sector,	  Receive	  Pilot	  Agree	  Handoff,	  Receive	  Flight	  Agree	  
Handoff	  
RP,	  ARFA	  RE,	  
CA	  
Flight	  Enter	  Air	  Sector,	  Current	  Flight	  Strip	  Waypoint,	  Ignore	  Unknown	  Area	  Radio	  Comm,	  
Ignore	  Not	  Work	  Area	  Radio	  Comm	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The	   following	   tables	  are	   the	  workframes	  and	  thoughtframes	  of	   the	  Pilots	  group	  of	  different	  flights.	  “Other”	  refers	  to	  the	  generic	  flight	  that	  represents	  ongoing	  traffic	  to	  simulate	  the	  Zurich	  ATCO’s	  workload	  in	  the	  Überlingen	  scenario.	  	  
Table	  23-­‐3	  Pilot	  Agents	  Workframes	  Priorities	  	  
Workframe	   Priority	   Agents	  
Situate	  (1st	  time	  in	  plane	  cockpit)	   100	   DHL	  611,	  BTC	  2937,	  Other	  
Pre	  Flight	  Preparation	   100	   DHL	  611,	  BTC	  2937,	  Other	  
Control	  Communication	  To	  ATC	   100	   DHL	  611,	  BTC	  2937,	  Other	  
Control	  Communication	  From	  ATC	   100	   DHL	  611,	  BTC	  2937,	  Other	  
Get	  TCAS	  Traffic	  Alert	  Info	   100	   DHL	  611,	  BTC	  2937,	  Other	  
Get	  TCAS	  Resolution	  Alert	  Info	   100	   DHL	  611,	  BTC	  2937,	  Other	  
Tune	  Radio	   60	   DHL	  611,	  BTC	  2937,	  Other	  
Control	  Operating	  Procedures	  (checklists,	  briefings,	  etc.)	   50	   DHL	  611,	  BTC	  2937,	  Other	  
Control	  Flight	  Deck	  Components	  (auto-­‐pilot,	  altitude	  settings,	  
etc.)	  
50	   DHL	  611,	  BTC	  2937,	  Other	  
Control	  Aircraft	  Information	  (verify	  routes,	  waypoints,	  etc.)	   40	   DHL	  611,	  BTC	  2937,	  Other	  
Control	  Heading	   30	   DHL	  611,	  BTC	  2937,	  Other	  
Control	  Aircraft	  Configuration	  (flaps,	  gears	  &	  speed	  brakes)	   25	   DHL	  611,	  BTC	  2937,	  Other	  
Control	  Airspeed	   20	   DHL	  611,	  BTC	  2937,	  Other	  
Control	  Flight	  Level	   20	   DHL	  611,	  BTC	  2937,	  Other	  
Control	  Vertical	  Speed	   20	   DHL	  611,	  BTC	  2937,	  Other	  
Takeoff	  From	  Runway	   20	   DHL	  611,	  BTC	  2937,	  Other	  
Land	  On	  Runway	   20	   DHL	  611,	  BTC	  2937,	  Other	  
Traffic	  Alert	  (from	  TCAS)	   20	   DHL	  611,	  BTC	  2937,	  Other	  
Control	  Vertical	  Profile	   0	   DHL	  611,	  BTC	  2937,	  Other	  
Control	  Waypoints	   0	   DHL	  611,	  BTC	  2937,	  Other	  
Monitor	  Route	  (before	  given	  clearance	  by	  ATCO)	   0	   DHL	  611,	  BTC	  2937,	  Other	  
Follow	  Increase	  Climb	  Advise	  (from	  TCAS)	   100	   DHL	  611	  
Follow	  Increase	  Descent	  Advise	  (from	  TCAS)	   100	   DHL	  611	  
Follow	  Initial	  Resolution	  Advisory	   90	   DHL	  611	  
Monitor	  Resolution	  Advisory	   70	   DHL	  611	  
Clear	  Of	  Conflict	  (from	  TCAS)	   70	   DHL	  611	  
Monitor	  Traffic	  Alert	   10	   DHL	  611	  	  	  
Table	  23-­‐4	  Pilot	  Agents	  Thoughtframes	  	  
Agents	   Thoughtframes	  DHL	  611,	  BTC	  2937,	  Other	   Flight	  Phase	  Preflight,	  Flight	  Phase	  Takeoff,	  Flight	  Phase	  En	  Route,	  Flight	  Phase	  Approach,	  Flight	  Phase	  Landing,	  Next	  SID	  Route,	  Next	  STAR	  Route,	  Next	  Flight	  Plan	  Route,	  Plane	  Taxi	  On	  Runway,	  Inform	  Flight	  In	  Sector	  Again,	  ATC	  Message	  For	  Other	  Flight	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Agents	   Thoughtframes	  DHL	  611	   Ignore	  ATCO	  Climb	  Request,	  Ignore	  ATCO	  Climb	  Faster	  Request,	  Ignore	  ATCO	  Descend	  Request,	  Ignore	  ATCO	  Descend	  Faster	  Request	  
24 Appendix:	  Scenario	  Configurations	  These	  model	   configurations—initial	   conditions	   formalized	   as	   properties	   of	   agents	  and	  objects—correspond	   to	   the	   ten	   scenarios	   (Table	  8-­‐1;	  Table	  10-­‐1)	   intended	   to	  sequentially	   and	   cumulatively	   add	   anomalies	   to	   a	   base	   scenario	   that	   served	   to	  define	   a	   complete	   scenario	   and	   by	   this	   sequence	   to	   test	   its	   generality.	   	   The	  simulation	  time	  in	  every	  case	  was	  18:15	  GMT	  	  on	  07/01/2002,	  corresponding	  to	  the	  scheduled	  BTC	  2937	  departure	  time	  from	  Moscow	  at	  18:45	  GMT.	  
24.1 Configurations	  of	  Brahms	  Agents	  Brahms	  agents	  are	  configured	  for	  each	  scenario	  based	  on	  their	  Group	  memberships.	  Each	   Brahms	   Group	   defines	   behaviors	   for	   all	   agents	   within	   the	   group.	   A	   Brahms	  Group	   can	   inherit	   behaviors	   from	   other	   Brahms	   Groups.	   For	   example,	   the	   “Air	  Traffic	  Approach	  Control	  Group”	  defines	  activities	  for	  handling	  flights,	  and	  its	  group	  members	   inherit	   additional	   activities	   for	   handling	   flights	   approaching	   an	   airport,	  which	   are	   not	   inherited	   by	   the	   “Radar	   Planner	   Group.”	   Similarly,	   the	   “Pilot	   TCAS	  Trained	  Group”	  has	  activities	  for	  pilots	  to	  follow	  TCAS	  advisories	  that	  are	  additional	  to	  the	  behaviors	  inherited	  from	  the	  “Pilot	  Group.”	  	  	  
Table	  24-­‐1	  Air	  Traffic	  Controllers	  and	  Pilots	  Configuration	  for	  Alternative	  
Brahms-­‐GÜM	  Scenarios	  
Scenario Description Brahms Agents Brahms Group Membership 
2A)	  Normal	   ATCO	  Zurich	  AR	  RE	   AirTrafficApproachControlGroup	  ATCO	  Zurich	  RP	   RadarPlannerGroup	  Pilot	  BTC2937	   PilotTCASTrainedGroup	  
2B)	  Normal	  w/o	  Phones	   ATCO	  Zurich	  AR	  RE	   AirTrafficApproachControlGroup	  ATCO	  Zurich	  RP	   RadarPlannerGroup	  Pilot	  BTC2937	   PilotTCASTrainedGroup	  
2C)	  Phones	  out	  &	  Radar	  
degraded,	  but	  TCAS	  rules	  
ATCO	  Zurich	  AR	  RE	   AirTrafficApproachControlGroup	  ATCO	  Zurich	  RP	   RadarPlannerGroup	  Pilot	  BTC2937	   PilotTCASTrainedGroup	  
2D)	  …	  but	  ZATC	  rules	   ATCO	  Zurich	  AR	  RE	   AirTrafficApproachControlGroup	  ATCO	  Zurich	  RP	   RadarPlannerGroup	  Pilot	  BTC2937	   PilotGroup	  
1A)	  Normal-­‐SMOP	   ATCO	  Zurich	  RP	   AirTrafficApproachControlGroup,	  RadarPlannerGroup	  Pilot	  BTC2937	   PilotTCASTrainedGroup	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Scenario Description Brahms Agents Brahms Group Membership 
1B)	  SMOP	  w/o	  Phones	   ATCO	  Zurich	  RP	   AirTrafficApproachControlGroup,	  RadarPlannerGroup	  Pilot	  BTC2937	   PilotTCASTrainedGroup	  
1C)	  SMOP	  w/o	  Radar	   ATCO	  Zurich	  RP	   AirTrafficApproachControlGroup,	  RadarPlannerGroup	  Pilot	  BTC2937	   PilotTCASTrainedGroup	  
1D)	  Actual,	  but	  TCAS	  Followed	   ATCO	  Zurich	  RP	   AirTrafficApproachControlGroup,	  RadarPlannerGroup	  Pilot	  BTC2937	   PilotTCASTrainedGroup	  
1E)	  Überlingen	   ATCO	  Zurich	  RP	   AirTrafficApproachControlGroup,	  RadarPlannerGroup	  Pilot	  BTC2937	   PilotGroup	  
24.2 Configurations	  of	  Brahms	  Objects	  Brahms	  Objects	   are	   configured	   for	   each	   scenario	   based	   on	   the	   values	   assigned	   to	  their	   attributes	   in	   the	   initial	   model	   configuration.	   For	   example,	   for	   the	   scenario	  when	  Radar	   is	  degraded,	  STCA	  Zurich	  will	  also	  be	  turned	  off,	  which	  is	  modeled	  by	  setting	  the	  attribute	  isOpticalOn	  to	  false.	  Similarly,	  for	  scenarios	  where	  Phones	  are	  unavailable	  or	  calls	  are	  unsuccessful,	  phoneStatus	  is	  set	  to	  “busy.”	  	  
Table	  24-­‐2	  Radar	  and	  Phones	  Configuration	  in	  Alternative	  Scenarios	  
Scenario Description Brahms Objects Attributes Values 
2A)	  Normal	   STCA	  Zurich	   isOpticalOn	   true	  ATC	  Phone	  Friedrichshafen	  ATCT	   phoneStatus	   free	  ATC	  Phone2	  Friedrichshafen	  ATCT	   phoneStatus	   free	  
2B)	  Normal	  w/o	  Phones	   STCA	  Zurich	   isOpticalOn	   true	  ATC	  Phone	  Friedrichshafen	  ATCT	   phoneStatus	   busy	  ATC	  Phone2	  Friedrichshafen	  ATCT	   phoneStatus	   busy	  
2C)	  Phones	  out	  &	  Radar	  
degraded,	  but	  TCAS	  rules	  
STCA	  Zurich	   isOpticalOn	   false	  ATC	  Phone	  Friedrichshafen	  ATCT	   phoneStatus	   busy	  ATC	  Phone2	  Friedrichshafen	  ATCT	   phoneStatus	   busy	  
2D)	  …	  but	  ZATC	  rules	   STCA	  Zurich	   isOpticalOn	   false	  ATC	  Phone	  Friedrichshafen	  ATCT	   phoneStatus	   busy	  ATC	  Phone2	  Friedrichshafen	  ATCT	   phoneStatus	   busy	  
1A)	  Normal-­‐SMOP	   STCA	  Zurich	   isOpticalOn	   true	  ATC	  Phone	  Friedrichshafen	  ATCT	   phoneStatus	   free	  ATC	  Phone2	  Friedrichshafen	  ATCT	   phoneStatus	   free	  
1B)	  SMOP	  w/o	  Phones	   STCA	  Zurich	   isOpticalOn	   true	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ATC	  Phone	  Friedrichshafen	  ATCT	   phoneStatus	   busy	  ATC	  Phone2	  Friedrichshafen	  ATCT	   phoneStatus	   busy	  
1C)	  SMOP	  w/o	  Radar	   STCA	  Zurich	   isOpticalOn	   false	  ATC	  Phone	  Friedrichshafen	  ATCT	   phoneStatus	   free	  ATC	  Phone2	  Friedrichshafen	  ATCT	   phoneStatus	   free	  
1D)	  Actual,	  but	  TCAS	  
Followed	  
STCA	  Zurich	   isOpticalOn	   false	  ATC	  Phone	  Friedrichshafen	  ATCT	   phoneStatus	   busy	  ATC	  Phone2	  Friedrichshafen	  ATCT	   phoneStatus	   busy	  
1E)	  Überlingen	   STCA	  Zurich	   isOpticalOn	   false	  ATC	  Phone	  Friedrichshafen	  ATCT	   phoneStatus	   busy	  ATC	  Phone2	  Friedrichshafen	  ATCT	   phoneStatus	   busy	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25 Appendix:	  Brahms	  Simulation	  Graphics	  of	  System	  
Interactions	  This	  appendix	  provides	  several	  examples	  of	  Brahms-­‐GÜM	  simulations	  presented	  in	  the	  Brahms	  AgentViewer,	  which	  displays	  the	  chronology	  of	  activities	  and	  associated	  workframes	  for	  selected	  agents	  and	  objects.	  
25.1 Pilot-­‐Aircraft	  Operations	  	  Brahms-­‐GÜM	   simulates	   how	   pilots	   control	   an	   aircraft	   by	   the	   activities	   of	  pulling/pushing	  the	  cockpit	  control	  column,	  flipping	  switches	  or	  dialing	  selectors	  on	  Mode	  Control	  Panel	  (MCP).	  Pilots	  get	  information	  about	  performance	  of	  an	  aircraft	  by	  the	  activities	  of	   looking	  at	  Primary	  Flight	  Display	  (PFD)	  and	  Navigation	  Display	  (ND).	   Figure	  25-­‐1	   shows	  an	  example	   timeline	  of	  DHL	  pilot	   activities	  during	   initial	  take	  off	  from	  the	  Bergamo	  airport	  runway.	  The	  pilot	  pulls	  back	  the	  control	  column	  to	   get	   the	   plane	   to	   climb,	  monitors	   the	   plane’s	   climbing	   altitude	   on	   PFD,	   retracts	  landing	  gear,	  and	  continues	  monitoring	  altitude	  until	  plane	  reaches	  a	  certain	  flight	  level	  above	  the	  airport.	  	  
	  
Figure	  25-­‐1:	  Pilot	  Takes-­‐off	  from	  Bergamo	  Runway	  Figure	   25-­‐2	   provides	   a	   detailed	   view	   of	   what	   happens	   after	   the	   pilot	   pulls	   the	  control	  column	  in	  the	  DHL	  cockpit,	  which	  changes	  the	  vertical	  speed	  of	  the	  plane	  as	  it	  climbs	  above	  the	  runway.	  Data	  is	  communicated	  from	  Control	  Column	  to	  aircraft	  computer	   (Control	  Display	  Unit;	  CDU),	  which	  commands	   the	  aircraft	  wing	   flaps	   to	  extend.	  Extended	  flaps	  will	  accelerate	  vertical	  speed	  based	  on	  flaps	  climb/descend	  acceleration	  value	  (e.g.,	  accelerate	  by	  6	  feet	  per	  second).	  The	  GPS	  receiver	  updates	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longitude,	   latitude	   positions	   and	   altitude	   of	   plane	   based	   on	   both	   air	   and	   vertical	  speeds	  and	  sends	  plane’s	  altitude	  and	  vertical	   speed	   to	  Primary	  Flight	  Display	   for	  the	  pilot	  to	  observe.	  	   	  Blue	  lines	  indicate	  communications	  with	  numbers	  indicating	  how	  much	  data	  is	  being	  transferred.	  	   1) DHL	  pilot	  pulls	  back	  
Control	  Column	  which	  causes	  
Control	  Column	  to	  send	  info	  to	  
CDU	  —Column	  State	  =	  max	  backward.	  2) CDU	  converts	  that	  
column	  state	  to	  extend	  flaps	  to	  
maximum	  and	  informs	  Wings	  –	  Flaps	  State	  =	  max	  extend,	  Rate	  of	  Display	  =	  2	  seconds	  (for	  how	  often	  to	  calculate	  acceleration	  of	  vertical	  speed).	  3) Wings	  sets	  up	  flaps	  to	  
extended	  max	  &	  calculate	  next	  
accelerated	  vertical	  speed	  –	  vertical	  speed	  =	  60	  feet/second.	  4) GPS	  receiver	  detects	  
vertical	  speed	  and	  calculates	  
position	  of	  plane	  then	  sends	  
info	  to	  PFD	  –	  altitude	  =	  1286	  feet,	  vertical	  speed	  =	  60	  feet/second.	  	  	  	  	  	  
Figure	  25-­‐2:	  Detail	  View	  of	  Vertical	  Speed	  changes	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  Figure	   25-­‐3	   shows	   that	   after	   the	   plane	   takes	   off,	   Captain	   Phillips	   changes	   the	   air	  speed	  from	  150	  kt	  to	  350	  kt	  by	  dialing	  the	  speed	  selector	  on	  the	  MCP	  and	  pushes	  the	  switch	   to	   “set”.	   He	   then	  monitors	   air	   speed	   displayed	   in	   PFD	   to	   confirm	   that	   the	  plane	  is	  changing	  air	  speed.	  Captain	  Phillips	  then	  confirms	  the	  next	  waypoint,	  LIME	  NDB1,	  which	  is	  displayed	  in	  CDU;	  he	  directs	  the	  plane	  to	  move	  to	  this	  next	  waypoint.	  	  	  
	  
Figure	  25-­‐3:	  Pilot	  sets	  Air	  Speed	  to	  Next	  Waypoint	  
25.2 Radio	  Communications	  All	   radios	   tuned	   to	   the	   same	   frequency	   receive	   the	   same	   communications	   in	   the	  Brahms-­‐GÜM	  simulation.	  Figure	  25-­‐4shows	  communications	  between	  the	  BTC2937	  Pilot/Cockpit	  and	  BTC	  plane’s	  radio	  during	  handoff	  to	  another	  Air	  Traffic	  Controller.	  Communications	  only	  occur	  between	  the	  BTC	  pilot	  and	  ATC	  Zurich	  if	  the	  radios	  are	  operational	  and	  tuned	  to	  the	  same	  frequency.	  Also	  occurring	  in	  parallel	  are	  similar	  communications	  among	  BTC	  Radio,	  Munich	  ATC	  Radio,	  and	  Munich	  ATCO.	  	  
	  
	  	  




Figure	  25-­‐4:	  Munich	  Handoff	  Flight	  to	  Zurich	  Figure	  25-­‐5	  provides	  a	  detailed	  view	  of	  Pilot	  communications	  via	  the	  Radio	  during	  a	  particular	   handoff.	  The	   BTC	   Pilot	   tunes	   the	   radio	   to	   Zurich	   frequency,	   contacts	  Zurich	  ATCC	  to	  inform	  that	  his	  flight	  is	  entering	  the	  Zurich	  air	  sector,	  and	  receives	  acknowledgement	  from	  Zurich.	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Blue	  lines	  indicate	  communications;	  numbers	  indicate	  how	  many	  attributes	  are	  being	  transferred	  	  
1,	  2,	  &	  3.	  BTC	  Pilot	  to	  his	  Radio	  (direct	  
communication):	  1)	  BTC	  Pilot	  tunes	  radio	  to	  Zurich	  ATC	  —frequency	  =	  128.05	  2)	  BTC	  Pilot	  calls	  into	  Zurich	  ATC—Pilot.flightNumber,	  Flight	  (BTC2937)	  &	  BTC2937.flightNumber	  3)	  BTC	  Pilot	  informs	  Zurich	  a/c	  is	  entering	  
sector	  —receiver	  (i.e.,	  Zurich	  ATC),	  performative	  =	  INFORM,	  reason	  =	  flight,	  Medium	  =	  radio,	  commTime	  (for	  prioritization	  of	  responses)	  	  	  
4	  &	  6	  BTC	  Radio	  transmits	  on	  frequency	  
to	  Zurich	  radio	  	  4)	  BTC	  Radio	  relays	  to	  Zurich	  flight	  call	  (i.e.,	  relay	  #2)	  	  6)	  BTC	  Radio	  relays	  to	  Zurich	  (i.e.,	  relay	  #3)	  	  	  
5	  &	  7	  BTC	  Radio	  broadcasts	  in	  cockpit	  (beliefs	  same	  as	  #2	  &	  #3,	  a	  workaround	  so	  the	  co-­‐pilot	  can	  know	  what	  Pilot	  told	  radio;	  see	  Section	  28.3)	  	  	  
8.	  	  Zurich	  Radio	  transmits	  on	  frequency	  
to	  BTC	  Radio:	  
Zurich	  ATC	  confirms	  handover—receiver	  (i.e.,	  BTC	  Pilot,	  performative	  =	  
CONFIRM,	  reason	  =	  flight,	  Medium	  =	  radio,	  	  commTime	  (for	  prioritization	  of	  responses)	  	  	  
9.	  BTC	  Radio	  broadcasts	  in	  cockpit	  (i.e.,	  relay	  #8)	  	  
	  
Figure	  25-­‐5:	  Detail	  View	  of	  Radio	  Communications	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25.3 Radar	  Display	  and	  Monitoring	  Primary	  Surveillance	  Radars	   (PSR)	  scan	   their	  associated	  air	   sectors	   for	  planes.	  An	  air	  sector	  is	  defined	  by	  its	  maximum	  and	  minimum	  latitude,	  longitude,	  and	  altitude.	  A	   plane’s	   latitude,	   longitude,	   and	   altitude	   are	   updated	   by	   its	   GPS	   receiver	   as	   the	  plane	  flies	  toward	  a	  waypoint	  and	  the	  PSR	  checks	  to	  determine	  whether	  	  the	  plane’s	  position	   is	  within	   its	  monitored	   air	   sector.	   Figure	   25-­‐6	   shows	   the	   Tupolev	   plane,	  flight	   BTC	   2937,	   flying	   toward	   the	   Trasadingen	   waypoint	   and	   its	   position	   being	  updated	   by	   its	   GPS	   Receiver.	   Zurich	   PSR	   scans	   its	   air	   sector	   and	   detects	   that	   the	  position	  of	  BTC	  2937	  is	  within	  its	  sector;	  so	  PSR	  informs	  Zurich	  Air	  Traffic	  Control	  (ATC)	  Server	  (not	  shown)	  that	  BTC	  2937	  has	  entered	  the	  Zurich	  air	  sector.	  	  
	  
Figure	  25-­‐6:	  Zurich	  Radar	  Scans	  for	  Planes	  Each	  Air	  Traffic	  Control	   (ATC)	  Display	   is	   set	  up	  with	  an	  ATC	  Server.	  ATC	  Displays	  may	   have	   smaller	   air	   sectors	   displayed;	   for	   example,	   Zurich’s	   AFRA	   Display	   was	  displaying	  a	  smaller	  area	  within	  Zurich	  air	  space	  just	  above	  Friedrichshafen	  airport.	  Zurich	   ATC	   Server	   has	   information	   about	   this	   smaller	   “AFRA	   air	   sector”	   being	  displayed;	   so	   it	   only	   sends	   information	   about	   a	   plane	   to	   AFRA	   Display	   when	   a	  plane’s	  position	  is	  within	  the	  AFRA	  air	  space.	  	  	  	  	   	  
	  	  
WORK	  PRACTICE	  SIMULATION	  OF	  COMPLEX	  HUMAN-­‐AUTOMATION	  SYSTEMS	  IN	  SAFETY-­‐CRITICAL	  SITUATIONS	   2
9
2 	  
	   Blue	  lines	  indicate	  communications;	  numbers	  indicate	  how	  many	  attributes	  are	  being	  transferred.	  	  1) Zurich	  PSR	  detects	  BTC	  2937	  in	  its	  air	  space	  and	  sends	  plane	  info	  to	  Zurich	  ATC	  Server	  –plane’s	  geographic	  
location,	  heading,	  bearing,	  
longitude,	  latitude,	  altitude,	  
airspeed,	  flight,	  flight	  number,	  
waypoint,	  time	  to	  waypoint,	  
and	  other	  planes	  within	  Zurich	  
Air	  Sector.	  	  2) Zurich	  ATC	  Server	  sets	  BTC	  2937’s	  air	  sector	  to	  South-­‐East	  sector	  and	  sends	  info	  to	  South-­‐Sector	  Display	  -­‐	  plane’s	  
geographic	  location,	  heading,	  
bearing,	  longitude,	  latitude,	  
altitude,	  airspeed,	  flight,	  flight	  
number,	  air	  sector,	  waypoint,	  
time	  to	  waypoint,	  and	  other	  
planes	  within	  South-­‐East	  
Sector.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Figure	  25-­‐7:	  Detail	  View	  of	  Zurich	  Radar	  data	  to	  Display	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Figure	  25-­‐7	  shows	  that	  when	  BTC	  2937	  enters	  the	  Zurich	  air	  space,	  its	  identity	  and	  location	  information	  is	  transferred	  from	  the	  Zurich	  PSR	  to	  the	  ATC	  Server	  and	  then	  to	   the	   South-­‐Sector	  Display.	   The	   plane’s	   position	   is	  within	   the	   smaller	   South-­‐East	  Sector	  defined	  for	  South	  Sector	  Display,	  located	  at	  South	  Sector	  Workstation;	  so	  the	  Server	  updates	  its	  record	  of	  BTC	  2937	  as	  being	  in	  this	  smaller	  air	  sector	  and	  sends	  the	  aircraft	  information	  to	  this	  display.	  When	  South-­‐Sector	  Display	  receives	  the	  BTC	  2937	   information,	   it	   determines	   which	   plane	   is	   closest	   to	   BTC	   2937	   (lateral	   and	  vertical	   separations	   between	   planes)	   and	   whether	   the	   closest	   plane	   is	   on	   an	  intersecting	  flight	  path.	  	  
	  
Figure	  25-­‐8:	  Zurich	  ATCO	  monitors	  BTC	  2937	  Figure	  25-­‐8	  shows	  an	  example	  of	  an	  ATCO	  monitoring	   the	  radar	  display.	  Here	   the	  Zurich	  ATCO,	  Peter	  Neilson,	  responds	  to	  flight	  BTC	  2937’s	  call-­‐in	  of	  having	  entered	  the	   Zurich	   air	   sector.	   Peter	   confirms	   that	   he	   sees	   the	   BTC	   2937	   displayed	   on	   his	  radar	  display	  and	  monitors	  the	  flight	  in	  the	  Radar	  display.	  
25.4 TCAS	  Operation	  	  TCAS	  calculates	  range	  and	  vertical	  tau	  values,	  which	  are	  the	  number	  of	  seconds	  until	  lateral	  or	  vertical	  collision	  for	  a	  plane	  within	  same	  air	  sector.	  Based	  on	  TCAS	  rules	  and	  calculated	  tau	  values,	  a	  Traffic	  Alert	  (“Traffic!	  Traffic!”)	  and/or	  Resolution	  Alert	  (“Climb!	   Climb!”	   or	   “Descend!	   Descend!”)	   is	   broadcast	   to	   pilots.	   TCAS	   also	   sends	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range	   separation,	   vertical	   separation,	   and	   heading	   of	   conflicting	   plane	   to	   the	  Navigation	   Display	   (ND),	   representing	   information	   that	   the	   real-­‐world	   ATCO	   can	  detect	  when	  looking	  at	  the	  display.	  	  
	  
Figure	  25-­‐9:	  TCAS	  issues	  Traffic	  Alert	  Figure	   25-­‐9	   shows	  what	   happens	  when	   TCAS	   broadcasts	   “Traffic!	   Traffic!”	   in	   the	  DHL	   611	   cockpit.	   Captain	   Phillips	   immediately	   reads	   the	   plane	   range	   separation,	  vertical	   separation,	   and	   heading	   from	   ND.	   Captain	   Phillips	   also	   monitors	   vertical	  separation	  between	  his	  plane	  and	  BTC	  2937	  by	  monitoring	  ND.	  	  Figure	  25-­‐10	   shows	  what	  happens	  when	  TCAS	  broadcasts	   “Descend!	  Descend!”	   in	  the	   DHL	   611	   cockpit.	   Captain	   Phillips	   looks	   for	   the	   flight	   altitude	   to	   which	   to	  descend	  provided	  by	  TCAS	  and	  displayed	   in	   the	  PFD.	  Captain	  Phillips	   then	  pushes	  the	  Control	  Column	  forward	  to	  start	  plane	  descent.	  
	  	  




Figure	  25-­‐10:	  TCAS	  issues	  Descend	  Resolution	  Alert	  	  Figure	  25-­‐11	  shows	  the	  events	  in	  the	  Überlingen	  scenario	  how	  TCAS	  issues	  advice	  to	  DHL	  611	  to	  descend	  and	  gives	  BTC	  2937	  the	  inverse	  advice	  to	  climb	  to	  a	  higher	  altitude.	  
	  	  




Figure	  25-­‐11:	  TCAS	  issues	  contrary	  Resolution	  Alerts	  
25.5 ATC-­‐Pilot	  Communications	  Figure	  25-­‐12	  shows	  that	  after	  the	  DHL	  pilot,	  Captain	  Phillips,	  has	  completed	  handoff	  on	  entering	   the	  Zurich	  air	   sector,	  he	   requests	  a	   change	  of	   flight	   level	   from	  26,000	  feet	  to	  36,000	  feet	  and	  is	  given	  clearance	  by	  Zurich	  air	  traffic	  control.	  
	  	  




Figure	  25-­‐12:	  DHL	  Pilot	  Requests	  Flight	  Level	  Change	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26 Appendix:	  Example	  Log	  of	  Brahms	  Simulation	  Run	  This	  is	  an	  excerpt	  of	  a	  log	  file	  created	  during	  the	  simulation	  of	  Brahms-­‐GÜM	  with	  the	  Überlingen	  scenario	  configuration	  (designated	  1F	   in	  Table	  10-­‐1;	  refinements	  were	  made	   subsequently,	   as	   described	   in	   that	   chapter).	   The	   excerpt	   is	   annotated	   to	  indicate	  what	  general	  events	  are	  occurring.	  	  	  
 
The	  late-­‐arriving	  AEF	  flight	  enters	  the	  air	  sector	  of	  the	  Friedrichshafen	  airport.	  ATCO	  
in	  the	  control	  tower	  reads	  the	  flight	  strip,	  looks	  for	  the	  flight	  in	  the	  radar	  display,	  and	  
learns	  about	  the	  route	  from	  the	  flight	  strip. 
[ATC_Server_Friedrichshafen_ATCT] - 21:18:07 : Flight AEF1135 in Air 
Sector Friedrichshafen Airport 
[ATCO_Friedrichshafen_Airport] - 21:18:10 : Wait for Flight Strip printout 
[ATCO_Friedrichshafen_Airport] - 21:18:16 : Reading Flight Strip 
[ATCO_Friedrichshafen_Airport] - 21:18:17 : Search for AEF1135 in display 
[ATCO_Friedrichshafen_Airport] - 21:18:17 : Search for flight in display 
[ATCO_Friedrichshafen_Airport] - 21:18:40 : Read AEF1135 Flight Strip route 
 
DHL	  flight	  enters	  Zurich	  south	  air	  sector 
[ATC_Server_Zurich_ARTCC] - 21:21:49 : Flight DXH611 in Air Sector 
Zurich South ARTCC 
 
Zurich	   Controller	   Assistant	   takes	   DHL	   flight	   strip	   to	   ATCO	   who	   then	   examines	   the	  
radar.	   
[Zurich CA]- 21:22:06 : Moving to ARTCC Zurich (LSAZ) South Workstation 
[Zurich CA]- 21:22:08 : Handover DXH611 Flight Strip 
[ATCO_Zurich_RP] - 21:22:08 : Reading Flight Strip 
[ATCO_Zurich_RP] - 21:22:12 : Search for DHX611 in display 
[ATCO_Zurich_RP] - 21:22:12 : Search for flight in display 
[Zurich CA]- 21:22:12 : Moving to ARTCC Zurich (LSAZ) CA Workstation 
[ATCO_Zurich_RP] - 21:22:28 : Search for flight in display 
 
Meanwhile	  another	  (unnamed)	  flight	  enters	  the	  Zurich	  sector;	  ATCO	  detects	  the	  DHL	  
and	   reads	   the	   information,	   then	   detects	   the	   other	   flight	   and	   interacts	   with	   it.	   This	  
designates	   activity	   “handling	   other	   flights”	   that	   is	   modeling	   arrival	   and	   handoff	  
without	   details	   that	   occur	   for	   BTC,	   DHL,	   and	   AEF	   flights,	   which	   are	   modeled	  
individually.	  This	  “other	  flight”	  is	  modeled	  as	  something	  like	  a	  helicopter	  that	  shows	  up	  
in	  the	  airspace	  in	  one	  location	  that	  ATCO	  interacts	  with	  every	  minute.	   
[ATC_Server_Zurich_ARTCC] - 21:22:38 : Flight OTHER in Air Sector Zurich 
East ARTCC 
[ATCO_Zurich_RP] - 21:22:49 : Read DXH611 Flight Strip route 
[ATCO_Zurich_RP] - 21:22:54 : monitoring DXH611 [B757]	  -­‐	  21:23:01	  :	   Flight	  DXH611	  Flying	  LOKTA	  Route	  [B757]	  -­‐	  21:23:01	  :	   Flight	  DXH611	  Heading	  North	  [B757]	  -­‐	  21:23:01	  :	   AirSpeed:	  463,	  Vertical	  Speed:	  37	  [B757]	  -­‐	  21:23:01	  :	   Altitude:	  16295.0	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[ATCO_Zurich_RP] - 21:23:23 : monitoring OTHER 
[ATCO_Zurich_RP] - 21:23:26 : Radio Flight OTHER REQUEST chat 
[ATCO_Zurich_RP] - 21:23:54 : monitoring DXH611 
 
BTC	  flight	  strip	  is	  similarly	  printed,	  conveyed,	  and	  printed.	  	  ATCO	  handles	  several	  other	  
flights.	   
[ATC_Server_Zurich_ARTCC] - 21:24:10 : Flight BTC2937 in Air Sector 
Zurich ARTCC 
[ATCO_Zurich_RP] - 21:24:11 : monitoring OTHER 
[ATCO_Zurich_RP] - 21:24:13 : Radio Flight OTHER REQUEST chat 
[Zurich CA]- 21:24:14 : Wait for Flight Strip printout 
[Zurich CA]- 21:24:22 : Reading Flight Strip 
[Zurich CA]- 21:24:24 : Search for BTC2937 in display 
[Zurich CA]- 21:24:24 : Search for flight in display 
[ATCO_Zurich_RP] - 21:24:36 : monitoring OTHER 
[Zurich CA]- 21:24:40 : Search for flight in display 
[ATCO_Zurich_RP] - 21:24:56 : monitoring OTHER 
[Zurich CA]- 21:24:57 : Search for flight in display 
[ATCO_Zurich_RP] - 21:25:12 : monitoring OTHER 
[Zurich CA]- 21:25:15 : Read BTC2937 Flight Strip route 
[ATCO_Zurich_RP] - 21:25:16 : Radio Flight OTHER REQUEST chat 
[Zurich CA]- 21:25:17 : Read BTC2937 Flight Strip route 
[ATCO_Zurich_RP] - 21:25:44 : monitoring OTHER 
 
DHL	  exists	  Bergamo	  Airport	  sector	  and	  receives	  information	  about	  handoff	  to	  Zurich. 
[ATC_Display_Bergamo_Airport] - 21:25:51 : Flight DXH611 exits displayed 
sector 
[ATCO_Bergamo_Airport] - 21:25:52 : Radio Flight DXH611 REQUEST 
handoff [A320]	  -­‐	  21:25:54	  :	   Flight	  AEF1135	  Flying	  TURKHEIM	  Route	  [A320]	  -­‐	  21:25:54	  :	   Flight	  AEF1135	  Heading	  South-­‐West	  [A320]	  -­‐	  21:25:54	  :	   AirSpeed:	  320,	  Vertical	  Speed:	  0	  [A320]	  -­‐	  21:25:54	  :	   Altitude:	  9997.0	  
[Pilot_DHX611] - 21:26:01 : Flight DXH611 AGREE handoff 
[ATCO_Zurich_RP] - 21:26:05 : monitoring DXH611 
 
BTC	  now	  appears	   in	  Karlsruhe	  radar	  sector.	   	  ATCO	  handles	  another	  flight;	  DHL	  pilot	  
tunes	   to	   Zurich	   sector,	   informs	   ATCO	   of	   arrival,	   and	   ATCO	   confirms	   handoff.	   CA	  
provides	  AEF	  flight	  strip.	   
[ATC_Server_Karlsruhe_ARTCC] - 21:26:10 : Flight BTC2937 in Air Sector 
Karlsruhe ARTCC 
[ATCO_Zurich_RP] - 21:26:13 : monitoring OTHER 
[Pilot_DHX611] - 21:26:16 : tuning radio to 128.05 
[ATCO_Zurich_RP] - 21:26:17 : Radio Flight OTHER REQUEST chat 
[Pilot_DHX611] - 21:26:18 : Flight DXH611 INFORM flight 
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[ATCO_Zurich_RP] - 21:26:39 : Radio Flight DXH611 CONFIRM flight 
[Zurich CA]- 21:26:42 : Moving to ARTCC Zurich (LSAZ) ARFA Workstation 
[Zurich CA]- 21:26:46 : Handover AEF1135 Flight Strip 
[Zurich CA]- 21:26:48 : Moving to ARTCC Zurich (LSAZ) CA Workstation 
	  
ATCO	   sees	   DHL	   in	   display;	   DHL	   requests	   FL360;	   ATCO	   goes	   to	   ARFA	   (right	  
workstation)	  to	  read	  AEF	  flight	  strip,	   then	  returns	  to	   left	  workstation	  to	  responds	  to	  
DHL,	  confirms	  change,	  and	  marks	  the	  flight	  strip	  accordingly.	  Aircraft-­‐to-­‐ATCC	  radio	  
communication	  takes	  3	  seconds	  before	  beliefs	  get	  transferred,	  thus	  ATCO	  didn’t	  “hear”	  
request	   to	   change	   flight	   level	   before	   noticing	   AEF	   flight	   control	   strip	   at	   ARFA	  
workstation	  area	  (placed	  by	  the	  CA).	  	  
[ATCO_Zurich_RP] - 21:26:58 : monitoring DXH611 
[Pilot_DHX611] - 21:27:01 : Flight DXH611 REQUEST flightLevel 
[Pilot_DHX611] - 21:27:01 : Flight Level 36000.0 
[ATCO_Zurich_RP] - 21:27:02 : Moving to ARTCC Zurich (LSAZ) ARFA 
Workstation 
[ATCO_Zurich_RP] - 21:27:05 : Reading Flight Strip 
[ATCO_Zurich_RP] - 21:27:08 : Search for AEF1135 in display 
[ATCO_Zurich_RP] - 21:27:08 : Search for flight in display 
[ATCO_Zurich_RP] - 21:27:10 : Moving to ARTCC Zurich (LSAZ) South 
Workstation 
[ATCO_Zurich_RP] - 21:27:12 : Radio Flight DXH611 AGREE flightLevel [B757]	  -­‐	  21:27:27	  :	   Vertical	  Speed:	  0	  [B757]	  -­‐	  21:27:27	  :	   Altitude:	  26063.0	  
[ATCO_Zurich_RP] - 21:27:30 : Update DXH611 LOKTA Route on flight strip 
 
Returning	  to	  ARFA	  workstation,	  ATCO	  reads	  AEF	  flight	  strip,	  recognizes	  that	  the	  route	  
requires	  his	  coordination	  with	  control	  tower,	  and	  attempts	  handoff	  by	  phone	   
[ATCO_Zurich_RP] - 21:27:31 : Moving to ARTCC Zurich (LSAZ) ARFA 
Workstation 
[ATCO_Zurich_RP] - 21:27:32 : Read AEF1135 Flight Strip route 
[ATCO_Zurich_RP] - 21:27:42 : Pick-up & Dialing Phone 
 
This	  is	  the	  workframe	  for	  the	  phone	  attempt…	  
// group AirTrafficApproachControlGroup 
workframe Coordinate_Flight_Approach_Airport { 
 priority: 40; 
 variables: // omitted here for brevity 
 when(knownval(current.radioUsed = unknown) and 
  knownval(current.phoneUsed = unknown) and 
  knownval(flight.status = FlightStatus_Descent) and 
  knownval(flight.cleared = false) and 
  knownval(flight.handoff = false) and 
  knownval(flight.handoffCompletedOn = unknown) and // handoff has not occurred 
  knownval(star.runway = flight.runwayArrival) and 
  knownval(airportSector = star.airportAirSpace) and 
  knownval(myPhone.location = current.location) and 
  knownval(airportPhone = airportSector.phoneNumber) and 
  knownval(current.numberRetriesLeft > 0) and // initial belief allows three attempts 
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  knownval(attempts = current.numberRetriesLeft - 1)) 
 do { 
  conclude((current.generalizedFunction = Manage_Communication), fc:0); 
  conclude((current.commReason = "approach handoff"), fc:0); 
  conclude((current.commPerformative = "REQUEST"), fc:0); 
  coordinateFlightApproach(flight, airportSector, myPhone, airportPhone); 




Meanwhile	  BTC	  flight	  enters	  the	  Zurich	  sector;	  CA	  provides	  the	  flight	  strip.	  ATCO’s	  call	  
is	   unsuccessful;	   he	   hangs	   up	   and	   returns	   to	   left	   workstation	   to	   read	   the	   BTC	   flight	  
strip. 
[ATC_Server_Zurich_ARTCC] - 21:27:55 : Flight BTC2937 in Air Sector 
Zurich East ARTCC 
[ATCO_Zurich_RP] - 21:28:03 : Hang-up Phone 
[ATCO_Zurich_RP] - 21:28:09 : Pick-up & Dialing Phone 
[Zurich CA]- 21:28:11 : Moving to ARTCC Zurich (LSAZ) South Workstation 
[Zurich CA]- 21:28:15 : Handover BTC2937 Flight Strip 
[Zurich CA]- 21:28:18 : Moving to ARTCC Zurich (LSAZ) CA Workstation 
[ATCO_Zurich_RP] - 21:28:28 : Hang-up Phone 
 
ATCO’s	  gives	  priority	  to	  reading	  flight	  strip	  over	  trying	  the	  phone	  call	  again.	  
[ATCO_Zurich_RP] - 21:28:29 : Moving to ARTCC Zurich (LSAZ) South 
Workstation 
[ATCO_Zurich_RP] - 21:28:31 : Reading Flight Strip 
[ATCO_Zurich_RP] - 21:28:33 : Search for BTC2937 in display 
[ATCO_Zurich_RP] - 21:28:33 : Search for flight in display 
[ATCO_Zurich_RP] - 21:29:02 : Read BTC2937 Flight Strip route 
 
AEF	   flight	  progresses	   to	  next	   segment.	  ATCO	  attempts	   to	   call	   Friedrichshafen	  again,	  
fails,	  and	  handles	  another	  flight.	   [A320]	  -­‐	  21:29:06	  :	   Flight	  AEF1135	  Flying	  KEMPTEN	  Route	  [A320]	  -­‐	  21:29:06	  :	   Flight	  AEF1135	  Heading	  South-­‐South-­‐West	  [A320]	  -­‐	  21:29:06	  :	   AirSpeed:	  320,	  Vertical	  Speed:	  -­‐26	  [A320]	  -­‐	  21:29:06	  :	   Altitude:	  9841.0	  
[ATCO_Zurich_RP] - 21:29:17 : Pick-up & Dialing Phone 
 
The	  Karlsruhe	  ATCO	  provides	  information	  to	  AEF	  for	  handoff	  to	  Zurich.	  	  Zurich	  ATCO’s	  
call	  fails	  again;	  he	  handles	  another	  flight. 
[ATCO K]- 21:29:32 : Radio Flight AEF1135 REQUEST handoff 
[ATCO_Zurich_RP] - 21:29:33 : Hang-up Phone 
[ATCO_Zurich_RP] - 21:29:36 : monitoring OTHER 
[ATCO_Zurich_RP] - 21:29:39 : Radio Flight OTHER REQUEST chat 
[Pilot_AEF1135] - 21:29:44 : Flight AEF1135 AGREE handoff 
 
AEF	  flight	  arrives	  in	  Zurich	  ARFA	  sector;	  AEF	  informs	  ATCO	  of	  arrival,	  who	  tells	  him	  to	  
wait	  then	  confirms	  handoff	  after	  flight	  appears	  in	  ARFA	  radar	  display. 
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[ATC_Server_Zurich_ARTCC] - 21:29:52 : Flight AEF1135 in Air Sector 
Zurich ARFA ARTCC 
[Pilot_AEF1135] - 21:29:58 : tuning radio to 119.92 
[Pilot_AEF1135] - 21:30:00 : Flight AEF1135 INFORM flight 
[ATCO_Zurich_RP] - 21:30:08 : Moving to ARTCC Zurich (LSAZ) ARFA 
Workstation 
[ATCO_Zurich_RP] - 21:30:10 : Radio Flight AEF1135 INFORM hold_off 
[ATCO_Zurich_RP] - 21:30:31 : Search for flight in display 
[ATCO_Zurich_RP] - 21:30:55 : Radio Flight AEF1135 CONFIRM flight 
[ATCO_Zurich_RP] - 21:31:20 : monitoring AEF1135 
[ATCO_Munich_ARTCC] - 21:31:23 : Radio Flight BTC2937 REQUEST 
handoff 
 
ATCO	  moves	  out	  of	  work	  area	  where	  radar	  display	   is	   located	   to	  higher-­‐level	  area	   to	  
tell	   (Brahms	   “broadcast,”	   an	   outloud	   utterance)	   CA	   that	   alternate	   airport	   phone	  
number	  is	  needed.	  
[ATCO_Zurich_RP] - 21:31:23 : Moving out of work area 
 
BTC	  exits	  Munich	  sector	   
[ATC_Display_Munich_ARTCC] - 21:31:27 : Flight BTC2937 exits displayed 
sector [A320]	  -­‐	  21:31:27	  :	   Flight	  AEF1135	  Flying	  TOD	  Friedrichshafen	  Route	  [A320]	  -­‐	  21:31:27	  :	   Flight	  AEF1135	  Heading	  West-­‐South-­‐West	  [A320]	  -­‐	  21:31:27	  :	   AirSpeed:	  300,	  Vertical	  Speed:	  -­‐26	  [A320]	  -­‐	  21:31:27	  :	   Altitude:	  7768.0	  
 
After	  three	  phone	  attempts,	  ATCO	  requests	  an	  alternate	  number	  from	  the	  CA. 
[ATCO_Zurich_RP] - 21:31:28 : REQUEST alternate_phone 
[ATCO_Zurich_RP] - 21:31:30 : Moving to ARTCC Zurich (LSAZ) ARFA 
Workstation 
[ATCO_Zurich_RP] - 21:31:32 : Moving to ARTCC Zurich (LSAZ) South 
Workstation 
[Zurich CA]- 21:31:33 : Moving to ARTCC Zurich (LSAZ) Manager 
Workstation 
	  
ATCO	   handles	   another	   flight	   while	   BTC	   receives	   information	   for	   Zurich	   handoff,	  
informs	  Zurich	  ATCO,	  who	  confirms. 
[ATCO_Zurich_RP] - 21:31:34 : monitoring OTHER 
[Pilot_BTC2937] - 21:31:36 : Flight BTC2937 AGREE handoff 
[Zurich CA]- 21:31:38 : Moving to ARTCC Zurich (LSAZ) South Workstation 
[ATCO_Zurich_RP] - 21:31:38 : Radio Flight OTHER REQUEST chat 
[Zurich CA]- 21:31:41 : PROPOSE alternate_phone 
[Pilot_BTC2937] - 21:31:51 : tuning radio to 128.05 
[Zurich CA]- 21:31:51 : Moving to ARTCC Zurich (LSAZ) CA Workstation 
[Pilot_BTC2937] - 21:31:53 : Flight BTC2937 INFORM flight 
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[ATCO_Zurich_RP] - 21:32:03 : Radio Flight BTC2937 CONFIRM flight [B757]	  -­‐	  21:32:12	  :	   Vertical	  Speed:	  0	  [B757]	  -­‐	  21:32:12	  :	   Altitude:	  36041.0	  
[ATCO_Zurich_RP] - 21:32:24 : monitoring BTC2937 
 
ATCO	  attempts	  to	  use	  the	  alternate	  number	  provided	  by	  the	  CA	  and	  fails.	  DHL	  arrives	  
in	  Zurich	  and	  Karlsruhe	  radar	  display	  sectors.	  ATCO	  moves	  back	  to	  handle	  AEF	  flight,	  
then	  returns	  to	   left	  workstation	  to	  handle	  another	   flight.	  Karlsruhe	  receives	  the	  DHL	  
flight	  strip. 
[ATCO_Zurich_RP] - 21:32:33 : Pick-up & Dialing Phone 
[ATC_Server_Zurich_ARTCC] - 21:32:41 : Flight DXH611 in Air Sector 
Zurich East ARTCC 
[ATCO_Zurich_RP] - 21:32:51 : Hang-up Phone 
[ATC_Server_Karlsruhe_ARTCC] - 21:32:55 : Flight DXH611 in Air Sector 
Karlsruhe ARTCC 
[ATCO_Zurich_RP] - 21:32:55 : Moving to ARTCC Zurich (LSAZ) ARFA 
Workstation 
[ATCO_Zurich_RP] - 21:32:57 : monitoring AEF1135 
[ATCO_Zurich_RP] - 21:32:59 : Moving to ARTCC Zurich (LSAZ) South 
Workstation 
[ATCO_Zurich_RP] - 21:33:01 : monitoring OTHER 
[ATCO_Zurich_RP] - 21:33:04 : Radio Flight OTHER REQUEST chat 
[ATCO Karlsruhe]- 21:33:05 : Wait for Flight Strip printout 
[ATCO Karlsruhe]- 21:33:07 : Search for DXH611 in display 
[ATCO Karlsruhe]- 21:33:07 : Reading Flight Strip 
[ATCO Karlsruhe]- 21:33:09 : Read DHX611 Flight Strip route 
 
Following	  simulates	  that	  ATCO	  could	  apprehend	  separation	  problem	  if	  he	  monitors	  the	  
left	   workstation	   radar	   display.	   However,	   he	   is	   first	   busy	   handling	   another	   flight	  
handoff… 
[ATCC Z Display SE]- 21:33:10 : BTC - DHL lateral separation: 26.46 
[ATCC Z Display SE]- 21:33:18 : BTC - DHL lateral separation: 25.27 
[ATCO_Zurich_RP] - 21:33:25 : monitoring OTHER 
[ATCO_Zurich_RP] - 21:33:27 : Radio Flight OTHER REQUEST chat 
[ATC_Display_Munich_ARTCC] - 21:33:42 : Flight AEF1135 exits displayed 
sector 
[ATCC Z Display SE]- 21:33:45 : BTC - DHL lateral separation: 19.36 
 
With	   handoff	   of	   AEF	   to	   Friedrichshafen	   still	  most	   urgent,	   ATCO	   does	   not	   detect	   the	  
separation	  issue,	  but	  rather	  moves	  to	  ARFA	  workstation	  and	  suggests	  that	  AEF	  simply	  
contact	  the	  control	  tower	  (thus	  skipping	  protocol	  step	  of	  ATCO	  informing	  tower	  first).	  
AEF	  agrees	  and	  proceeds. 
[ATCO_Zurich_RP] - 21:33:49 : Moving to ARTCC Zurich (LSAZ) ARFA 
Workstation 
[ATCO_Zurich_RP] - 21:33:54 : Radio Flight AEF1135 REQUEST handoff 
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[Pilot_AEF1135] - 21:33:56 : Flight AEF1135 REQUEST arrival 
[Pilot_AEF1135] - 21:34:08 : Flight AEF1135 AGREE handoff 
[ATCC Z Display SE]- 21:34:09 : BTC - DHL lateral separation: 15.25 
 
The	  higher	  priority	  handoff	  complete,	  ATCO	  returns	  to	  left	  workstation	  and	  monitors	  
the	  radar,	  finally	  detecting	  the	  loss	  of	  separation	  between	  the	  DHL	  and	  BTC	  (now	  less	  
than	  15	  nm). 
[ATCO_Zurich_RP] - 21:34:20 : Moving to ARTCC Zurich (LSAZ) South 
Workstation 
[Pilot_AEF1135] - 21:34:22 : tuning radio to 124.35 
[ATCO_Zurich_RP] - 21:34:22 : monitoring BTC2937 
[Pilot_AEF1135] - 21:34:24 : Flight AEF1135 INFORM flight 
[ATCO_Zurich_RP] - 21:34:26 : See Loss of Separation between DXH611 and 
BTC2937 
 
This	  is	  the	  workframe	  for	  checking	  loss	  of	  separation	  (logic	  is	  discussed	  in	  Section	  
9.2)…	  
 
// group AirTrafficControllerOfficerGroup 
workframe Check_Flights_Loss_Of_Separation { 
 priority: 100; 
 variables: // omitted for brevity 
 when(knownval(current.radioUsed = unknown) and 
  knownval(current.phoneUsed = unknown) and 
  knownval(plane.flight = flight) and 
  known(flight.sectorFrequency ) and 
  unknown(flight.flightInBoundary ) and 
  knownval(flight.isFlightClosestCrossing = true) and 
  knownval(flight.flightClosest = otherFlight) and 
  knownval(otherPlane.flight = otherFlight) and 
  known(otherFlight.sectorFrequency ) and 
  knownval(flightNum = flight.flightNumber) and 
  knownval(otherFlightNum = otherFlight.flightNumber) and 
  knownval(atcDisplayLocation = atcDisplay.location) and 
  knownval(atcDisplay airSectors flight.airSector) and 
  knownval(atcDisplay.minLateralSeparation > flight.flightLateralSeparation) and 
  knownval(atcDisplay.minVerticalSeparation > flight.flightVerticalSeparation)) 
 do { 
  printlnWithSimTime_ss("Check Loss of Separation between %1 and %2", flightNum, 
otherFlightNum); 




In	  this	  simulation	  run,	  choice	  of	   flight	  to	   inform	  was	  random;	  ATCO	  chose	  to	  contact	  
DHL	  and	  based	  on	  flight	  route	  radios	  for	  them	  to	  descend	  1500	  feet. 
[ATCO_Zurich_RP] - 21:34:26 : Reading DXH611 flight strip 
[ATCO_Zurich_RP] - 21:34:28 : Request DXH611 Descend to next route flight 
level 
 
Workframe	  that	  determines	  instruction	  to	  descend	  based	  on	  control	  strip	  information	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(logic	  is	  discussed	  in	  Section	  9.2)…	  
 
// group AirTrafficControllerOfficerGroup, composite_activity resolvePlanesInConflict 
workframe Request_Descend_Next_Flight_Level { 
 variables: 
  forone(FlightProgressStrip) strip; 
  forone(BaseAreaDef) stripLoc; 
  forone(FlightPlan) plan; 
  forone(FlightSegment) route; 
  forone(FlightSegment) nextRoute; 
  forone(double) fl; 
  forone(double) newFL; 
 when(knownval(current.commReason != "descend") and 
  knownval(current.commReason != "descend_faster") and 
  knownval(current.commReason != "climb") and 
  knownval(current.commReason != "climb_faster") and 
  knownval(pilot.commReason != "tcas_descent") and 
  knownval(route = flight.route) and // current flight segement or route 
  knownval(plan.flight = flight) and 
  knownval(stripLoc = strip.location) and 
  knownval(strip.flightPlan = plan) and 
  knownval(strip routes nextRoute) and 
  knownval(nextRoute != route) and 
  knownval(nextRoute.flightLevel < route.flightLevel) and 
  knownval(fl = route.flightLevel) and 
  knownval(newFL = fl - current.heightSeparation)) 
 do { 
  printlnWithSimTime_s("Request %1 Descend to next route flight level", flightNumber); 
  conclude((route.flightLevel = newFL), fc:0); 
  conclude((current.flight = flight), fc:0); 
  conclude((current.commReceiver = pilot), fc:0); 
  conclude((current.commReason = "descend"), fc:0); 
  conclude((pilot.commReason = "descend"), fc:0); // to remember advise to pilot 
  conclude((current.commPerformative = "REQUEST"), fc:0); 
  radioFlight(radio, flight, true, 1, 2, true); // give new route level 




[ATCO_Zurich_RP] - 21:34:28 : Radio Flight DXH611 REQUEST descend 
[ATCO_Zurich_RP] - 21:34:28 : Flight Level 34500.0 
	  
Friedrichshafen	   confirms	   the	   handoff	  with	   AEF.	   TCAS	   alerts	   traffic	   in	   both	   BTC	   and	  
DHL	  cockpits	  with	  47	  seconds	  to	  collision	  (vertical	  TAU	  is	  zero	  because	  the	  planes	  are	  
essentially	  at	  the	  same	  altitude). 
[ATCO_Friedrichshafen_Airport] - 21:34:32 : Radio Flight AEF1135 CONFIRM 
flight [TCAS_BTC2937]	  -­‐	  21:34:33	  :	   Traffic!	  Traffic!	  [TCAS_BTC2937]	  -­‐	  21:34:33	  :	   TCAS	  TA!	  Range	  Tau:	  47,	  Vertical	  Tau:	  0	  [TCAS_DHX611]	  -­‐	  21:34:33	  :	   Traffic!	  Traffic!	  [TCAS_DHX611]	  -­‐	  21:34:33	  :	   TCAS	  TA!	  Range	  Tau:	  47,	  Vertical	  Tau:	  0	  [TCAS_BTC2937]	  -­‐	  21:34:33	  :	   Separations	  Lateral:	  10.63	  nm	  Vertical	  :	  -­‐2.0	  ft	  [TCAS_DHX611]	  -­‐	  21:34:33	  :	   Separations	  Lateral:	  10.63	  nm	  Vertical	  :	  2.0	  ft	  [TCAS_BTC2937]	  -­‐	  21:34:37	  :	   TCAS	  TA!	  Range	  Tau:	  41,	  Vertical	  Tau:	  0	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[TCAS_DHX611]	  -­‐	  21:34:37	  :	   TCAS	  TA!	  Range	  Tau:	  41,	  Vertical	  Tau:	  0	  [ATCC	  Z	  Display	  SE]-­‐	  21:34:37	  :	   BTC	  -­‐	  DHL	  lateral	  separation:	  9.5	  [TCAS_BTC2937]	  -­‐	  21:34:41	  :	   TCAS	  TA!	  Range	  Tau:	  38,	  Vertical	  Tau:	  0	  [TCAS_DHX611]	  -­‐	  21:34:41	  :	   TCAS	  TA!	  Range	  Tau:	  38,	  Vertical	  Tau:	  0	  
 
In	   this	  particular	  model	  version	   the	  DHL	  pilots	   take	  19	   seconds	   to	   respond	   to	  ATCO,	  
subsequently	  modified	  to	  5	  seconds.	  AEF	  makes	  approach	  for	  landing. 
[Pilot_DHX611] - 21:34:47 : Auto-Pilot Off [A320]	  -­‐	  21:34:47	  :	   Flight	  AEF1135	  Flying	  Friedrichshafen	  NDB	  Route	  [A320]	  -­‐	  21:34:47	  :	   Flight	  AEF1135	  Heading	  West-­‐South-­‐West	  [A320]	  -­‐	  21:34:47	  :	   AirSpeed:	  300,	  Vertical	  Speed:	  0	  [A320]	  -­‐	  21:34:47	  :	   Altitude:	  6871.0	  
[Pilot_DHX611] - 21:34:47 : Push Control Column to Descend 
 
With	  TAU	  now	  at	  35	  seconds,	  TCAS	  now	  informs	  BTC	  to	  climb	  and	  DHL	  to	  descend. [TCAS_BTC2937]	  -­‐	  21:34:49	  :	   Climb!	  Climb!	  [TCAS_BTC2937]	  -­‐	  21:34:49	  :	   TCAS	  RA!	  Range	  Tau:	  35,	  Vertical	  Tau:	  0	  [TCAS_BTC2937]	  -­‐	  21:34:49	  :	   Separations	  Lateral:	  8.38	  nm	  Vertical	  :	  1.0	  ft	  [TCAS_BTC2937]	  -­‐	  21:34:50	  :	   TCAS	  RA!	  Range	  Tau:	  35,	  Vertical	  Tau:	  0	  [TCAS_DHX611]	  -­‐	  21:34:50	  :	   Descend!	  Descend!	  [TCAS_DHX611]	  -­‐	  21:34:50	  :	   TCAS	  RA!	  Range	  Tau:	  35,	  Vertical	  Tau:	  0	  [TCAS_DHX611]	  -­‐	  21:34:50	  :	   Separations	  Lateral:	  8.38	  nm	  Vertical	  :	  -­‐1.0	  ft	  [TCAS_DHX611]	  -­‐	  21:34:51	  :	   TCAS	  RA!	  Range	  Tau:	  35,	  Vertical	  Tau:	  0	  
 
DHL	  pilots	  recognize	  they	  are	  in	  TCAS	  descent	  (which	  they	  already	  started	  under	  ATCO	  
direction)	  and	   inform	  ATCO.	   	  BTC	  reaches	   -­‐31	   ft/sec	  vertical	  change	   in	  velocity;	  AEF	  
requests	   arrival	   at	   airport;	   ATCO	   is	   monitoring	   the	   two	   flights	   on	   collision	   course	  
(“tracking”	  indicates	  he	  is	  determining	  whether	  to	  issue	  expedite,	  which	  is	  unnecessary	  
here). 
[Pilot_DHX611] - 21:34:53 : Execute TCAS Advisory to Descend 
[Pilot_DHX611] - 21:34:54 : Flight DXH611 INFORM TCAS_descent [TCAS_BTC2937]	  -­‐	  21:34:54	  :	   TCAS	  RA!	  Range	  Tau:	  27,	  Vertical	  Tau:	  0	  
[ATCO_Friedrichshafen_Airport] - 21:34:54 : monitoring AEF1135 [TCAS_DHX611]	  -­‐	  21:34:55	  :	   TCAS	  RA!	  Range	  Tau:	  24,	  Vertical	  Tau:	  0	  [B757]	  -­‐	  21:34:56	  :	   Vertical	  Speed:	  -­‐31	  [B757]	  -­‐	  21:34:56	  :	   Altitude:	  35999.0	  
[Pilot_AEF1135] - 21:34:57 : Flight AEF1135 REQUEST arrival 
[ATCO_Zurich_RP] - 21:34:57 : monitoring BTC2937 in conflict [TCAS_BTC2937]	  -­‐	  21:34:58	  :	   TCAS	  RA!	  Range	  Tau:	  21,	  Vertical	  Tau:	  0	  [TCAS_DHX611]	  -­‐	  21:34:59	  :	   TCAS	  RA!	  Range	  Tau:	  21,	  Vertical	  Tau:	  0	  
[ATCO_Zurich_RP] - 21:35:01 : tracking DXH611 in conflict [TCAS_BTC2937]	  -­‐	  21:35:02	  :	   TCAS	  RA!	  Range	  Tau:	  19,	  Vertical	  Tau:	  3	  [TCAS_DHX611]	  -­‐	  21:35:03	  :	   TCAS	  RA!	  Range	  Tau:	  19,	  Vertical	  Tau:	  6	  
[ATCC Z Display SE]- 21:35:03 : BTC - DHL lateral separation: 5.01 [TCAS_BTC2937]	  -­‐	  21:35:06	  :	   TCAS	  RA!	  Range	  Tau:	  16,	  Vertical	  Tau:	  9	  [TCAS_DHX611]	  -­‐	  21:35:07	  :	   TCAS	  RA!	  Range	  Tau:	  13,	  Vertical	  Tau:	  9	  
[ATCO_Friedrichshafen_Airport] - 21:35:07 : Radio Flight AEF1135 AGREE 
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arrival [TCAS_BTC2937]	  -­‐	  21:35:10	  :	   TCAS	  RA!	  Range	  Tau:	  10,	  Vertical	  Tau:	  12	  [TCAS_DHX611]	  -­‐	  21:35:11	  :	   TCAS	  RA!	  Range	  Tau:	  10,	  Vertical	  Tau:	  12	  [TCAS_BTC2937]	  -­‐	  21:35:14	  :	   TCAS	  RA!	  Range	  Tau:	  7,	  Vertical	  Tau:	  15	  [TCAS_DHX611]	  -­‐	  21:35:15	  :	   TCAS	  RA!	  Range	  Tau:	  7,	  Vertical	  Tau:	  18	  [TCAS_BTC2937]	  -­‐	  21:35:18	  :	   TCAS	  RA!	  Range	  Tau:	  5,	  Vertical	  Tau:	  21	  
[ATCO_Zurich_RP] - 21:35:18 : tracking BTC2937 in conflict [TCAS_DHX611]	  -­‐	  21:35:19	  :	   TCAS	  RA!	  Range	  Tau:	  2,	  Vertical	  Tau:	  21	  [TCAS_BTC2937]	  -­‐	  21:35:22	  :	   TCAS	  RA!	  Range	  Tau:	  0,	  Vertical	  Tau:	  24	  [TCAS_DHX611]	  -­‐	  21:35:23	  :	   TCAS	  RA!	  Range	  Tau:	  0,	  Vertical	  Tau:	  24	  
 
When	   range	   (lateral)	   TAU	   drops	   to	   zero	   and	   vertical	   TAU	   is	   greater	   than	   zero,	   the	  
planes	  have	  flown	  past	  each	  other,	  as	  indicated	  by	  these	  descriptions. [T154]-­‐	  21:35:25	  :	   BTC	  2937	  West	  of	  Uberlingen!	  [B757]	  -­‐	  21:35:25	  :	   DHL	  611	  North	  of	  Uberlingen!	  [TCAS_BTC2937]	  -­‐	  21:35:26	  :	   TCAS	  RA!	  Range	  Tau:	  0,	  Vertical	  Tau:	  27	  [TCAS_DHX611]	  -­‐	  21:35:27	  :	   TCAS	  RA!	  Range	  Tau:	  0,	  Vertical	  Tau:	  30	  
[ATCC Z Display SE]- 21:35:27 : BTC - DHL lateral separation: 0.52 [TCAS_BTC2937]	  -­‐	  21:35:30	  :	   TCAS	  RA!	  Range	  Tau:	  0,	  Vertical	  Tau:	  33	  [TCAS_DHX611]	  -­‐	  21:35:31	  :	   TCAS	  RA!	  Range	  Tau:	  0,	  Vertical	  Tau:	  33	  
[ATCO_Zurich_RP] - 21:35:35 : monitoring DXH611 in conflict [TCAS_BTC2937]	  -­‐	  21:35:36	  :	   TCAS	  TA!	  Range	  Tau:	  0,	  Vertical	  Tau:	  36	  
[ATCO_Zurich_RP] - 21:35:36 : monitoring BTC2937 in conflict [TCAS_DHX611]	  -­‐	  21:35:37	  :	   TCAS	  TA!	  Range	  Tau:	  0,	  Vertical	  Tau:	  36	  
 
ATCO	  handles	  another	  flight;	  DHL	  informs	  ATCO	  that	  the	  conflict	  had	  cleared. 
[ATCO_Zurich_RP] - 21:35:37 : monitoring OTHER [TCAS_BTC2937]	  -­‐	  21:35:40	  :	   TCAS	  TA!	  Range	  Tau:	  5,	  Vertical	  Tau:	  42	  [B757]	  -­‐	  21:35:40	  :	   Vertical	  Speed:	  0	  [B757]	  -­‐	  21:35:40	  :	   Altitude:	  34697.0	  
[Pilot_DHX611] - 21:35:41 : Flight DXH611 INFORM conflict_cleared 
[ATCO_Zurich_RP] - 21:35:41 : Radio Flight OTHER REQUEST chat 
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27 Appendix:	  Brahms	  Probabilistic	  Constructs	  Affecting	  
Simulation	  Variability	  	  Brahms	   models	   include	   probabilistic	   events	   such	   that	   running	   a	   given	   model	  multiple	  times	  may	  produce	  different	  outcomes.	  Variances	  are	  possible	  in	  durations	  and	   beliefs,	   which	   affects	   both	   decisions	   made	   by	   agents	   and	   circumstantial	  temporal-­‐spatial	  interactions	  (e.g.,	  if	  an	  agent	  isn’t	  at	  a	  location	  at	  a	  particular	  time,	  he	  might	  not	   detect	   an	   alarm).	  Table	  27-­‐1	   lists	   the	  Brahms	  model	   constructs	   that	  may	   have	   probabilistic	   values.	   	   Following	   sections	   enumerate	   the	   variables	   in	  Brahms-­‐GÜM.	  	  
Table	  27-­‐1:	  Probabilistic	  variability	  in	  action	  durations	  and	  beliefs	  in	  Brahms	  
models	  Primitive	  Activity	  Duration	   The	  duration	  of	  the	  activity	  can	  be	  defined	  to	  be	  a	  fixed	  amount	  of	  time	  or	  a	  random	  amount	  of	  time.	  	  For	  a	  fixed	  time,	  the	  random	  facet	  is	  set	  to	  false	  and	  the	  max-­‐duration	  attribute	  is	  set	  (seconds).	  	  To	  define	  a	  random	  amount	  of	  time,	  the	  random	  facet	  is	  set	  to	  true,	  the	  min-­‐duration	  	  and	  the	  max-­‐duration	  facets	  are	  set	  (seconds).	  Detectable	  When	   Detectable	  may	  be	  checked	  after	  every	  fact/belief	  change	  or	  at	  a	  specified	  percent	  completion	  time	  of	  
the	  workframe	  or	  activity,	  varying	  from	  0%	  (start)	  to	  100%	  (end)	  completion.	  Detectable	  Probability	  	  (WF	  action,	  Composite	  Activity,	  &	  End-­‐Condition	  to	  Complete	  or	  Abort	  Composite	  Activity)	  
The	  fact	  Detect-­‐Certainty	  (DC)	  is	  an	  unsigned	  number	  [0,	  100],	  representing	  the	  probability	  that	  the	  
fact(s)	  will	  be	  detected	  with	  a	  normal	  distribution.	  The	  default,	  if	  the	  detect-­‐certainty	  is	  not	  specified,	  is	  100. Consequence	  Probability	  	   Belief-­‐Certainty	  (BC)	  and	  Fact-­‐Certainty	  (FC)	  are	  an	  unsigned	  integer	  [0,	  100]	  representing	  probability	  
(normal	  distribution)	  that	  the	  proposition	  will	  be	  
concluded.	  Workframe	  priority	  <=	  Composite/Primitive	  Activity	  	  Priority	   Activities	  can	  be	  assigned	  a	  priority.	  The	  priorities	  of	  activities	  in	  a	  workframe	  are	  used	  to	  define	  the	  priority	  of	  a	  workframe.	  The	  workframe	  will	  get	  the	  priority	  of	  the	  activity	  with	  the	  highest	  priority	  defined	  in	  the	  workframe.	  (Used	  conventionally	  to	  order	  a	  composite	  activity	  into	  an	  ordered	  process	  of	  WFs.)	  Thoughtframe	  priority	   When	  multiple	  TFs	  are	  available	  to	  be	  fired	  at	  the	  same	  time,	  the	  one	  with	  the	  highest	  priority	  will	  fire	  first.	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The	   following	   tables	   show	   variability	   in	   durations	   between	   minimums	   and	  maximums	  of	  activities	  for	  Air	  Traffic	  Controllers	  and	  Pilots.	  	  
Table	  27-­‐2	  Air	  Traffic	  Controller	  and	  Pilot	  Activities	  







primitive	   Talk	   1	   3	   Talking	  between	  ATCOs	  or	  pilots	  communicate	   sendCommunication	   1	   3	   ATCO	  to	  ATCO	  or	  pilot	  to	  pilot	  communications	  communicate	   sendCommunicationViaDevice	   3	   6	   ATCO	  communicates	  using	  a	  device	  like	  a	  phone.	  ATCO	  to	  pilot	  using	  radio.	  
primitive	   listenToRadio	   1,6	   2,12	   Listening	  to	  radio	  like	  waiting	  for	  pilot	  response,	  etc.	  
move	   moveOverToRadio	   2	   4	   Move	  to	  where	  radio	  is	  located.	  
communicate	   sendMessageVia	  Radio	   2	   4	   ATCO	  or	  pilot	  communicates	  using	  radio.	  
communicate	   sendFlightCommunication	   3	   5	   Communicate	  flight	  information.	  	  
Table	  27-­‐3	  Air	  Traffic	  Controller	  Activities	  







Description	  communicate	   readScheduleClock	   1	   3	   Read	  time	  from	  clock	  move	   mv_ToLocation	   1,3	   3,8	   Move	  to	  location	  like	  workstation	  area,	  etc.	  primitive	   Situate	   2	   5	   Get	  familiar	  at	  a	  new	  work	  location	  primitive	   pickUpPhone	   1	   3,	  5	   ATCO	  picks	  up	  phone	  to	  make	  a	  call.	  primitive	   putDownPhone	   2	   4	   When	  hanging	  up	  phone	  at	  end	  of	  conversation,	  other	  phone	  is	  busy,	  etc.	  communicate	   listenToPhone	   10	   30,	  300	   Listening	  to	  phone.	  Get	  phone	  status	  =	  Free,	  Busy,	  etc.	  Interrupted	  (&	  ends)	  when	  phone	  is	  answered.	  primitive	   listenToRadio	   1,6	   2,12	   Listening	  to	  radio	  like	  waiting	  for	  pilot	  response,	  etc.	  move	   moveOverToRadio	   2	   4	   Move	  to	  where	  radio	  is	  located.	  communicate	   sendMessageVia	  Radio	   2	   4	   ATCO	  communicates	  using	  radio.	  Within	  composite	  activity	  talkOnRadio()	  communicate	   sendFlightPlan	   1	   5	   Send	  (File)	  flight	  plan	  to	  Automated	  Flight	  Service	  Station	  (AFSS)	  Computer	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communicate	   readPlanDetatils	   1	   5	   Read	  flight	  plan	  details	  like	  flight	  number,	  routes,	  etc.	  communicate	   readFlightDetails	   1	   5	   Read	  flight	  details	  like	  from	  airport,	  destination,	  etc.	  communicate	   readRouteDetails	   1	   3	   Read	  route	  waypoints,	  flight	  levels,	  etc.	  communicate	   sendFlight	  Communication	   3	   5	   ATCO	  communicates	  flight	  info.	  Workframes	  Request	  Approach	  Handoff,	  Agree	  Takeover	  On	  Phone,	  Refuse	  Takeover	  On	  Phone	  communicate	   checkRadio	   1	   3	   Check	  Radio	  is	  set	  to	  frequency.	  get	   getFlightProgress	  Strip	   1	   3	   Take	  flight	  progress	  strip	  before	  moving	  it	  put	   putFlightProgress	  Strip	   1	   3	   Put	  flight	  progress	  strip	  in	  area	  after	  moving	  it	  move	   moveWorkstation	  Area	   1,	  3	  	   3,	  6	   Move	  to	  workstation	  area	  where	  radar	  display,	  radio,	  etc.	  are	  located.	  move	   moveAirTraffic	  ControlArea	   2	   5	   Move	  out	  of	  workstation	  area	  which	  are	  sub-­‐areas	  of	  air	  traffic	  control	  area	  communicate	   monitorPlane	   2,	  3	  	   4,	  5	   Read	  plane	  information	  from	  radar	  screens.	  Workframe	  monitorFlight	  communicate	   monitorSector	   1,	  3	  	   3,	  5	   Read	  what	  planes	  are	  in	  sectors	  displayed.	  Workframes	  Search	  Flights	  In	  Display,	  Monitor	  For	  Flight	  Conflict,	  etc.	  communicate	   getPlaneInfo	   5	   10	   Read	  plane	  location	  coordinates,	  altitude,	  etc.	  information	  from	  radar	  display.	  In	  composite	  activity	  getPlaneFlightInfo.	  communicate	   getFlightInfo	   2	   4	   Read	  flight	  number,	  closest	  flight,	  etc.	  information	  from	  radar	  display.	  In	  composite	  activity	  getPlaneFlightInfo	  	  primitive	   Read	   1	   10	   Reading	  communicate	   configureATCDisplay	   1	   3	   Change	  ATC	  Display	  properties	  like	  turn	  on	  audio	  sound,	  etc.	  communicate	   readFlightDetails	   1	   5	   Read	  flight	  information,	  like	  flight	  number,	  etc.	  from	  flight	  strip.	  In	  composite	  activity	  readFlightProgressStrip	  communicate	   readRouteDetails	   1	   5	   Read	  route	  information,	  like	  waypoints,	  flight	  levels,	  etc.	  from	  flight	  strip.	  In	  composite	  activity	  readFlightProgressStrip.	  communicate	   readFlightSegment	  Info	   1	   3	   Read	  flight	  segment	  information.	  Similar	  to	  readRouteDetails	  but	  different	  information	  about	  route	  being	  read.	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communicate	   checkFlightInAir	  Sector	   2	   5	   Check	  flight	  in	  air	  sector	  displayed	  on	  radar	  display	  communicate	   giveATCDisplay	  Briefing	   3	   10	   Briefing	  ATCO	  taking	  over	  during	  handover	  to	  ATCO	  communicate	   sendAirSectorInfo	   3	   5	   Radio	  next	  air	  sector	  radio	  frequency	  to	  pilot	  during	  air	  sector	  handoff	  communicate	   sendFlightInfo	   1,	  2,	  5	   2,4,6	   Radio	  flight	  number.	  In	  composite	  activity	  radioFlight	  communicate	   sendFlightRouteInfo	   1,	  2,	  5	   2,4,6	   Radio	  flight	  level	  for	  route.	  In	  composite	  activity	  radioFlight	  communicate	   updateFlightRoute	   1	   3	   Update	  route	  flight	  level	  in	  flight	  strip.	  In	  composite_activity	  updateFlightProgressStrip	  communicate	   monitorFlightInfo	   2	   5	   Quick	  monitoring	  of	  flight	  in	  radar	  display	  -­‐	  shorter	  duration	  than	  monitorPlane	  communicate	   monitorPlaneIn	  Conflict	   1	   3	   Read	  conflicting	  planes'	  location	  coordinates,	  altitudes,	  etc.	  information	  from	  radar	  display.	  Workframe	  Monitor	  Plane	  In	  Conflict	  broadcast	   requestSector	  AlternatePhone	   2	   5	   ATCO	  asks	  out	  loud	  for	  alternate	  contact	  phone	  number.	  In	  composite	  activity	  requestAlternateAirSectorPhone	  communicate	   reportAlternate	  Phone	   2	   5	   Report	  if	  call	  using	  alternate	  phone	  number	  succeeded	  or	  failed.	  primitive	   lookForWorkArea	   1	   3	   Look	  for	  where	  other	  ATCOs	  are	  located.	  communicate	   informFlightStrip	   1	   5	   Inform	  ATCO	  flight	  strip	  is	  available	  and	  at	  workstation	  area	  communicate	   discussAlternate	  SectorContact	   10	   20	   Discuss	  about	  alternate	  contacts	  in	  other	  Air	  Traffic	  Control	  Centers	  communicate	   readAirSectorContactInfo	   2	   5	   Assistant	  reads	  alternate	  phone	  number	  contact	  from	  document	  communicate	   proposeAlternate	  PhoneNumber	   7	   10	   Assistant	  proposes	  ATCO	  use	  alternate	  contact	  phone	  number	  communicate	   giveFlightDetails	   5	   15	   ATCO	  communicates	  approaching	  flight's	  number,	  etc.	  information.	  In	  composite	  activity	  coordinateFlightApproach	  communicate	   givePlaneDetails	   5	   15	   ATCO	  communicates	  approaching	  flight's	  plane	  location,	  etc.	  information.	  In	  composite	  activity	  coordinateFlightApproach	  communicate	   readGPSInfo	   1	   3	   Read	  GPS	  information	  of	  waypoint	  communicate	   readWaypointInfo	   1	   3	   Read	  Waypoint	  information	  of	  SID	  or	  STAR	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communicate	   readSID	   5	   60	   Read	  Standard	  Instrument	  Departure	  (procedure	  for	  take-­‐off)	  communicate	   readSTAR	   5	   60	   Read	  Standard	  Terminal	  Arrival	  Procedure	  primitive	   checkRunwayStatus	   1	   3	   Check	  whether	  runway	  is	  available	  for	  take-­‐off	  or	  landing	  	  
Table	  27-­‐4	  Pilot	  Activities	  







Description	  primitive	   talk	   1	   3	   Talking.	  	  communicate	   sendCommunication	   1	   3	   Pilot	  to	  Pilot	  communications.	  communicate	   sendCommunicationViaDevice	   3	   6	   Pilot	  communicates	  using	  a	  device	  like	  radio.	  	  primitive	   listenToRadio	   1,6	   2,12	   Listening	  to	  radio	  like	  waiting	  for	  ATCO	  response,	  etc.	  move	   moveOverToRadio	   2	   4	   Move	  to	  where	  radio	  is	  located.	  communicate	   sendMessageVia	  Radio	   2	   4	   Pilot	  communicates	  using	  radio.	  Within	  composite	  activity	  talkOnRadio().	  primitive	   dialingSelector	   1	   5	   Dialing	  selectors	  on	  Mode	  Control	  Panel	  (MCP),	  changing	  radio	  frequency,	  etc.	  primitive	   pushingSwitch	   1	   2	   Pushing	  a	  switch	  on	  Mode	  Control	  Panel	  (MCP)	  primitive	   pushingControl	  Column	   3	   5	   Pushing	  Control	  Column	  (a.k.a.	  Yoke)	  to	  get	  plane	  to	  descend.	  primitive	   pullingControl	  Column	   3	   5	   Pulling	  Control	  Column	  (a.k.a.	  Yoke)	  to	  get	  plane	  to	  climb.	  communicate	   configureFlaps	   1	   2	   Pilot	  pushing	  on	  cockpit	  control	  column	  to	  extend	  or	  retract	  plane's	  flaps	  to	  climb	  or	  descend.	  communicate	   informAboutFlight	   1	   2	   Pilot	  communicates	  flight	  information,	  like	  flight	  number,	  etc.	  using	  Radio	  communicate	   readPrimaryFlight	  Display	   1,	  3,	  5,	  30	   3,	  6,	  10,	  60	   Read	  air	  speed,	  vertical	  speed	  &	  altitude	  displayed	  in	  Primary	  Flight	  Display	  (PFD)	  communicate	   pushVerticalNAV	  Switch	   1	   2	   Pushing	  Vertical	  Navigation	  switch	  on	  Mode	  Control	  Panel.	  Send	  altitude	  value	  communicate	   pushVerticalSpeed	  Switch	   1	   4	   Pushing	  Vertical	  Speed	  switch	  on	  Mode	  Control	  Panel.	  Send	  vertical	  speed	  value	  communicate	   pushSpeedSwitch	   1	   2	   Pushing	  Air	  Speed	  switch	  on	  Model	  Control	  Panel.	  Send	  air	  speed	  value	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communicate	   readMCPSettings	   1	   2,	  3	   Read	  Mode	  Control	  Panel	  settings	  like	  bearing,	  auto-­‐pilot	  on/off,	  etc.	  communicate	   readNavigation	  Display	   2,	  3	   5,	  8	   Read	  time	  &	  distance	  to	  waypoint	  in	  Navigation	  Display	  (ND).	  Durations	  depends	  on	  gpsUpdateRate	  of	  AircraftGPSReceiver.	  	  communicate	   readTCASInfo	   3	   4	   Read	  TCAS	  info	  displayed	  in	  Navigation	  Display	  communicate	   readRadioFrequency	   1	   2	   Read	  frequency	  setting	  of	  radio	  communicate	   switchAutoPilot	   1	   2	   Switch	  auto-­‐pilot	  on	  or	  off	  on	  Mode	  Control	  Panel.	  communicate	   tuneRadio	   1	   2	   Tune	  radio	  to	  frequency	  communicate	   getAltitudeInfo	   4	   9	   Read	  altitude	  info	  from	  Primary	  Flight	  Display	  (PFD).	  Durations	  depends	  on	  gpsUpdateRate	  of	  AircraftGPSReceiver.	  communicate	   readMCPVertical	  Speed	   1	   3	   Read	  Mode	  Control	  Panel	  setting	  for	  vertical	  speed.	  communicate	   readMCPAltitude	   1	   3	   Read	  Mode	  Control	  Panel	  setting	  for	  flight	  level.	  communicate	   directToWaypoint	   1	   5	   Set	  Control	  Display	  Unit	  to	  fly	  to	  waypoint	  communicate	   monitorWaypoint	   3	   5	   Read	  time	  &	  distance	  to	  waypoint	  in	  Navigation	  Display	  (ND).	  Durations	  depends	  on	  gpsUpdateRate	  of	  AircraftGPSReceiver.	  communicate	   skipWaypoint	   3	   5	   Update	  (program)	  flight	  plan	  in	  Control	  Display	  Unit	  (computer)	  to	  skip	  next	  waypoint.	  communicate	   requestDeparture	  Clearance	   1	   2	   Radio	  ATCO	  for	  permission	  to	  depart	  airport.	  Performed	  with	  composite	  activity	  talkOnRadio()	  communicate	   requestArrival	  Clearance	   1	   2	   Radio	  ATCO	  for	  permission	  to	  land	  on	  airport	  runway.	  Performed	  with	  composite	  activity	  talkOnRadio()	  communicate	   requestFlightLevel	  Clearance	   1	   2	   Radio	  ATCO	  for	  permission	  to	  change	  flight	  level/altitude.	  Perform	  with	  composite	  activity	  talkOnRadio()	  communicate	   acknowledgeHandoff	   1	   2	   Radio	  ATCO	  to	  agree	  to	  handoff.	  Perform	  with	  composite	  activity	  talkOnRadio()	  communicate	   pushHeadingSelector	   1	   2	   Pushing	  a	  selector	  on	  Mode	  Control	  Panel	  (MCP)	  communicate	   monitorHeading	   3	   5	   Read	  plane	  heading	  from	  Primary	  Flight	  Display	  (PFD).	  communicate	   monitorVertical	  Speed	   1	   5	   Read	  plane	  vertical	  speed	  from	  Primary	  Flight	  Display	  (PFD).	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communicate	   monitorAirspeed	   1	   5	   Read	  plane	  airspeed	  from	  Primary	  Flight	  Display	  (PFD).	  communicate	   changeGear	   3	   5	   Pilot	  setting	  gears	  down	  for	  landing	  or	  up	  for	  takeoff.	  communicate	   speedBrake	   3	   5	   Pilot	  applying	  speed	  brakes	  after	  landing	  plane	  to	  decrease	  plane's	  speed	  on	  runway.	  communicate	   getRouteInfo	   3	   5	   Pilot	  reading	  flight	  segment/route	  info.	  communicate	   readWaypointGPS	   1	   3	   Get	  GPS	  of	  Waypoint	  communicate	   readGPSInfo	   1	   3	   Get	  GPS	  coordinate	  latitude,	  longitude,	  altitude,	  etc.	  primitive	   briefing	   5	   10	   Briefing	  other	  pilots	  in	  cockpit.	  Workframe	  Perform	  Takeoff	  Briefing,	  Perform	  Approach	  Briefing	  communicate	   readWaypointInfo	   1	   3	   Read	  waypoint	  info	  from	  STAR.	  communicate	   readFlightSegment	  Info	   1	   3	   Read	  flight	  segment/route	  info	  from	  Control	  Display	  Unit	  (CDU)	  communicate	   reviewChecklist	   300	   420	   Review	  checklist	  for	  departure	  or	  landing.	  communicate	   turnOffAlert	   1	   2	   Pilot	  turning	  off	  alerts	  via	  Control	  Display	  Unit	  (CDU).	  communicate	   readFlightPlanDetails	   5	   8	   Get	  flight	  plan	  info	  like	  SID,	  STAR,	  flight	  segments,	  etc.	  communicate	   readFlightDetails	   15	   20	   Get	  flight	  details	  like	  arrival	  &	  departure	  time,	  airports,	  etc.	  communicate	   readFlightPlanRoute	   5	   8	   Get	  flight	  segment/route	  info	  like	  to	  &	  from	  waypoints,	  etc.	  communicate	   readSTAR	   15	   20	   Read	  Standard	  Terminal	  Arrival	  procedure	  (STAR)	  communicate	   readSID	   15	   20	   Read	  Standard	  Instrument	  Departure	  procedure	  (SID)	  communicate	   updateRouteInCDU	   3	   5	   Update	  (program)	  flight	  segment/route	  info	  in	  Control	  Display	  Unit	  (Computer).	  communicate	   monitorTCASInfo	   1,	  3	   3,	  8	   Read	  TCAS	  info	  about	  nearest	  flight,	  etc.	  from	  Navigation	  Display.	  Durations	  depends	  on	  gpsUpdateRate	  of	  AircraftGPSReceiver.	  	  communicate	   readVerticalRate	  Advice	   1	   2	   Read	  TCAS	  advice	  to	  climb	  or	  descend	  from	  Navigation	  Display	  communicate	   informATCAdvisory	   1	   2	   Inform	  ATCO	  on	  radio	  (talkOnRadio)	  about	  TCAS	  advisory	  to	  climb	  or	  descend	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27.1 Modifications	  to	  Brahms	  Engine	  for	  Compatibility	  with	  Automated	  
Verification	  Methods	  We	   made	   several	   modifications	   to	   the	   Brahms	   engine	   to	   enable	   managing	   the	  variability	   inherent	   in	  Brahms	  simulations,	  both	  for	  testing	  and	  refining	  the	  model	  as	  well	  as	  for	  applying	  model	  checking	  methods.	  	  	  The	  nature	  of	  Brahms	  variables	  is	  that	  a	  single	  model	  configuration	  (“scenario”)	  can	  produce	  different	  outcomes	  each	   time	   it	   is	   simulated.	   	   Further,	   the	   interactions	  of	  modeled	   people	   and	   systems	   in	   Brahms-­‐GÜM	   are	   sensitive	   to	   cumulative	   timing	  effects	   (e.g.,	   each	   flight	   handoff	   requires	   a	   certain	   number	   of	   seconds,	   which	   is	  variable,	  and	  the	  number	  of	   flights	  to	  be	  handled	  is	  also	  variable).	   	  This	  variability	  will	  generate	  different	  behavior	  sequences	  (“chains	  of	  events”)	  over	  multiple	  runs.	  	  	  It	   therefore	   became	   useful	   to	   allow	   the	   model	   builder	   to	   define	   a	   “seed”	   for	   the	  random	   number	   generator,	   such	   that	   every	   run	   with	   a	   given	   model	   would	   be	  identical.	   This	   of	   course	   facilitated	   understanding	   and	   debugging	   the	   simulation.	  	  	  This	  seed	  value	  is	  used	  by	  the	  Brahms	  virtual	  machine	  to	  generate	  the	  randomized	  duration	   for	   activities	   and	   to	   determine	   the	   certainty	   value	   for	   belief,	   fact,	   and	  detectables,	  as	  indicated	  in	  Table	  27-­‐1.	  The	  absence	  of	  this	  mechanism	  from	  Brahms	  heretofore	  demonstrates	  how	  the	  complexity	  and	  precision	  of	  Brahms-­‐GÜM	  exceeds	  any	  simulation	  we	  had	  previously	  constructed.	  In	  particular,	  we	  had	  usually	  used	  a	  discrete	   event	   cycle	   (clock	   tick)	   of	   3	   or	   5	   seconds,	   whereas	   we	   use	   1	   second	   in	  Brahms-­‐GÜM.	  	  One	  complication	  for	  model	  checking	  is	  that	  Brahms	  model	  builders	  have	  heretofore	  relied	  on	  textual	  order	  of	  WFs	  in	  definition	  files	  to	  determine	  the	  ordering	  in	  which	  WFs	   for	   a	   given	   activity	   are	   applied,	   a	   default	   of	   the	  Brahms	   engine.	  However,	   to	  make	  such	  semantics	  explicit,	  priorities	  are	  now	  assigned	  when	  order	  is	  important.	  Also,	   the	   engine	   now	   randomizes	   the	   selection	   of	   available	   workframes,	  thoughtframes,	  and	  interrupted	  workframes	  having	  the	  same	  priority.	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28 Appendix:	  Limitations	  of	  Brahms	  Framework	  The	  Brahms-­‐GÜM	  simulation	  exercised	   the	  Brahms	   framework	   to	  a	  greater	  extent	  than	   any	   previous	  model,	   combining	   every	  method	  we	   had	   previously	   developed,	  such	  as	  how	  to	  simulate	  reading	  a	  display,	  radio/phone	  conversations,	  moving	  in	  an	  office,	  and	  broadcast	  (“out	  loud”)	  communications.	   	  Simulating	  agent	  activities	  in	  a	  moving	   vehicle	   such	   as	   an	   automobile	   had	   been	   anticipated	   in	   the	   design	   of	   the	  language,	   but	  had	  never	  been	  attempted,	   let	   alone	   simulating	   flying	   an	  aircraft	   by	  manual	   and	   autopilot	   controls	   on	   a	  planned	   route.	   	  We	  had	  modeled	  displays	  but	  nothing	  as	  complicated	  as	  simulating	  radar	  of	  objects	  in	  motion.	  	  Not	  surprisingly	  a	  few	   limitations	   in	   the	   language	   were	   discovered,	   which	   are	   described	   in	   this	  appendix.	  
28.1 Perceiving	  Broadcast	  While	  Moving	  The	  built-­‐in	  “Move”	  activity	  is	  treated	  like	  any	  primitive	  activity	  in	  a	  Brahms	  model,	  which	   means	   that	   the	   agent	   cannot	   do	   anything	   else	   while	   the	   activity	   is	   being	  performed.	  In	  particular	  a	  broadcast	  while	  the	  agent	  is	  moving	  will	  not	  be	  detected	  by	   the	  moving	  agent	  because	  an	  agent	   in	  motion	  was	  not	   represented	  as	  being	   in	  any	   location	   at	   all.	   	   For	   example	   when	   moving	   say	   from	   the	   left	   to	   the	   right	  workstation,	   the	   agent	  would	   previously	   not	   be	   in	   any	   location	   at	   all,	   rather	   than	  being	  simulated	  as	  being	  in	  the	  ATCC.	  This	  may	  seem	  like	  an	  obvious	  shortcoming	  in	  the	  design,	  but	  it	  has	  not	  previously	  caused	  	  a	  problem.	  	  In	  the	  Überlingen	  scenario	  the	  limitation	  prevented	  the	  ATCO	  from	  detecting	  radio	  calls	  while	  moving	  	  from	  the	  workstation	  area	  to	  speak	  with	  the	  CA.	  	  	  To	  remedy	  this	  undesired	  effect,	  we	  modified	  the	  Brahms	  engine	  so	  when	  an	  agent	  is	  moving	  from	  one	  location	  to	  another,	  the	  agent	  is	  resident	  in	  the	  parent	  location	  while	   moving	   (i.e.,	   the	   more	   general	   location	   shared	   by	   both	   the	   start	   and	   end	  locations,	   if	  one	  exists).	   	  A	  side	  benefit	   is	   that	  a	  moving	  agent	  can	  now	  also	  detect	  other	   agents	  who	   reside	   in	   the	   transit	   (more	   general)	   area,	   and	   other	   agents	  will	  detect	  arrival	  (and	  departure)	  of	  the	  moving	  agent.	  	  
28.2 Simulating	  Acting	  During	  a	  Communication	  Agents	  can	  only	  do	  one	  activity	  at	  a	  time,	   that	   is,	   their	  actual	  primitive	  actions	  are	  serial,	   not	   parallel.	   	   So	   although	   they	   can	   now	   detect	   broadcast	   communications	  while	  moving,	  they	  cannot	  read	  something	  on	  a	  wall	  while	  walking	  by	  or	  carry	  out	  a	  conversation,	  or	  even	  write	  something	  down	  while	  they	  are	  listening	  to	  a	  person	  or	  the	  radio.	  	  	  	  An	   obvious	   example	   of	   parallel	   actions	   appears	   in	   the	   BFU	   Report	   timeline	   chart	  (Appendix	  3),	  which	  shows	   that	   the	  BTC	  crew	  understood	  and	  were	  acting	  on	   the	  ATCO’s	  command	  before	  he	  finished	  speaking.	  He	  spoke	  for	  8	  seconds.	  A	  BTC	  crew	  member	   says	   "Descend!"	   at	   34:54,	  which	   is	   5	   sec	   into	   ATCO’s	   utterance.	   The	   last	  part	  of	   the	  phrase	  was	  “expedite,	   I	  have	  crossing	   traffic,”	  which	  requires	  a	  bit	   less	  than	  2	  seconds	  to	  say	  quickly.	  	  Therefore,	  to	  model	  the	  relation	  between	  the	  start	  of	  the	  ATCO’s	   intervention	  and	  AP	  disengage	   it	  was	  necessary	   to	  shorten	   the	  ATCO’s	  
	  	  
WORK	  PRACTICE	  SIMULATION	  OF	  COMPLEX	  HUMAN-­‐AUTOMATION	  SYSTEMS	  IN	  SAFETY-­‐CRITICAL	  SITUATIONS	   3
1
7 	  
modeled	   speech	  by	  a	   few	  seconds,	  with	   the	  AP	  disengage	  occurring	   in	   the	   second	  immediately	  following.	  	  
28.3 Simulating	  an	  Object	  “Hearing”	  a	  Broadcast	  Communication	  An	  oversight	   in	  the	  design	  of	  the	  Brahms	  language	  is	  that	  a	  modeled	  object	  (e.g.,	  a	  radio)	  can	  broadcast	  communications	  that	  will	  be	  “heard”	  by	  agents	  who	  are	  in	  the	  geographic	  area,	  but	  it	  cannot	  receive	  broadcast	  communications.	  This	  is	  an	  obvious	  shortcoming	   for	   modeling	   a	   microphone	   for	   example.	   Consequently,	   in	   the	  simulation	  of	  radio	  communications	  in	  the	  cockpit	  (Figure	  25-­‐5),	  it	  is	  necessary	  for	  the	   simulated	   pilot	   to	   communicate	   directly	  with	   radio,	   and	   others	   in	   the	   cockpit	  will	   not	   hear	   what	   he	   is	   saying.	   In	   Brahms-­‐GÜM	   the	   radio	   broadcasts	   back	   the	  messages	  it	  receives.	  	  	  	  Giving	   objects	   the	   ability	   to	   receive	   broadcast	   messages	   requires	   some	  consideration.	  Many	  more	  objects	  are	  commonly	  present	  in	  a	  geographic	  area	  than	  agents,	   so	   the	   engine	   would	   have	   to	   be	   smarter	   about	   how	   broadcast	  communications	  are	  processed.	  	  For	  example,	  objects	  might	  be	  given	  an	  attribute	  to	  indicate	  that	  they	  are	  capable	  of	  receiving	  audible	  messages.	  
28.4 Simulating	  “Monitoring”	  a	  Display	  	  In	  Brahms-­‐GÜM	  we	  simulated	  ATCO	  “reading”	  the	  radar	  display	  as	  we	  have	  always	  modeled	  a	  person	  reading	  documents.	  First,	   the	  representations	  (text	  or	  graphics)	  printed	  on	  a	  document	  or	  displayed	  on	  a	  screen	  are	  modeled	  as	  “beliefs”—they	  are	  propositions	  about	  the	  world,	  and	  hence	  (unlike	  Brahms	  “facts”)	  are	  not	  necessarily	  true.	   	   Thus	   to	   simulate	   the	   activity	   of	   monitoring	   the	   display	   we	   model	   ATCO’s	  “reading”	  activity	  as	  a	  Brahms	  communication	  act	  that	  “asks”	  the	  display	  to	  transfer	  its	   beliefs	   about,	   for	   example,	   the	   aircraft	   designations,	   altitudes,	   etc.	   This	  information	  is	  modeled	  as	  beliefs	  of	  the	  radar	  display	  object,	  that	  is,	  as	  propositions,	  as	   opposed	   to	   being	   represented	   as	   geometric	   lines	   or	   character	   marks.	   This	  approach	  is	  well-­‐known	  in	  cognitive	  science,	   though	  of	  course	   it	   finesses	  the	  work	  involved	  in	  looking	  and	  interpreting	  the	  marks	  on	  a	  screen	  (Clancey	  2005)	  	  This	  approach	  has	   	  been	  sufficient	   in	  modeling	  documents	  such	  as	   job	  orders	   in	  a	  business	  office,	   checklists	  on	  Apollo,	  or	  written	  procedures	  onboard	   the	   ISS.	  But	  a	  radar	   display	   is	   dynamic	   and	   almost	   always	   perceived	   selectively	   (e.g.,	   scanning	  	  different	   screen	   areas	   clockwise	   in	   sequence).	   Unlike	   a	   document	   or	   typical	  computer	  screen,	  the	  radar	  screen	  is	  also	  updating	  while	  you	  are	  looking	  at	  it.	  Also,	  the	   information	   is	   obviously	   not	   all	   text,	   graphics	   must	   be	   examined	   and	  conceptually	  related	  (e.g.,	  conceiving	  that	  a	  flight	  is	  “close”	  to	  a	  sector	  boundary).	  	  However,	   having	   the	   radar	   display	   simply	   communicated	   all	   of	   the	   information	  relevant	   to	  a	  particular	   flight	   (including	  separation	   issues),	   	  make	   it	  easier	   for	   the	  simulated	  ATCO	  to	  know	  important	  facts.	   It	  might	  be	  preferable	  in	  future	  research	  using	  Brahms	  to	  simulate	  more	  of	  the	  effort	  required	  to	  look	  and	  relate	  parts	  of	  the	  display.	  One	  way	  to	  do	  this	  is	  to	  represent	  the	  graphic	  relations	  as	  propositions	  (e.g.,	  the	  physical	  location	  of	  objects	  on	  the	  screen),	  that	  is,	  representing	  the	  information	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as	   facts	   about	   the	   display.	   It	  would	   then	  be	   possible	   to	  model	   the	   agent’s	   looking	  activity	  in	  a	  fine-­‐grained	  way	  using	  detectables,	  which	  operate	  on	  facts	  in	  the	  world	  (i.e.,	   the	  distinction	  between	   someone	  presenting	   their	   view	  of	   the	  world	  vs.	   your	  observing	  the	  world	  directly	  yourself).	   	  The	  result	  would	  still	  be	  that	  the	  agent	  has	  an	   uncertain,	   incomplete	   model	   of	   (beliefs	   about)	   the	   world,	   and	   the	   partial	  character	   would	   reflect	   better	   how	   the	   ATCO	   was	   looking	   at	   the	   display.	   This	   is	  relevant	   in	   particular	   to	  Überlingen:	  We	   believe	   the	   right	  workstation’s	   display—where	   the	   Zurich	   ATCO	   was	   sitting	   while	   speaking	   to	   AEF	   1135	   and	   apparently	  following	   the	   AEF	   on	   the	   screen—showed	   the	   BTC	   and	   DHL	   on	   an	   intersecting	  course	  less	  than	  20	  nm	  apart,	  but	  he	  did	  not	  perceive	  that	  information	  in	  the	  display.	  	  	  Ideally,	  the	  radar	  system	  to	  model	  calculations	  could	  be	  modeled	  as	  belief	  and	  what	  is	   displayed	   on	   screen	   would	   be	   facts	   (at	   the	   level	   of	   simple	   text	   and	   partially	  abstracted	  graphics).	  	  These	  facts	  would	  be	  created	  in	  the	  simulation	  as	  the	  screen	  is	  refreshed.	  The	  model	  would	  then	  have	  “world	  facts”	  about	  the	  actual	  location	  of	  the	  aircraft,	  velocity,	  etc.;	  the	  radar	  system’s	  “beliefs”	  about	  these	  facts	  (partial	  and	  not	  current	  because	  of	  the	  delay	  of	  the	  radar	  sweep);	  facts	  about	  what	  is	  presented	  on	  the	  display	  at	  any	  time;	  and	  ATCO’s	  beliefs	  about	  the	  location	  of	  the	  aircraft,	  etc.	  by	  virtue	   of	   detecting	   and	   reasoning	   about	   what	   is	   presented	   on	   the	   display.	   This	  example	  illustrates	  the	  redundancy	  and	  variation	  of	  models	  of	  the	  world	  that	  occur	  in	  actuality.	  	  However,	  a	  complication	  in	  Brahms	  prevents	  implementing	  this	  fact–>belief–>fact–>belief	   flow	  directly—detectables	   are	  not	   specific	   to	   areas.	   	   So	   if	   for	   example,	   the	  simulated	  ATCO	   sitting	   at	   the	   left	  workstation	   detecting	   information	   about	   flights	  would	   be	   able	   to	   detect	   information	   about	   flights	   displayed	   on	   the	   right	  workstation—or	   anywhere	   in	   the	   ATCC.	   This	   is	   an	   issue	   in	   the	   Brahms	  language/engine	   not	   encountered	   previously	   because:	   1)	   detectables	   were	   not	  intended	   for	   simulating	   perception	   of	   documents	   or	   displays,	   and	   2)	   detectables	  were	   intended	   for	  simulating	  perception	  of	   facts	  about	   things	   in	   the	  world	  (e.g..,	  a	  tool	   on	   a	   table,	   a	   disconnected	   wire,	   the	   setting	   of	   a	   switch),	   3)	   detectables	   are	  associated	  with	  workframes,	  part	  of	  activities,	  which	  are	  always	  located	  (occurring	  in	  some	  modeled	  geographic	  area).	  	  The	  analysis	  clarified	  that	  the	  design	  of	  the	  language/engine	  was	  implicitly	  based	  on	  the	   semantics	   that	   detectables	   are	   used	   to	   model	   perception	   of	   visual	   facts	   and	  communications	   to	   model	   auditory	   perception	   (including	   broadcasts	   such	   as	   an	  alarm).	  	  The	  analysis	  also	  revealed	  that	  the	  semantics	  of	  detectables	  (as	  implemented	  in	  the	  Brahms	  engine)	  was	   less	   constrained	   than	  we	   realized—facts	   are	  detectable	   from	  anywhere	  in	  the	  world.	  When	  detection	  involves	  facts	  about	  objects	  that	  in	  the	  same	  location	  as	  the	  agent,	  there	  is	  no	  problem—the	  model	  is	  designed	  so	  the	  agent	  must	  move	  to	  the	  object’s	  location	  before	  the	  activity	  with	  detectables	  is	  performed	  (e.g.,	  Brahms-­‐GÜM	  models	  the	  ATCO	  moving	  from	  one	  workstation	  to	  another	  to	  read	  the	  display	  and	  control	  strips,	  speak	  on	  a	  certain	  frequency,	  or	  use	  the	  telephone).	  The	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complication	   in	   Brahms-­‐GÜM	   is	   that	   the	   flight	   is	   not	   actually	   in	   the	   ATCC,	   so	  detecting	  facts	  about	  it	   is	  not	  possible;	  ATCO	  can	  only	  detect	  facts	  about	  what’s	  on	  the	  screen,	  which	  are	  representations	  about	  the	  flight.	  	  	  Of	   course,	  we	  do	  not	  what	   to	   represent	   squiggles	   on	   the	   display	   but	   propositions	  about	  flights	  associated	  with	  different	  areas	  on	  the	  display.	  	  Given	  that	  Brahms	  was	  never	   designed	   for	   simulating	   perceptual	   work,	   relegating	   this	   to	   a	   coupled	  simulation	  would	  appear	  to	  be	  the	  best	  approach.	  
28.5 Object	  Actions	  Require	  at	  Least	  One	  Clock	  Tick	  	  In	   other	  Brahms	   simulations,	  we	  have	   associated	   on	   clock	   tick	   of	   the	   engine	  with	  three	  seconds	  of	  real	  time.	  For	  the	  Überlingen	  scenario	  we	  used	  one	  second	  per	  tick	  because	   of	   	   the	   actions	   that	   needed	   to	   occur	   the	   second	   following	   	   another	   event	  (e.g.,	   disengaging	   AP	   in	   response	   to	   TCAS).	   However,	   this	   means	   every	   action-­‐reaction	   or	   two	   sequential	   actions	   in	   general	   requires	   two	   seconds.	   Thus,	   for	  example	  a	  radio	  call	  requires	  (at	  least)	  a	  second	  to	  speak	  into	  the	  microphone	  (i.e.,	  communicating	  with	  the	  radio),	  a	  second	  for	  the	  speaker’s	  radio	  to	  communicate	  to	  the	   listener’s	   radio,	  and	  another	  second	   for	   the	   listener’s	   radio	   to	  communicate	   to	  the	   listener—three	   seconds	   for	   what	   is	   practically	   a	   speed-­‐of-­‐light	   transaction.	  Consequently,	  in	  the	  Überlingen	  scenario	  if	  the	  ATCO	  takes	  five	  seconds	  to	  utter	  the	  emergency	   course	   of	   action,	   the	   BTC	   pilots	   cannot	   respond	   until	   at	   least	   eight	  seconds	   after	   he	   begins	   speaking,	   which	   is	   a	   second	   or	   two	   too	   long.	   	   	   Another	  example	  of	  the	  “one	  tick	  per	  action”	  restriction	  occurs	  within	  the	  TCAS	  model	  itself,	  in	   which	   in	   a	   TCAS	   object	   may	   be	   busy	   updating	   its	   internal	   model	   of	   aircraft	  relationships	   when	   it	   should	   be	   issuing	   an	   advisory.	   	   This	   is	   manifested	   in	  simulation	   runs	   in	  which	   there	   is	   a	   five	   second	   delay	   between	   the	   DHL	   and	   BTC	  TCAS	  traffic	  advisories.	  	  We	  can	  work	  around	  the	  TCAS	  issue	  by	  reconfiguring	  the	  model,	  but	  determined	  it	  not	  to	  be	  necessary	  for	  present	  purposes	  because	  the	  simulated	  Brahms-­‐GÜM	  pilots	  do	  not	  act	  on	  a	  TA.	  	  The	  issue	  with	  the	  radios,	  however,	  is	  a	  problem	  that	  can	  only	  be	  solve	  by	  modifying	  how	  objects	   are	   simulated	  by	   the	  Brahms	  engine,	   allowing	   for	  actions	   to	   take	   less	   than	   the	  period	  of	   the	  clock	   tick,	  and	   thus	  processing	  multiple	  cycles	  of	  object	  actions	  within	  a	  clock	  tick.	  	  	  Notice	   that	   eliminating	   the	   radios	   would	   seem	   obvious,	   but	   violates	   the	   “total	  system	  model”	  principle.	  For	  example,	  we	  could	  not	  model	  the	  implications	  of	  a	  pilot	  entering	   the	  wrong	   frequency	   in	   the	   radio	   (one	   of	   the	   causes	   of	   the	   crash	   of	   the	  plane	  flown	  by	  JF	  Kennedy	  Jr.).	  
28.6 Modeling	  an	  Activity’s	  Constraints,	  Goals,	  and	  Distributed	  Responsibilities	  It	  would	  be	  advantageous	  to	  document	  and	  provide	  metadata	  about	  activities,	  such	  as	  the	  goals	  and	  responsibilities	  being	  satisfied	  (Clancey	  2002),	  constraints	  affecting	  priorities,	   and	   so	   on.	   To	   do	   this,	  we	  would	   represent	   an	   activity	   as	   an	   conceptual	  
object	  within	  Brahms.	  Just	  as	  a	  “flight”	  is	  a	  conceptual	  entity,	  an	  ATCO	  or	  pilot	  would	  have	  a	  mental	  model	  representing	  the	  activities	  of	  a	  flight.	  Alternatively,	  one	  could	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extend	   the	   Brahms	   language	   to	   represent	   this	   conceptual	   information	   within	   the	  activity	   definition	   proper,	   that	   is,	   allow	   an	   activity	   to	   have	   additional	   properties	  besides	   WFs,	   TFs,	   etc.	   	   One	   could	   also	   represent	   constraints	   that	   constitute	  specifications,	   such	   as	   properties	   that	   should	   be	   satisfied	   after	   the	   activity	  completes,	  which	  would	  be	  useful	  for	  model	  verification.	  
28.7 Providing	  an	  “Explanation	  System”	  for	  the	  Simulation	  Aside	  from	  the	  changes	  to	  the	  language	  and	  engine,	  it	  would	  be	  helpful	  for	  modelers	  and	   subject	   matter	   experts	   studying	   simulated	   scenarios	   to	   implement	   an	  explanation	  system	  like	  that	  developed	  for	  consultation	  systems	  in	  the	  1970s	  (Scott	  et	  al.	  1977).	  	  Rather	  than	  studying	  logs	  and	  the	  AgentViewer,	  one	  could	  ask	  natural	  language	  questions	  about	  the	  simulation	  run.	  	  The	  following	  are	  illustrative	  general	  questions	   that	   would	   make	   it	   easier	   to	   understand,	   critique,	   and	   improve	   the	  simulation	  and	  hence	  the	  corresponding	  work	  system	  design:	  	  
• What	  does	  agent	  X	  believe	  about	  {agent,	  group,	  object}	  Y?	  
• Which	  agents	  currently	  do/don’t	  believe	  P?	  
• Why	  does/doesn’t	  agent	  X	  believe	  P?	  
• Did	  agent	  X	  do	  activity	  Y?	  	  When?	  	  Why?	  
• Why	  didn’t	  agent	  X	  do	  activity	  Y?	  
• What	  activities	  were	  pending/interrupted	  for	  agent	  X	  during	  time	  period	  T?	  
• If	   agent	   X	   believed	   P	   at	   time	   T,	   how	   would	   that	   have	   influenced	   his	  subsequent	  behavior?	  	  A	   program	   can	   answer	   such	   questions	   by	   analyzing	   a	   simulation	   trace	   and	  interpreting	   the	   logic	   of	   the	   model	   with	   respect	   to	   the	   operation	   of	   the	   engine	  (Clancey	  et	  al.	  1986).	  	  
	  
